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Abstract:	  
	  	   This	  dissertation	  philosophically	  reconstructs	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  (思孟學派)	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  and	  engages	  in	  intercultural	  explorations	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  and	  resolute	  agency	  in	  ameliorating	  ethical	  and	  political	  discourse.	  	  A	  family-­‐centric,	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  persons	  is	  presupposed	  in	  historical	  and	  philosophical	  reconstruction	  of	  this	  living	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  The	  guiding	  idea	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  is	  explored	  in	  a	  metaethical	  conceptual	  constellation	  within	  a	  qi	  氣-­‐based	  correlative	  cosmology	  and	  relational	  ontology	  of	  persons,	  understood	  as	  role-­‐encumbered	  becomings,	  rather	  than	  discrete	  metaphysical	  entities	  or	  foundational	  subjects	  of	  ethical-­‐political	  discourse.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  recent	  developments	  in	  pragmatism,	  hermeneutic	  phenomenology,	  and	  other	  philosophical	  movements	  that	  attempt	  to	  think	  through	  creative	  agency,	  without	  positing	  foundational,	  discrete	  subjects,	  this	  dissertation	  situates	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  conception	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  within	  larger	  intercultural	  comparative	  philosophical	  conversations	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  the	  interpretive	  horizons	  available	  to	  co-­‐creative	  participants	  in	  an	  intergenerational	  communicating	  community	  of	  "tian	  commanding"	  (tianming	  天命)	  exemplary	  ethical	  inquirers	  striving	  to	  realize	  provisional	  and	  disclosive	  moral	  truths	  in	  experience.	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Introduction	  	  	   The	  writing	  of	  this	  dissertation	  has	  been	  a	  real	  adventure.	  	  The	  decision	  to	  embark	  upon	  this	  particular	  project	  of	  reconstructing	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  (思孟學派)	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  thinking	  for	  intervening	  critically	  in	  present	  ethical	  and	  metaethical	  discourse	  was	  not	  made	  from	  any	  autonomous	  position	  of	  liberal	  choice.	  	  Rather	  this	  topic	  has	  been	  slowly	  but	  surely	  coming	  into	  focus	  for	  me	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  a	  unique	  participant	  in	  the	  University	  of	  Hawaii's	  historically	  distinctive	  philosophy	  department	  and	  as	  an	  emergent	  contributor	  to	  an	  ongoing	  intergenerational	  conversation	  of	  comparative	  philosophy.	  	  All	  of	  the	  esteemed	  teachers,	  fellow	  students,	  and	  friendly	  colleagues	  I've	  come	  to	  know	  during	  the	  course	  of	  my	  PhD	  program	  have	  been	  instrumental	  (in	  a	  deeply	  Deweyan	  sense)	  in	  helping	  me	  to	  think	  through	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  ethically	  concerning	  oneself	  with	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  "selving"—that	  is,	  processes	  of	  becoming	  a	  distinctive	  self	  in	  a	  relational	  field	  of	  unique	  embodiment.	  	  As	  I	  reflect	  upon	  my	  experience	  as	  a	  graduate	  student	  and	  teacher,	  happening	  alongside	  of	  many	  other	  family	  commitments	  and	  social	  associations,	  living	  as	  a	  unique	  member	  of	  multiple	  interpretive	  communities,	  I	  find	  no	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  my	  particular	  narrative	  or	  how	  I	  became	  interested	  in	  the	  particular	  subject-­‐matter	  of	  this	  dissertation	  without	  appealing	  directly	  to	  a	  felt	  transactional	  sense	  of	  my	  embodied	  aspiration	  for	  integrity	  or	  ethical	  self-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making.	  	  Often	  feeling	  like	  I	  might	  be	  in	  a	  similar	  boat	  with	  David	  Hume	  especially	  when	  he	  speaks	  about	  turning	  inward	  to	  seek	  a	  true	  self,	  but	  could	  find	  nothing	  other	  than	  a	  series	  of	  fleeting	  impressions,	  I	  would	  differ	  however	  insofar	  as	  my	  felt	  impressions	  are	  never	  just	  atomized	  sense	  data	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given	  to	  a	  solipsistic	  theatre	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  are	  always	  alive	  with	  richly	  emotional	  content	  and	  relationally-­‐constituted	  narrative	  meanings	  that	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  anything	  that	  'I'	  think,	  say,	  or	  do	  as	  being	  somehow	  the	  product	  of	  an	  autonomous,	  rational,	  subjective	  consciousness	  or	  some	  metaphysically	  given	  faculty	  of	  discrete	  will	  power.	  	  	  	   Perhaps	  then	  these	  sorts	  of	  philosophical	  reflections	  on	  my	  own	  narrative	  becoming	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  have	  drawn	  me	  to	  exploring	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  conceptual	  cluster	  of	  thinking	  about	  persons	  as	  role-­‐focused	  becomings	  or	  as	  ritual	  vessels	  of	  qi	  氣	  embodiment.	  	  My	  personal	  philosophical	  inclinations	  towards	  pragmatism,	  agential	  realism,	  and	  Confucian	  philosophy—striving	  to	  be	  sinologically	  informed	  especially	  with	  ongoing	  developments	  in	  archaeological	  excavations	  and	  intertextual	  interpretations—obviously	  has	  brought	  me	  to	  this	  particular	  constellation	  of	  themes	  and	  working	  arguments	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  But	  it	  has	  truly	  been	  a	  process	  of	  "focusing	  the	  familiar"	  (zhongyong	  中
庸)	  for	  me	  as	  I've	  patiently	  and	  methodically	  worked	  to	  realize	  theoretical	  insights	  through	  my	  embodied	  personal	  experience.	  	  	  I	  think	  the	  emerging	  picture	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  early	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  is	  the	  most	  apt	  to	  describe	  a	  fully	  relational	  conception	  of	  persons	  while	  still	  articulating	  a	  richly	  "internal"	  language	  of	  creative	  agency.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  critical	  amelioration	  and	  "individually"	  located	  moral	  agency	  can	  be	  articulated	  without	  appealing	  to	  some	  transcendent	  or	  metaphysically	  vacuous	  conception	  of	  persons	  that	  appeals	  to	  supernatural	  or	  non-­‐relational	  phenomenon	  in	  conceiving	  of	  creativity,	  agency,	  and	  persons	  in	  the	  world.	  	  A	  richly	  realist	  and	  vibrantly	  materialist	  conception	  of	  persons	  is	  presupposed	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throughout	  my	  philosophical	  reconstruction	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  and	  I	  see	  nothing	  in	  any	  of	  the	  texts	  I	  work	  with	  to	  challenge	  this	  basic	  theoretical	  orientation.	  	   	  I'm	  now	  convinced	  that	  my	  unique	  narrative	  selving	  process	  has	  brought	  me	  to	  this	  very	  juncture	  of	  a	  transactionally	  realized	  potential—the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  are	  all	  open	  for	  revisionary	  readings	  and	  imaginative	  reconstructions	  here—and	  I	  will	  invite	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  dissertation	  to	  see	  where	  this	  all	  might	  lead	  going	  forward.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  briefly	  outline	  each	  section	  and	  provide	  some	  synoptical	  comments	  to	  help	  guide	  the	  reader	  through	  this	  work	  and	  hopefully	  begin	  to	  provoke	  some	  imaginative	  responses	  for	  making	  better	  use	  of	  this	  text.	  	   Chapter	  One	  "Reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  Thinking	  Through	  Ethical	  Agency	  Beyond	  Foundational	  Individualism"	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  major	  themes	  and	  theoretical	  stances	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  The	  main	  focus	  in	  this	  chapter	  initially	  is	  to	  simply	  introduce	  this	  particular	  historical-­‐philosophical	  lineage	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism.	  	  And	  then	  next	  to	  begin	  to	  offer	  some	  interwoven	  bits	  of	  convincing	  evidence	  for	  thinking	  that	  this	  tradition	  still	  has	  much	  to	  offer	  us	  in	  advancing	  contemporary	  inter-­‐cultural	  philosophical	  discursive	  formations,	  especially	  regarding	  reconstructing	  a	  non-­‐foundational,	  yet	  pragmatically	  realist	  conception	  of	  embodied	  ethical	  agency.1	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout	  this	  dissertation	  I	  will	  be	  using,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  the	  terms	  'ethical'	  and	  'moral'	  interchangeably.	  	  Since	  I	  think	  a	  compelling	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  for	  thinking	  that	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  there	  is	  no	  stand	  alone	  field	  of	  axiological	  inquiry	  that	  has	  solely	  to	  do	  with	  pristinely	  moral	  obligations,	  I	  will	  frequently	  just	  be	  talking	  about	  creative	  agency	  without	  adding	  the	  qualifier	  'ethical'.	  	  In	  fact,	  since	  it	  is	  far	  from	  obvious	  that	  we	  can	  make	  any	  rigid	  distinction	  between	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   Part	  1.1	  argues	  for	  the	  unavoidability	  of	  making	  generalizations	  in	  contextualizing	  any	  philosophical	  texts	  from	  an	  unfamiliar	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  background.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  always	  theoretically	  optimal	  to	  employ	  a	  method	  of	  
ars	  contextualis	  in	  working	  through	  complex	  philosophical	  translations.	  	  We	  shouldn't	  assume	  that	  we	  can	  adequately	  approach	  any	  text	  with	  hermeneutic	  innocence	  and	  we	  especially	  need	  to	  avoid	  committing	  what	  A.N.	  Whitehead	  called	  the	  "fallacy	  of	  the	  perfect	  dictionary."2	  	  There	  are	  never	  simple	  correspondences	  between	  philosophically	  weighty	  terms	  in	  respective	  conceptual	  clusters	  found	  	  within	  distinct	  cultural	  matrices	  of	  meaning	  that	  are	  employed	  to	  make	  discursively	  visible	  working	  conceptions	  of	  ethical	  agency.	  	  This	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  responsibly	  articulating	  working	  conceptual	  clusters	  within	  horizons	  of	  inter-­‐cultural	  interpretation	  to	  productively	  enter	  into	  hermeneutic	  circles	  of	  progressive	  understanding.	  	  Drawing	  on	  Henry	  Rosemont's	  anti-­‐individualist	  and	  sinologically	  sensitive	  interpretations	  of	  Confucian	  thinking	  about	  "encumbered"	  role-­‐bearing	  persons,	  I	  show	  how	  a	  distinctively	  Confucian	  "conceptual	  cluster"	  is	  always	  operative	  in	  any	  attempt	  at	  philosophical	  ars	  contextualis.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  only	  through	  putting	  our	  inevitably	  circularly	  formed	  conceptual	  clusters	  at	  risk	  in	  a	  lived	  hermeneutical	  project	  of	  self-­‐understanding	  that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  realize	  a	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  fact/value	  or	  even	  prudential,	  aesthetic,	  moral,	  etc.	  oughts	  in	  experience	  set	  against	  the	  horizon	  of	  Confucian	  ritually	  constructed	  space	  of	  reasons,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  speaking	  of	  Confucian	  ethics	  (virtues,	  roles,	  or	  integrative	  approaches)	  is	  a	  semantic	  and	  philosophical	  redundancy—see	  for	  example	  the	  phrase	  "Confucian	  role	  ethics"	  (rujia	  jiaose	  lunli	  daode	  儒家角色倫理道德)	  as	  it	  has	  a	  double	  redundancy	  with	  "roles"	  being	  used	  twice	  and	  "ethics"	  being	  repeated	  as	  role-­‐patterning	  (lunli	  倫理)	  and	  the	  creative	  focusing	  of	  pluralistically	  located	  fields	  of	  power	  (dao	  de	  道德).	  2	  See	  A.N.	  Whitehead,	  Modes	  of	  Thought,	  "Lecture	  9"	  (p.235).	  The	  fallacy	  occurs	  as	  follows:	  "There	  is	  an	  insistent	  presupposition	  continually	  sterilizing	  philosophic	  thought.	  It	  is	  the	  belief,	  the	  very	  natural	  belief,	  that	  mankind	  has	  consciously	  entertained	  all	  the	  fundamental	  ideas	  which	  are	  applicable	  to	  its	  experience.	  Further	  it	  is	  held	  that	  human	  language,	  in	  single	  words	  or	  in	  phrases,	  explicitly	  expresses	  these	  ideas."	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responsible	  and	  responsive	  set	  of	  productive	  generalizations	  in	  approaching	  these	  texts	  and	  the	  unfamiliar	  philosophical	  contexts	  that	  they	  emerge	  from.	  	  	  Having	  made	  these	  general	  interpretive	  points,	  I	  then	  go	  on	  to	  initiate	  an	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  project	  that	  might	  be	  able	  provoke	  theoretical	  advance	  within	  current	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  very	  possibility	  and	  nature	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  agential	  
realism	  in	  ethics	  and	  political	  theory.	  	  In	  beginning	  to	  articulate	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  conceptual	  cluster	  to	  approach	  a	  critically	  transformative,	  non-­‐foundational,	  and	  ritually-­‐constructed	  thinking	  through	  embodied	  ethical	  agency,	  I	  focus	  quite	  a	  bit	  upon	  the	  central	  Si-­‐Meng	  concept	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	  I	  take	  this	  phrase	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  ethical	  epoche	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  that	  opens	  up	  productive	  possibilities	  for	  imaginative	  fantasy	  variation	  in	  realizing	  unique	  potential	  and	  agentially	  participating	  in	  performative	  and	  transformative	  role-­‐taking	  in	  ritually	  constructed	  creative	  spaces	  of	  interpretation	  and	  transformative	  praxis.	  	   In	  part	  1.2,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  central	  philosophical	  personae	  or	  "Masters"	  (zi	  
子)—Zisizi	  子思子	  and	  Mengzi	  孟子.	  	  I	  view	  these	  two	  figures	  as	  important	  conceptual	  persona	  who	  obviously	  shape	  the	  texts	  associated	  with	  their	  names	  in	  a	  way	  that	  exceeds	  the	  simple,	  single-­‐source	  "author	  function"	  in	  many	  philosophical	  traditions.	  	  But	  as	  inheritors	  of	  a	  distinctively	  Confucian	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  embodied	  ethical	  agency,	  these	  conceptual	  persona	  continue	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  living	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  "way-­‐making"	  daotong	  道統.	  	  While	  raising	  some	  of	  the	  multitude	  of	  interpretive	  problems	  associated	  with	  reading	  received	  texts	  and	  hermeneutic	  traditions	  in	  light	  of	  recently	  excavated	  silk	  and	  bamboo	  manuscripts	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from	  pre-­‐Imperial	  times,	  I	  begin	  to	  articulate	  what	  is	  so	  distinctive,	  philosophically	  speaking,	  about	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  that	  has	  so	  many	  interpreters	  positing	  a	  distinctive	  "lineage"	  (jia	  家)	  that	  bears	  their	  shared	  signature.	  	  Building	  upon	  some	  of	  the	  best	  interpretive	  and	  sinological	  work	  being	  done	  in	  recent	  years,	  I	  attempt	  to	  express	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  with	  four	  distinctive	  features:	  (1)	  relational	  internalism;	  (2)	  embodied	  ethical	  agency;	  (3)	  interpersonal	  affectivity;	  and	  (4)	  musical	  flourishing.	  	  Without	  wishing	  to	  offer	  a	  reductive	  analysis	  of	  this	  complex	  philosophical	  lineage	  of	  historical	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  by	  employing	  these	  four	  interrelated	  themes	  of	  interpretation	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  bring	  into	  clearer	  focus	  some	  of	  the	  unique	  ways	  that	  this	  lineage	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  reconstructing	  historical	  tradition,	  a	  re-­‐reading	  of	  an	  emergent	  textual	  corpus,	  and	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  living	  "way-­‐making	  tradition"	  (daotong	  道統)	  of	  Confucianism	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  "portable	  tradition"3	  in	  the	  late	  modern	  world.	  	   Section	  1.3	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  John	  Dewey's	  call	  for	  a	  
reconstruction	  in	  philosophy.	  	  What	  this	  phrase	  signaled	  for	  Dewey	  was	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  working	  faith	  in	  creative	  democracy	  as	  way	  of	  life.	  	  In	  highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  most	  remarkable	  passages	  of	  Dewey's	  Reconstruction	  in	  Philosophy	  (1920),	  I	  show	  how	  a	  move	  away	  from	  systematic	  abstraction	  to	  concretely	  embodied	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  the	  idea	  of	  Confucianism	  as	  "portable	  tradition"	  in	  the	  late	  modern	  world	  see	  Robert	  Neville's	  
Boston	  Confucianism.	  	  I	  tend	  to	  agree	  that	  we	  can	  often	  export	  Confucianism	  from	  its	  original	  Chinese	  cultural-­‐linguistic	  context	  to	  do	  impressive	  theoretical	  work	  in	  non-­‐indigenous	  cultural	  contexts.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  so	  sanguine	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  carrying	  out	  such	  cultural	  exporting	  without	  a	  careful	  and	  nuanced	  conversation	  putting	  the	  background	  philosophical	  assumptions	  or	  deep	  cultural	  grammar	  at	  risk	  in	  an	  encounter	  with	  particular	  texts,	  thinkers,	  and	  lineage	  traditions	  of	  Confucianism.	  	  Otherwise,	  how	  could	  the	  tradition	  do	  any	  substantive	  transformative	  theoretical	  work	  and	  not	  just	  be	  co-­‐opted	  within	  a	  familiar	  set	  of	  substance-­‐based	  ontology	  or	  foundationally	  individualistic	  assumptions	  about	  persons	  that	  is	  so	  prevalent	  in	  the	  globalizing	  (Western)	  late	  modern	  period	  of	  (neo)liberal	  Capitalist	  dynamics.	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concepts	  deployed	  to	  cultivate	  a	  critical,	  pragmatic	  intelligence	  in	  natural	  and	  social	  experience	  can	  be	  used	  not	  just	  in	  the	  context	  of	  "American"	  philosophy,	  but	  has	  real	  enduring	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  approaching	  the	  reconstructing	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  as	  a	  truly	  live	  option	  for	  ethical	  and	  political	  theory—especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  adumbrating	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  conception	  of	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  in	  a	  creatively	  democratic	  (political	  and	  religious)	  context.	  	   Section	  1.4	  covers	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  dynamic	  of	  relational	  internalism.	  	  The	  proliferation	  of	  "internalist"	  language	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  (both	  received	  and	  unearthed)	  has	  had	  interpreters	  engaged	  in	  philosophical	  disputes	  regarding	  how	  to	  best	  understand	  correlative	  concepts	  like	  "intrinsic"	  nei	  內	  and	  "extrinsic"	  wai	  外	  in	  various	  contexts.4	  	  Should	  we	  for	  example	  understand	  the	  "central"	  or	  "inner"	  heartminding	  (zhongxin	  中心)	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  ontologically	  discrete	  and	  foundational	  subject	  of	  moral	  discourse?	  	  Or	  is	  it	  better	  understood	  pragmatically	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
relational	  becoming	  and	  as	  an	  emergent	  site	  of	  agential	  dynamism	  insistently	  foregrounding	  entangled	  and	  embodied	  agency	  against	  a	  fringe	  background	  of	  ecstatically	  natural	  experience	  and	  tian	  天	  stipulated	  roles?	  	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  latter,	  correlative	  reading	  of	  persons	  as	  irreducibly	  processual	  in	  nature.	  	  Embodied	  narrative	  processes,	  beginning	  in	  inchoate	  "matter-­‐energy"	  (qi	  氣)	  configurations	  and	  hopefully	  consummating	  in	  ethically	  resolute	  patterns	  (li	  理)	  of	  personal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Sometimes	  nei	  內	  and	  wai	  外	  are	  used	  to	  point	  to	  a	  distinction	  between	  family	  relationships	  and	  governing	  social	  contexts.	  	  For	  example	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  "relational	  flourishing"	  (ren	  
仁)	  is	  the	  virtuosic	  method	  for	  realizing	  harmonious	  family	  reverence	  in	  parent-­‐child	  relationships	  (fuzi	  父子);	  and	  "optimal	  appropriateness"	  (yi	  義)	  is	  the	  virtuosic	  method	  for	  realizing	  deferential	  respect	  in	  governing	  social	  arrangements	  between	  rulers	  and	  ministers	  (jun	  chen	  君臣).	  	  While	  this	  clearly	  points	  to	  a	  functional	  distinction	  between	  "inner"	  and	  "outer"	  spaces	  of	  appearance	  it	  does	  not	  indicate	  what	  modern	  liberal	  theory	  would	  recognize	  as	  a	  public/private	  dichotomy.	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commitments	  and	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility,	  are	  all	  we	  have	  to	  work	  with	  in	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  agential	  realism.	  	  To	  help	  in	  the	  process	  of	  carrying	  out	  what	  might	  be	  a	  rather	  profound	  conceptual	  gestalt	  shift	  in	  thinking	  through	  agency	  and	  relational	  "internalism",	  I	  draw	  significantly	  upon	  Thomas	  Kasulis'	  comparative	  philosophical	  work	  and	  his	  "cultural	  metaphysics"	  that	  employs	  concepts	  of	  intimacy	  and	  integrity	  as	  a	  bi-­‐polar	  spectrum	  of	  cultural-­‐discursive	  formations	  signaling	  radically	  distinctive	  modes	  of	  ethical	  attention	  and	  respective	  centers	  of	  axiological	  conceptual	  clusters.	  	   Section	  1.5	  carefully	  considers	  the	  "somaesthetic"	  dimensions	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  ethical	  agency.	  	  By	  way	  of	  contrast	  with	  a	  traditionally	  Nietzschean	  diagnosis	  of	  Western	  philosophical	  grammar,	  implying	  an	  all	  pervasive	  denigration	  of	  bodily	  experience,	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  advertises	  a	  vital	  conception	  of	  embodied	  agency	  that	  is	  free	  from	  problematic	  reliance	  upon	  any	  transcendent,	  metaphysical	  notions	  or	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐Many	  cultural	  gestalt.	  	  Si-­‐Meng	  somaesthetics	  offers	  a	  process-­‐oriented	  and	  transactional	  conception	  of	  persons	  as	  embodying	  their	  non-­‐fungible	  roles	  and	  relationally	  thick	  experiences	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  over	  a	  lifetime.	  	   Section	  1.6	  continues	  to	  develop	  a	  robustly	  relational	  ontology	  of	  persons	  by	  thinking	  through	  transactionally	  emergent	  affects	  (i.e.	  non-­‐dual	  experience	  of	  embodied	  emotions	  and	  pre-­‐conceptual	  feelings)	  in	  the	  role	  that	  qing	  情	  plays	  in	  moral	  perception	  and	  ethical	  decision-­‐making	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse.	  	  Moving	  away	  from	  received	  Cartesian	  prejudices	  involving	  a	  disembodied	  intellect	  capable	  of	  rationally	  determining	  principles	  for	  autonomous	  choices	  undergirding	  moral	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conduct,	  a	  pragmatically	  embodied	  and	  atmospherically	  affect	  saturated	  sense	  of	  ethical	  agency	  is	  developed	  here	  in	  critical	  dialogue	  with	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism.	  	  The	  work	  of	  the	  contemporary	  comparative	  philosopher	  Bongrae	  Seok	  is	  introduced	  and	  explored	  for	  its	  ameliorative	  potential	  in	  developing	  a	  neuroethically	  informed	  and	  morally	  viable	  mode	  of	  focus-­‐field	  thinking	  in	  a	  non-­‐foundationalist,	  pragmatically	  imaginative	  theoretical	  context.	  	   The	  last	  section	  (1.7)	  of	  chapter	  one	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  "joyous/musical	  flourishing"	  (yue/le	  樂)	  as	  a	  guiding	  pole	  star	  for	  organizing	  the	  conceptual	  cluster	  or	  ethical	  constellation	  of	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  theory.	  	  	  By	  introducing	  the	  binomial	  pairing	  "ritual	  propriety	  and	  music"	  (liyue	  禮樂)	  as	  a	  central	  component	  of	  the	  Confucian	  ethical	  project,	  I	  emphasize	  the	  improvisational	  and	  creatively	  concerted	  dimensions	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  to	  work	  against	  the	  prejudice	  that	  roles	  and	  rituals	  can	  only	  serve	  to	  stifle	  individual	  creativity	  through	  the	  proliferation	  of	  patriarchal,	  classist,	  and	  other	  oppressive	  social	  and	  individual	  habits.	  	  	  In	  considering	  the	  way	  "musicality/joy"	  (樂)	  is	  used	  in	  several	  Analects	  passages	  and	  how	  it	  continues	  to	  develop	  as	  a	  fecund	  ethical	  concept	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking,	  I	  highlight	  a	  non-­‐foundational,	  concerted	  sense	  of	  improvisational	  agency	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  imaginatively	  realized	  ethical	  ideal	  (i.e.	  an	  "ends-­‐in-­‐view").	  	  To	  strive	  to	  transform	  the	  everyday,	  secular	  world	  into	  sacred	  experience	  through	  ritual	  practice	  and	  musical	  flourishing	  is	  not	  to	  rest	  passively	  in	  the	  traditional	  hierarchical	  structures	  of	  social	  and	  familial	  living,	  but	  is	  rather	  to	  strive	  with	  imagination	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  our	  shared	  experiences	  together	  in	  families	  and	  ethically	  emergent	  (i.e.	  'ritually	  constructed)	  communicating	  communities.	  	  This	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kind	  of	  making	  the	  most	  of	  our	  natural	  and	  social	  ingredients	  is	  offered	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  certain	  theories	  of	  ontological	  and	  ethical	  perfectionism.	  	  Such	  stultifying	  post-­‐Rawlsian	  theories	  of	  perfectionism	  are	  critiqued	  here,	  but	  the	  dismissive	  anti-­‐perfectionist	  theoretical	  stance	  usually	  presupposed	  by	  classical	  and	  more	  recent	  versions	  of	  political	  liberalism	  is	  not	  given	  the	  last	  word.	  	  Moving	  away	  from	  foundational	  subjectivity	  to	  a	  concerted,	  embodied	  and	  improvised	  ethical	  agency	  is	  a	  major	  theoretical	  takeaway	  of	  this	  concluding	  section	  to	  chapter	  one.	  	   Chapter	  two	  "'Way-­‐making	  Begins	  with	  Feeling'	  (dao	  shi	  yu	  qing)道始於情—The	  Role	  of	  Affect	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Moral	  Theory"	  continues	  the	  project	  of	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  in	  an	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  philosophical	  conversation	  with	  some	  recent	  trends	  in	  metaethics	  and	  practical	  theories	  of	  ethical	  agency.	  	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  systemic	  completeness	  and	  "non-­‐ideal"	  approaches	  to	  moral	  and	  political	  theory.	  	  By	  putting	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  into	  a	  productive	  conversation	  with	  pragmatism,	  phenomenology,	  affect	  theory,	  moral	  sentimentalism	  and	  other	  recent	  trends	  in	  Anglophone	  analytic	  and	  more	  continental	  developments	  in	  metaethical	  and	  ethical-­‐political	  theorizing,	  I	  highlight	  the	  continued	  significance	  that	  this	  particular	  living	  tradition	  has	  towards	  contributing	  to	  our	  tasks	  of	  thinking	  more	  robustly	  relationally	  in	  conceiving	  of	  our	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities.	  	  In	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts,	  thinkers,	  and	  tradition	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  do	  better	  justice	  to	  non-­‐ideal	  theorizing	  about	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  without	  having	  to	  posit	  fictitious	  moral	  entities	  like	  foundational	  subjectivities	  or	  autonomously	  discrete	  bearers	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  moral	  obligations.	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   In	  section	  2.1,	  the	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  enters	  into	  a	  sustained	  conversation	  with	  metaethical	  positions	  that	  can	  be	  broadly	  characterized	  as	  "sentimentalist"	  in	  nature.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  Si-­‐Meng	  insights	  into	  the	  equiprimordiality	  of	  expressed	  and	  perceived	  values	  can	  elucidate	  debates	  between	  expressivists	  and	  projectivists	  in	  a	  post-­‐Humean	  space	  of	  metaethical	  reasons.	  	  I	  also	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  cognitivist/non-­‐cognitivist	  debate	  in	  recent	  analytic	  metaethics	  by	  placing	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  in	  the	  same	  camp	  as	  certain	  neo-­‐pragmatists	  who	  embrace	  the	  epithet	  pragmatic	  moral	  realists.	  	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  doing	  justice	  to	  our	  ethical	  intuitions	  regarding	  the	  shared	  significance	  of	  ethical	  values	  without	  having	  to	  posit	  some	  pre-­‐ordained,	  a	  priori	  realm	  of	  transcendental	  reasons.	  	  We	  realize	  our	  value-­‐laden	  pluriverse	  as	  true	  just	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  recognizing	  the	  relational	  potentials	  and	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities	  honeycombing	  our	  experience	  as	  we	  strive	  with	  imagination	  to	  bring	  these	  to	  ameliorative	  fruition	  in	  the	  context	  of	  shared	  embodiment	  of	  culture	  and	  a	  richly	  narratively	  configured	  conception	  of	  human	  persons	  in	  the	  most	  concrete	  and	  immediate	  context	  of	  family-­‐centric	  ethically	  interpretive	  communities.	  	   In	  section	  2.2,	  I	  consider	  the	  importance	  of	  "feeling"	  (qing	  情)	  as	  an	  embodied	  moral	  sensibility	  (or	  source	  of	  "good	  taste")	  and	  as	  an	  experience	  of	  ethically	  disclosive	  affectivity.	  	  I	  begin	  by	  considering	  some	  recent	  sinological	  disputes	  regarding	  the	  semantic	  and	  philosophical	  valence	  of	  the	  term	  qing	  情	  in	  early	  Chinese	  (i.e.	  pre-­‐Buddhist)	  texts.	  	  The	  curious	  fact	  that	  the	  term	  can	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  fact	  and	  value	  realms—that	  is,	  the	  way	  we	  feel	  about	  things	  and	  the	  way	  things	  are—in	  an	  ambiguous	  semantic	  and	  intertextual	  register	  is,	  I	  argue,	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revelatory	  of	  a	  philosophical	  truth	  regarding	  the	  conceptual	  common	  sense	  or	  deep	  
philosophical	  grammar	  of	  a	  distinctively	  pre-­‐Qin	  intellectual	  discourse	  that	  doesn't	  separate	  out	  subjective/objective,	  mind/body,	  reason/sentiment	  poles	  of	  embodied	  experience-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  	  Several	  strategies	  for	  getting	  the	  most	  out	  of	  an	  inter-­‐cultural	  hermeneutical	  conversation	  here	  are	  introduced	  and	  advocated	  for	  future	  philosophical	  practice	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  	  While	  the	  phrase	  "way-­‐making	  begins	  in	  felt	  experience"	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  excavated	  Guodian	  郭店	  corpus,	  this	  section	  draws	  most	  heavily	  from	  the	  Mengzi	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  non-­‐dualistic	  and	  non-­‐foundational	  conception	  of	  Confucian	  feeling	  (qing	  情).	  	  A	  metaethical	  theory	  of	  perception	  that	  both	  tracks	  truth	  and	  reveals	  imaginatively	  realized	  potentials	  of	  ameliorative	  flourishing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities.	  	   The	  second	  half	  of	  this	  section	  deals	  with	  Cheng	  Chung-­‐ying's	  theory	  of	  onto-­‐hermeneutics	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interpreting	  recently	  excavated	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts.	  	  By	  putting	  Heideggerian,	  Spinozan,	  and	  Deleuzean	  thinking	  in	  conversation	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Guodian	  corpus	  we	  can	  realize	  a	  richly	  onto-­‐hermeneutic	  conversation	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  feeling	  in	  realizing	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  in	  a	  world	  of	  pure	  becoming.	  	   In	  section	  2.3,	  I	  introduce	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  classical	  pragmatists	  William	  James	  and	  John	  Dewey	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  affect	  in	  the	  pragmatic	  task	  of	  ameliorating	  lived	  experience.	  	  I	  consider	  the	  so-­‐called	  James-­‐Lange	  theory	  of	  emotions,	  which	  puts	  embodied	  experience	  before	  subjective	  inwardness,	  in	  developing	  a	  process-­‐	  and	  relationally-­‐oriented	  moral	  psychology	  of	  persons.	  	  By	  taking	  biology	  seriously	  James	  was	  able	  to	  overcome	  any	  residual	  idealism	  haunting	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psychology	  and	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  	  Furthermore,	  by	  fully	  countenancing	  cultural	  conditions,	  James	  didn't	  succumb	  to	  any	  simplistic	  reductionism	  or	  mechanistic	  behaviorism,	  but	  robustly	  theorizes	  our	  unique	  status	  as	  biological-­‐cum-­‐cultural	  agents	  of	  creative	  change—by	  this	  I	  just	  mean	  ameliorative	  transformation	  or	  
immanently	  intelligent	  design.	  	  James'	  later	  theory	  of	  pure	  experience	  serves	  as	  a	  productive	  conceptual	  bridge	  by	  which	  to	  approach	  the	  rather	  uncanny	  set	  of	  somaesthetic	  assumptions	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  philosophical	  corpus.	  	  John	  Dewey's	  "atmospheric	  quality"	  approach	  to	  conceptualizing	  ethically-­‐expressive	  emotions	  is	  introduced	  to	  further	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  a	  staunchly	  somaesthetic	  stance	  regarding	  the	  cultivation	  of	  embodied	  virtuosic	  agency	  (de	  德)	  in	  a	  richly	  aesthetic	  and	  creatively	  democratic	  project	  of	  "commanding	  situations"	  (tianming	  
天命)	  within	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  The	  neo-­‐pragmatism	  of	  Richard	  Shusterman's	  somaesthetic	  approach	  and	  Hilary	  Putnam's	  version	  of	  pragmatic	  moral	  realism	  are	  employed	  to	  find	  further	  productive	  resonance	  with	  the	  reconstructed	  tradition	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  moral	  theory	  disclosed	  by	  this	  reconstruction	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethics.	  	   In	  section	  2.4,	  I	  put	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  discourse	  in	  critical	  conversation	  with	  the	  metaethical	  position	  of	  Michael	  Slote's	  moral	  sentimentalism.	  	  The	  major	  issue	  is	  the	  question	  of	  moral	  truth	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  broadly	  conceived	  
expressivist	  or	  pragmatic	  moral	  realist	  stance	  that	  takes	  affect	  and	  feeling	  as	  basic	  ingredients	  or	  normative	  sources.	  	  By	  understanding	  family-­‐centric	  relational	  affects	  as	  sources	  of	  ethical	  normativity	  in	  our	  embodied	  experience	  we	  can	  come	  to	  see	  how	  the	  moral	  values	  that	  richly	  saturate	  our	  experience	  are	  more	  than	  just	  conventional	  constructions	  or	  habitual	  customs	  of	  perception,	  but	  have	  a	  deep	  and	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directive	  quality	  that	  makes	  them	  potentially	  more	  real	  than	  scientifically	  verifiable	  actual	  entities	  or	  ordinal	  "natural	  complexes"	  like	  DNA,	  quarks,	  and	  the	  like.	  	  	  In	  this	  section	  it	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  Michael	  Slote's	  version	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism	  is	  overly	  reliant	  upon	  certain	  19th	  century	  Eurocentric	  assumptions	  that	  atomize	  both	  persons	  and	  percepts	  in	  an	  empirical	  tradition	  of	  moral	  psychology.	  	  By	  reading	  Slote's	  post-­‐Humean	  thinking	  alongside	  of	  certain	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts,	  I	  problematize	  this	  dichotomy	  presupposed	  between	  felt,	  subjective	  values	  and	  objective	  moral	  truths.	  	  I	  argue	  for	  this	  non-­‐dual	  reconstruction	  by	  introducing	  the	  deeply	  relational	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  embodied	  moral	  psychology	  found	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  somaesthetic	  thinking	  about	  non-­‐foundational	  moral	  agency.	  	   In	  section	  2.5,	  I	  offer	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  excavated	  "Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Commanding	  Conditions"	  XingZiMingChu	  《性自命出》to	  further	  develop	  the	  non-­‐ideal	  theorizing	  of	  our	  deeply	  embodied	  and	  relationally	  thick	  creative	  moral	  agency	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  our	  immediately	  felt	  affects	  as	  experienced	  in	  the	  family-­‐centric,	  ritually-­‐constructed,	  and	  tian-­‐commanding	  interpreting	  communities	  (viz.,	  the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  community	  of	  role	  ethical	  inquirers).	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  sensible	  moral	  realism	  grounded	  in	  a	  pragmatic	  conception	  of	  relational	  agency	  and	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  that	  does	  full	  justice	  to	  our	  potentials	  to	  realize	  value	  in	  "commanding	  conditions"	  (tianming	  天命)—both	  by	  perceiving	  and	  responding	  to	  ethical	  vocations	  and	  by	  creatively	  realizing	  novel	  situations	  of	  emergent	  value	  configurations.	  	  The	  Guodian	  texts	  are	  mined	  largely	  for	  their	  power	  in	  moving	  us	  away	  from	  foundational	  or	  ontologically	  essentialist	  understandings	  of	  individuals	  and	  getting	  us	  to	  think	  in	  a	  more	  agentially	  realist	  way	  about	  persons	  in	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the	  relationally	  thick	  contexts	  of	  family-­‐centric	  interpreting	  communities.	  	  The	  role	  of	  affect,	  especially	  'anxious	  concern'	  (you	  懮)	  and	  'resolute	  agency'	  (shen	  慎),	  is	  considered	  within	  the	  relationally	  "internalist"	  thinking	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethics	  in	  thinking	  through	  our	  embodied	  experience	  of	  creative	  moral	  agency.	  	   Chapter	  three	  ""Resolute	  Agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  as	  a	  Non-­‐Foundational	  Ground	  for	  Agential	  Realism	  in	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics	  explores	  the	  central	  Si-­‐Meng	  idea	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  as	  an	  embodied	  ethical	  practice	  or	  "skillful	  means"	  (gongfu	  功夫)	  aimed	  at	  realizing	  creative	  agency.	  	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  fundamental	  practical	  or	  ontological	  difference	  between	  aesthetic,	  ethical,	  political,	  and	  religious	  values	  within	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  we	  don't	  need	  to	  differentiate	  between	  different	  modalities	  of	  agency,	  but	  instead	  we	  can	  focus	  on	  the	  more	  pressing	  problem	  of	  realizing	  the	  kinds	  of	  discursive-­‐material	  conditions	  of	  creative	  
tian-­‐participation	  presupposed	  by	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts.	  	  The	  chapter	  opens	  by	  problematizing	  the	  foundationally	  individualistic	  assumptions	  that	  haunts	  most	  modern	  readers	  in	  their	  reading	  of	  many	  early	  Chinese	  texts.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  erstwhile	  "two	  world"	  metaphysical	  presuppositions	  of	  substance	  ontology	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  deeply	  relational	  and	  correlative	  philosophical	  presuppositions	  of	  a	  qi	  氣	  cosmology.	  	  Such	  a	  cultural	  paradigm	  shift	  is	  foregrounded	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  newcomers	  to	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  in	  their	  initial	  attempts	  at	  ars	  contextualis	  within	  this	  open-­‐ended,	  but	  historico-­‐culturally	  commanding	  community	  of	  role	  ethical	  inquirers.	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   Section	  3.1	  deals	  with	  "commanding	  moral/vital	  energies"	  (note	  how	  the	  productive	  conceptual	  ambiguity	  of	  ming	  命	  defies	  any	  simple	  translation	  schema)	  in	  role	  ethical	  thinking.	  	  By	  contextualizing	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Warring	  States	  philosophical	  history	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  certain	  conceptual	  clusters	  providing	  a	  coherent	  theory	  of	  agency	  presupposing	  a	  transactionally	  embodied	  moral	  sociology,	  which	  is	  pronouncedly	  not	  just	  a	  reductionist	  psychology,	  of	  persons.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  the	  best	  work	  of	  contemporary	  interpreters	  of	  the	  recent	  Si-­‐Meng	  affiliated	  archeological	  finds—	  scholars	  such	  as	  Pang	  Pu,	  Chen	  Lai,	  Liang	  Tao,	  Scott	  Cook,	  et.	  al—I	  aim	  to	  reveal	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  conceptual	  clustering	  that	  is	  philosophically	  unique	  to	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucianism.	  	  Several	  hermeneutical	  issues	  and	  some	  important	  caveats	  are	  presented	  here	  before	  returning	  to	  the	  philosophical	  task	  of	  reconstructing	  a	  viable	  Si-­‐Meng	  conception	  of	  creative	  agency	  for	  addressing	  our	  present	  moral	  problems	  and	  pressing	  ethical	  predicaments.	  	   In	  section	  3.2,	  I	  consider	  the	  role	  that	  performative	  somaesthetics	  and	  moral	  physiognomy	  plays	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  corpus.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  relational	  thinking	  and	  non-­‐foundational	  conceptions	  of	  ethically	  exemplary	  persons	  is	  explored	  here	  in	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  the	  entirely	  "superficial"	  phenomenology	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  qi-­‐
based	  somaesthetic	  discourse.	  	  The	  middle	  chapters	  of	  the	  Analects	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  demeanor,	  dress,	  comportment,	  and	  ritualized	  style	  of	  Confucius	  are	  compared	  with	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  physiognomy	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  and	  Xunzi.	  	  And	  taking	  creative	  agency	  as	  a	  somaesthetically	  imagined	  ends-­‐in-­‐view,	  or	  as	  an	  embodied	  ethical	  ideal,	  is	  how	  I	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  moral	  physiognomy	  discourse	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	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thinking	  about	  ethically	  exemplary	  persons.	  	  Without	  presupposing	  "ideal	  theory"	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  abstract	  conception	  of	  autonomous	  persons	  making	  rationally	  grounded	  choices	  about	  the	  good	  life,	  Si-­‐Meng	  role-­‐focused	  thinking	  and	  feeling	  can	  critically	  identify	  and	  transform	  coercive	  ritual	  practices	  and	  role	  expectations	  via	  an	  practices	  made	  evident	  within	  a	  pragmatically	  realist	  stance	  regarding	  resolute	  agency.	  	   In	  section	  3.3,	  the	  concept	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  is	  further	  explored	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  "democratic"	  experience.	  	  Exemplarist	  thinking	  in	  ethics	  is	  taken	  up	  as	  a	  basic	  framework	  here	  by	  which	  to	  understand	  moral	  education	  and	  the	  power	  of	  non-­‐verbal	  suasion	  in	  achieving	  relational	  amelioration—replacing	  the	  still	  common	  preoccupation	  with	  autonomous	  individuals.	  	  The	  recovered	  Guodian	  corpus	  of	  texts	  is	  used	  as	  a	  hermeneutical	  resource	  as	  I	  critically	  re-­‐read	  the	  Mengzi	  in	  light	  of	  these	  texts	  and	  after	  Xunzi's	  (misplaced)	  criticism	  of	  supposed	  Si-­‐Meng	  moral	  "hypocrisy",	  that	  the	  Xunzi	  takes	  to	  be	  latent	  in	  the	  "Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct"	  thesis	  and	  concomitant	  focus	  on	  bodily	  expression	  or	  moral	  "physiognomy."	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  show	  how	  the	  Xunzi	  and	  Mengzi	  actually	  share	  a	  large	  body	  of	  somaesthetic	  philosophical	  presuppositions	  regarding	  human	  nature,	  ethical	  potential	  and	  the	  relational	  dynamics	  of	  ritually-­‐constituted	  selving	  processes	  in	  a	  fluid	  boundary	  of	  role	  ethical	  interpretive	  community.	  	  The	  embodied	  concept	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  is	  a	  shared	  semantic	  and	  philosophical	  resource	  for	  both	  the	  Xunzi	  and	  Mengzi	  in	  terms	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  human	  becoming	  in	  a	  ritually,	  role-­‐focused	  moral	  theory.	  	  I	  show	  how	  the	  ritually-­‐constructed	  "externalist"	  stance	  of	  the	  Xunzi	  and	  the	  relationally	  "internalist"	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position	  found	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  share	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  somaesthetic	  presuppositions	  regarding	  "overcoming	  the	  self	  with	  ritual"	  (kejifuli	  克己復禮),	  and	  both	  of	  these	  well-­‐known	  strands	  of	  early	  Confucianism	  take	  unique	  potential	  and	  plurisingular	  
agency	  seriously	  by	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  "self	  love"	  (ziai	  自愛)	  in	  the	  family-­‐centric,	  relational	  contexts	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	   The	  final	  section	  of	  chapter	  three	  deals	  with	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  conception	  of	  agential	  realism	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  feminist	  philosopher	  of	  science	  Karen	  Barad.	  	  Barad's	  ethically	  and	  politically	  salient	  theory	  of	  quantum	  entanglement	  is	  a	  powerful	  resource	  in	  ongoing	  projects	  of	  thinking	  through	  agential	  realism	  and	  in	  	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethics.	  	  By	  introducing	  the	  paradoxical—from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  traditionally	  representationalist	  epistemology	  and	  logics—perspective	  of	  agential	  realism,	  wherein	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  relations	  without	  foundational	  relata	  and	  where	  things	  can	  simultaneously	  be	  both	  wholly	  discursive	  and	  completely	  materialist,	  we	  are	  provided	  with	  a	  fecund	  hermeneutic	  vista	  from	  which	  to	  apply	  creative	  agency	  to	  current	  material-­‐discursive	  formations	  in	  the	  interwoven	  domains	  of	  science,	  ethics,	  politics,	  and	  religion.	  	  The	  section	  begins	  with	  a	  plea	  to	  rethink	  the	  stale	  stereotypes	  of	  a	  static	  and	  conservative	  Confucianism	  by	  focusing	  instead	  upon	  the	  non-­‐foundationalist	  features	  of	  a	  tradition	  that	  always	  has	  to	  rethink	  creative	  agency	  in	  the	  ever	  shifting	  contexts	  of	  family-­‐centric	  matrices	  of	  relationships	  and	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  Karen	  Barad's	  quantum	  thinking	  about	  agential	  realism	  has	  great	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  potential	  in	  sparking	  conversations	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  further	  hermeneutic	  entanglements,	  hopefully	  culminating	  in	  a	  more	  stable	  and	  richly	  democratic	  (viz.,	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pluralistic	  and	  radically	  inclusive)	  realizations	  of	  non-­‐foundational,	  post-­‐patriarchal,	  post-­‐totalitarian,	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  post-­‐anthropocentric	  agency.	  	   Chapter	  four,	  "Comparative	  Philosophy,	  Phenomenology	  and	  Hermeneutics:	  A	  Methodological	  Interlude,"	  functions	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  theoretical	  caesura	  by	  productively	  interrupting	  the	  theoretical	  flow	  of	  this	  dissertation	  somewhat	  to	  take	  a	  critically	  reflective	  moment	  to	  consider	  some	  basic	  issues	  at	  play	  in	  the	  closely	  related	  fields	  of	  phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics.	  	  In	  exploring	  these	  two	  traditions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Paul	  Ricouer	  has	  brought	  them	  together	  in	  an	  ethically	  holistic	  way,	  I	  consider	  how	  philosophical	  hermeneutics	  can	  assist	  those	  of	  us	  engaged	  in	  projects	  of	  amelioratively	  reconstructing	  both	  philosophical	  and	  cultural	  Confucianism.	  	  Such	  musings	  will	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  going	  forward	  in	  addressing	  equity	  and	  justice	  in	  class,	  race	  and	  gender	  roles	  and	  redressing	  other	  historically	  oppressive	  abuses	  of	  nominally	  Confucian	  'patterns	  of	  deferential	  relationality'	  (li	  禮).	  	  Considering	  one's	  self	  as	  another,	  Ricouer's	  ethical	  demand,	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  in	  phenomenologically	  attuned	  and	  hermeneutically	  sensitive	  processes	  of	  relational	  amelioration.	  	  Processes	  that	  take	  the	  tacit	  inequalities	  operative	  at	  the	  level	  of	  material-­‐discursive	  formation	  at	  least	  as	  seriously	  as	  the	  more	  readily	  obvious	  patterns	  of	  systemic	  coercion	  and	  violent	  exclusion	  in	  social	  and	  political	  life.	  	   Section	  4.1	  simply	  introduces	  phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics	  as	  two	  distinct	  fields	  of	  philosophy	  and	  considers	  how	  a	  non-­‐foundationalist	  approach	  to	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  and	  relational	  psychology	  might	  be	  an	  optimal	  way	  of	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metaethically	  situating	  this	  reconstruction	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	   Section	  4.2	  discusses	  how	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  and	  others	  depart	  from	  a	  traditionally	  Husserlian	  tendency	  to	  seek	  ontological	  and	  epistemic	  foundations	  in	  projects	  of	  phenomenology	  as	  a	  rigorous	  science	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  embodied	  experience.	  	  I	  also	  show	  here	  how	  a	  kind	  of	  ethical	  epoche—or	  what	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  term	  a	  ritual-­‐practice	  of	  "bracketing"	  for	  purposes	  of	  realizing	  greater	  resolution	  in	  role-­‐focused	  imaginative	  potential—can	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  gongfu	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  embodied	  and	  imaginative	  practices	  of	  realizing	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	  Such	  non-­‐foundationalism	  in	  thinking	  through	  ethical	  agency	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  ethical	  thinking	  of	  neo-­‐	  and	  classical	  pragmatism	  after	  taking	  into	  account	  Wilfred	  Sellars	  epistemological	  critique	  of	  the	  "myth	  of	  the	  given."	  	  Finally,	  William	  James	  and	  John	  Dewey's	  radically	  empirical	  metaphysics	  of	  experience	  are	  reconsidered	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Richard	  Rorty's	  "linguistic	  turn"	  in	  deconstructing	  any	  concept	  of	  pre-­‐cultural	  "experience"	  taken	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  power	  and	  cultural	  politics.	  	  The	  need	  for	  a	  gestalt	  shift	  away	  from	  foundational	  individualism	  in	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  and	  politics	  is	  made	  even	  more	  evident	  here	  in	  comparing	  this	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism	  with	  pragmatism	  and	  hermeneutic	  phenomenology.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  thinking	  can	  offer	  more	  than	  just	  a	  confirmation	  of	  our	  pragmatist,	  non-­‐foundationalist	  sensibilities	  in	  epistemology,	  ethics,	  and	  political	  theorizing.	  	  The	  embodied,	  critical	  hermeneutic	  practice	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  and	  agency	  without	  having	  to	  confess	  a	  purely	  negative	  protestant	  epistemology—an	  epistemology	  that	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requires	  a	  belief	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  radical	  depravity	  in	  our	  capacities	  for	  moral	  perception	  and	  cultivation.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  even	  after	  disabusing	  ourselves	  of	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  given,	  we	  can	  still	  speak	  productively	  about	  ethical	  and	  metaethical	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  sources	  of	  agency.	  	   Section	  4.3	  continues	  to	  explore	  Ricouerean	  hermeneutics	  in	  comparative	  conversation	  with	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking.	  	  The	  ethical-­‐political	  questions	  of	  critique	  and	  belonging	  are	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  context	  of	  talking	  about	  the	  juxtaposed	  options	  of	  
faith	  and	  suspicion	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  textual	  and	  contextually	  focused	  interpretations	  of	  traditions.	  	  Specific	  concerns	  about	  discrimination	  and	  role-­‐focused	  justice	  is	  considered	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  feminist	  readings	  of	  Confucianism—both	  as	  a	  cultural	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  as	  basic	  philosophical	  presuppositions	  for	  a	  living	  tradition	  of	  texts,	  thinkers	  and	  interpretive	  possibilities.	  	   Section	  4.4	  continues	  to	  think	  through	  the	  fore-­‐structures	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  understanding	  in	  a	  living	  philosophical-­‐religious	  tradition	  of	  "gathering	  way-­‐making"	  (daotong	  道統).	  	  I	  introduce	  some	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  translations	  of	  passages	  from	  the	  "Expansive	  Learning"	  (Daxue	  大學)	  to	  show	  the	  kind	  of	  attractive	  metaethical	  presuppositions	  about	  roles,	  persons,	  and	  responsibilities	  can	  be	  derived	  for	  present	  projects	  of	  identifying	  and	  transforming	  oppressive	  structures	  of	  relationality.	  	   Chapter	  five	  "The	  Significance	  of	  'Resolute	  Becoming'	  Shendu	  and	  the	  Recovery	  of	  its	  "True"	  Meaning	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Hermeneutics"	  attempts	  to	  bring	  to	  consummatory	  (dis)closure	  this	  project	  of	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  theory	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  agency.	  	  Culminating	  this	  sustained	  conversation	  with	  historical	  and	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contemporary	  movements	  in	  comparative	  philosophy	  a	  holistically	  relational,	  role-­‐focused	  conception	  of	  persons	  in	  hermeneutically	  horizonal	  contexts	  of	  family	  centric	  thinking	  can	  be	  articulated	  in	  ethical,	  political	  and	  religious	  fields	  of	  discourse.	  	  A	  non-­‐foundational,	  role-­‐focused	  conception	  of	  persons	  only	  permits	  a	  somaesthetically	  nuanced	  hermeneutics	  wherein	  affect	  and	  responsibility	  are	  mutually	  entailing	  in	  ongoing	  projects	  of	  clarifying	  and	  expanding	  interpretive	  communities	  (both	  real	  and	  imagined)	  as	  ritually	  constructed	  (li	  禮)	  spaces	  of	  meaningful	  appearance.	  	   Section	  5.1	  returns	  to	  the	  received	  interpretive	  glosses	  about	  	  shen	  du	  慎獨	  as	  having	  predominantly	  a	  spatial	  and	  psychological	  connotation	  of	  private	  inwardness.	  	  While	  not	  wanting	  to	  entirely	  jettison	  the	  complex	  hermeneutical	  maneuvers	  of	  significant	  Confucian	  commentarial	  contributors	  like	  Zheng	  Xuan	  and	  Zhu	  Xi,	  I	  do	  wish	  to	  problematize	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  interpretive	  glosses	  have	  been	  used	  to	  promote	  bad	  readings	  of	  Confucianism	  as	  overly-­‐rigid	  and	  self-­‐sacrificially	  ascetic	  in	  terms	  of	  positing	  a	  big	  Other	  to	  surveil	  every	  thought,	  speech,	  and	  action	  in	  a	  purely	  inward	  disciplinary	  space	  of	  private	  consciousness.	  	  The	  recently	  excavated	  Guodian	  materials	  lend	  support	  to	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  reading	  of	  shendu	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ethical	  epoche	  wherein	  imaginative	  variation	  and	  creative	  "role-­‐taking"	  or	  role-­‐focusing"	  is	  made	  possible	  to	  critically	  reimagine	  and	  transform	  ritually	  stipulated	  social	  and	  familial	  roles.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  only	  through	  our	  role-­‐focused	  selves,	  taken	  from	  a	  vast	  field	  of	  constantly	  shifting	  relationality	  with	  more	  or	  less	  settled	  biological	  and	  cultural	  rhythms	  of	  presentation,	  that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve	  any	  degree	  of	  creative	  agency	  in	  our	  "encumbered"	  (but	  not	  determined)	  ritual	  webs	  of	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entanglement.	  	  By	  taking	  seriously	  an	  embodied	  conception	  of	  agency	  within	  a	  qi	  氣	  correlative	  cosmology,	  I	  present	  an	  intertextual	  hermeneutic	  to	  re-­‐read	  shendu	  慎獨	  in	  the	  Zhongyong	  and	  Daxue	  that	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  non-­‐foundationalist	  conception	  of	  self	  and	  role-­‐focused	  dynamic	  of	  creative	  agency,	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  seemingly	  more	  existentially	  private	  readings	  of	  the	  Han	  and	  Song	  commentators.	  	  Following	  recent	  developments	  in	  post-­‐structuralist	  affect	  theory	  in	  Anglophone	  philosophy	  we	  might	  ask	  how	  to	  say	  "new	  materialism"	  in	  pre-­‐Qin	  Chinese?	  	  And	  the	  answer	  would	  no	  doubt	  be	  a	  very	  old	  name	  for	  some	  very	  old	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  	   In	  section	  5.2	  I	  offer	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  theory	  of	  agency	  that	  in	  some	  ways	  goes	  beyond	  metaphysics	  to	  an	  immediate	  experience	  of	  semiotic	  engagement	  (firstness,	  secondness,	  thirdness).	  	  Without	  positing	  a	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"	  (Sellars)	  to	  initiate	  phenomenological	  or	  speculative	  metaphysics,	  we	  can	  still	  do	  much	  in	  way	  of	  contextualizing	  (through	  foregrounding	  some	  uncommon	  cultural	  assumptions)	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  in	  conversation	  with	  	  some	  of	  John	  Dewey's	  writings	  on	  time,	  individuality,	  and	  relational	  selving.	  	  I	  put	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  conceptual	  cluster	  regarding	  creative	  agency	  in	  critical	  conversation	  with	  Dewey's	  dynamic	  notion	  of	  creative	  individual	  potential	  found	  in	  his	  seminal	  "Time	  and	  Individuality"	  (1940)	  essay.	  	   In	  section	  5.3	  I	  consider	  the	  terms	  "true-­‐ing"	  or	  "resolution"	  (shen	  慎)	  and	  "creativity"	  or	  "unique	  transforming"	  (du	  獨)	  not	  only	  in	  the	  more	  readily	  obvious	  Si-­‐Meng	  corpus	  of	  texts,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  received	  Xunzi	  and	  Zhuangzi.	  	  By	  providing	  some	  extra-­‐lineage	  background,	  a	  better	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  a	  dynamic	  reading	  of	  
shendu	  慎獨	  as	  a	  most	  basic	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  importance	  of	  embodied	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thinking-­‐feeling	  and	  cultivating	  critical	  intelligence	  to	  realize	  more	  effective	  strategies	  for	  optimizing	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義)	  and	  realizing	  creative	  agency	  (cheng	  誠)	  throughout	  the	  ordinary	  course	  of	  our	  lives	  (zhongyong	  中庸).  The	  idea	  of	  "self	  [reflexive]	  love"	  (ziai	  自愛)	  advertised	  by	  Yan	  Hui	  and	  Kongzi	  as	  the	  height	  of	  ethical	  realization	  in	  the	  Xunzi	  is	  perhaps	  another	  way	  to	  say	  shendu	  慎獨.	  	  And	  despite	  the	  frequent	  polemic	  criticisms	  leveled	  at	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucians	  within	  the	  
Xunzi	  text,	  a	  few	  passages	  in	  particular	  stand	  out	  as	  bearing	  a	  remarkable	  similarity	  in	  terms	  of	  theorizing	  a	  ritually	  constructed	  and	  somaesthetically	  imaginative	  self—a	  process	  notion	  without	  any	  transcendent	  metaphysical	  foundations.	  	   Moving	  even	  farther	  away	  from	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage,	  at	  least	  speaking	  from	  a	  post-­‐Han	  period	  standardization	  of	  texts,	  lineages	  and	  traditions,	  certain	  passages	  in	  early	  Daoist	  writings	  seem	  to	  indicate	  a	  shared	  horizon	  of	  meanings	  for	  both	  shen	  慎	  and	  du	  獨.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  several	  passages	  from	  the	  Zhuangzi	  to	  articulate	  a	  pragmatic,	  anti-­‐representationalist	  approach	  to	  thinking	  about	  "truth"	  as	  "true-­‐ing"	  or	  a	  process	  of	  continually	  adjusting	  to	  transforming	  experience	  in	  a	  somaesthetically	  ameliorative	  manner.	  	   In	  section	  5.4	  I	  introduce	  the	  method	  of	  "rhythmanalysis"	  developed	  by	  the	  neo-­‐marxist	  thinker	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  and	  his	  collaborators.	  	  Simply	  put,	  rhythmanalysis	  is	  a	  method	  that	  is	  embodied	  and	  pragmatic.	  	  As	  a	  theoretical	  stance	  it	  takes	  the	  lived	  body	  as	  a	  "tool"	  of	  attunement	  to	  both	  perceive	  and	  transform	  biosocial	  rhythms.	  	  Rhythms	  are	  a	  basic	  unit	  of	  measurement	  and	  can	  be	  considered	  dynamic,	  provisional	  forms	  that	  exist	  biologically,	  culturally,	  politically,	  ritually,	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musically,	  religiously,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  As	  an	  everyday	  theoretical	  tool,	  rhythmanalysis	  offers	  a	  most	  helpful	  general	  framework	  to	  highlight	  and	  critically	  engage	  with	  the	  role-­‐focused	  conception	  of	  agency	  found	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts.	  	  The	  work	  of	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  while	  beginning	  with	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  sinological	  and	  archaeological	  knowledge,	  must	  expand	  to	  deal	  critically	  with	  received	  prejudices	  and	  coercive	  role	  identities	  developed	  over	  time	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Confucian	  orthodoxy.	  	  Rhythmanalysis	  allows	  us	  a	  somaesthetically	  nuanced	  way	  to	  think	  relationally	  about	  how	  to	  optimally	  realize	  more	  fluid	  and	  enabling	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  present	  age.	  	  By	  doing	  away	  with	  any	  comforting	  metaphysical	  illusions	  of	  an	  autonomous	  subject	  capable	  of	  grounding	  liberal	  conceptions	  of	  choice	  in	  ethical	  and	  political	  matters,	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  rhythmanalytic	  agent	  who	  can	  with	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degrees	  of	  grace,	  tact	  and	  power	  transform	  through	  ethically	  selective	  attention	  or	  "resolution"	  the	  particular	  relationships	  (de	  德 focus)	  that	  they	  find	  themselves	  in-­‐habiting	  (qizhi	  氣質 given	  habit	  energy)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ritually	  stipulated	  role-­‐expectations	  (dao	  道 field).	  	   In	  section	  5.5	  I	  present	  William	  James'	  classic	  conception	  of	  the	  stream	  of	  consciousness	  and	  a	  focus-­‐fringe	  model	  of	  selective	  attention.	  	  I	  see	  James	  as	  an	  important	  pragmatic	  founder	  of	  focus-­‐field	  thinking.	  	  He	  pushed	  against	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  metaphysical	  realism	  and	  substance	  ontology	  by	  criticizing	  "block-­‐universe"	  thinking	  in	  its	  various	  modalities.	  	  In	  developing	  a	  more	  process-­‐oriented	  conception	  of	  consciousness,	  James	  was	  keen	  to	  observe	  the	  ethical	  and	  religious	  implications	  of	  his	  thinking	  by	  exploring	  the	  ways	  that	  an	  often	  overlooked	  fringe	  creativity	  can	  creatively	  burst	  upon	  the	  more	  or	  less	  settled	  habituated	  person,	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allowing	  for	  dramatic	  and	  dynamic	  experiences	  of	  "conversion"	  or	  invigorated	  agency	  in	  self-­‐stylized	  projects	  of	  ameliorative	  selective	  attention.	  This	  Jamesian	  approach	  to	  considering	  the	  importance	  of	  selective	  attention	  in	  the	  field	  of	  conscious	  experience	  is	  conceptually	  akin	  to	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  that	  regards	  creative	  agency	  to	  be	  a	  process	  emerging	  from	  embodied,	  role-­‐relational	  practices	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	   In	  section	  5.6	  I	  consider	  several	  recent	  approaches	  to	  focus-­‐field	  thinking	  to	  make	  better	  sense	  of	  early	  Confucian	  discourse.	  	  In	  surveying	  some	  of	  the	  more	  important	  recent	  literature	  on	  the	  subject,	  I	  show	  how	  a	  metaphor	  of	  focus-­‐field	  thinking	  (wherein	  part-­‐whole	  mereology	  is	  replaced	  with	  a	  holographic	  understanding	  of	  constitutive	  correlative	  becoming),	  can	  be	  enhanced	  with	  a	  hermeneutic	  narrative	  approach	  to	  interpreting	  decentered	  selving	  processes.	  	  My	  theoretical	  position	  is	  that	  a	  dynamic	  focus-­‐field	  model	  of	  agency	  is	  the	  optimal	  way	  of	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  discourse.	  	  We	  can	  learn	  a	  lot	  from	  this	  particular	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  thinking	  about	  non-­‐foundational	  socially	  situated	  selving.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  strive	  with	  imagination	  and	  strenuous	  moral	  effort	  to	  transform	  oppressive	  structures	  and	  role-­‐identities	  from	  within	  taking	  into	  full	  account	  the	  material-­‐discursive	  practices	  that	  make	  such	  identities	  possible	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  We	  cannot	  expect	  some	  sort	  of	  "magical	  bullet"	  solution	  of	  idealized,	  abstract	  theorizing	  to	  appear	  and	  liberate	  us	  as	  autonomous	  subjects	  from	  all	  social	  suffering.	  	  More	  realistically	  and	  responsibly,	  we	  need	  to	  start	  where	  we	  find	  ourselves—always	  already	  in	  a	  historically	  conditioned	  horizon	  of	  roles	  and	  rituals—and	  work	  democratically	  together	  in	  horizonal	  hermeneutic	  communities	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of	  interpretation.	  	  All	  we	  can	  hope	  for	  is	  performing	  more	  virtuosically	  with	  what	  we	  have	  available	  and	  striving	  with	  imagination	  to	  partner	  wherever	  strategically	  desirable	  with	  others	  engaged	  in	  similar	  projects	  to	  critically	  transform	  and	  ethically	  expand	  role-­‐focused	  selving	  and	  ritually-­‐realized	  experiences	  of	  embodied	  responsibility.	   	  	   The	  conclusion	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  presented	  more	  as	  a	  prolegomena	  for	  further	  research	  using	  this	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  paradigm	  of	  role-­‐focused	  thinking.	  	  Thus	  it	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  adumbrating	  any	  definitive	  theoretical	  statements	  of	  achieved	  systematic	  completeness.	  	  Rather,	  it	  should	  invite	  a	  growing	  community	  of	  interpreters	  to	  work	  together	  in	  creating	  ever	  more	  semiotically	  dense	  and	  expansive	  shared	  sign	  and	  symbol	  systems	  of	  horizonal	  and	  democratic	  achievement	  in	  tian	  天	  commanding	  communities	  of	  interpretation.	  	  
	   1	  
Chapter	  One—	  Reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  Thinking	  
Through	  Ethical	  Agency	  Beyond	  Foundational	  Individualism	  	  I.	  The	  Need	  for	  a	  Philosophical	  Translation	  as	  Ars	  Contextualis	  	   The	  project	  of	  becoming	  fully	  human,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  realizing	  one's	  utmost	  capabilities	  as	  a	  unique	  and	  human	  person	  with	  an	  ethically	  efficacious	  sense	  of	  personal	  creativity,	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  Confucian	  thinking	  about	  ethics,	  politics,	  and	  religiosity.	  	  While	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  is	  best	  approached	  from	  a	  hermeneutical	  standpoint	  that	  attempts	  to	  do	  full	  justice	  to	  the	  inter-­‐relatedness	  of	  dynamic	  conceptual	  clusters	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  analytically	  reductive	  systematicity	  of	  clear	  and	  distinct	  ideas,	  we	  still	  might	  wish	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  complex	  processes	  of	  interwoven	  horizonal	  hermeneutical	  circles	  with	  a	  culturally	  and	  linguistically	  unfamiliar	  tradition	  via	  a	  particular	  philosophical	  phrase	  or	  concept	  instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  reconstruct	  a	  working	  glossary	  at	  every	  single	  moment	  of	  interpretation.	  	  	  	   	  In	  this	  work,	  I	  have	  set	  out	  to	  philosophically	  explore	  and	  hermeneutically	  appreciate	  a	  most	  important	  phrase	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  early	  Ruist1	  thinking	  about	  ethical	  agency.	  	  In	  the	  correlative	  cosmology	  of	  early	  Chinese	  thinking	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  typically	  follow	  contemporary	  anglophone	  trends	  in	  rendering	  Ruism	  (rujia	  儒
家)	  as	  "Confucianism."	  	  While	  certainly	  bearing	  the	  stigmata	  of	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  interpretation,	  I	  don't	  agree	  with	  Lionel	  Jensen	  that	  "Confucianism"	  was	  entirely	  "manufactured"	  by	  Jesuits	  and	  subsequent	  colonizers.	  	  See	  Jensen	  Manufacturing	  Confucianism.	  	  I	  think	  the	  term	  rujia	  in	  Chinese	  despite	  not	  explicitly	  mentioning	  Confucius	  really	  points	  to	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  "genteel"	  (ru	  儒)	  tradition	  of	  scholarly	  learning-­‐service	  creatively	  transmitted	  by	  exemplary	  persons	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another	  related	  to	  Master	  Kong	  (Kongzi	  孔子)	  himself.	  	  I	  also	  would	  take	  serious	  issue	  with	  contemporary	  writers	  who	  would	  doubt	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  received	  sources	  in	  detecting	  a	  historical	  philosophical	  persona	  like	  Confucius	  or	  other	  early	  Confucian	  thinkers.	  	  For	  a	  rather	  egregious	  error	  on	  the	  side	  of	  "doubting	  antiquity"	  see	  Michael	  Hunter's	  recent	  Confucius	  Beyond	  the	  Analects	  (2017)	  wherein	  he	  doubts	  that	  Confucius	  was	  a	  historical	  figure	  at	  all.	  	  While	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  "Confucius"	  becomes	  a	  hermeneutic	  repository	  for	  wisdom	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  corporate	  person	  spread	  throughout	  traditional	  time	  and	  space,	  it	  is	  taking	  it	  too	  far	  to	  decide	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  doubt	  the	  authenticity	  of	  historico-­‐philosophical	  revelatory	  texts	  like	  the	  Analects.	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personal	  becoming,	  the	  phrase	  that	  will	  be	  a	  unifying	  thread	  throughout	  this	  dissertation	  is	  "authoritative	  persons	  must	  be	  ever	  so	  careful	  (or	  resolute)	  about	  their	  unique	  personal	  becoming"	  junzi	  bi	  shen	  qi	  du	  ye	  君子必慎其獨也.2	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  phrase	  in	  early	  Confucian	  ethics	  and	  reveals	  much	  about	  a	  relational	  moral	  psychology	  that	  deals	  most	  directly	  with	  the	  question	  of	  human	  becoming	  and	  tasks	  of	  realizing	  resolute	  ethical	  agency	  in	  transactional	  contexts	  of	  embodied	  roles	  and	  existential	  relationships.	  	  	  	   The	  task	  of	  putting	  oneself	  into	  productive	  conversation	  with	  a	  living	  
tradition	  like	  Confucianism	  is	  a	  most	  complicated	  hermeneutical	  affair	  to	  be	  sure.	  	  In	  order	  to	  simplify	  somewhat	  the	  task	  of	  realizing	  an	  effective	  conversation	  over	  time	  with	  a	  living	  tradition	  that	  both	  puts	  our	  personal	  being	  into	  question	  and	  submits	  the	  established	  semiotic	  patterns	  and	  evaluative	  structures	  of	  the	  tradition	  itself	  to	  critical	  scrutiny	  in	  future-­‐oriented	  	  projects	  of	  ameliorative	  reconstruction,	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  focus	  on	  this	  particularly	  important	  conceptual	  cluster	  by	  situating	  it	  within	  a	  broader	  conceptual	  constellation	  discoverable	  within	  some	  central	  texts	  traditionally	  and	  more	  recently	  associated	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage3	  of	  Confucianism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Throughout	  this	  dissertation	  the	  reader	  will	  notice	  that	  I	  translate	  this	  phrase	  variously	  as	  "caring	  about	  personal	  uniqueness",	  "resolute	  singularity",	  "remaining	  vigilant	  about	  one's	  unique	  relational	  potential",	  or	  more	  succinctly	  as	  "resolution"	  or	  "resolute	  becoming."	  	  Part	  of	  this	  variation	  has	  to	  do	  with	  context	  and	  although	  I	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  having	  too	  unwieldy	  a	  set	  of	  possible	  English	  translations	  for	  this	  central	  Si-­‐Meng	  concept,	  I	  think	  this	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  philosophy	  and	  the	  need	  for	  "philosophical	  translations"	  and	  responsible	  ars	  contextualis,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  correspondence	  or	  equivalent	  term	  available	  in	  the	  English	  parole	  to	  capture	  the	  complex	  scope	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  
langue	  out	  of	  which	  this	  conceptual	  cluster	  emerges.	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  identity	  is	  a	  very	  complicated	  hermeneutical	  affair	  as	  it	  involves	  both	  received	  texts	  and	  commentarial	  tradition	  as	  well	  as	  several	  recently	  recovered	  texts	  from	  archeological	  discoveries.	  	  The	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  (simeng	  jia思孟家	  or	  simeng	  xuepai思孟學派)	  refers	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   First	  of	  all,	  we	  will	  be	  exploring	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  phrase	  in	  its	  earliest	  appearances	  (in	  both	  received	  and	  recently	  excavated	  archaeological	  texts)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Wuxing	  《五行》(Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct).	  	  Secondly,	  we	  will	  be	  examining	  this	  notion	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  shendu	  慎獨 and	  related	  concepts	  like	  "creativite	  integrity"	  (cheng	  誠),	  "naturing"	  (xing	  性),	  "heartminding"	  (xin	  心),	  and	  "moral	  virtuosity"	  (de	  德)	  in	  the	  Zhongyong	  《中庸》(Focusing	  the	  Familiar)	  and	  discovering	  how	  these	  important	  Confucian	  ideals	  play	  a	  role	  in	  our	  warranted	  interpretive	  glosses	  of	  received	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  and	  of	  the	  important	  question	  of	  understanding	  the	  interpretive	  stance	  of	  relational	  internalism.	  	  Finally,	  we	  will	  be	  taking	  a	  close	  look	  at	  the	  Mengzi	  《孟子》	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  further	  deepening	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  this	  text	  develops	  a	  robust	  notion	  of	  relationally	  constituted	  personhood	  and	  creative	  embodied	  agency	  unfolding	  within	  a	  process-­‐oriented,	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	   In	  Against	  Individualism:	  A	  Confucian	  rethinking	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  morality,	  
politics,	  family,	  and	  religion,	  Henry	  Rosemont	  argues	  that	  a	  pervasive	  and	  mischievous	  "ideology"	  of	  foundational	  individualism	  dominates	  so	  much	  current	  thinking	  about	  ethics,	  economics,	  politics,	  and	  global	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  	  Rosemont	  argues	  that,	  at	  least	  since	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  enlightenment	  project	  in	  the	  West,	  a	  pernicious	  ideology	  that	  celebrates	  human	  beings	  as	  "free	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  writing	  and	  influential	  thinking	  of	  the	  philosophers	  Zisizi	  子思子	  (483-­‐402	  BCE)	  and	  Mengzi	  孟子	  (372-­‐289	  BCE).	  	  Zisizi	  was	  a	  grandson	  of	  Confucius	  and	  Mengzi	  was	  traditionally	  said	  to	  have	  studied	  under	  Zisizi	  or	  one	  of	  his	  disciples	  (門人).	  	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  "philosophical	  identity"	  is	  largely	  an	  ex	  post	  facto	  project	  carried	  about	  by	  later	  inheritors	  of	  the	  Ruist	  tradition	  of	  ethical	  philosophy	  (e.g.	  the	  Tang-­‐Song	  dynasty	  invention	  of	  an	  orthodoxic/orthopraxic	  tradition	  of	  a	  transmission	  of	  learning	  from	  the	  exemplary	  Sage	  rulers	  through	  Confucius	  and	  his	  disciples	  into	  the	  present	  day—the	  so-­‐called	  "Transmission	  of	  the	  Way"	  (daotong	  道統)	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autonomous,	  rights-­‐holding,	  rational	  individuals	  (usually	  adding	  "self-­‐interested"	  to	  the	  list)	  with	  appropriate	  moralities,	  political	  constitutions	  and	  legal	  systems	  to	  support	  both	  the	  overall	  ideology	  and	  the	  economic	  system	  [of	  Capitalism]"	  serves	  to	  shape	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  about	  what	  is	  politically	  possible	  and	  ethically	  desirable	  in	  current	  geopolitical	  configurations.	  Building	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Herbert	  Fingarette4,	  the	  analytic	  philosopher	  of	  ordinary	  language	  and	  pragmatic	  behaviorism,	  Rosemont	  presents	  a	  powerful	  critique	  of	  this	  all-­‐too-­‐pervasive	  ideology	  of	  individualism	  using	  the	  idea	  of	  more	  or	  less	  distinctive,	  but	  always	  porously	  entangled,	  idea	  of	  (inter)culturally	  patterned	  "conceptual	  clusters":	  Every	  culture	  has	  a	  vocabulary	  denoting	  core	  concepts	  for	  describing,	  analyzing	  and	  evaluating	  human	  conduct,	  long	  ago	  as	  well	  as	  today.	  	  In	  contemporary	  English	  that	  vocabulary	  tends	  to	  cluster	  around	  the	  term	  "morals"	  and	  includes	  such	  other	  terms	  as	  "freedom,"	  "ought,"	  "rights,"	  "liberty,"	  "reason,"	  "obligation,"	  "choice,"	  "dilemma,"	  "evil,"	  "objective/subjective,"	  "right/wrong,"	  "individual,"	  "duty"	  and	  several	  related	  terms.	  	  Without	  these	  terms	  a	  discussion	  of	  moral	  issues	  could	  not	  take	  place.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  any	  and	  all	  efforts	  to	  speed	  read	  the	  Analects	  for	  its	  moral	  insights,	  none	  of	  these	  terms	  clustered	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  "morals"	  has	  a	  close	  lexical	  equivalent	  in	  classical	  Chinese,	  and	  hence,	  in	  a	  very	  significant	  sense,	  Confucius	  should	  not	  be	  described	  as	  a	  "moral	  philosopher"	  in	  the	  contemporary	  English	  meaning	  of	  that	  expression,	  for	  imposing	  our	  current	  concept-­‐cluster	  on	  his	  text	  will	  only	  eventuate	  in	  seeing	  him	  as	  a	  well-­‐meaning	  preacher	  at	  best,	  as	  a	  muddled	  or	  hopelessly	  naive	  thinker	  at	  worst.5	  	  The	  need	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  cultural	  gestalt	  shift	  in	  moral	  thinking	  away	  from	  "rights-­‐possessing	  individuals"	  to	  "role-­‐bearing	  persons",	  that	  is,	  from	  theoretically	  unencumbered	  autonomous	  selves	  to	  relationally	  encumbered	  processes	  of	  becoming	  more	  fully	  human	  (i.e.	  an	  ethically	  robust	  selving	  process	  in	  a	  horizonal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  his	  Confucianism:	  The	  Secular	  as	  Sacred.	  5	  Henry	  Rosemont	  Jr.,	  A	  Readers	  Guide	  to	  the	  Analects,	  p.17.	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community	  of	  creative	  democratic	  interpetation),	  is	  made	  evident	  by	  Rosemont	  in	  referencing	  the	  fallacy	  of	  misplaced	  concreteness	  present	  in	  any	  thinking	  that	  presupposes	  substantive	  selves	  in	  isolation	  from	  their	  communal	  and	  familial	  narrative	  formations.	  	  	  In	  considering	  unique	  human	  persons	  as	  generic	  instantiations	  of	  a	  distinct	  natural	  or	  ontological	  kind	  (human	  being),	  such	  a	  misplaced	  naturalism	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  debilitating	  normative	  deficit	  in	  addressing	  real	  world	  problems	  and	  predicaments	  that	  are	  most	  currently	  pressing—massive	  poverty,	  gross	  inequality,	  radical	  environmental	  degradation,	  climate	  chaos,	  possibility	  of	  nuclear	  holocaust,	  increasing	  xenophobic	  and	  racial	  hatred,	  cruelty,	  violence,	  and	  the	  horrifying	  list	  goes	  on.	  	  These	  symptoms	  of	  social	  disease	  are	  representative	  of	  deep	  ethical	  predicaments	  that	  we	  can	  only	  hope	  to	  resolve	  if	  the	  regnant	  ideology	  of	  individualism	  is	  replaced	  with	  something	  more	  amenable	  to	  a	  thoroughly	  relational	  thinking	  about	  persons	  in	  the	  non-­‐ideal	  contexts	  of	  their	  precarious,	  vulnerable,	  and	  ethically	  adventurous	  lives.6	  	   Advocates	  for	  non-­‐foundationalist	  and	  anti-­‐individualist	  approaches	  to	  Confucian	  philosophy	  like	  Henry	  Rosemont	  and	  Herbert	  Fingarette	  at	  times	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  anything	  even	  remotely	  resembling	  the	  familiar	  conceptual	  cluster	  of	  the	  regnant	  ideology	  of	  individualism	  and	  liberal	  morality	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  early	  Confucian	  sources.	  	  Thus	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  Confucian	  "morality"	  because	  for	  the	  Confucians,	  experience	  is	  shot	  through	  with	  
responsibility	  of	  a	  thoroughly	  pluralistic	  nature—and	  since	  there	  is	  no	  discretely	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  problems	  that	  can	  be	  solved	  as	  in	  a	  social	  engineering	  project	  and	  
predicaments	  that	  can	  only	  be	  "resolved"	  with	  changing	  basic	  cultural	  presuppositions	  see	  Peter	  Hershock's	  Buddhism	  in	  the	  Public	  Sphere:	  Reorienting	  Global	  Interdependence	  (2010),	  p.180.	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distinctively	  moral	  realm	  of	  discourse	  from	  which	  we	  can	  clearly	  identify	  a	  purely	  ethical	  sense	  of	  ought	  or	  should	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  axiological	  prescription,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  purportedly	  foundational	  subject	  of	  onto-­‐ethical	  discourse	  is	  illusory	  and	  superfluous.	  	  So	  why	  even	  speak	  of	  Confucian	  "ethics"	  at	  all?	  	   Indeed,	  it	  doesn't	  seem	  possible	  that	  we	  can	  conceptually	  demarcate	  a	  moral	  ought	  say	  from	  a	  prudential,	  aesthetic,	  biological,	  or	  some	  other	  type	  of	  normative	  
claim	  made	  on	  persons	  in	  their	  holistic	  experience	  as	  persons	  in	  early	  Confucian	  discourse	  in	  terms	  of	  embodiment,	  familial	  embededness,	  social	  belonging,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  We	  might	  find	  support	  for	  such	  a	  strong	  comparative	  philosophical	  claim,	  regarding	  the	  inappropriateness	  of	  speaking	  of	  a	  distinct	  domain	  of	  Confucian	  
ethical	  philosophy	  following	  the	  trend	  in	  some	  analytic	  circles	  of	  moral	  philosophy	  that	  emerges	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  J.L.	  Mackie's	  claim	  that	  most	  modern	  moral	  philosophy	  rests	  upon	  a	  fundamental	  category	  mistake.7	  While	  it	  may	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  easy	  understanding	  for	  those	  enmeshed	  in	  societies	  and	  traditions	  that	  clearly	  demarcate	  an	  "ethical"	  realm	  of	  specialization	  in	  philosophy	  and	  religion,	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  taking	  the	  conceptual	  gestalt	  shift	  offered	  by	  Confucian	  role	  ethics8	  seriously	  then	  we	  might	  have	  to	  begin	  speaking	  about	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  political	  participation	  without	  ethics	  as	  a	  distinctive	  domain	  of	  discourse.	  	  This	  goes	  even	  further	  than	  the	  neo-­‐pragmatist	  insistence	  that	  we	  think	  of	  ethics	  without	  principles	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  I'm	  thinking	  of	  Elizabeth	  Anscombe's	  "Modern	  Moral	  Philosophy"	  and	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre's	  After	  
Virtue	  in	  analytic	  Anglo-­‐American	  moral	  philosophy	  that	  both	  argue	  that	  the	  search	  for	  moral	  foundations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  systematic	  theories	  emerges	  in	  the	  enlightenment	  from	  a	  sort	  of	  category	  mistake	  in	  thinking	  about	  persons	  outside	  of	  the	  value	  contexts	  created	  by	  specific	  cultural	  practices	  and	  religious	  institutions	  (i.e.	  "traditions").	  8	  Roger	  Ames	  has	  suggested	  that	  in	  Chinese	  the	  phrase	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  (儒家角色倫理學)	  is	  redundant,	  because	  the	  idea	  of	  "role	  ethics"	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  "bringing	  optimal	  patterning	  to	  roles	  and	  relations"	  (lunli	  倫理)	  which	  is	  the	  binomial	  character	  pairing	  used	  to	  translate	  "ethics"	  in	  the	  modern	  period.	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(e.g.	  Richard	  Rorty,	  Hilary	  Putnam),	  in	  advocating	  a	  culturally	  located	  and	  resolutely	  embodied	  practical	  wisdom	  that	  seamlessly	  integrates	  aesthetic-­‐ethical-­‐political	  value	  considerations	  without	  the	  hyphenated	  disciplinary	  assumptions.	  	  Taking	  a	  cue	  from	  Richard	  Shusterman's	  somaesthetic	  stance,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  allows	  us	  to	  be	  doubly	  neo-­‐pragmatic	  by	  taking	  a	  bodily	  turn	  after	  the	  linguistic	  turn,	  thereby	  fully	  embracing	  the	  pluralistic	  ontology	  of	  pure	  experience	  and	  the	  epistemological-­‐axiological	  stance	  of	  radical	  empiricism.	  	  At	  least	  we	  could	  make	  good	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  without	  ethics	  as	  pointing	  towards	  an	  ameliorative	  vision	  of	  a	  future	  informed	  more	  by	  a	  non-­‐ideal,	  anti-­‐foundationalist	  view	  of	  persons	  as	  irreducibly	  relational	  projects.	  	   In	  what	  follows	  it	  will	  become	  readily	  obvious	  that	  many	  of	  my	  philosophical	  proclivities	  are	  largely	  aligned	  with	  what	  Roger	  Ames	  and	  David	  Hall	  have	  dubbed	  an	  "aesthetic	  order"	  of	  thinking.9	  Ames	  and	  Hall	  claim	  that	  an	  aesthetic	  as	  juxtaposed	  with	  a	  reductively	  rational-­‐logical	  ordering	  of	  experience	  "begins	  with	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  one	  thing	  and	  assesses	  this	  particular	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  balanced	  complexity	  of	  its	  context."10	  	  They	  also	  suggest	  that	  because	  an	  aesthetic	  ordering	  of	  a	  correlative	  cosmology	  "celebrates	  the	  disclosure	  of	  insistent	  particularity	  of	  each	  detail	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  consequent	  unity	  of	  these	  specific	  details,	  plurality	  must	  be	  conceived	  as	  prior	  to	  unity."11	  	  I	  am	  in	  wholehearted	  agreement	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  early	  Ruist	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Thinking	  Through	  Confucius	  (1987),	  p.136.	  	  "The	  concepts	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  logical	  order	  are	  inversely	  related.	  	  Aesthetic	  order	  presses	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  particularity	  and	  uniqueness;	  logical	  order	  toward	  generality	  and	  absolute	  substitutability."	  	  10	  Ibid.	  11	  Ibid.	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unique	  human	  becoming	  within	  the	  vital	  context	  of	  socially	  embodied	  roles	  and	  lived	  relationships	  is	  with	  a	  general	  hermeneutic	  framework	  or	  "ars	  contextualis"—that	  is	  approaching	  all	  interpretive	  schemes	  with	  a	  non-­‐reductive,	  holistic,	  pluralistic	  "aesthetic	  order"	  in	  mind.	  	  Thus	  it	  probably	  will	  not	  be	  all	  that	  surprising	  that	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  this	  dissertation	  I	  will	  be	  drawing	  upon	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  task	  of	  philosophical	  thinking	  like	  philosophical	  hermeneutics,	  non-­‐foundationalist	  phenomenology,	  (neo)pragmatism,	  and	  process	  metaphysics	  to	  elucidate	  productive	  resonances	  found	  within	  these	  anti-­‐rationalistic	  protestant	  reformations	  in	  Western	  philosophy	  and	  indigenous	  Confucian	  concepts	  relating	  to	  the	  core	  phrase	  "resolute	  agency"12	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  conceptual	  cluster	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  II.	  Reconstructing	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  Lineage	  of	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics	  	   Kong	  Ji	  孔伋	  (483-­‐402	  BCE),	  was	  the	  grandson	  of	  Confucius	  (551-­‐479	  BCE),	  and	  is	  better	  known	  by	  his	  "style"	  name	  Zisizi	  子思子	  or	  "Master"	  Zisi.	  	  His	  name	  is	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  authorship	  of	  the	  Zhongyong	  and	  with	  three	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  In	  the	  process	  of	  working	  on	  this	  dissertation	  I	  have	  frequently	  changed	  my	  mind	  on	  how	  to	  optimally	  translate	  the	  phrase	  shendu	  慎獨.	  	  "Caring	  for	  personal	  uniqueness,"	  "concernful	  becoming,"	  "resolute	  human	  potential,"	  resolute	  ritual	  transformation,"	  etc.	  have	  all	  been	  suggested	  or	  tried	  at	  various	  points.	  	  I	  will	  still	  be	  using	  various	  methods	  to	  translate	  the	  term	  throughout,	  because	  as	  like	  many	  key	  concepts	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophy	  a	  productive	  vagueness	  suffuses	  its	  philosophical	  aura.	  	  At	  one	  point	  I	  had	  decided	  on,	  whenever	  possible,	  employing	  the	  expression	  "concerning	  creativity"	  as	  a	  consistently	  clear	  way	  to	  translate	  this	  phrase.	  	  I	  came	  across	  this	  translation	  scheme	  when	  reading	  John	  Berthrong's	  Concerning	  Creativity	  (SUNY,	  1998)	  a	  book	  that	  deals	  with	  Whitehead,	  Neville,	  and	  Zhu	  Xi.	  	  I	  don't	  think	  Berthrong	  had	  in	  mind	  this	  particular	  expression	  that	  actually	  does	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  Zhu	  Xi's	  neo-­‐Confucian	  hermeneutics,	  but	  it	  works	  quite	  well	  in	  terms	  of	  capturing	  the	  gerundively	  engaged	  ethical	  focus	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  situations	  of	  emergent	  personal	  becoming	  and	  "creative"	  (cheng	  誠)	  ethical-­‐political	  transformations.	  	  After	  all	  it	  is	  the	  non-­‐foundational	  relational	  potential	  of	  persons	  (du	  獨)	  that	  is	  the	  agentially	  charged	  
material	  through	  which	  creative	  integration	  of	  natural	  experience	  as	  ethically	  consummatory	  and	  religiously	  disclosive	  happens.	  	  But	  since	  this	  phrase	  is	  ungrammatical	  and	  somewhat	  misleading	  in	  English	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	  phrase	  "resolute	  becoming/agency"	  consistently	  as	  it	  calls	  forth	  the	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  relational	  selving	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  presuppositions.	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documents	  that	  were	  compiled	  together	  as	  the	  Record	  of	  Ritual	  Propriety	  (Liji	  禮記):	  "A	  Record	  of	  the	  Gnomon"	  (biaoji	  表記),"	  "The	  Black	  Robes	  (ziyi	  緇衣),"	  and	  "A	  Record	  of	  the	  Dike	  (fangji	  坊記)."	  	  The	  received	  tradition	  makes	  mention	  of	  a	  text	  known	  as	  the	  Zisizi	  《子思子》but	  we	  don't	  have	  any	  extant	  versions	  and	  many	  scholars	  think	  that	  the	  fragments	  that	  we	  do	  have	  are	  either	  inauthentic	  attributions	  or	  a	  forgery.	  	  However,	  with	  the	  recovery	  of	  recently	  excavated	  archaeological	  materials	  the	  presumed	  Zisizi	  corpus	  of	  writing	  has	  been	  significantly	  enhanced.	  	  Some	  contemporary	  interpreters,	  like	  Li	  Xueqin,	  even	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  several	  of	  the	  Jingmen	  Guodian	  Bamboo	  finds	  are	  chapters	  of	  a	  previously	  lost	  Zisizi	  text.	  	  For	  our	  present	  purposes	  we	  will	  be	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  two	  core	  Zisizi	  documents—The	  Five	  Modes	  of	  Virtuosic	  Conduct	  (Wuxing	  五行)	  and	  the	  Focusing	  
the	  Familiar	  (Zhongyong	  中庸).	  	  While	  we	  may	  occasionally	  appeal	  to	  a	  text	  attributed	  or	  associated	  with	  presumed	  Zisizi	  authorship,	  it	  will	  behoove	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  these	  two	  texts	  more	  or	  less	  exclusively	  as	  they	  most	  clearly	  reveal	  some	  of	  the	  central	  features	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  thinking	  and	  simplify	  our	  task	  of	  thinking	  through	  this	  reconstructed	  lineage.	  	   Mengzi	  (372-­‐289	  BCE)	  is	  traditionally	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  disciple	  of	  Zisizi.	  	  While	  this	  is	  perhaps	  not	  objective	  intellectual	  history,	  we	  can	  say	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Mengzi	  were	  certainly	  philosophically	  influenced	  by	  Zisizi's	  thinking.	  	  Xunzi	  (310-­‐235	  BCE)	  places	  these	  two	  thinkers	  together	  in	  a	  critical	  gesture	  against	  what	  he	  took	  to	  be	  a	  superficial	  and	  hypocritical	  form	  of	  pseudo-­‐Confucian	  teaching:	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Emulating	  the	  former	  kings	  in	  broad	  outline	  yet	  incognizant	  of	  their	  traditions;	  boastful	  and	  ambitious	  nonetheless,	  [yet]	  sundry	  and	  scattered	  in	  learning	  and	  experience;	  creating	  a	  doctrine	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  archaic	  things	  and	  calling	  it	  the	  "five	  conducts"	  (wu	  xing	  五行),	  unorthodox	  to	  the	  extreme	  and	  lacking	  any	  correspondence,	  abstruse	  and	  incomprehensible,	  cryptic	  and	  unintelligible;	  and	  thereupon	  adorning	  their	  words	  and	  lending	  reverence	  to	  their	  doctrine,	  saying:	  "These	  are	  truly	  the	  words	  of	  the	  former	  gentleman	  (Confucius)!"—Zi	  Si	  sang	  the	  lead	  in	  this,	  and	  Meng	  Ke	  chimed	  along	  .	  .	  .	  .13	  	  Some	  commentators	  have	  thought	  that	  the	  term	  wu	  xing	  五行	  here	  referred	  to	  the	  naturalistic	  yin-­‐yang	  cosmology	  of	  the	  Han	  dynasty	  or	  the	  so-­‐called	  "Five	  Phases"—water,	  fire,	  wood,	  metal,	  and	  earth	  (水火木金土)	  and	  it	  was	  for	  many	  a	  longstanding	  mystery	  as	  to	  what	  such	  purely	  naturalist	  speculations	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  moral	  psychological	  thinking	  of	  either	  Zisizi	  or	  Mengzi.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Tang	  dynasty	  commentator	  Yang	  Liang,	  the	  "five	  conducts"	  here	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	  "five	  constancies"	  (wu	  chang	  五常)	  or	  "virtuosities"	  of	  "relational	  virtuosity,	  optimal	  appropriateness,	  ritual	  practice,	  wisdom,	  and	  trust"	  (ren	  仁,	  yi	  義,	  li	  禮,	  zhi	  知,	  and	  
xin	  信).	  But	  it	  wasn't	  until	  Pang	  Pu	  and	  others	  were	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  passage	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Guodian	  Bamboo	  strips	  containing	  the	  Wuxing	  that	  the	  mystery	  was	  put	  to	  rest.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  at	  least	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Xunzi	  that	  it	  was	  customary	  to	  associate	  the	  thinking	  of	  Zisizi	  and	  Mengzi	  together	  as	  one	  harmoniously	  coherent	  philosophical	  lineage—the	  so-­‐called	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage思孟家.	  	   While	  the	  task	  of	  grouping	  together	  historical	  documents	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  a	  specific	  lineage	  of	  thinkers	  is	  profoundly	  difficult	  and	  requires	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13略法先王而不知其統， （猶）然而（猶）材劇志大，聞見雜博。案往舊造說，謂之五行，甚辟違
而無類，幽隱而無說，閉約而無解。案飾其辭，而祇敬之，曰：此真先君子之言也。子思唱之，孟
軻和之。"Fei	  shi'er	  zi	  非十二子,	  Wang	  Xianqian,	  Xunzi	  jijie,	  p.	  94	  [Modified	  translation	  of	  Scott	  Cook	  from	  his	  "Consummate	  Artistry	  and	  Moral	  Virtuosity:	  The	  "Wu	  xing	  五行"	  Essay	  and	  its	  Aesthetic	  Implications."	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sinological	  and	  philological	  expertise,	  we	  must	  recognize	  that	  such	  hermeneutical	  activity	  can	  never	  approach	  a	  wholly	  objective	  science.	  	  What	  we	  can	  reasonably	  anticipate	  to	  achieve	  though,	  is	  building	  upon	  the	  best	  scholarship	  available	  to	  us	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  a	  coherent	  vision	  of	  philosophical	  order	  from	  the	  assumed	  Si-­‐Meng	  corpus	  of	  writings—drawing	  from	  them	  a	  conceptual	  cluster	  or	  certain	  "family	  resemblances"	  that	  might	  serve	  as	  a	  unifying	  thread	  elucidating	  and	  guiding	  the	  text's	  most	  edifying	  conceptual	  clustering.	  	  For	  our	  present	  purposes,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  bracket	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  the	  complex	  questions	  of	  authorial	  intent	  and	  textual	  attribution	  as	  emerging	  in	  the	  field	  of	  sinological	  philology	  and	  attempt	  to	  focus	  as	  directly	  as	  possible	  upon	  the	  relevant	  philosophical	  implications	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  for	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  thinking.	  	   	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  tradition	  can	  be	  effectively	  summarized	  using	  the	  following	  fourfold	  schema	  of	  representation:	  1)	  Relational	  Internalism	  	  2)	  Embodied	  Agency	  3)	  Interpersonal	  Affectivity	  4)	  Musical	  Flourishing	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  philosophical	  "reconstruction"	  of	  each	  of	  these	  characteristic	  features	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  I	  want	  to	  first	  present	  John	  Dewey's	  pragmatic	  call	  for	  a	  reconstruction	  [of	  and	  in]	  philosophy.	  	  What	  Dewey's	  radical	  proposal	  amounts	  to	  is	  to	  take	  the	  cultivation	  of	  creative	  intelligence	  out	  of	  the	  murky	  and	  unproductive	  waters	  of	  the	  historical	  "problems	  of	  philosophers"	  and	  turn	  instead	  to	  the	  everyday	  problems	  of	  human	  persons	  in	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families	  and	  communicating	  communities,	  seeking	  a	  more	  full	  and	  stable	  realization	  of	  values	  that	  might	  make	  this	  life	  worth	  living.	  III.	  John	  Dewey's	  Reconstruction	  in	  Philosophy	  	   In	  1920	  John	  Dewey	  published	  a	  systematic	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  Greco-­‐Medieval	  European	  philosophy	  and	  argued	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  carrying	  out	  a	  reconstruction	  in	  philosophical	  thinking	  that	  would	  seek	  to	  bring	  the	  methods	  and	  functional	  concepts	  of	  previous	  philosophies	  down	  to	  a	  democratically	  oriented	  planet	  earth	  upon	  which	  these	  working	  concepts	  could	  then	  effect	  real	  amelioration.	  	  Dewey	  articulates	  his	  holistic	  and	  even	  religious	  conception	  of	  democracy	  as	  an	  ideal	  way	  of	  life	  in	  suggesting	  that	  although	  "[d]emocracy	  has	  many	  meanings"	  its	  moral	  meaning,	  "is	  found	  in	  resolving	  that	  the	  supreme	  test	  of	  all	  political	  institutions	  and	  industrial	  arrangements"	  and	  this	  meaning	  "shall	  be	  the	  contribution	  they	  make	  to	  the	  all-­‐round	  growth	  of	  every	  member	  of	  society."14	  	   Dewey's	  Reconstruction	  in	  Philosophy	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  sustained	  argument	  for	  shifting	  the	  emphasis	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry	  from	  the	  epistemologically	  rarefied	  search	  for	  an	  existentially	  disengaged,	  purely	  theoretical	  or	  contemplative	  knowledge	  to	  a	  more	  pragmatically	  focused	  sense	  of	  engaged,	  experimental	  inquiry	  and	  the	  cultivation	  of	  intelligence	  in	  practice.	  	  For	  Dewey	  the	  quest	  for	  certainty	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  pursuit	  of	  pragmatic	  truths.	  	  But	  "truth"	  for	  Dewey	  is	  always	  an	  adverbial,	  gerundive,	  and	  contextual	  affair	  and	  never	  a	  separate	  totalizing	  formation	  transcending	  historical,	  embodied	  experience.	  	  Dewey	  wishes	  to	  move	  our	  philosophical	  thinking	  away	  from	  the	  pure	  epistemic	  subject	  of	  a	  cogito	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Dewey,	  Reconstruction	  in	  Philosophy	  (Henry	  Holt,	  1920),	  p.86.	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vitally	  engaged	  field	  of	  agency	  in	  realizing	  ourselves	  as	  socially-­‐embedded	  and	  role-­‐encumbered	  dramatis	  personae.	  	  Dewey	  even	  suggests	  that	  instead	  of	  thinking	  of	  human	  nature	  as	  exemplifying	  the	  "rational	  animal"	  we	  consider	  humankind	  instead	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  "dramatized	  animal."15	  	   Dewey	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  culture	  and	  "tradition"	  in	  thinking-­‐in-­‐context	  of	  communicating	  communities	  as	  opposed	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  disengaged	  epistemic	  spectator	  "view	  from	  Nowhere"	  characterized	  by	  introspective	  "reflective"	  thinking:	  Tradition	  thus	  formed	  becomes	  a	  kind	  of	  norm	  to	  which	  individual	  fancy	  and	  suggestion	  conform.	  	  An	  abiding	  framework	  conceiving	  life	  grows	  up	  into	  which	  individuals	  are	  inducted	  by	  education.	  	  Both	  unconsciously	  and	  by	  definite	  social	  requirement	  individual	  memories	  are	  assimilated	  to	  group	  memory	  or	  tradition	  and	  individual	  fancies	  are	  accommodated	  to	  the	  body	  of	  beliefs	  characteristic	  of	  a	  community.16	  	  Dewey	  proposes	  a	  "genetic	  method"	  to	  clear	  up	  the	  conceptual	  confusion	  and	  ethical-­‐political	  inertia	  created	  by	  centuries	  of	  Graeco-­‐Medieval	  thinking	  about	  persons	  as	  foundational	  individuals—that	  is,	  as	  rational	  subjects	  of	  epistemology	  and	  as	  will-­‐ing	  participants	  in	  ethical-­‐political	  systems	  of	  distortingly	  idealized	  social	  contracts.	  	  For	  Dewey	  the	  genetic	  method	  "is	  a	  more	  effective	  way	  of	  undermining	  this	  [rationalistic	  and	  foundationally	  individualist]	  type	  of	  philosophic	  theorizing	  than	  any	  attempt	  at	  logical	  refutation	  could	  be."17	  	   The	  genetic	  method	  is	  not	  merely	  meant	  to	  tell	  an	  intellectual	  history	  of	  certain	  pervasive	  ideas	  and	  undergirding	  presuppositions	  in	  a	  particular	  cultural	  milieu,	  but	  similar	  to	  a	  Nietzschean	  genealogical	  approach,	  the	  telling	  of	  a	  history	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Dewey,	  ibid.,	  p.4.	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.8.	  17	  Ibid.	  p.24.	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the	  present	  can	  serve	  to	  diagnose	  certain	  philosophical-­‐cum-­‐physiological	  pathologies	  and	  disclose	  depth	  dynamics	  of	  perniciously	  operative	  hierarchies	  of	  coercive	  power.	  	  Dewey,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  a	  Nietzschean	  model	  of	  self-­‐overcoming	  of	  and	  through	  nihilism	  would	  allow,	  is	  rather	  sanguine	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  an	  "ordered	  and	  intelligent	  happiness"	  within	  historically	  realized	  communicating	  communities—understood	  here	  not	  just	  as	  Habermasian	  ideal	  speech	  conditions	  but	  as	  a	  more	  basically	  embodied	  practice	  of	  optimizing	  discursive	  fields	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  disclosure	  in	  natural-­‐historical	  communities.	  	  After	  having	  fully	  understood	  and	  transformed	  the	  reigning	  philosophical	  grammar	  or	  intellectual	  "common	  sense"	  in	  a	  localized	  community	  of	  interpretation,	  Dewey	  wishes	  to	  replace	  grand	  metaphysical	  narratives	  or	  culturally	  reified	  ethnonationalist	  mythologies	  with	  localized	  and	  piecemeal	  attempts	  at	  democratic	  amelioration	  of	  shared	  experience	  through	  the	  preservation	  and	  creative	  realization	  of	  intelligent	  practice:	  	  That	  which	  may	  be	  pretentiously	  unreal	  when	  it	  is	  formulated	  in	  metaphysical	  distinctions	  becomes	  intensely	  significant	  when	  connected	  with	  the	  drama	  of	  the	  struggle	  of	  social	  beliefs	  and	  ideals.	  	  Philosophy	  which	  surrenders	  its	  somewhat	  barren	  monopoly	  of	  dealings	  with	  Ultimate	  and	  Absolute	  Reality	  will	  find	  a	  compensation	  in	  enlightening	  the	  moral	  forces	  which	  move	  mankind	  and	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  aspirations	  of	  men	  to	  attain	  to	  a	  more	  ordered	  and	  intelligent	  happiness.18	  	  Dewey	  professes	  that	  to	  realize	  intelligent	  practice	  is	  to	  realize	  a	  creative	  agency	  in	  situations	  of	  natural	  complexity.	  	  Deweyan	  experimentalism	  is	  inherently	  naturalistic	  in	  that	  it	  attempts	  to	  "respect	  matter"	  as	  opposed	  to	  denigrating	  the	  lived	  body	  of	  natural-­‐social	  experience.	  	  For	  Dewey	  to	  "respect	  matter"	  means	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Ibid.,	  pp.26-­‐27.	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"respect	  the	  conditions	  of	  achievement;	  conditions	  which	  hinder	  and	  obstruct	  and	  which	  have	  to	  be	  changed,	  conditions	  which	  help	  and	  further	  and	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  modify	  obstructions	  and	  attain	  ends."	  	  And	  it	  is	  only	  when	  we	  as	  a	  culture	  or	  a	  communicating	  community	  of	  engaged	  ethical	  inquirers	  have	  "learned	  to	  pay	  sincere	  and	  persistent	  regard	  to	  matter,	  to	  the	  conditions	  upon	  which	  depends	  negatively	  and	  positively	  the	  success	  of	  all	  endeavor"	  that	  we	  might	  hope	  to	  express	  a	  "sincere	  and	  fruitful	  respect	  for	  ends	  and	  purposes."19	  	  Understanding	  the	  naturalistic	  background	  undergirding	  any	  means-­‐end	  continua	  in	  experience—in	  other	  words,	  recognizing	  the	  irreducible	  coherence	  of	  social	  intelligence	  and	  material	  practices—is	  to	  be	  well	  on	  the	  way	  to	  realizing	  creative	  agency	  in	  the	  world.	  	  While	  to	  "profess	  to	  have	  an	  aim	  and	  then	  neglect	  the	  means	  of	  its	  execution	  is	  self-­‐delusion	  of	  the	  most	  dangerous	  sort."20	  	  Dewey	  rejects	  any	  simplistic	  and	  false	  dichotomies	  between	  moral	  materialisms	  that	  deny	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  (theories	  like	  Spencerian	  social	  evolutionism)	  and	  moral	  idealisms	  or	  "sentimental"	  theories	  that	  profess	  lofty	  ideals	  without	  a	  pragmatic	  respect	  for	  a	  continuity	  of	  means-­‐end	  thinking	  in	  socially	  embodied	  intelligence.	  	  	   Suggesting	  a	  pragmatic	  naturalism	  as	  a	  viable	  middle	  way	  between	  the	  two	  extremes	  of	  reductive	  materialism	  and	  sentimental	  idealism,	  Dewey	  calls	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  "true	  stuff	  of	  experience"	  in	  realizing	  collective	  democratic	  agency:	  The	  true	  'stuff'	  of	  experience	  is	  recognized	  to	  be	  adaptive	  courses	  of	  actions,	  habits,	  active	  functions,	  connections	  of	  doing	  and	  undergoing;	  sensori-­‐motor	  co-­‐ordinations.	  	  Experience	  carries	  principles	  of	  connection	  and	  organization	  within	  itself.	  	  These	  [a	  priori	  Neo-­‐Kantian]	  principles	  are	  none	  the	  worse	  because	  they	  are	  vital	  and	  practical	  rather	  than	  epistemological....this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  p.72.	  20	  Ibid.	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organization	  intrinsic	  to	  life	  renders	  unnecessary	  a	  super-­‐natural	  and	  super-­‐empirical	  synthesis.	  	  It	  affords	  the	  basis	  and	  material	  for	  a	  positive	  evolution	  of	  intelligence	  as	  an	  organizing	  factor	  within	  experience.21	  	  Instead	  of	  seeking	  ahistorical,	  transcendental	  sources	  of	  meaning	  and	  value	  via	  a	  disengaged	  theoretical	  "use"	  of	  rational	  intellect,	  Dewey	  urges	  us	  to	  re-­‐envision	  moral	  philosophers	  instead	  as	  "moral	  artists"	  who	  make	  good	  use	  of	  narratives	  and	  exercise	  our	  powers	  of	  imagination	  in	  projects	  of	  to	  "reconstruction"	  in	  experience	  along	  more	  ordered,	  intelligent,	  and	  ultimately	  happy	  lines.	  	   For	  Dewey	  the	  only	  moral	  value	  that	  isn't	  open	  to	  revision	  is	  growth.	  	  Dewey	  obviously	  understands	  moral	  growth	  here	  not	  in	  merely	  quantitative	  terms.	  	  We	  can't	  measure	  Gross	  Domestic	  Happiness	  the	  same	  way	  we	  might	  calculate	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  for	  example.	  	  Dewey	  envisions	  growth	  within	  a	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  of	  persons	  as	  emerging	  out	  of	  role-­‐encumbered	  interpretive	  communities.	  	  For	  Dewey	  growth	  as	  an	  ethical	  value	  is	  just	  ordered,	  progressive	  change	  over	  time.	  	  The	  ethical	  aim	  of	  pragmatic	  agency	  is	  to	  realize	  intelligence	  in	  ameliorating	  situations.	  	  Agency	  must	  be	  applied	  to	  concrete	  situations	  and	  "signifies	  nothing	  less	  than	  that	  the	  world	  or	  any	  part	  of	  it	  as	  it	  presents	  itself	  at	  a	  given	  time	  is	  accepted	  or	  acquiesced	  in	  only	  as	  material	  for	  change...precisely	  as	  the	  carpenter,	  say,	  accepts	  things"	  	  and	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  along	  passive	  lines	  as	  mere	  acceptance	  but	  as	  an	  active,	  adapting	  designer	  who	  "notes	  things	  not	  just	  as	  objects	  in	  themselves,	  but	  with	  reference	  to	  what	  he	  wants	  to	  do	  to	  them	  and	  with	  them;	  to	  the	  end	  he	  has	  in	  mind."22	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.,	  p.91.	  22	  Ibid.,	  pp.114-­‐115.	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   Pragmatic	  moral	  inquiry	  is	  protected	  from	  the	  "vexatious	  and	  wasteful	  conflict	  between	  naturalism	  and	  humanism"	  because	  "inquiry,	  discovery	  take	  the	  same	  place	  in	  morals	  that	  they	  have	  come	  to	  occupy	  in	  sciences	  of	  nature."	  	  And	  for	  Dewey	  theories	  of	  truth,	  validation,	  demonstration	  "become	  experimental,	  a	  matter	  of	  consequences."23	  Dewey's	  experimental	  theory	  of	  pragmatic	  ethical	  agency	  can	  be	  productively	  characterized	  with	  the	  following	  four	  themes:	  1)	  Adaptability:	  "Moral	  life	  is	  protected	  from	  falling	  into	  formalism	  and	  rigid	  repetition.	  	  It	  is	  rendered	  flexible,	  vital,	  growing."24	  	  2)	  Attentiveness:	  Every	  (moral)	  situation	  deserves	  "the	  same	  intelligent	  attention."25	  	  3)	  Situationalism:	  Dewey	  suggests	  that	  a	  reconstructed	  experimentalism	  "destroys	  the	  root	  of	  Phariseeism"—there	  is	  no	  one	  size	  fits	  all	  morality.	  4)	  Evolutionary	  Intelligence:	  For	  Dewey	  "the	  process	  of	  growth,	  of	  improvement	  and	  progress,	  rather	  than	  the	  static	  outcome	  and	  result,	  becomes	  the	  significant	  thing."	  And	  "Not	  health	  as	  an	  end	  fixed	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  but	  the	  needed	  improvement	  in	  health—a	  continual	  process—is	  the	  end	  and	  good."	  All	  "active	  process	  of	  transforming	  the	  existent	  situation.	  	  Not	  perfection	  as	  a	  final	  goal,	  but	  the	  ever-­‐enduring	  process	  of	  perfecting,	  maturing,	  refining	  is	  the	  aim	  in	  living	  .	  .	  .	  directions	  of	  change	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  experience.	  	  Growth	  itself	  is	  the	  only	  moral	  'end'."26	  	   Adaptability,	  attentiveness,	  situationalism,	  and	  evolutionary	  intelligence	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  just	  four	  kindred	  ways	  of	  talking	  about	  non-­‐foundational	  ameliorism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.,	  p.174.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.175.	  25	  Ibid.,	  p.176.	  	  I	  believe	  Dewey's	  notion	  of	  ethical	  attention	  resonates	  profoundly	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  appreciation	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  shendu	  慎獨.	  26	  Ibid.,	  p.177.	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as	  a	  basic	  ethical	  orientation.	  	  Without	  positing	  a	  traditional	  teleological	  ethics	  of	  perfectionism,	  we	  have	  instead	  the	  idea	  of	  endless	  perfecting	  in	  concrete	  situations	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationships	  that	  narratively	  shape	  us	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  lifetime.	  	  Dewey	  defines	  meliorism	  as	  "the	  belief	  that	  the	  specific	  conditions	  which	  exist	  at	  one	  moment,	  be	  they	  comparatively	  bad	  or	  comparatively	  good,	  in	  any	  event	  may	  be	  bettered.	  	  It	  encourages	  intelligence	  to	  study	  the	  positive	  means	  of	  good	  and	  the	  obstructions	  to	  their	  realization,	  and	  to	  put	  forth	  endeavor	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  conditions."27	  	  It	  is	  growing	  "or	  continuous	  reconstruction	  of	  experience"	  that	  is	  the	  "only	  end."28	  	   The	  ideal	  as	  an	  end-­‐in-­‐view	  of	  democracy	  is	  made	  accessible	  to	  ordinary	  experience	  in	  the	  form	  of	  what	  the	  moral	  imagination	  can	  conjure	  up	  in	  reverently	  thinking	  about	  "the	  all-­‐around	  growth	  of	  every	  member	  of	  society."29	  Dewey	  is	  able	  to	  avoid	  the	  Scylla	  of	  classically	  liberal	  atomism	  and	  the	  Charybdis	  of	  social	  conformism/determinism	  (both	  of	  which	  rest	  upon	  foundationally	  individual	  assumptions	  about	  persons	  and	  society	  as	  being	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  aggregated	  collectivity	  of	  discrete	  individuals)	  by	  steering	  us	  into	  the	  waters	  of	  an	  organic	  conception	  of	  persons	  wherein	  "society	  and	  individuals	  are	  correlative,	  organic	  to	  one	  another,	  society	  requiring	  the	  service	  and	  subordination	  of	  individuals	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  existing	  to	  serve	  them."30	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  p.178.	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.184.	  29	  Ibid.,	  p.186.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.187.	  	  Sor-­‐Hoon	  Tan	  has	  adroitly	  considered	  the	  importance	  of	  Dewey's	  thinking	  in	  navigating	  the	  extremes	  of	  social	  conformism	  and	  autonomous	  individualism	  for	  projects	  aimed	  at	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  "Confucian	  democracy"	  in	  both	  liberal	  and	  a-­‐liberal	  cultural-­‐political	  contexts.	  	  See	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   Dewey	  offers	  a	  vision	  of	  what	  it	  would	  mean	  to	  think	  about	  persons	  beyond	  the	  metaphysical	  tradition	  of	  substance	  dualism	  and	  foundational	  individualism	  inherited	  from	  the	  regnant	  Greco-­‐Medieval	  philosophical	  grammar.	  	  In	  a	  fully	  reconstructed	  pragmatic	  vein,	  Dewey	  writes:	  When	  the	  self	  is	  regarded	  as	  something	  complete	  within	  itself,	  then	  it	  is	  readily	  argued	  that	  only	  internal	  moralistic	  changes	  are	  of	  importance	  in	  general	  reform.	  	  Institutional	  changes	  are	  said	  to	  be	  merely	  external.	  	  They	  may	  add	  conveniences	  and	  comforts	  to	  life,	  but	  they	  cannot	  effect	  moral	  improvements.	  	  The	  result	  is	  to	  throw	  the	  burden	  for	  social	  improvement	  upon	  free-­‐will	  in	  its	  most	  impossible	  form.	  	  Moreover,	  social	  and	  economic	  passivity	  are	  encouraged.	  	  Individuals	  are	  led	  to	  concentrate	  in	  moral	  introspection	  upon	  their	  own	  vices	  and	  virtues,	  and	  to	  neglect	  the	  character	  of	  the	  environment.	  	  Morals	  withdraw	  from	  active	  concern	  with	  detailed	  economic	  and	  political	  conditions.	  	  Let	  us	  perfect	  ourselves	  within,	  and	  in	  due	  season	  changes	  in	  society	  will	  come	  of	  themselves	  is	  the	  teaching.	  	  And	  while	  saints	  are	  engaged	  in	  introspection,	  burly	  sinners	  run	  the	  world.	  	  But	  when	  
self-­‐hood	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  an	  active	  process	  it	  is	  also	  seen	  that	  social	  modifications	  are	  the	  only	  means	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  changed	  personalities.	  	  Institutions	  are	  viewed	  in	  their	  educative	  effect:	  —	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  types	  of	  individuals	  they	  foster.	  	  The	  interest	  in	  objective	  reform	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  conditions	  are	  identified.	  	  And	  inquiry	  into	  the	  meaning	  of	  social	  arrangements	  gets	  definite	  point	  and	  direction.	  	  We	  are	  led	  to	  ask	  what	  the	  specific	  stimulating,	  fostering	  and	  nurturing	  power	  of	  each	  specific	  social	  arrangement	  may	  be.	  	  The	  old-­‐time	  separation	  between	  politics	  and	  morals	  is	  
abolished	  at	  its	  root.31	  	  	  It	  is	  only	  by	  reconstructing	  thinking	  and	  feeling	  in	  a	  relationally	  holistic	  way,	  at	  "the	  root",	  that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  realize	  more	  effective	  creative	  agency	  in	  democratic	  practices	  of	  ars	  contextualis.	  	  Dewey	  wants	  to	  give	  a	  new	  sense	  to	  the	  well-­‐worn	  concept	  of	  "Freedom"	  not	  as	  the	  exercise	  of	  individual	  autonomy	  but	  as	  the	  wholehearted	  participation	  in	  the	  ameliorative	  transformation	  of	  entangled	  webs	  of	  interpretive	  communities	  critically	  extending	  from	  families	  into	  various	  layers	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  her	  Confucian	  Democracy:	  A	  Deweyan	  Reconstruction	  (2003),	  especially	  her	  treatment	  of	  "individuality	  and	  organic	  sociality"	  pp.52-­‐62.	  31	  Ibid.,	  p.196.	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social-­‐political	  community	  context.	  	  For	  Dewey,	  the	  "long-­‐time	  controversy	  between	  rights	  and	  duties,	  law	  and	  freedom	  is	  another	  version	  of	  the	  strife	  between	  the	  Individual	  and	  Society	  as	  fixed	  concepts.	  .	  .	  Freedom	  for	  an	  individual	  means	  growth,	  ready	  change	  when	  modification	  is	  required."32	  	   With	  this	  understanding	  of	  Deweyan	  reconstruction	  in	  and	  of	  philosophy	  in	  mind	  let	  us	  transition	  back	  to	  our	  own	  reconstructing	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  as	  a	  distinct	  and	  viable	  philosophical	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  capable	  of	  amelioratively	  intervening	  in	  contemporary	  global	  ethical,	  political,	  and	  religious	  discourse.	  IV.	  Relational	  Internalism	  
	   A	  central	  theme	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  is	  the	  proper	  way	  of	  becoming	  consummately	  human	  (rendao	  人道)	  inevitably	  involves	  processes	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  our	  interpersonal	  experience	  of	  relationships	  and	  the	  values	  at	  play	  in	  our	  admiration	  for	  exemplary	  persons	  and	  their	  performative	  virtuosic	  conduct	  (de	  德)	  disclosed	  in	  place-­‐based	  historical-­‐cultural	  contexts.	  	  We	  always	  already	  find	  ourselves	  "thrown"	  into	  such	  horizons	  of	  intergenerational	  narrative	  belonging.33	  The	  Zhongyong	  reminds	  us	  that	  "proper	  way-­‐making	  is	  never	  far	  off"	  (dao	  bu	  yuan	  
ren	  道不遠人)	  or	  wholly	  transcendent	  of	  our	  narratively	  embedded	  relational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.207.	  33	  I	  use	  the	  Heideggerian	  term	  "throwness"	  here	  with	  some	  reticence	  because	  the	  vision	  of	  unique	  human	  becomings	  on	  offer	  in	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics	  has	  a	  much	  more	  optimistic	  sense	  of	  human	  belonging	  in	  family	  (not	  merely	  biological	  but	  understood	  as	  a	  cultural-­‐ethical	  achievement	  and	  idealization	  of	  the	  human	  experience).	  	  However,	  the	  aspect	  of	  "thrownness"	  as	  pointing	  to	  our	  always	  indeterminate	  sense	  of	  non-­‐autonomous	  facticity	  does	  a	  nice	  job	  of	  capturing	  the	  overall	  fragility	  of	  the	  process	  of	  exercising	  solicitude	  over	  one's	  relational	  nexus	  of	  transactional	  becoming	  and	  hints	  at	  the	  limitations	  that	  any	  ethico-­‐political	  project	  drawing	  upon	  the	  resources	  of	  CRE	  would	  inevitably	  face	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact.	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contexts	  and	  thus	  creative	  way-­‐making	  as	  role-­‐focused	  agency	  cannot	  be	  abandoned	  for	  even	  a	  moment.	  Resolutely	  attending	  to	  personal	  cultivation	  in	  fields	  of	  relational	  becoming	  implies	  that	  the	  "virtuosic	  powers"	  (de	  德)	  variously	  identified	  as	  threefold	  (ren	  仁,	  zhi	  智,	  yong	  勇)	  in	  the	  Zhongyong,	  fourfold	  (ren	  仁,	  yi	  義,	  li	  禮,	  
zhi	  智)	  in	  the	  Mengzi,	  and	  fivefold	  (ren	  仁,	  yi	  義,	  li	  禮,	  zhi	  智,	  sheng	  聖)	  in	  the	  "Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct"	  Wuxing	  are	  viewed,	  by	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  tradition,	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  development	  of	  our	  personal	  experience.	  	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  posit	  some	  transcendent	  onto-­‐teleological	  source	  of	  values	  as	  the	  root	  (ben	  本)	  	  is	  single-­‐sourced	  within	  an	  interpretive	  horizon	  achieved	  within	  the	  natural	  complexes	  of	  family	  and	  social	  institutions.	  	   The	  concept	  of	  "intrinsic"	  (nei	  內)	  is	  pervasive	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  and	  is	  frequently	  contrasted	  with	  the	  "extrinsic"	  (wai	  外).34	  	  Since	  I	  choose	  to	  read	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  as	  devoid	  of	  a	  sharp	  ontological	  dichotomy	  between	  a	  supposedly	  purely	  inward	  psychologism	  and	  an	  objective	  world	  or	  things-­‐in-­‐themselves,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  these	  terms	  is	  to	  employ	  a	  correlative	  cosmological	  framework	  that	  presupposes	  a	  pragmatic	  distinction	  between	  a	  "private",	  because	  more	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  a	  unique	  human	  person,	  and	  a	  "public"	  realm,	  because	  more	  extrinsic	  to	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  a	  relationally	  distinct	  site	  of	  deference	  within	  a	  role-­‐governed	  social	  ontology	  of	  persons.	  	  A	  driving	  problematic	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  reconstruct	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  conception	  of	  ethically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  There	  is	  considerable	  debate	  as	  to	  how	  to	  understand	  this	  conceptual	  pairing	  in	  received	  texts	  like	  the	  Mengzi	  and	  Zhongyong.	  	  Some	  recently	  excavated	  texts	  point	  to	  a	  conceptual	  evolution	  from	  a	  simple	  spatial	  boundary	  threshold	  marked	  by	  the	  "household	  gates",	  to	  a	  more	  metaphysical	  construction	  of	  agency	  as	  sourced	  from	  within	  embodied	  experience	  or	  derived	  from	  externally	  imposed	  norms.	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experiential	  internalism	  within	  a	  thoroughly	  correlative	  cosmology.35	  	  Certain	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  values	  would	  require	  the	  positing	  of	  some	  superordinate	  source	  of	  transcendent	  principles	  that	  come	  to	  unilaterally	  direct	  or	  conduct	  natural	  experience	  via	  an	  external	  imposition	  of	  some	  predetermined	  teleological	  order	  of	  being.	  	  Such	  an	  ontotheological	  or	  "supernatural"	  way	  of	  conceiving	  axiological	  sources	  has	  certainly	  been	  part	  of	  the	  philosophical	  "common	  sense"	  in	  Western	  philosophy.	  	  Such	  thinking	  depends	  upon	  a	  substance	  ontology	  and	  accompanying	  philosophical	  grammar	  that	  expresses	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  essentialized	  substances	  and	  their	  corresponding	  attributes.	  	  In	  a	  world	  defined	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  static,	  discrete	  substances	  (Reality)	  and	  our	  subjective	  perception	  of	  changing	  phenomena	  (Appearance),	  values	  are	  transcendentally	  grounded	  in	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐many	  metaphysical	  narrative.	  	  Such	  transcendent	  values	  are	  then	  conceived	  as	  either	  purely	  subjective	  expressions	  of	  value	  preference	  or	  as	  objective	  perceptions	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  "queer"	  qualia	  as	  moral	  epiphenomena.	  	  In	  a	  thoroughly	  relational	  
cosmology	  however,	  we	  avoid	  the	  false	  dichotomy	  between	  hard-­‐headed	  reductionism	  and	  tender-­‐minded	  mystification.	  	  For	  correlative	  thinking	  the	  philosophical	  grammar	  of	  discrete	  substances	  and	  accidental	  appearances	  finds	  no	  interpretive	  traction.	  	  In	  the	  speculative	  metaphysics	  pressupposed	  by	  pre-­‐Qin	  correlative	  thinkers,	  the	  predominant	  conceptual	  clusters	  on	  offer	  allusively	  reference	  fluid	  processes	  and	  relatively	  stable	  events	  and	  a	  rhythm	  of	  experience	  punctuated	  with	  the	  "flights	  and	  perchings"	  of	  consummatory	  disclosure.	  	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  I	  generally	  prefer	  to	  employ	  the	  term	  relational	  'cosmology'	  instead	  of	  'ontology'	  because	  of	  the	  decidedly	  a-­‐metaphysical	  assumptions	  of	  the	  early	  Chinese	  philosophical	  tradition.	  	  See	  my	  review	  of	  
Chinese	  Metaphysics	  and	  its	  Problems	  (Cambridge	  2015)	  "Chinese	  Metaphysics:	  A	  New	  Name	  for	  some	  Old	  Ways	  of	  Thinking"	  in	  China	  Review	  International	  (2017).	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important	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  problem	  of	  indexical	  or	  illustrative	  reference	  or	  "pointing"	  to	  exemplary	  figures	  can	  be	  explained	  within	  a	  correlative	  cosmology	  of	  dynamic	  transactional	  becoming	  punctuated	  with	  the	  ethico-­‐aesthetic	  consummations	  of	  certain	  celebrated	  personalities	  and	  their	  virtuosic	  achievements.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  exemplarism	  will	  be	  an	  optimal	  way	  to	  approach	  Confucian	  Role	  ethics.	  	  In	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethical	  vision,	  the	  admirable	  exemplarity	  of	  persons	  (real	  and	  imagined)	  gets	  situated	  within	  a	  disclosive	  horizon	  of	  tian	  天	  engendered	  role-­‐focused	  agency.36	  	   In	  the	  1998	  Gilbert	  Ryle	  lectures,	  published	  later	  as	  Intimacy	  or	  Integrity:	  
Philosophy	  and	  Cultural	  Difference,	  Thomas	  Kasulis	  draws	  a	  most	  helpful	  distinction	  between	  an	  intimacy	  and	  integrity	  orientation.	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  "we	  might	  find	  it	  helpful	  to	  watch	  for	  certain	  general	  patterns	  that	  might	  have	  heuristic	  value"	  as	  it	  will	  "aid	  our	  concern	  for	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limitations	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  analysis,	  communication,	  and	  cooperation."37	  	  While	  recognizing	  that	  "generalizations	  are	  always	  distortions,"	  Kasulis	  still	  distinguishes	  between	  what	  he	  sees	  to	  be	  two	  fundamentally	  divergent	  cultural	  modes	  of	  disclosing	  values	  in	  embodied	  experience.	  	  He	  focuses	  on	  two	  "recursive	  cultural	  patterns"—intimacy	  and	  
integrity—showing	  how	  they	  respectively	  generate	  "very	  different	  cultural	  understanding[s]	  of	  fact	  and	  value,	  of	  what-­‐is	  and	  what-­‐should-­‐be,	  by	  reiterating	  this	  pattern	  over	  and	  over	  again	  into	  ever	  more	  complex	  theoretical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	  more	  on	  exemplarist	  readings	  of	  Confucianism	  see	  Tim	  Connolly's	  The	  Foundations	  of	  
Confucian	  Ethics	  (Forthcoming)	  and	  Amy	  Olberding's	  Moral	  Exemplars	  in	  the	  Analects:	  The	  Good	  
Person	  is	  That	  (2013).	  37	  Thomas	  Kasulis,	  Intimacy	  or	  Integrity,	  p.5	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manifestations."38	  	  By	  exploring	  "two	  essentially	  different	  ways	  of	  relating"	  as	  juxtaposed	  "cultural	  gestalts"	  Kasulis	  provides	  a	  most	  useful	  heuristic	  for	  thinking	  through	  cultural	  difference	  and	  deep	  philosophical	  grammar.	  	   Etymology	  can	  be	  philosophically	  revealing.	  	  Intimus	  means	  either	  "what	  is	  innermost"	  or	  "a	  close	  friend."	  	  And	  the	  verb	  "intimare"	  means	  "to	  make	  known"	  and	  "putting	  this	  together,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  root	  meaning	  of	  intimacy	  is	  something	  like	  'making	  known	  to	  a	  close	  friend	  what	  is	  innermost.'"39	  	  Thus,	  intimacy	  always	  involves	  an	  "inseparability,	  a	  belonging	  together,	  a	  sharing"—an	  interpretive	  perspective	  that	  involves	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  primacy	  of	  internal	  relations	  over	  external	  relatedness.	  	  Kasulis	  characterizes	  an	  intimacy	  orientation	  with	  five	  features:	  1)	  Intimacy	  is	  objective,	  but	  personal	  rather	  than	  public.	  2)	  In	  an	  intimate	  relation,	  self	  and	  other	  belong	  together	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  sharply	  distinguish	  the	  two.	  3)	  Intimate	  knowledge	  has	  an	  affective	  dimension.	  4)	  Intimacy	  is	  somatic	  as	  well	  as	  psychological.	  5)	  Intimacy's	  ground	  is	  not	  generally	  self-­‐conscious,	  reflective,	  or	  self-­‐illuminating.40	  	   An	  integrity	  orientation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  derives	  from	  the	  Latin	  "integritas"	  related	  to	  "integer,"	  meaning	  an	  indivisible	  whole.	  	  Kasulis	  reminds	  us	  that	  we	  call	  whole	  numbers	  "integers"	  because	  they	  are	  not	  fractionalized	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Ibid.,	  p.11.	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.24.	  40	  Ibid..	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"integer"	  is	  probably	  related	  to	  "in"	  +	  "tegere"	  or	  "in"	  +	  "tangere,"	  that	  is,	  "not"	  +	  "touch-­‐able."	  	  So	  that	  which	  has	  integrity	  is	  "untouched,	  uncorrupted,	  pure."	  	  A	  person	  of	  integrity	  will	  not	  sell	  out.	  	  And	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  ship's	  hull	  will	  keep	  it	  afloat.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  etymological	  meaning	  of	  integrity	  suggests	  "being	  whole,	  indivisible,	  and	  inviolable."41	  	  And	  in	  more	  or	  less	  direct	  opposition	  to	  an	  intimacy	  orientation	  an	  integrity	  orientation	  clusters	  around	  the	  following	  five	  features:	  1)	  Objectivity	  as	  public	  verifiability.	  2)	  External	  over	  internal	  relations.	  3)	  Knowledge	  as	  ideally	  empty	  of	  affect.	  4)	  The	  intellectual	  and	  psychological	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  somatic.	  5)	  Knowledge	  as	  reflective	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  of	  its	  own	  grounds.	  Kasulis'	  approach	  is	  most	  helpful	  in	  providing	  framework	  for	  orienting	  our	  thinking	  about	  deep	  philosophical	  grammar	  and	  localized	  patterns	  of	  cultural	  difference.	  	  We	  could	  then	  claim	  that	  that	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  cultural	  orientation	  is	  decidedly	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  intimacy	  cultural	  gestalt.	  	  However,	  we	  might	  also	  wish	  to	  push	  beyond	  
describing	  cultural	  difference	  and	  critically	  ponder	  the	  value	  of	  one	  or	  another	  basic	  orientation	  in	  prescribing	  possible	  cultural	  embodiment.	  	  	  	   Indeed,	  a	  major	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  ask	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  creatively	  "integrate"	  the	  best	  of	  both	  an	  intimacy	  and	  integrity	  orientation	  while	  avoiding	  the	  pernicious	  aspects	  of	  what	  both	  cultural-­‐metaphysical	  extremes	  are	  capable	  of	  carrying	  out	  in	  the	  service	  of	  distorting	  ideologies	  and	  coercively	  imposed	  value	  horizons.	  	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  "resolute	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.25.	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becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  and	  agential	  "creativity"	  (cheng	  誠)	  can	  offer	  a	  way	  around	  the	  seeming	  impasse	  of	  a	  metaphysical	  bifurcation	  and	  pernicious	  relativism	  that	  would	  essentialize	  these	  fundamental	  differences	  in	  cultural	  orientation.	  	  Such	  essentializing	  bifurcation	  is	  precisely	  what	  John	  Dewey	  warned	  against	  in	  the	  inaugural	  issue	  of	  Philosophy	  East	  and	  West	  as	  "cultural	  block	  universes"	  standing	  in	  confrontational	  and	  incommensurable	  relationships	  to	  each	  other	  on	  a	  global	  stage	  of	  intercultural	  comparative	  philosophy:	  To	  adapt	  a	  phrase	  of	  William	  James,	  there	  are	  no	  "cultural	  block	  universes"	  and	  the	  hope	  of	  free	  men	  everywhere	  is	  to	  prevent	  any	  such	  "cultural	  block	  universes"	  from	  ever	  arising	  and	  fixing	  themselves	  upon	  all	  mankind	  or	  any	  portion	  of	  mankind.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  your	  journal	  can	  keep	  the	  idea	  open	  and	  working	  that	  there	  are	  "specific	  philosophical	  relationships"	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  West	  and	  in	  the	  East	  and	  between	  the	  West	  and	  East	  you	  will,	  I	  think,	  be	  contributing	  most	  fruitfully	  and	  dynamically	  to	  the	  enlightenment	  and	  betterment	  of	  the	  human	  estate.42	  	  But	  this	  doesn't	  mean	  that	  we	  shouldn't	  be	  up	  front	  about	  drawing	  productive	  generalizations	  regarding	  the	  basic	  presuppositions	  and	  deep	  philosophical	  grammar	  implicit	  in	  uniquely	  located	  cultures	  of	  interpretation	  (thinkers,	  texts,	  and	  traditions).	  	  We	  can't	  do	  productive	  comparative	  philosophy	  amongst	  or	  "in-­‐between"	  traditions,	  if	  we	  don't	  first	  attempt	  to	  get	  clear	  about	  the	  common	  philosophical	  grammar	  and	  background	  presuppositions	  shaping	  the	  conceptual	  clusters	  operative	  in	  any	  encounter	  with	  thinkers	  and	  texts	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  their	  enabling	  traditions.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  John	  Dewey,	  "On	  Philosophical	  Synthesis"	  	  PEW	  1	  (April	  1951:	  3).	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V.	  Embodied	  Ethical	  Agency	  	   Within	  the	  context	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  embodiment	  plays	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  conceptualizing	  categories	  of	  moral	  psychology.	  	  The	  prevalence	  of	  embodied	  moral	  phenomenology	  and	  embodied	  root-­‐metaphors	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  should	  alert	  us	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  within	  the	  naturalistic	  assumptions	  of	  this	  tradition	  there	  is	  no	  space	  for	  purely	  theoretical	  or	  abstract	  discourse	  about	  ethical	  judgment	  or	  moral	  reflection.	  	  All	  thinking	  is	  irremediably	  a	  sort	  of	  "someaesthetics"43	  or	  thinking-­‐through-­‐the-­‐body	  for	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucians.	  	   Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  has	  argued	  convincingly	  that	  a	  certain	  "philosophy	  of	  grammar"	  structures	  all	  thinking	  due	  to	  inevitable	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  specificity:	  The	  strange	  family	  resemblance	  of	  all	  Indian,	  Greek,	  and	  German	  philosophizing	  is	  explained	  easily	  enough.	  	  Where	  there	  is	  an	  affinity	  of	  languages,	  it	  cannot	  fail,	  owing	  to	  the	  common	  philosophy	  of	  grammar—I	  mean,	  owing	  to	  the	  unconscious	  domination	  and	  guidance	  by	  similar	  grammatical	  functions—that	  everything	  is	  prepared	  at	  the	  outset	  for	  a	  similar	  development	  and	  sequence	  of	  philosophical	  systems;	  just	  as	  the	  way	  seems	  barred	  against	  certain	  other	  possibilities	  of	  world-­‐interpretation.44	  	  The	  idea	  presented	  here	  is	  that	  our	  various	  modes	  of	  "world-­‐interpretation"	  are	  grown	  out	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  "philosophical	  systems"	  driven	  in	  large	  part,	  if	  not	  entirely,	  by	  the	  "unconscious	  domination"	  of	  an	  embodied	  mode	  of	  world	  disclosure	  or	  a	  deep	  philosophy	  of	  grammar.	  	  Our	  sedimented	  habits	  and	  deeply	  ingrained	  patterns	  of	  conduct	  and	  bodily	  comportment	  have	  their	  own	  moral	  intertia.	  	  An	  inertia	  that	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  influenced	  by	  deep	  cultural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  See	  Richard	  Shusterman's	  Thinking	  Through	  the	  Body:	  Essays	  in	  Somaesthetics	  (2012)	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  this	  new	  name	  for	  some	  very	  old	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  philosophy	  as	  an	  embodied	  practice	  of	  enhancing	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  as	  opposed	  to	  some	  priestly-­‐valued	  rejection	  of	  vitality	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  purely	  rational	  preparation	  for	  death.	  44	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,	  p.	  19.	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presuppositions	  that	  operate	  unconsciously	  and	  pervasively	  in	  enacting	  agency	  and	  disclosive	  world-­‐interpretation.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Nietzsche	  here	  is	  not	  arguing	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  hard	  linguistic	  determinism	  (a	  la	  Sapir-­‐Whorf	  hypothesis).	  	  For	  despite	  our	  throwness	  in	  a	  culturally	  encoded	  philosophical	  grammar,	  we	  can	  still	  think	  or	  say	  virtually	  anything	  within	  the	  play	  of	  differences	  available	  within	  any	  natural	  language	  complex.	  	  What	  Nietzsche	  is	  proscribing	  is	  that	  any	  given	  cultural	  context	  inevitably	  does	  influence	  how	  and	  what	  we	  can	  possibly	  think	  and	  do	  when	  we	  engage	  in	  philosophical	  reflection	  as	  that	  "uncommonly	  stubborn	  attempt	  to	  think	  clearly."45	  	   William	  James	  has	  similarly	  suggested	  that	  "our	  fundamental	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  things	  are	  discoveries	  of	  exceedingly	  remote	  ancestors,	  which	  have	  been	  able	  to	  preserve	  themselves	  throughout	  the	  experience	  of	  all	  subsequent	  time.	  	  They	  form	  one	  great	  stage	  of	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  human	  mind's	  development,	  the	  stage	  of	  common	  sense."46	  	  James	  further	  argued	  that	  this	  philosophical	  common	  sense	  is	  operative	  at	  the	  level	  of	  our	  basic	  thinking	  about:	  "things,	  kinds,	  sameness	  or	  difference,	  minds,	  bodies,	  subjects	  and	  attributes,	  causal	  influence,	  the	  fancied,	  the	  real,"	  and	  so	  on.	  	  In	  considering	  the	  philosophical	  common	  sense	  as	  adumbrated	  by	  the	  pragmatist	  pioneer,	  Roger	  Ames	  sounds	  a	  critical	  endorsement	  of	  this	  "generalizing"	  without	  "essentializing"	  way	  of	  thinking:	  	  Although	  we	  might	  	  be	  properly	  critical	  of	  James	  for	  taking	  the	  familiar	  categories	  of	  our	  own	  common	  sense—indeed,	  the	  default	  vocabulary	  of	  a	  metaphysical	  realism—as	  definitive	  of	  the	  "human	  mind"	  without	  taking	  genuine	  cultural	  differences	  into	  account,	  his	  basic	  point	  about	  the	  thickness	  of	  culture	  is	  still	  well	  made.	  	  Sedimented	  across	  the	  centuries	  into	  our	  ways	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  How	  William	  James	  defined	  philosophy	  at	  one	  point.	  	  See	  Pragmatism	  (1907).	  46	  William	  James,	  Pragmatism,	  p.	  76.	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of	  thinking	  and	  living	  is	  a	  persistent	  deep	  stratum,	  an	  abiding	  internal	  impulse	  that	  grounds	  more	  apparent	  changes.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  "common	  sense"	  has	  itself	  always	  been	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  ineluctable	  process	  of	  change,	  but	  relatively	  speaking,	  it	  is	  also	  resilient	  and	  enduring.47	  	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  resilient	  and	  enduring	  modes	  of	  philosophical	  common	  sense	  in	  the	  modern	  West	  has	  been	  a	  presumption	  of	  an	  ontological	  difference	  to	  explain	  agency—the	  ubiquity	  of	  mind/body	  dualism.	  	  When	  James'	  suggests	  that	  this	  dualistic	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  the	  "discovery	  of	  exceedingly	  remote	  ancestors"	  we	  should	  inquire	  as	  to	  how	  far	  back	  he	  would	  have	  us	  take	  this	  genealogy	  of	  culturally	  embodied	  concepts.	  	  We	  might	  want	  to	  read	  James	  against	  James	  himself	  in	  problematizing	  an	  overly	  Eurocentric	  conception	  of	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  philosophical	  "common	  sense."48	  	   At	  least	  since	  Plato's	  Phaedrus	  it	  has	  been	  customary	  to	  think	  of	  the	  lived	  
soma	  as	  an	  more	  or	  less	  inert	  container	  for	  an	  agentially	  active	  individual	  psyche,	  theoretically	  at	  least,	  capable	  of	  existing	  independently	  of	  any	  materially	  embodied	  structure.	  	  By	  the	  modern	  period	  Rene	  Descartes'	  methodological	  dualism	  of	  mind/body	  (res	  cogitans	  and	  res	  extensa)	  further	  served	  to	  entrench	  this	  mode	  of	  philosophical	  common	  sense	  within	  the	  emerging	  modern	  Western	  philosophical	  imaginaire.	  Gilbert	  Ryle	  took	  these	  sorts	  of	  dualistic	  metaphysics	  of	  persons	  as	  paradigmatic	  instances	  of	  a	  fundamental	  "category	  mistake"	  in	  thinking	  and	  initiated	  a	  critique	  in	  analytic	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  that	  has	  helped	  to	  release	  the	  grip	  that	  this	  cultural	  common	  sense	  has	  held	  for	  so	  long.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Roger	  Ames,	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.43.	  48	  For	  a	  critical	  look	  at	  the	  pernicious	  aspects	  of	  Jamesian	  cultural	  chauvinism	  and	  cultural	  interpretation	  see	  Samir	  Chopra's	  "The	  Worst	  Sentence	  James	  Ever	  Wrote"	  https://samirchopra.com/2017/11/14/the-­‐worst-­‐sentence-­‐william-­‐james-­‐ever-­‐wrote/#comment-­‐93648	  (Accessed	  4/20/18)	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   In	  a	  similar	  vein	  of	  "paradigm	  shifting"	  protestant	  critique,	  William	  James	  offers	  an	  analogy	  of	  "climate"	  to	  illustrate	  the	  redundancy	  of	  dualistic	  thinking	  in	  positing	  a	  superordinate	  substance	  like	  "soul"	  or	  "self"	  or	  "mind"	  to	  explain	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  agency	  as	  a	  superordinate	  process	  guiding	  our	  "stream	  of	  consciousness":	  The	  low	  thermometer	  to-­‐day,	  for	  instance,	  is	  supposed	  to	  come	  from	  something	  called	  the	  "climate."	  	  Climate	  is	  really	  only	  the	  name	  for	  a	  certain	  group	  of	  days,	  but	  it	  is	  treated	  as	  if	  it	  lay	  behind	  the	  day,	  and	  in	  general	  we	  place	  the	  name,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  being,	  behind	  the	  facts	  it	  is	  the	  name	  of.	  	  But	  the	  phenomenal	  properties	  of	  things	  ...	  do	  not	  inhere	  in	  anything.	  	  They	  adhere,	  or	  cohere,	  rather,	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  substance	  inaccessible	  to	  us,	  which	  we	  think	  accounts	  for	  such	  cohesion	  buy	  supporting	  it,	  as	  cement	  might	  support	  pieces	  of	  a	  mosaic,	  must	  be	  abandoned.	  	  The	  fact	  of	  the	  bare	  cohesion	  itself	  is	  all	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  substance	  signifies.	  	  Behind	  that	  fact	  is	  nothing.49	  	  Instead	  of	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  transcendent	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐many	  model	  or	  Reality/appearance	  set	  of	  dualistic	  categories,	  in	  the	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  offered	  here	  the	  "Confucian	  alternative	  to	  locating	  personal	  identity	  in	  some	  superordinate	  soul	  or	  self	  or	  mind	  is	  to	  find	  this	  same	  coherence	  in	  the	  achieved	  coordination	  and	  integration	  of	  one's	  conduct	  expressed	  through	  one's	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relations."50	  	   Indeed,	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  somaesthetics51	  that	  aims	  to	  cultivate	  an	  ethical	  mode	  of	  concentration	  on	  and	  through	  the	  body	  that	  enhances	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  experience	  by	  opening	  us	  up	  to	  the	  potentials	  for	  personal	  growth	  inherent	  in	  our	  embodied	  experience	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  vitally	  significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  William	  James,	  Pragmatism,	  p.42.	  50	  Roger	  Ames,	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.103.	  51	  "Somaesthetics"	  is	  a	  neologism	  coined	  by	  Richard	  Shusterman	  to	  refer	  to	  philosophical	  thinking	  through	  the	  body—both	  for	  its	  potential	  to	  critically	  ameliorate	  our	  thinking	  and	  for	  its	  promise	  to	  enhance	  our	  lived	  experience	  through	  cultivating	  better	  modes	  of	  embodied	  living	  and	  self-­‐use.	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relationships.	  	  In	  reflecting	  on	  our	  embodied,	  relational	  and	  irreducibly	  narrative	  disclosure	  of	  ethical	  agency	  and	  personhood,	  Roger	  Ames	  argues	  that	  "physically,	  socially,	  and	  religiously,	  our	  bodies	  are	  a	  specific	  matrix	  of	  nested	  relations	  and	  functions,	  and	  are	  invariably	  a	  collaboration	  between	  our	  persons	  and	  our	  many	  environments.	  .	  ."Nobody"	  and	  no	  "body"—not	  the	  vital,	  the	  social,	  or	  the	  carnal	  bodies—do	  anything	  by	  themselves."52	  	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition,	  "we	  might	  correlate	  'body'	  (ti	  體)	  and	  its	  cognate	  character	  'achieved	  propriety	  in	  one's	  roles	  and	  relations'	  (li	  禮)	  by	  arguing	  that	  they	  express	  two	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  same	  phenomenon:	  	  That	  is,	  they	  reference	  'a	  living	  body'	  and	  'embodied	  living'	  respectively."53	  	   Ti	  體	  is	  just	  one	  character	  amongst	  many	  in	  a	  conceptual	  cluster	  bearing	  a	  family	  resemblance	  to	  some	  post-­‐metaphysical	  pragmatist	  conceptions	  of	  lived	  embodiment.	  	  Other	  terms	  include	  "lived	  body/ritually	  performative	  person"	  (shen	  
身),	  "mortal	  coil"	  (qu	  區),	  "embodied	  self"	  (ji	  己),	  etc.54	  	  The	  correlative	  cosmological	  and	  philosophically	  cognate	  relationship	  between	  "embodiment"	  (ti	  體)	  and	  "ritual	  practice"	  (li	  禮)	  is	  clearly	  born	  out	  in	  foundational	  texts	  like	  the	  Book	  of	  Rites:	  Now	  the	  great	  corpus	  of	  ritual	  proprieties	  (li	  zhi	  dati	  禮之大體)	  is	  embodied	  (ti	  體)	  in	  the	  heavens	  and	  the	  earth,	  emulates	  the	  four	  seasons,	  takes	  yin	  and	  
yang	  as	  its	  standard,	  comports	  with	  human	  feeling,	  and	  is	  thus	  called	  "ritual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.109.	  53	  Ibid.	  54	  See	  Deborah	  Sommer's	  insightful	  article	  "Boundaries	  of	  the	  Ti	  Body."	  Asia	  Major	  (Third	  Series),	  
21(1).	  	  Here	  she	  defines	  the	  ti-­‐body	  relationally	  in	  analogical	  fashion	  with	  the	  propagation	  of	  vegetable	  roots/rhizomes	  as	  a	  "polysemous	  corpus	  of	  indeterminate	  extent	  that	  can	  be	  partitioned	  into	  subtler	  units,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  often	  analogous	  to	  the	  whole	  and	  shares	  a	  fundamental	  consubstantiality	  and	  common	  identity	  with	  that	  whole....When	  a	  ti	  body	  is	  fragmented	  into	  parts	  (literally	  or	  conceptually),	  each	  part	  retains,	  in	  certain	  aspects,	  a	  kind	  of	  wholeness	  or	  becomes	  a	  simulacra	  of	  the	  larger	  entity	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  constituent."	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practice"	  (li	  禮).	  	  As	  for	  those	  who	  would	  denigrate	  these	  proprieties,	  they	  have	  no	  idea	  where	  such	  things	  come	  from.55	  	  While	  it	  might	  be	  entirely	  appropriate	  to	  jettison	  any	  foundational	  notion	  of	  personal	  "identity"	  when	  working	  within	  this	  process-­‐oriented	  conceptual	  cluster	  of	  Confucian	  terms	  for	  embodiment,	  we	  can	  still	  speak	  of	  a	  relationally	  integrated	  and	  role-­‐focused	  experiential	  and	  intersubjective	  nexus	  of	  ethical	  embodiment	  that	  abides	  through	  changing	  temporal	  transformations	  and	  significant	  narrative	  transitions:	  The	  communal	  shen	  身	  body	  is	  diffused	  in	  the	  dynamic	  family	  and	  communal	  roles	  and	  relations	  that	  constitutes	  it,	  and	  just	  as	  the	  ti	  體	  body	  does	  not	  carry	  with	  it	  a	  superordinate	  notion	  of	  "self"	  or	  "soul"—some	  ghost	  in	  the	  machine—likewise,	  achieved	  propriety	  in	  living	  one's	  roles	  and	  relations	  (li	  
禮)	  that	  complements	  this	  body	  in	  constituting	  one's	  person	  is	  also	  primordial.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  quality	  of	  one's	  conduct	  is	  not	  mediated	  by	  or	  reduplicated	  in	  some	  notion	  of	  a	  discrete	  "agent"	  or	  "character"	  that	  would	  isolate	  and	  locate	  persons	  outside	  of	  the	  concrete	  patterns	  of	  their	  social	  and	  natural	  relations.	  	  Instead,	  the	  identity	  of	  persons	  lies	  in	  the	  achieved	  amalgamation,	  the	  integration,	  and	  the	  sustained	  coherence	  of	  their	  continuing	  habits	  of	  conduct	  within	  the	  embodied	  roles	  that	  constitute	  them.56	  	  As	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  disclose	  throughout	  this	  exploration	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  on	  the	  creative	  integration	  of	  personal	  experience	  and	  the	  inward	  transformation	  of	  selving	  processes	  to	  realize	  effective	  agency	  in	  the	  world,	  ritually-­‐refined	  embodiment	  plays	  a	  vital	  role.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  D.C.	  Lau	  (1992).	  Liji	  50.1/174/18:	  凡禮之大體，體天地，法四時，則陰陽，順人情，故謂之禮。
呲之者是不知禮之所由生也。	  56	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.111.	  	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  while	  we	  should	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  jettison	  notions	  of	  a	  discrete	  "subjectivity"	  as	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐Many	  metaphysics	  of	  persons,	  that	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  
agency	  realized	  in	  a	  relational	  context	  of	  correlative	  cosmology	  and	  aesthetic	  holism	  is	  still	  a	  viable	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  non-­‐foundational	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  moral	  psychology.	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VI.	  Relational	  Ontology	  of	  Persons	  and	  Transactional	  Affect	  
	   Affect	  theory	  has	  come	  to	  replace	  obsolete	  and	  dualistic	  ways	  of	  conceptualizing	  emotional	  experience	  within	  some	  supposedly	  purely	  inward	  and	  private	  theater	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  no	  inherent	  intentional	  structure	  or	  object-­‐oriented	  ontology.	  	  Cartesian	  solipsism	  views	  the	  emotional	  life	  of	  persons	  as	  epistemically	  external	  to	  the	  "theater	  of	  the	  rational	  mind"	  and	  such	  thinking	  about	  emotion	  has	  been	  perpetuated	  in	  the	  common	  sense	  of	  Western	  modernity.	  	  Within	  traditional	  Cartesian	  assumptions	  it	  is	  held	  that	  we	  "have"	  or	  subjectively	  "experience"	  emotions	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  might	  perceive	  images	  projected	  onto	  a	  diaphanous	  screen	  of	  consciousness.	  	  As	  such,	  emotions	  are	  utterly	  unreliable	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemic	  and	  ontological	  disclosure.	  	  The	  fact/value	  dichotomy	  so	  central	  to	  so	  much	  of	  the	  Cartesian-­‐inspired	  project	  of	  Enlightenment	  modernity—the	  pervasive	  separation	  of	  "what-­‐is"	  from	  "what-­‐ought-­‐to-­‐be"	  as	  non-­‐overlapping	  domains	  of	  discourse—has	  its	  roots	  in	  this	  denigration	  of	  affective	  experience	  as	  
mere	  appearance.	  	  We	  might	  trace	  this	  intellectual	  tendency	  back	  to	  a	  certain	  Greek	  (Platonic-­‐Stoic)	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  separates	  pure	  thinking	  from	  the	  messy	  experience	  of	  embodied	  emotions.	  	  Or	  we	  might	  trace	  this	  genealogy	  to	  a	  Pauline	  Christianity	  that	  radically	  distrusts	  anything	  emerging	  from	  the	  "flesh"	  as	  contradistinctive	  from	  a	  presumably	  holy	  "spirit."	  	  In	  any	  case,	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  within	  the	  philosophical	  "common	  sense"	  inherited	  from	  the	  Western	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Enlightenment	  project,	  a	  persistent	  dualism	  haunts	  our	  thinking	  regarding	  the	  divorced	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  domains	  of	  personal	  experience.57	  	   In	  the	  process-­‐oriented,	  correlative	  cosmology	  from	  which	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  emerges	  the	  philosophical	  grammar	  and	  cultural	  context	  is	  very	  different.	  	  The	  closest	  conceptual	  correlate	  with	  the	  English	  word	  "emotion"	  is	  qing	  情	  which	  can	  mean	  something	  like	  the	  "essential	  facts	  about	  a	  thing	  or	  a	  situation"	  and	  "how	  experience	  is	  felt	  or	  disclosed	  through	  less	  than	  wholly	  manifest	  or	  obvious	  dimensions	  of	  situations."	  	  	  In	  his	  book	  Embodied	  Moral	  Psychology	  and	  Confucian	  
Philosophy,	  Bongrae	  Seok	  outlines	  the	  semantic	  valence	  of	  qing	  情	  and	  raises	  some	  pressing	  questions	  about	  the	  significance	  this	  term	  has	  within	  Confucian	  ethical	  thinking:	  In	  Chinese	  philosophy,	  emotion	  is	  typically	  notated	  as	  qing	  (情)	  but	  qing	  is	  not	  necessarily	  affective,	  expressive,	  or	  irrational	  inner	  subjective	  states.	  	  In	  many	  Chinese	  philosophical	  texts,	  qing	  is	  explained	  (a)	  ontologically	  as	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  human	  being,	  (b)	  epistemologically	  as	  the	  way	  the	  mind	  (not	  as	  a	  distant	  observer	  but	  as	  a	  close	  resonator)	  understands	  the	  world,	  (c)	  axiologically	  as	  the	  positive	  sense	  of	  harmony	  or	  commitment	  to	  higher	  moral	  values.	  	  If	  qing	  is	  more	  than	  private	  inner	  episodes	  and	  feelings,	  what	  is	  qing	  and	  why	  is	  it	  important	  in	  Confucian	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  moral	  psychology?58	  	  Seok	  goes	  on	  to	  answer	  his	  own	  question	  by	  showing	  that	  qing	  情	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  dynamic	  and	  open	  field	  of	  embodied	  emotion	  which	  unifies	  the	  multiple	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Of	  course	  certain	  counter-­‐trends	  exist	  alongside	  Cartesian	  dualism.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  Spinozan	  legacy	  of	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  affectivity	  that	  is	  organically	  related	  to	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things	  and	  is	  capable	  of	  growth	  or	  diminution	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  actively	  or	  passively	  construed,	  all	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  epistemically	  inert	  Cartesian	  subject	  tracking	  perceptual	  and	  emotional	  experience	  mysteriously	  interacting	  from	  within	  the	  pineal	  gland.	  58	  Bongrae	  Seok,	  Embodied	  Moral	  Psychology	  and	  Confucian	  Philosophy	  (Lexington,	  2013),	  p.	  123.	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interpretations	  of	  qing	  along	  a	  fact-­‐value	  dialectical	  spectrum.59	  	  Part	  of	  the	  confusion	  for	  translating	  interpreters	  arises	  from	  expressions	  like	  "nature	  of	  things"	  
wu	  zhi	  qing	  物之情	  (Mencius,	  3A4)	  which	  lead	  Angus	  Graham	  (1989)	  and	  others	  to	  gloss	  qing	  as	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  something	  being	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  essentialist	  interpretations,	  wherein	  qing	  =	  eidos,	  is	  that	  when	  applied	  to	  passages	  that	  explicitly	  relate	  qing	  to	  the	  embodied	  moral	  emotions	  we	  might	  think	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  authors	  are	  identifying	  the	  essential	  traits	  of	  a	  
universal	  human	  nature.	  	  It	  would	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  category	  mistake	  according	  to	  Graham60	  though	  to	  view	  the	  qing	  情	  of	  insentient	  creatures	  or	  situations	  as	  any	  different	  from	  the	  qing	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  Graham's	  process-­‐intrinsic	  "essentialist"	  reading	  of	  qing	  is	  given	  further	  credence	  by	  the	  intimate	  correlation	  that	  the	  term	  has	  with	  "natural	  tendencies"	  or	  "inherent	  dispositions"	  (xing	  性)	  in	  so	  much	  pre-­‐Qin	  discourse.	  	  	  	   The	  unprovenanced	  Shanghai	  Museum	  version	  of	  the	  Chu	  楚	  bamboo	  slips	  "Natural	  Tendencies	  Emerge	  from	  Conditions"	  (Xingziming	  Chu	  《性自命出》)	  is	  titled	  "Discourse	  on	  Natural	  Tendencies	  and	  Affectivity"	  (Xingqing	  Lun	  《性情論》),	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  "In	  sum	  there	  are	  three	  major	  semantic	  dimensions	  of	  qing.	  	  First,	  qing	  means	  the	  nature	  of	  things.	  	  It	  is	  parallel	  but	  contrasted	  with	  xing,	  which	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  essential	  and	  identifying	  features	  of	  existence.	  	  Second,	  qing	  also	  means	  the	  direct	  and	  vivid	  sensation	  of	  the	  way	  things	  progress	  or	  evolve	  in	  particular	  conditions	  of	  situations	  or	  environments.	  	  Third,	  qing	  means	  the	  affective	  side	  of	  the	  human	  psyche,	  the	  feeling	  we	  have	  about	  events	  occurring	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  us."	  (Ibid.,	  p.126)	  	  I	  would	  take	  issue	  with	  Seok's	  characterization	  of	  the	  third	  dimension	  of	  qing.	  Insofar	  as	  there	  is	  no	  ontological	  gap	  between	  the	  psychological	  inside	  and	  phenomenal	  outside	  of	  our	  experience	  on	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  account	  of	  relational	  internalism,	  it	  is	  therefore	  inappropriate	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  divide	  here.	  60	  I	  of	  course	  apply	  the	  term	  "essentialist"	  to	  A.C.	  Graham	  in	  a	  very	  limited	  sense	  only	  to	  refer	  to	  his	  insistence	  that	  the	  term	  always	  means	  something	  like	  situational	  disposition	  in	  pre-­‐Qin	  sources.	  	  Professor	  Graham's	  groundbreaking	  work	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophy	  (especially	  in	  the	  Inner	  Chapters	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  and	  in	  the	  Neo-­‐Confucianism	  of	  the	  Cheng	  brothers)	  of	  course	  problematizes	  any	  substantialist	  or	  metaphysically	  essentialist	  reading	  of	  indigenous	  Chinese	  traditions	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  dynamically	  process-­‐oriented	  view	  of	  things.	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and	  Confucian	  thinkers	  have	  been	  consistently	  interested	  in	  exploring	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  "natural	  tendencies"	  and	  relational	  "affect"	  in	  various	  contexts.	  	  	  Indeed,	  Mengzi	  seems	  to	  view	  xing	  性 and	  qing	  情 as	  virtually	  interchangeable	  in	  his	  debate	  with	  Gaozi	  (Mengzi	  6A6)	  who	  held	  that	  the	  "nature"	  xing	  性	  of	  human	  persons	  was	  ethically	  ambivalent	  at	  best	  (xing	  wushan	  wu	  bushan性無善無不善).	  	  Mengzi's	  response	  to	  this	  Gaozian	  challenge	  is	  to	  respond	  that	  as	  far	  as	  human	  qing	  
情	  goes	  it	  is	  certainly	  capable	  of	  acting	  ethically	  efficaciously	  (nairuo	  qi	  qing	  乃若其
情	  則可以為善).	  	  	  	   The	  Xunzi	  also	  connects	  xing	  and	  qing	  at	  various	  points:	  "xing	  is	  what	  tian	  accomplishes	  and	  qing	  is	  xing's	  material	  foundation"	  (性者天之就也	  情者性之質
也).61	  In	  the	  same	  chapter,	  Xunzi	  explicitly	  connects	  "natural	  tendencies"	  with	  embodied	  emotions:	  "xing's	  love,	  hate,	  joy,	  anger,	  sadness,	  and	  pleasure	  are	  called	  
qing"	  (性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情).	  	  And	  in	  the	  Liyun	  (禮運)	  chapter	  of	  the	  Liji	  (禮記)	  we	  find	  expressions	  such	  as	  "human	  qing	  is	  a	  field"	  (人情以為田)	  and	  "human	  qing	  is	  the	  sage	  king's	  field"	  (故人情者	  聖王之田也).	  	  In	  reference	  to	  such	  passages,	  Seok	  reminds	  us	  that	  in	  contrast	  "to	  the	  private	  theater	  of	  Cartesian	  mind,	  this	  open	  field	  [of	  interpersonal	  affectivity]"	  is	  "publicly	  accessible"	  and	  capable	  of	  cultivation.62	  	  	   Indeed,	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  affective	  experience	  (qing	  情)	  can	  be	  unified	  in	  this	  metaphor	  of	  a	  transactional	  field	  of	  interpersonal	  disclosure	  (as	  juxtaposed	  to	  a	  statically	  given	  mirror	  metaphor	  of	  subjective	  representation):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Xunzi,	  Chapter	  22,	  Rectification	  of	  Names	  正名篇.	  62	  Seok,	  p.135.	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This	  interactive	  and	  open	  nature	  of	  qing	  is	  probably	  understood	  better	  in	  the	  metaphor	  of	  field.	  	  Qing	  is	  an	  open	  space	  (field)	  where	  the	  world	  is	  felt	  directly	  and	  engaged	  interactively.	  	  It	  is	  not	  an	  enclosed	  theater	  where	  the	  world	  is	  only	  translated	  or,	  at	  best,	  transplanted.	  	  As	  qing	  is	  cultivated	  and	  properly	  governed,	  it	  is	  tuned	  to	  the	  world	  and	  it	  presents	  the	  world	  to	  us	  because	  it	  is	  the	  embodied	  feeling	  that	  gives	  us	  the	  direct	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  given	  situation	  really	  means	  to	  us.	  	  As	  far	  as	  we	  live	  in	  this	  world,	  we	  cannot	  be	  neutral	  and	  cool	  to	  the	  world;	  we	  are	  inescapably	  emotional	  to	  and	  interactive	  with	  the	  world	  because	  the	  world	  is	  not	  a	  physical	  location	  but	  a	  meaningful	  place	  to	  us.	  	  From	  this	  perspective	  of	  embodiment	  and	  interaction,	  different	  meanings	  of	  qing	  can	  be	  coherently	  understood.63	  	  In	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  a	  great	  emphasis	  placed	  upon	  the	  vital	  significance	  of	  affectivity	  (qing	  情)	  in	  coming	  to	  know	  an	  interpersonally	  disclosive	  world	  of	  shared	  experience	  and	  common	  values.	  	  Indeed,	  qing	  情	  is	  "'what	  something	  really	  is'	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  unmediated	  experience	  itself	  resides	  in	  affective	  transactions	  that	  become	  selective	  and	  abstract	  when	  reduced	  to	  the	  cognitive	  structures	  of	  language"	  and	  "is	  important	  in	  understanding	  the	  radically	  contextualized	  and	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  creativity	  itself."64	  VII.	  Musical	  Flourishing	  Beyond	  Ethical	  Perfectionism	  	   Confucian	  philosophy	  celebrates	  the	  ritual	  refinement	  and	  transformative	  musical	  flourishing	  (liyue	  zhidu	  禮樂制度)	  on	  offer	  within	  a	  disclosive,	  intergenerational	  communicating	  community	  (tianming	  天命).	  	  	  The	  binomial	  or	  contrapuntal	  pairing	  of	  "ritual	  practice"	  (li	  禮)	  and	  "musical	  flourishing"	  (yue/le	  樂)	  suggests	  a	  deeply	  somaesthetic	  correlative	  yinyang	  disclosive	  relationship.	  	  For	  every	  aspect	  of	  our	  lives	  that	  we	  attempt	  to	  provide	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  order	  to	  by	  drawing	  upon	  culturally	  available	  patterns	  of	  deferential	  conduct	  and	  ritual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Ibid.,	  p.139.	  64	  Hall	  and	  Ames,	  Zhongyong	  "Glossary",	  pp.73-­‐74.	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propriety,	  there	  is	  always	  an	  opportunity	  for	  realizing	  consummatory	  experiences	  of	  inspired	  living	  together.	  	  	  The	  pervasive	  prejudice	  regarding	  the	  Confucian	  ritualization	  of	  natural	  experience	  as	  involving	  soul	  stifling	  of	  individuality	  through	  oppressive	  hierarchies	  of	  patriarchal	  and	  elitist	  coercion	  can	  be	  put	  at	  risk	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  important	  role	  that	  "musical	  flourishing"	  has	  always	  played,	  and	  continues	  to	  play,	  in	  concert	  with	  "ritual	  practice"	  li	  禮	  and	  "optimal	  appropriateness"	  yi	  義.	  	   Confucius	  himself	  celebrated	  a	  work	  of	  musical	  creation	  and	  choreography	  attributed	  to	  the	  paragon	  of	  filial	  virtue,	  the	  former	  sage-­‐king	  Shun,	  known	  as	  the	  "Shao"	  (韶)	  dance,	  a	  work	  that	  he	  said	  was	  "both	  thoroughly	  beautiful	  and	  thoroughly	  edifying"	  (盡美矣，又盡善也).	  	  In	  witnessing	  the	  performance	  of	  this	  dance,	  Confucius	  experienced	  a	  profound	  transformation	  of	  his	  embodied	  perceptual	  habits:	  The	  Master	  heard	  [a	  musical	  performance	  of]	  "Shao"	  while	  in	  Qi,	  and	  for	  three	  months	  he	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  taste	  of	  meat.	  	  He	  said,	  "I	  never	  imagined	  the	  making	  of	  music	  could	  reach	  such	  heights!"65	  	  The	  ideal	  on	  offer	  here	  is	  that	  a	  realization	  of	  an	  aesthetically	  consummatory	  experience	  can	  lead	  to	  morally	  edifying	  transformation.	  	  Such	  depth	  transformation	  in	  the	  somaesthetic	  rhythm	  of	  Confucius'	  standard	  of	  taste	  so	  affected	  him	  that	  the	  gustatory	  delights	  were	  incomparable	  with	  the	  persistent	  quality	  of	  musical	  flourishing	  atmospherically	  pervading	  his	  embodied	  experience.	  	  The	  ethical	  distionction	  between	  the	  "great	  body"	  (dati	  大體)	  and	  "minute	  body"	  (xiaoti	  小體)	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  子在齊聞韶，三月不知肉味，曰：「不圖為樂之至於斯也。」Analects	  3.25	  and	  7.13.	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the	  Mengzi	  resonates	  with	  this	  passage.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  Confucius'	  sensibility	  was	  so	  altered	  by	  his	  experience	  of	  the	  Shao	  performance	  that	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  value	  the	  individualized	  realm	  of	  ordinary	  sensory	  experience	  (色食性也)	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  simultaneously	  beautiful	  and	  ethically	  edifying	  work	  of	  music	  and	  dance	  was	  apparently	  capable	  of	  eliciting	  such	  an	  attunement	  of	  Confucius'	  affective	  and	  ethical	  perceptions	  that	  an	  atmospheric	  quality	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  import	  continued	  to	  exert	  an	  irresistible	  influence	  on	  his	  somaesthetic	  disposition	  for	  quite	  some	  time.	  	  	  	   This	  type	  of	  total	  absorption	  in	  the	  aesthetic	  process	  culminating	  in	  a	  consummatory	  experience	  and	  opening	  up	  into	  realms	  of	  ethical	  and	  personal	  growth	  is	  also	  made	  manifest	  in	  Analects	  6.20	  wherein	  "musical	  flourishing"	  (yao	  樂)	  is	  used	  as	  a	  verb	  signifying	  a	  profound,	  encompassing	  immersion	  in	  some	  subject-­‐matter	  or	  morally	  problematic	  situation	  or	  predicament.	  	  In	  approaching	  the	  proper	  ways	  of	  becoming	  consummately	  human	  (dao	  道):	  Knowing	  it	  propositionally	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  taking	  delight	  in	  it.	  	  Taking	  delight	  in	  it	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  disclosing	  [musical]	  joy	  in	  it	  (yao	  zhi	  zhe	  	  樂之
者).66	  	  This	  kind	  of	  deep	  affective	  attunement	  not	  different	  from	  musical	  appreciation	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  aesthetic	  holism	  wherein	  persons	  are	  taken	  up	  into	  processes	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  cultivation	  and	  culmination	  in	  experiences	  of	  relational	  and	  disclosive	  consummation.	  	  The	  composition	  and	  performance	  of	  music	  has	  its	  own	  standards	  of	  integrity	  and	  excellence	  that	  celebrate	  the	  unique	  particularity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  知之者不如好之者。好之者不如樂之者。	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individual	  performers	  and	  their	  instruments	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  achieved	  collaborative	  harmony	  that	  is	  not	  oppressive	  of	  unique	  individuality:	  Confucius	  spoke	  with	  the	  Music	  Master	  of	  Lu.	  	  He	  said:	  "Music	  can	  be	  realized.	  	  At	  its	  inception	  it	  is	  important	  to	  harmonize	  together.	  	  As	  the	  performance	  proceeds	  it	  is	  to	  be	  pure	  with	  distinct	  elements	  spontaneously	  coming	  together	  without	  interruption.	  	  This	  is	  how	  music	  achieves	  consummation.67	  	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  is	  the	  organic	  conception	  of	  spontaneous	  harmony	  presupposed	  as	  distinguished	  from	  a	  coercive,	  external	  imposition	  of	  order	  onto	  the	  unique	  particulars	  of	  the	  musical	  ensemble.	  	  	   Scott	  Cook	  highlights	  an	  "involuntary"	  sense	  of	  intentionality	  in	  thinking	  through	  Confucian	  notions	  of	  aesthetic	  and	  ethical	  value	  realization:	  	  "In	  contrasting	  Chinese	  artistic/literary	  theory	  with	  its	  Western	  counterpart,	  recent	  discussions	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  relative	  lack	  of	  a	  notion	  of	  "voluntary"	  creation	  in	  the	  former.	  	  Often	  cited	  in	  this	  regard	  	  is	  the	  "Great	  Preface"	  to	  the	  Book	  of	  Odes	  (Shi	  "Daxu"	  詩大序),	  which	  drawing	  upon	  both	  the	  Mencius	  and	  a	  theory	  of	  musical	  creation	  found	  in	  the	  Yue	  Ji	  樂記	  (Record	  of	  Music),	  describes	  poetry's	  expression	  of	  "intention"	  (zhi	  志)	  in	  terms	  of	  "sentiments/affections"	  (qing	  情)	  being	  "stirred	  within"	  (dong	  yu	  zhong	  動於中)	  and	  taking	  "form	  in	  words"	  (xing	  yu	  yan	  形於言),	  and,	  eventually	  being	  drawn	  out	  into	  song	  (yongge	  詠歌)	  and,	  unconsciously,	  danced	  and	  stamped	  with	  hands	  and	  feet	  (buzhi	  shou	  zhi	  wu	  zhi	  zu	  zhi	  ta	  zhi	  不知手之舞之
足之踏之).	  	  As	  the	  Yue	  Ji	  and	  earlier	  texts	  put	  it,	  these	  sentiments	  are	  "touched	  off	  by	  external	  things"	  (gan	  yu	  wu	  er	  dong	  感於物而動),	  and	  the	  vocal	  "sounds"	  (sheng	  聲)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67Analects	  3.23.	  	  子語魯大師樂。曰：「樂其可知也：始作，翕如也；從之，純如也，皦如也，繹如
也，以成。」	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and	  expressive	  "music"	  (yin	  音)	  that	  take	  form	  as	  a	  result	  invariably	  reveal	  to	  the	  perceptive	  listener	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  those	  sentiments	  and	  the	  stimuli	  that	  first	  stirred	  them	  into	  existence."68	  	   	  	   In	  a	  similar	  vein	  of	  thinking,	  Stephen	  Owen	  argues	  for	  a	  non-­‐intentionalist	  reading	  of	  Chinese	  poetic	  creativity:	  "[The	  English	  word]	  'Intention'	  is	  voluntary;	  a	  moment's	  reflection	  will	  reveal	  how	  deeply	  the	  notion	  of	  'intention'	  is	  implicated	  in	  the	  Western	  concern	  with	  free	  will.	  	  Chih	  [zhi	  志]	  may	  have	  a	  level	  of	  the	  voluntary,	  but	  the	  concept	  privileges	  the	  involuntary	  origins	  of	  any	  act	  of	  volition:	  chih	  occurs	  because	  one	  is	  stirred	  by	  something	  in	  the	  external	  world.	  	  One	  may	  have	  the	  'intention'	  to	  express	  one's	  chih.	  .	  .	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  	  But	  for	  one	  who	  'understands	  language'.	  .	  .	  the	  chih	  perceived	  in	  reading	  the	  shih	  will	  be	  true	  chih,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  is	  what	  the	  writer	  'intends'	  to	  be	  revealed."69	  The	  idea	  in	  both	  these	  passages	  is	  that	  we	  do	  well	  to	  avoid	  the	  intentional	  fallacy	  when	  reading	  early	  Chinese	  philosophical	  or	  literary	  texts	  or	  appreciating	  the	  musical	  metaphors	  implicit	  therein.	  	  There	  is	  a	  pervasive	  and	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  privileging	  situational	  agency	  over	  discrete	  agency	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  of	  role	  ethical	  thought.	  	  	   	  In	  a	  persuasive	  reading	  of	  various	  commentaries	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Poetry,	  Martin	  Kern	  has	  suggested	  that	  we	  avoid	  the	  intentional	  fallacy	  altogether	  in	  understanding	  the	  phrase	  shi	  zuo	  詩作,	  usually	  understood	  as	  the	  "author"	  by	  taking	  it	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  "poem"	  itself	  auto-­‐generates	  or	  spontaneously	  emerges	  within	  an	  ethically	  problematic	  or	  political	  predicament.	  	  The	  affectively	  charged	  atmosphere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Scott	  Cook	  (2000),	  p.14.	  69	  Stephen	  Owen,	  Readings	  in	  Chinese	  Literary	  Thought	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard,	  1992),	  p.28.	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of	  ethical	  critique	  and	  poetic	  sensibility	  are	  intertwined	  leading	  to	  this	  Confucian	  theory	  of	  auto-­‐poesis.70	  	  Many	  familiar	  philosophical	  conundrums	  and	  concepts	  of	  an	  ontologically	  libertarian	  free-­‐will	  or	  an	  abstract	  conception	  of	  individual-­‐based	  character	  traits	  ,	  that	  is,	  the	  individually	  located,	  psychologized	  'Virtues',	  are	  best	  left	  behind	  when	  approaching	  reconstructing	  Confucian	  ethical	  thinkers	  within	  their	  own	  terms.	  	  We	  can	  of	  course,	  and	  should,	  continue	  to	  speak	  and	  advocate	  for	  an	  achieved	  political	  freedom	  or	  embodied	  sense	  of	  genuine	  agency.	  	  However,	  we	  do	  better	  not	  to	  presuppose	  textual	  interpretations	  that	  necessitate	  the	  positing	  of	  some	  superordinate	  conception	  of	  abstract,	  individualistic	  agency	  or	  a	  transcendent	  ideal	  of	  aretaic	  character.	  	   	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  we	  will	  be	  using	  the	  idea	  of	  musical	  flourishing	  to	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  disparate	  fields	  of	  experience	  are	  focally	  unified	  as	  personally	  embodied	  consummatory	  events	  that	  always	  disclosively	  open	  up	  into	  further	  experiences	  of	  edifying	  growth	  and	  meaningfully	  ethical	  resolution.	  	  Musical	  metaphors	  serve	  us	  the	  best	  in	  terms	  of	  offering	  up	  sonorous	  images	  of	  effortless	  and	  exemplary	  concerted	  action.	  	  Instead	  of	  thinking	  of	  ethical	  agency	  as	  the	  unilateral	  exercise	  of	  some	  abstract	  conception	  of	  character	  or	  a	  bundle	  of	  psychologically	  reified	  traits,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  think	  of	  the	  virtuosic	  musical	  performer	  in	  drawing	  analogies	  with	  ethical	  experience.	  	  One	  who	  has	  so	  thoroughly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  See	  Martin	  Kern,	  “Speaking	  of	  Poetry:	  Pattern	  and	  Argument	  in	  the	  ‘Kongzi	  shilun’.”	  In	  Literary	  
Forms	  of	  Argument	  in	  Early	  China,	  ed.	  Dirk	  Meyer	  and	  Joachim	  Gentz,	  pp.175-­‐200.	  Leiden:	  Brill,	  2015.	  See	  also	  “Shuo	  ‘Shi’:	  ‘Kongzi	  shilun’	  zhi	  wenli	  yu	  yili”	  《詩》：《孔子詩論》之文理與義理	  [Speaking	  of	  Poetry:	  Pattern	  and	  Argument	  in	  the	  Kongzi	  shilun].	  Wenxue	  yichan	  [Literary	  Heritage]	  2012.3:	  17-­‐25.Kern	  references	  Foucault's	  dictum	  that	  the	  author	  function	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  "	  functional	  principle	  by	  which,	  in	  our	  culture,	  one	  limits,	  excludes	  and	  chooses:	  (…)	  The	  author	  is	  therefore	  the	  ideological	  figure	  by	  which	  one	  marks	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  fear	  the	  proliferation	  of	  meaning.”	  	  See	  Foucault	  "What	  is	  an	  'Author'?"	  (1969).	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internalized	  an	  effective	  and	  excellent	  repertoire	  of	  embodied	  skills	  and	  dispositions	  and	  can	  effortlessly	  act	  (wu	  wei	  無為)	  to	  realize	  role	  virtuosity	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  their	  concerted	  performance	  of	  their	  ethical	  lives	  is	  what	  we	  point	  to	  when	  we	  point	  to	  exemplary	  figures	  in	  the	  living	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	   Perfectionism	  as	  a	  theoretical	  stance	  in	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy	  at	  the	  minimum	  refers	  to	  a	  position	  that	  seeks	  the	  highest	  good	  for	  human	  experience	  independent	  of	  hedonistic	  or	  subjective	  desire	  satisfaction	  considerations.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  a	  developmental	  theory	  of	  value,	  perfectionism	  can	  be	  demarcated	  along	  clear	  conceptual	  lines	  as	  either	  human	  nature	  perfectionism	  or	  objective	  goods	  
perfectionism.	  	  Since	  objective	  goods	  perfectionism	  makes	  dubious	  metaphysical	  claims	  about	  value	  in	  a	  natural	  and	  social	  ontology	  of	  persons,	  I	  will	  only	  be	  focusing	  on	  issues	  relating	  to	  human	  nature	  perfectionism.	  	  Briefly	  put,	  human	  nature	  perfectionism	  takes	  a	  developmental	  view	  of	  persons	  and	  posits	  a	  monistic	  (teleological)	  or	  pluralistic	  (pragmatic)	  value	  schema	  to	  be	  realized	  more	  or	  less	  fully	  in	  a	  life.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  renewal	  of	  political	  liberalism	  as	  a	  viable	  theoretical	  option,	  Rawls	  expressed	  criticism	  of	  both	  monistic	  and	  pluralistic	  forms	  of	  perfectionism	  in	  ethics	  and	  political	  theory,	  due	  to	  a	  doubt	  that	  liberal	  neutrality	  (and	  respect	  for	  personal	  dignity	  and	  autonomy)	  can	  not	  be	  preserved	  alongside	  of	  a	  communitarian	  or	  state-­‐based	  commitment	  to	  promoting	  perfectionist	  goods	  in	  society.	  	  In	  response	  certain	  thinkers	  like	  Stanley	  Cavell	  and	  Naiko	  Saito	  offered	  responses	  to	  political	  liberalism	  and	  its	  supposed	  value	  neutrality,	  by	  offering	  what	  they	  call	  "Emersonian	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perfectionism."71	  	  Emersonian	  perfectionism	  promotes	  consummatory	  experience	  in	  private	  projects	  of	  self-­‐creation,	  but	  is	  thoroughly	  pluralistic	  and	  doesn't	  permit	  authoritarian	  or	  patronizing	  social-­‐political	  projects	  or	  legislation	  that	  seeks	  to	  realize	  a	  specific,	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  even	  in	  a	  developmental	  model	  of	  human	  nature	  in	  process.	  	   I	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  theoretical	  language	  of	  perfectionism	  in	  value	  theory,	  even	  in	  its	  most	  liberal	  and	  pragmatic	  Emersonian	  forms,	  has	  a	  hard	  time	  jettisoning	  its	  Platonic-­‐Aristotelian	  inheritance	  of	  a	  metaphysical	  teleology.	  	  How	  can	  we	  think	  perfection	  without	  an	  a	  priori	  value	  schema	  that	  is	  being	  approximated	  in	  experience?	  	  One	  way	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  centrality	  of	  improvisation	  and	  constitutive	  performativity	  that	  a	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  approach	  to	  moral	  and	  political	  theory	  would	  certainly	  allow	  for.	  	  If	  the	  central	  question	  of	  Confucian	  ethics	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  by	  asking	  the	  very	  concrete	  question	  about	  two	  beloved	  exemplars	  in	  the	  tradition,	  then	  the	  musical	  flourishing	  (le/yue	  樂)	  model	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  articulate	  more	  personal	  (but	  not	  private)	  projects	  of	  creative	  value	  realization	  (a	  kind	  of	  perfectionism	  without	  teleology),	  while	  simultaneously	  remaining	  fair	  (but	  not	  neutral)	  in	  adjudicating	  questions	  of	  shared,	  public	  and	  communitarian	  regimes	  of	  value.	  	  The	  problematic	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  question	  that	  Cheng	  Hao	  and	  Cheng	  Yi	  became	  recognized	  for	  as	  part	  of	  their	  civil	  service	  examinations	  in	  the	  Northern	  Song	  dynasty—a	  question	  that	  has	  clear	  conceptual	  antecedents	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  thinking,	  "Where	  is	  the	  joy/musical	  flourishing	  of	  Confucius	  and	  Yan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  See	  Stanley	  Cavell	  Conditions	  Handsome	  and	  Unhandsome:	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Emersonian	  
Pefectionism	  (University	  of	  Chicago,	  1991)	  and	  Naiko	  Saito	  The	  Gleam	  of	  Light:	  Moral	  Perfectionism	  
and	  Education	  in	  Dewey	  and	  Emerson	  (Fordham,	  2005).	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Hui	  located?"	  (尋孔顏樂處，所樂何事？).	  	  I	  will	  try	  to	  keep	  this	  question	  on	  the	  fringe	  of	  my	  thinking	  as	  we	  continue	  exploring	  a	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  role	  ethical	  thinking.	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Chapter	  2:	  "Way-­‐making	  Begins	  with	  Feeling"	  (dao	  shi	  yu	  qing)道始於情—The	  
Role	  of	  Affect	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Moral	  Theory	  
	  	   This	  chapter	  will	  further	  explore	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  morally	  charged	  affectivity	  and	  ethically	  embodied	  feelings	  within	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  and	  its	  concomitant	  derivation	  of	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  or	  pragmatic	  moral	  "theory"1	  capable	  of	  addressing	  complex	  ethical	  and	  political	  problems	  in	  the	  pluralistic,	  multi-­‐cultural	  context	  of	  the	  current	  global	  geopolitical	  configuration.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  a	  very	  broadly	  conceived	  Western	  tradition	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism,	  with	  its	  roots	  stretching	  back	  to	  David	  Hume,	  Adam	  Smith,	  and	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  Epicureans	  and	  Stoics,	  we	  will	  be	  using	  this	  theoretical	  stance	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  inter-­‐cultural	  conceptual	  bridge	  to	  approach	  some	  of	  the	  uncanny	  set	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  assumptions	  regarding	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  in	  a	  transactional	  cosmological	  context	  marked	  by	  radical	  correlativity,	  irreducible	  relational	  entanglements	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  realizing	  optimally	  calibrated	  moral	  deliberations	  in	  ordinary	  critical	  praxis.	  	  Within	  such	  a	  transactional,	  relational	  perspective—one	  that	  always	  attempts	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  insistent	  particularity	  and	  relational	  uniqueness	  of	  narratively	  constituted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout	  this	  dissertation	  we	  will	  be	  exploring	  ideas	  and	  arguments	  from	  classical	  and	  contemporary	  sources	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  articulating	  a	  viable	  and	  ameliorative	  moral	  "theory"	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	  21st	  century	  ethical	  and	  political	  conundrums.	  	  	  I	  place	  "theory"	  in	  scare	  quotes	  only	  to	  indicate	  that	  since	  I	  am	  a	  convinced	  and	  committed	  axiological	  pluralist,	  but	  pragmatic	  moral	  realist,	  I	  cannot	  hope	  to	  develop	  an	  exhaustively	  systematic	  approach	  to	  ranking	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  universally	  accepted	  human	  valuing	  schemata,	  leading	  to	  an	  algorithmic	  approach	  to	  rational	  decision	  theory	  in	  ethical	  deliberation.	  	  The	  most	  that	  we	  can	  legitimately	  hope	  for	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  convincing	  moral	  vision	  that	  assists	  us	  in	  the	  messy,	  but	  inevitable,	  process	  of	  ranking	  our	  own	  personal	  scheme	  of	  normative	  valuation	  in	  an	  existentially-­‐practical	  orientation	  of	  conduct.	  	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  probably	  replace	  the	  word	  "theory"	  with	  "vision"	  in	  most	  contexts	  without	  losing	  any	  clarity.	  	  William	  James	  (see	  Pragmatism)	  says	  that	  a	  person's	  moral-­‐spiritual	  imaginative	  "vision"	  or	  "temperament"	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  and	  that	  all	  logical-­‐philosophical	  systems	  are	  just	  tailored	  to	  suit	  our	  primordial	  temperaments.	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persons—it	  is	  better	  that	  we	  jettison	  the	  language	  of	  "sentimentalism"	  altogether	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  affect	  theory	  discourse	  in	  metaethical	  and	  normative	  ethical	  theorizing.2	  I.	  Confucian	  Metaethics	  and	  Pragmatic	  Moral	  Realism	  	  	   	  In	  this	  chapter	  an	  important	  metaethical	  issue	  surrounding	  both	  the	  traditions	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism	  and	  ethical	  affect	  theory,	  will	  be	  explored.	  	  Namely	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  "projectivists/expressivists"	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  (e.g.	  Simon	  Blackburn’s	  “quasi-­‐Realism")	  and	  the	  "perceptualist"	  position	  on	  the	  other	  (e.g.	  John	  McDowell	  and	  David	  Wiggin’s	  “sensible	  subjectivism”	  or	  “secondary	  property	  realism”).3	  	  This	  important	  debate	  within	  recent	  metaethical	  theorizing	  derives	  its	  working	  vocabulary	  and	  philosophical	  grammar	  largely	  from	  a	  broadly	  conceived	  tradition	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism,	  and	  can	  I	  argue,	  be	  given	  greater	  pragmatic	  resolution	  and	  conceptual	  clarity	  if	  we	  realize	  that	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  metaethical	  debate	  regarding	  the	  epistemological	  and	  metaphysical	  status	  of	  moral	  
values	  is	  still	  working	  within	  the	  parochially	  conceived	  eighteenth-­‐century	  Eurocentric	  assumptions	  regarding	  ontological	  bifurcation	  between	  purportedly	  
objective,	  universal	  rationality	  and	  a	  supposedly	  subjective	  structure	  of	  sentiment	  capable	  of	  detecting	  and/or	  projecting	  moral	  validity.	  	  The	  classical	  Eurocentric	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  for	  example,	  Affect	  Theory	  Reader	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  and	  New	  Materialism:	  
Interviews	  and	  Cartographies	  (Open	  Humanities	  Press,	  2013).	  	  Of	  course,	  Baruch	  Spinoza's	  Ethics	  is	  a	  
locus	  classicus	  for	  employing	  affect	  discourse	  in	  discussions	  of	  ethics.	  	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  mention	  the	  centrality	  of	  affectional	  discourse	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  American	  pragmatism.	  	  See	  for	  example	  William	  James'	  "The	  Place	  of	  Affectional	  Facts	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Pure	  Experience"	  (1905).	  	  The	  puritan	  minister	  Jonathan	  Edwards	  also	  placed	  the	  affections	  front	  and	  center	  in	  deciding	  questions	  of	  axiological	  significance.	  	  See	  his	  Treatise	  Concerning	  the	  Religious	  Affections	  (1746).	  3	  See	  Simon	  Blackburn,	  "How	  to	  Be	  an	  Ethical	  Anti-­‐Realist"	  pp.166-­‐81	  from	  Essays	  in	  Quasi-­‐Realism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  and	  his	  Ruling	  Passions:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Practical	  Reasoning	  (OUP,	  1998).	  	  For	  the	  expressivist	  position	  see	  John	  McDowell,	  "Values	  and	  Secondary	  Qualities,"	  pp.	  110-­‐29	  from	  Ted	  Honderich,	  Morality	  &	  Objectivity	  (Routledge,	  1985)	  and	  David	  Wiggins,	  "A	  Sensible	  Subjectivism?,"	  pp.185-­‐211	  from	  Needs,	  Values,	  Truth,	  2nd	  edn.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1991).	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stance	  regarding	  moral	  sentimentalism,	  despite	  being	  decidedly	  anti-­‐rationalistic	  in	  nature,	  still	  presupposes	  some	  kind	  of	  ontological-­‐experiential	  dichotomy	  that	  emerges	  within	  a	  corresponding	  framework	  of	  foundationally	  individualistic	  assumptions	  regarding	  ethical	  subjectivity	  and	  a	  libertarian	  moral	  psychology	  (e.g.	  faculty	  psychology	  of	  the	  Will).	  	  By	  reconsidering	  this	  metaethical	  debate	  within	  a	  hermeneutical	  fusion	  of	  horizons	  opened	  up	  by	  a	  nuanced	  cross-­‐cultural	  exploration	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  inspired	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  get	  over	  any	  lingering	  metaphysical	  dichotomies	  that	  lead	  to	  an	  interpretive	  impasse	  or	  an	  intractable	  situation	  regarding	  the	  formation	  of	  normative	  ethical	  theory.	  	  Positions	  that	  would	  either	  prioritize	  the	  projection	  or	  expression	  of	  moral	  preferences	  and	  subjective	  values	  or	  prefer	  to	  valorize	  instead	  an	  actual	  or	  quasi-­‐objective	  perception	  of	  moral	  facts	  can	  be	  overcome	  in	  the	  interpretive	  framework	  opened	  up	  by	  a	  fusion	  or	  expansion	  of	  horizons	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  sustained	  dialogue	  with	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking.4	  	  Within	  a	  somaesthetically	  holistic	  and	  pragmatically	  pluralistic	  background	  of	  our	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  assumptions,	  we	  can	  offer	  instead	  a	  robust	  account	  of	  ethical	  value	  perception	  that	  resonates	  quite	  profoundly	  with	  what	  Hilary	  Putnam	  and	  Sami	  Philström	  have	  dubbed	  a	  kind	  of	  “pragmatic	  moral	  realism”5—a	  metaethical	  position	  wherein	  fact/value,	  is/ought,	  reason/sentiment	  dichotomies	  are	  all	  shown	  to	  rest	  on	  a	  fundamental	  category	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Of	  course	  this	  debate	  is	  not	  really	  novel	  to	  the	  18th	  century.	  	  It	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  particular	  instance	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  "Euthyphro	  dilemma".	  	  See	  Plato's	  Euthyphro	  wherein	  the	  Socratic	  question	  is	  posed	  as	  to	  whether	  something	  is	  good	  because	  the	  god's	  approve	  of	  it,	  or	  the	  god's	  approval	  is	  derivative	  of	  something	  being	  good	  independent	  of	  an	  internalist	  standard	  of	  evaluation.	  5	  See	  Hilary	  Putnam	  "A	  defense	  of	  internal	  realism"	  pp.30-­‐42	  in	  Realism	  with	  a	  Human	  Face,	  ed.	  James	  Conant	  (Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  and	  "Pragmatism	  and	  Moral	  Objectivity"	  pp.151-­‐181	  in	  Words	  and	  Life,	  ed.	  James	  Conant	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  	  Also	  for	  a	  compelling	  development	  of	  Putnam's	  neo-­‐pragmatism	  and	  realist	  thinking	  in	  ethics	  see	  Sami	  Philstrom's	  Pragmatic	  Moral	  Realism:	  A	  Transcendental	  Defense	  (Brill,	  2005).	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mistake.	  	  We	  do	  better	  to	  jettison	  any	  philosophical	  grammar	  that	  presupposes	  a	  reductive	  analysis	  of	  distinct	  modalities	  of	  experience	  such	  as	  an	  ontologically	  shielded	  "subjective"	  and	  "objective"	  domain	  of	  discourse	  that	  references	  a	  defunct	  and	  outdated	  epistemology	  and	  ethically	  pernicious	  moral	  psychology.	  	  What	  we	  ought	  to	  embrace	  is	  a	  pragmatically	  non-­‐analytic	  and	  pluralistically	  non-­‐reductive	  vocabulary	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  yinyang	  "aspectual"	  discourse	  regarding	  unique	  persons	  as	  complex	  achievements	  of	  a	  particular	  focus	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  diffuse	  field	  of	  relationality	  and	  an	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  the	  creatively	  construes	  emergent	  axiological	  values	  in	  our	  ordinary	  experience.	  	   	  What	  I	  will	  be	  proposing	  here	  is	  that	  we	  approach	  non-­‐ideal	  ethical	  theory	  with	  a	  pragmatic	  understanding	  of	  moral	  realism—an	  understanding	  that	  is	  decidedly	  pluralist	  and	  fallibilist	  in	  orientation	  and	  thereby	  capable	  of	  encompassing	  the	  tragic	  dimensions	  (non-­‐ideal)	  and	  non-­‐foundational	  views	  of	  our	  embodied	  ethical	  experience.6	  	  What	  needs	  to	  be	  prefaced	  here	  is	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  a	  realist	  orientation	  that	  does	  the	  work	  we	  want	  in	  our	  non-­‐ideal	  theorizing	  about	  ethical	  and	  political	  ideals.	  	  This	  is	  what	  Nancy	  Fraser	  has	  dubbed	  the	  "abnormal"	  conditions	  of	  theorizing	  about	  justice.7	  Because	  all	  of	  our	  normative	  deliberations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  While	  many	  critics	  of	  pragmatist	  ethics	  (a	  Deweyan	  brand	  in	  particular)	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  supposedly	  over-­‐optimistic	  and	  naive	  "social	  engineering"	  approach	  to	  ethically	  problematic	  situations	  has	  led	  to	  an	  impoverished	  sense	  of	  the	  ethical	  and	  political	  in	  classical	  pragmatist	  writings	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  While	  I	  would	  take	  issue	  with	  any	  reading	  that	  reduces	  Dewey's	  situational	  logic	  to	  mere	  social	  tinkering,	  I	  think	  we	  also	  do	  well	  to	  recognize	  other	  sources	  of	  classical	  pragmatic	  ethics	  on	  theorizing	  the	  tragic	  dimensions	  of	  experience.	  	  See	  for	  example	  W.E.B.	  Du	  Bois'	  The	  Souls	  of	  
Blackfolk	  (1903).	  	  For	  a	  contemporary	  reading	  that	  deals	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  tragic	  in	  pragmatist	  ethics	  see	  Colin	  Koopman's	  "Contesting	  Injustice:	  Why	  Pragmatist	  Political	  Thought	  Needs	  Du	  Bois"	  in	  Pragmatism	  and	  Justice	  (2017).	  7	  See	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  "Abnormal	  Justice"	  in	  Pragmatism	  and	  Justice	  (2017)	  where	  she	  argues	  that	  in	  a	  post-­‐Westphalian	  arrangement	  of	  nation-­‐states	  and	  a	  neoliberal	  economic	  order	  it	  becomes	  increasingly	  impossible	  to	  presuppose	  an	  shared	  or	  commensurable	  set	  of	  axiological	  discourse	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regarding	  value	  prioritizations	  and	  all	  of	  our	  ethically	  salient	  pointing	  out	  exemplary	  persons	  (and	  their	  relationally	  virtuosic	  excellences)	  within	  traditions	  of	  moral	  significance	  are	  inherently	  truth-­‐tracking,	  we	  have	  to	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  pragmatic	  moral	  realism.	  	  We	  don't	  just	  "perceive"	  (in	  a	  purely	  subjective	  sense)	  a	  set	  of	  ethically	  salient	  primary	  or	  secondary	  qualities—values	  that	  are	  nothing	  more	  than	  mere	  figments	  of	  either	  subjective	  or	  intersubjective	  imagination.	  	  Rather,	  when	  we	  are	  "expressing"	  our	  deeply	  held	  value	  preferences	  that	  serve	  to	  organize	  our	  very	  persons	  into	  unique	  configurations	  of	  role	  ethical	  energies	  (zhongxin	  中心)	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  exerting	  profound	  influence	  by	  "commanding"	  a	  real	  ethical	  order	  of	  things,	  it	  makes	  perfectly	  good	  sense	  to	  presuppose	  an	  ethical-­‐political	  truth	  of	  the	  
matter	  (tianming	  天命).	  	  "Commanding	  situations"	  (tianming	  天命)	  is	  here	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  better	  and	  worse	  ways	  of	  realizing	  our	  becoming	  uniquely	  creative	  human	  persons	  through	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  within	  concrete	  situations	  that	  are	  charged	  with	  role	  ethical	  normativity	  and	  dynamically	  configured	  relational	  responsibilities.	  	  	  We	  should	  consider	  a	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  theory	  as	  a	  distinctively	  moral	  realist	  position	  because,	  as	  an	  ethical	  stance,	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  rooted	  within	  a	  pragmatic	  orientation	  regarding	  value	  realization	  and	  the	  disclosure	  of	  matrices	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Ethical	  truth	  is	  what	  happens	  to	  our	  web	  of	  beliefs	  and	  corresponding	  styles	  of	  conduct	  in	  an	  emergent	  world	  that	  we	  come	  to	  perceive	  as	  rife	  with	  affective-­‐imagined	  potentialities	  that	  honeycomb	  our	  uniquely	  embodied	  experiences	  and	  personal	  narratives.	  	  As	  intimations	  of	  ameliorative	  futurity,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  answering	  the	  "who",	  "what",	  and	  "how"	  questions	  of	  justice	  when	  so	  much	  dissensus	  exists	  in	  terms	  of	  even	  identifying	  global	  or	  transnational	  movements	  to	  recognize	  and	  represent	  so	  many	  state,	  non-­‐state,	  and	  stateless	  actors	  and	  subjects.	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ethical	  horizons	  of	  possible	  becoming	  are	  always	  yet	  to	  be	  realized	  versions	  of	  ourselves-­‐in-­‐vital-­‐relationships	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  ethical	  reality	  and	  truth	  as	  a	  "democracy	  to	  come."8	  II.	  Qing	  情	  as	  embodied	  moral	  feeling	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  nuanced	  theoretical	  articulation	  of	  our	  ethical	  experience	  regarding	  the	  so	  far	  undefended	  claim	  that	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism	  offers	  a	  radical	  alternative	  to	  certain	  18th	  century	  Eurocentric	  notions	  of	  moral	  psychology	  and	  ethical	  epistemology,	  I	  will	  need	  to	  flesh	  out	  a	  bit	  the	  notion	  of	  "feelings"	  qing	  情	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophical	  discourse	  and	  to	  situate	  this	  distinctive	  notion	  of	  moral	  feelings	  in	  a	  metaethical	  framework	  that	  presupposes	  relational	  human	  becoming	  and	  embodied	  ethical	  agency	  over	  any	  foundationalist	  notions	  of	  individual	  autonomy,	  purely	  private	  notions	  of	  the	  will	  as	  a	  distinct	  faculty,	  or	  any	  reified	  conceptions	  of	  virtue	  and	  character.	  	  Qing	  情 truly	  elides	  any	  fact/value	  dichotomy	  insofar	  as	  the	  concept	  exhibits	  a	  proliferation	  of	  polysemy	  in	  a	  conceptual	  polarity	  spanning	  from	  “affections”,	  “feelings”	  all	  the	  way	  to	  “the	  way	  things	  are”	  or	  the	  "facts"	  of	  a	  “situation.”	  	  This	  	  semantic	  curiosity	  can	  reveal	  to	  us	  some	  of	  the	  deeper	  philosophical	  divergences	  and	  cultural	  differences	  marking	  the	  conceptual	  grammar	  that	  distinguishes	  a	  stereotypically	  Eurocentric	  way	  of	  knowing	  as	  valorizing	  disengaged	  and	  disembodied	  theoretical	  observation	  (episteme/theoria)	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  more	  Chinese	  way	  of	  realizing	  (zhi	  知)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  phrase	  originated	  with	  Jacques	  Derrida	  in	  his	  "messianic	  without	  messianism"	  reading	  of	  a	  marxian	  theoretial	  inheritance.	  	  See	  his	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  (1995).	  	  More	  recently	  Fred	  Dallmayr	  has	  written	  about	  "democracy	  to	  come"	  as	  a	  politics	  of	  "relational	  praxis"	  and	  ongoing	  struggle	  to	  realize	  the	  creative	  potentials	  of	  persons	  with	  a	  "weak	  ontology"	  (Vattimo)	  but	  strong	  democratic	  faith.	  	  See	  Dallmayr	  Democracy	  to	  Come:	  Politics	  as	  Relational	  Praxis	  (2017).	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atmospherically	  saturated	  value-­‐worlds	  in	  embodied	  processes	  of	  mapping	  productive	  correlations	  in	  natural	  experience	  (zhidao	  知道,	  lijie	  理解,	  tihui	  體會).	  	  The	  significance	  of	  affect	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  discourse	  or	  "moral	  epistemology”	  (perhaps	  better	  here	  would	  be	  something	  like	  zhi	  知-­‐ology	  with	  the	  connotations	  of	  道	  dao	  replacing	  the	  ontotheological	  semantic	  associations	  regarding	  etymology	  of	  a	  rationally	  transcendent	  logos)	  does	  not	  operate	  under	  assumptions	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  strict	  reason/sentiment	  dichotomy.	  	  	  The	  recognition	  of	  this	  fact	  can	  be	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  leading	  us	  towards	  a	  more	  holistic	  and	  transactional	  way	  of	  understanding	  moral	  knowledge	  and	  ethical	  perception.	  	  	   	  It	  will	  be	  illuminating	  here	  for	  us	  to	  explore	  passages	  from	  the	  relevant	  Guodian	  corpus	  of	  textual	  materials	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  to	  reveal	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	  semantic	  valence	  of	  qing.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  text	  "(Moral)	  Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Conditions"	  Xingzimingchu	  《性自命出》or	  "Discourse	  on	  Nature	  and	  Feeling"	  
Xingqinglun	  《性情論》9	  begins	  with	  the	  ontologically	  and	  existentially	  suggestive	  passage	  that	  “moral	  way-­‐making	  emerges	  from	  feeling	  (qing)”	  (daoshiyuqing	  道始於
情).	  	  	   The	  opening	  lines	  provide	  a	  phenomenological	  description	  of	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  ethically	  evaluate	  some	  situation	  as	  a	  biologically	  and	  culturally	  conditioned	  (xing	  
性)	  human	  person:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  These	  are	  two	  names	  for	  the	  more	  or	  less	  identical	  Chu	  楚	  text	  discovered	  in	  the	  Guodian	  tombs	  and	  the	  unprovenanced	  Shanghai	  museum	  version	  respectively.	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Although	  human	  persons	  have	  a	  biocultural	  inheritance/nature	  (xing	  性)	  their	  "heartminding"	  (xin	  心)	  activity	  is	  without	  fixed	  intentionality.	  	  Intentionality	  (zhi	  志)	  depends	  upon	  processes	  of	  emerging	  events	  in	  experience	  (wu	  物).	  	  Intentional	  action	  depends	  upon	  desire,	  and	  what	  we	  desire	  depends	  upon	  habit	  (xi	  習).	  	  	  Affective	  energies	  (qi	  氣)	  of	  happiness,	  anger,	  longing,	  and	  sadness	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  nature	  naturing	  (xing	  性).	  	  The	  expression	  of	  these	  feelings	  outwardly	  manifested	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  situations	  (wu	  物)	  calling	  them	  forth.	  	  Nature	  emerges	  from	  conditions	  (xingzimingchu	  
性自命出)	  and	  conditions	  derive	  from	  our	  "commanding	  biocultural	  legacy"	  (tian	  天).	  	  Authoritative	  way-­‐making	  begins	  with	  feelings	  (qing	  情)	  and	  feelings	  emerge	  from	  naturing	  (xing	  性).	  	  If	  in	  beginning	  one	  remains	  close	  to	  feeling,	  consummating	  one	  will	  be	  close	  to	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義).	  	  Realizing	  authentic	  feelings	  one	  can	  set	  out	  upon	  the	  existential	  path	  of	  authoritative	  way-­‐making;	  realizing	  optimal	  appropriateness	  one	  can	  vitally	  internalize	  the	  process	  of	  authoritative	  way-­‐making.10	  	  We	  can	  see	  from	  this	  passage	  how	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  conception	  of	  transactionally	  embodied	  moral	  psychology	  thinks	  through	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethically	  salient	  natural	  emotions	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  attunement	  to	  qualitative	  dimensions	  of	  embodied	  experience.	  	  This	  is	  a	  type	  of	  holistic	  thinking	  that	  emerges	  parri	  passu	  with	  the	  very	  commanding	  feelings	  we	  have	  within	  concrete	  situations.	  	  The	  ethically	  salient	  affects	  that	  undergird	  our	  more	  cognitively	  defined	  intentional	  stances	  of	  ethical	  evaluation	  emerge	  from	  a	  "fringe"	  background	  of	  correlative	  processes	  of	  becoming	  more	  fully	  human.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  how	  we	  feel	  about	  situations	  determines	  more	  or	  less	  how	  we	  will	  imaginatively	  ameliorate	  our	  situated	  experience	  so	  as	  to	  realize	  relational	  flourishing	  via	  the	  enacting	  of	  a	  non-­‐coercive,	  non-­‐foundational	  ethical	  agency.	  	  Here,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  reconstructed,	  non-­‐ideal	  ethical	  theorizing,	  we	  don't	  begin	  with	  a	  rationally-­‐deterministic,	  foundational	  individualism	  or	  some	  fully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10凡人虽有性，心亡奠志，待物而后作，待悦而后行，待 而后奠。喜怒哀悲之气，性也。及其見
于外，則物取之也。性自命出，命自天降。道始于情，情生于性。始者近情，終者近義。知情者能
出之，知義者能内（入）之。(Strip	  1)	  
	   54	  
formed	  autonomous	  psychological	  subjectivity;	  rather,	  we	  must	  begin	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  embodied	  and	  relationally	  "thick"	  experiences	  of	  complex	  and	  dynamically	  realized	  situations	  where	  feeling	  (which	  is	  always	  had	  within	  the	  context	  of	  an	  interpretive	  community)	  is	  all	  we	  have	  to	  work	  with	  in	  developing	  a	  non-­‐coercive	  and	  ameliorative	  conception	  of	  ethical	  agency	  that	  can	  be	  creatively	  realized	  in	  	  the	  narrative	  courses	  of	  our	  lives.	  	   Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  with	  its	  robustly	  somaesthetic	  presuppositions	  regarding	  the	  holistic	  realization	  of	  persons	  through	  non-­‐coercive	  ethical	  agency,	  offers	  us	  a	  truly	  live	  option	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  to	  navigate	  the	  complexities	  of	  ethical	  and	  political	  experience	  without	  having	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  ontological	  fiction	  of	  foundational	  subjectivity	  or	  the	  pernicious	  ethical-­‐political	  idea	  of	  an	  absolute	  sovereignty.	  	  By	  focusing	  upon	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  here	  we	  can	  bypass	  any	  fool's	  errand	  of	  ethical-­‐political	  theorizing	  that	  would	  attempt	  to	  identify	  an	  autonomous	  
individual	  or	  rationally	  foundational	  subject	  and	  then	  try	  to	  isolate	  particular	  character	  traits	  or	  identify	  rationally-­‐ordered	  principles	  by	  which	  to	  determine	  ideal	  modes	  of	  conduct,	  social-­‐political	  structures,	  or	  perfectly	  systemic	  conceptions	  of	  abstract	  justice.	  	  Instead,	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  always	  begins	  where	  we	  find	  ourselves	  by	  considering	  agency,	  action,	  and	  ethical	  situations	  in	  a	  holistic	  manner	  without	  reducing	  the	  complexity	  of	  our	  embodied	  habitus—seeing	  us	  always	  already	  as	  a	  socius	  emerging	  from	  ritually	  interpretive	  communities.	  	  	  	  	   Beginning	  with	  "affect"	  qing	  情,	  a	  concept	  that	  elides	  any	  fact/value	  dichotomy	  in	  ethics	  and	  ontology,	  Confucian	  ethical	  thinking	  avoids	  pernicious	  psychologizing	  of	  the	  identifiably	  moral	  emotions	  as	  either	  merely	  subjective	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expressions	  of	  preference	  or	  as	  a	  solipsistic	  construction	  of	  ethical	  facts	  and	  norms	  cut	  whole	  cloth	  out	  of	  a	  supposedly	  pre-­‐determined,	  fixed	  objective	  axiological	  order	  of	  being.	  	  What	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  offers	  us	  is	  a	  non-­‐foundational,	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  moral	  affect	  developed	  within	  a	  qi	  氣-­‐based	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	  By	  avoiding	  both	  psychological	  and	  physiological	  reductionist	  accounts	  of	  ethical	  sensibility,	  and	  by	  remaining	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  a	  correlative	  cosmology	  or	  "commanding"	  tian	  天-­‐based	  ecstatically	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  persons,	  Confucian	  somaesthetics	  provides	  a	  dynamic	  and	  transactional	  account	  of	  human	  nature	  (renxing	  人性)	  and	  creative	  conduct.	  	  	  A	  model	  of	  disengaged	  rationality,	  so	  familiar	  to	  the	  Western	  ontotheological	  tradition	  of	  ethics,	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  embodied	  practices	  of	  personal	  cultivation	  within	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  However,	  we	  should	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  consider	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  and	  its	  corresponding	  somaesthetic	  presuppositions	  and	  embodied	  practices	  as	  an	  antipodal	  "Other"	  to	  a	  supposedly	  pristine	  Western	  Reason—or	  some	  other	  totally	  ficticious,	  because	  ontologically	  foundational,	  "moral	  sense."	  	  	  Such	  an	  antipodal	  rendering	  would	  presuppose	  the	  possibility	  of	  disentangling	  fact	  from	  value	  in	  a	  purported	  realm	  of	  objectivity	  as	  distinct	  from	  a	  domain	  of	  purely	  subjective	  experience.	  	  The	  existentially	  embodied	  activity	  of	  "heartminding"	  (xin心)	  or	  "feeling"	  (qing	  情)	  our	  way	  about	  the	  blooming-­‐buzzing	  confusion	  of	  a	  value-­‐laden	  pluriverse,	  is	  in	  an	  affair	  that	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  clear	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  epistemic	  “knowing”	  and	  evaluative	  “feeling”	  of	  persons,	  things,	  and	  events	  in	  this	  temporally	  flowing	  and	  always	  transforming	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world.11	  	  The	  vital	  function	  of	  embodied	  heartminding	  is	  to	  creatively	  “think”	  (si	  思)	  creative	  integrity	  (cheng	  誠),	  and	  this	  brings	  with	  it	  the	  possibility	  of	  intuitively	  
responding	  (as	  distinct	  from	  merely	  reacting)	  to	  situations	  in	  ethically	  imaginative	  and	  morally	  ameliorative	  ways—this	  is	  the	  vital	  source	  from	  which	  all	  uniquely	  personal	  and	  generally	  shared	  ethical	  responsibilities	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  flows.	  Mengzi	  refers	  to	  the	  holistically,	  correlative	  fringe	  background	  of	  relationally	  determined	  responsibility	  and	  the	  pervasive	  atmospheric	  feelings	  associated	  with	  a	  prospective,	  aspirational	  realization	  of	  ethical	  belonging	  to	  the	  meaningful	  fabric	  of	  dynamic	  role-­‐focused	  relationality	  and	  tian	  天-­‐inspired	  co-­‐creativity	  by	  highlighting	  "creative	  integrity"	  (cheng	  誠)	  in	  our	  lived-­‐body/unique	  personhood	  (shen	  身):	  Mengzi	  said:	  "The	  myriad	  events	  all	  belong	  with	  me.	  	  There	  is	  no	  greater	  joy	  than	  reflecting	  upon	  my	  lived-­‐body/unique	  person	  and	  realizing	  this	  truth.	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  closer	  to	  seeking	  relational	  virtuosity	  (ren	  仁)	  than	  strenuously	  acting	  to	  realize	  empathic	  imagination	  (shu	  恕).12	  	  We	  can	  unproblematically	  read	  this	  passage	  pragmatically	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  aspirational,	  or	  prospective,	  consummation	  of	  a	  relationally	  flourishing	  person	  in	  a	  pluralistic,	  interdependent	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	  But	  we	  can	  also,	  I	  would	  contend,	  read	  it	  ontologically	  (not	  retrospectively	  referring	  to	  an	  a	  priori,	  antecedent	  system	  of	  meaningful	  contextualization,	  but	  as	  referencing	  a	  ground	  or	  root	  (ben	  本)	  of	  background	  fringe	  relationality	  that	  provides	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	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  See	  for	  example	  Analects	  6.14："To	  know	  it	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  liking	  it.	  	  To	  like	  it	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  taking	  deep	  joy	  in	  it."	  	  子曰：「知之者不如好之者，好之者不如樂之者。」	  12孟子曰：「萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。強恕而行，求仁莫近焉。」Mengzi	  7A4.	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realizing	  a	  resolute	  ethical	  focus	  and	  achieved	  practical	  agency	  that	  takes	  empathic	  concern	  and	  relational	  flourishing	  as	  ontologically	  basic.	  	   In	  another	  important	  passage	  describing	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  realizing	  "creative	  integrity"	  in	  one's	  lived-­‐body/unique	  person,	  Mengzi	  situates	  the	  process	  of	  cheng-­‐based	  cultivation	  in	  a	  nested	  hierarchy	  of	  familial,	  sociopolitical,	  and	  cosmological	  orders	  of	  relationality:	  Mengzi	  said,	  "When	  dwelling	  in	  a	  position	  of	  potential	  beneficiary	  but	  not	  obtaining	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  benefactors,	  the	  people	  cannot	  be	  ethicopolitically	  ordered.	  	  There	  is	  consummate	  way-­‐making	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  obtaining	  the	  confidence	  of	  benefactors.	  	  Not	  having	  the	  trust	  of	  friends,	  one	  cannot	  obtain	  the	  confidence	  of	  benefactors.	  	  There	  is	  a	  way	  of	  cultivating	  trust	  in	  friends;	  if	  serving	  one's	  familial	  intimates	  without	  joy,	  there	  cannot	  be	  trust	  with	  friends.	  	  Realizing	  joy	  in	  family	  has	  a	  consummate	  way;	  intra-­‐specting13	  upon	  the	  lived-­‐body	  and	  not	  realizing	  creative	  integrity,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  achieving	  joy	  in	  family	  relationships.	  	  There	  is	  consummate	  way-­‐making	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  realizing	  creative	  integrity	  in	  one's	  body-­‐person;	  	  not	  practicing	  enlightenment	  of	  moral	  efficacy,	  one	  cannot	  realize	  creative	  integrity	  in	  their	  body-­‐person.	  	  Creative	  integrity	  is	  the	  way-­‐making	  of	  tian.	  	  Thinking	  about	  how	  to	  realize	  creative	  integrity	  is	  the	  way-­‐making	  of	  human	  persons.	  	  Realizing	  optimal	  creative	  integrity	  but	  not	  affecting	  transformation	  of	  the	  ethicopolitical	  order	  has	  never	  happened.	  	  Without	  realizing	  creative	  integrity	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  affectively	  transform	  anything	  at	  all.14	  	  This	  passage	  highlights	  the	  social	  and	  familial	  embededness	  of	  human	  persons	  and	  their	  potential	  efficacy	  in	  terms	  of	  ameliorating	  the	  dynamically	  configured	  ethicopolitical	  orders	  (i.e.	  creative	  integrity/ethical	  agency)	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  part.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  "creative	  integrity"	  of	  persons	  is	  directly	  associated	  with	  realizing	  enlightenment	  in	  "relational	  efficacy"	  (mingshan	  明善)	  and	  in	  bringing	  joy/happiness	  to	  family	  members	  (yueqin	  悅親).	  	   It	  is	  also	  significant	  that	  in	  other	  contexts	  Mengzi	  considers	  our	  realized	  moral	  "natures"	  (xing	  性)	  in	  the	  dynamic	  contexts	  of	  embodied	  feelings	  and	  relationally-­‐constituted	  affects.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Mengzi	  6A6	  there	  is	  a	  discussion	  between	  Mengzi	  and	  his	  disciple	  Gongduzi	  about	  the	  purported	  Gaozian	  position	  regarding	  the	  ethical	  indeterminacy	  (or	  vacuity)	  of	  our	  tian-­‐commanding	  natures:	  Gongduzi	  said:	  "Gaozi	  says,	  "our	  nature	  is	  originally	  not	  efficacious	  or	  non-­‐efficacious"	  or	  "our	  nature	  can	  be	  made	  to	  be	  efficacious	  and	  it	  can	  be	  made	  to	  be	  non-­‐efficacious;	  for	  example,	  under	  Kings	  Wen	  and	  Wu	  the	  people	  were	  inclined	  towards	  moral	  efficacy,	  but	  under	  You	  and	  Li	  the	  people	  were	  given	  over	  to	  violent	  tendencies."	  	  He	  also	  said,	  "there	  is	  those	  who	  are	  good	  by	  nature	  and	  those	  who	  are	  bad	  by	  nature;	  for	  example,	  Shun	  had	  the	  Blind	  Man	  Gu	  Sou	  as	  a	  father	  and	  the	  tyrant	  Zhou	  had	  his	  brothers	  and	  the	  upright	  ministers	  Wei	  Zhao	  and	  Wangzi	  Bi	  Gan,	  but	  he	  still	  turned	  out	  awful.	  	  Today	  you	  talk	  about	  our	  moral	  "natures"	  being	  efficacious,	  what	  do	  you	  mean	  by	  this?"15	  	  Here	  Gongduzi	  expresses	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  skepticism	  regarding	  the	  inherent	  capacity	  of	  human	  persons	  to	  recognize	  or	  discover	  ethical	  truth	  in	  unique	  situations	  based	  in	  a	  proper	  orientation	  and	  effective	  growth	  potential	  of	  interdependent	  ethical	  agents	  in	  a	  correlative	  web	  of	  ethicopolitical	  becoming.	  	  Mengzi's	  response	  is	  important	  in	  that	  it	  situates	  our	  capacity	  for	  moral	  efficacy	  in	  an	  ecstatically	  naturalistic	  vein	  of	  thinking:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15公都子曰：「告子曰：『性無善無不善也。』或曰：『性可以為善，可以為不善；是故文武興，
則民好善；幽厲興，則民好暴。』或曰：『有性善，有性不善；是故以堯為君而有象，以瞽瞍為父
而有舜；以紂為兄之子且以為君，而有微子啟、王子比干。』今曰『性善』，然則彼皆非與？」	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Mengzi	  said,	  "as	  for	  our	  feelings	  (qing	  情),	  these	  can	  certainly	  be	  made	  efficacious.	  	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  [our	  natures]	  being	  morally	  efficacious.	  	  If	  one	  is	  acting	  non-­‐efficaciously	  this	  is	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  one's	  given	  embodied	  potential	  (cai	  才).	  	  Everyone	  has	  the	  feelings	  (lit.	  "heartminding"	  xin	  心)	  of	  empathy	  and	  commiseration.	  	  Everyone	  has	  the	  feelings	  of	  shame	  and	  disgust.	  	  Everyone	  has	  the	  feelings	  of	  deferential	  respect	  and	  reverence.	  	  Everyone	  has	  the	  feelings	  of	  right	  and	  wrong.	  	  The	  feelings	  of	  empathy	  and	  commiseration	  [when	  cultivated	  and	  appropriately	  extended]	  realize	  consummate	  conduct	  (ren	  仁).	  	  The	  feelings	  of	  shame	  and	  disgust	  [when	  cultivated	  and	  appropriately	  extended]	  realize	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義).	  	  The	  feelings	  of	  deferential	  respect	  and	  reverence	  [when	  cultivated	  and	  appropriately	  extended]	  realize	  ritual	  propriety	  (li	  禮).	  	  The	  feelings	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  [when	  cultivated	  and	  appropriately	  extended]	  realize	  moral	  wisdom	  (zhi	  智).	  	  Consummate	  conduct,	  optimal	  appropriateness,	  ritual	  propriety,	  and	  moral	  wisdom	  are	  not	  artificially	  attached	  to	  me	  from	  without	  (fei	  you	  waidingwoye
非由外鑠我也),	  I	  have	  them	  inherently.	  	  They	  are	  realized	  spontaneously	  without	  conscious	  effort.	  	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  said,	  "seeking	  it	  one	  gets	  it,	  relinquishing	  it	  one	  loses	  it."	  	  Even	  though	  some	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  better	  or	  worse	  in	  an	  entirely	  non-­‐calculable	  quantitative	  sense	  [of	  moral	  potential]	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  embodied	  affective	  potential	  (cai	  才)	  of	  persons	  it	  is	  truly	  inexhaustible.	  	  The	  Book	  of	  Poetry	  says,	  "Tian	  gave	  birth	  to	  the	  teeming	  multitudes,	  and	  every	  thing/event	  has	  its	  corresponding	  standard.	  	  For	  the	  masses	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  this	  ethical	  truth,	  their	  moral	  virtuosity	  would	  be	  of	  the	  utmost	  power."	  	  Kongzi	  said,	  "Whoever	  composed	  this	  poem	  certainly	  knows	  about	  way-­‐making!	  	  Because	  every	  situation	  has	  a	  standard,	  and	  the	  people	  can	  take	  hold	  of	  this	  truth,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  their	  ethical	  virtuosity	  is	  ever	  so	  powerful."16	  	  Mengzi	  responds	  by	  defending	  a	  version	  of	  ecstatically	  naturalistic	  moral	  realism	  that	  recognizes	  the	  situationally-­‐dependent	  and	  relationally-­‐constituted	  ethical	  potential	  of	  persons	  as	  being	  theoretically	  salient	  in	  determining	  the	  normative	  features	  and	  axiological	  realities	  of	  things	  as	  they	  unfold	  in	  the	  course	  of	  our	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interdependent	  experiences	  of	  becoming	  capable	  of	  realizing	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  in	  the	  uniquely	  situated	  worlds	  that	  we	  inhabit.	  	   Mengzi	  continues	  to	  challenge	  the	  moral	  relativist	  or	  ethical	  skeptic	  by	  offering	  a	  "good	  bad	  example"	  alongside	  of	  an	  analogical	  argument	  employing	  the	  ecological	  flourishing	  of	  Ox	  Mountain.	  	  In	  effect,	  we	  can	  learn	  about	  moral	  potential	  only	  by	  considering	  the	  vital	  importance	  that	  ethical	  "nourishment"	  (yang	  養)	  has	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  multiple	  failures	  to	  become	  fully	  human	  as	  part	  of	  unique	  families	  and	  historically	  given	  communities	  of	  stipulated	  sociopolitical	  roles	  and	  relationships:	  Mengzi	  said,	  "The	  foliage	  on	  Ox	  Mountain	  was	  once	  ever	  so	  luxuriant.	  	  Because	  it	  was	  in	  the	  suburbs	  of	  a	  great	  Kingdom,	  with	  the	  axes	  and	  hatchets	  continually	  cutting,	  how	  could	  it	  still	  be	  luxuriant?	  	  Even	  with	  its	  rhythmic	  breathing	  (i.e.	  nurturing	  rest)	  of	  night	  and	  day	  and	  the	  irrigation	  from	  rain	  and	  dew,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  it	  doesn't	  still	  have	  new	  sprouts	  springing	  forth.	  	  But	  with	  the	  grazing	  of	  the	  ox	  and	  sheep	  the	  hillsides	  appear	  totally	  denuded	  and	  barren.	  	  People	  see	  the	  denuded	  and	  barren	  state	  and	  think	  that	  it	  has	  always	  been	  this	  way.	  	  But	  is	  this	  the	  true	  "nature"	  (xing	  性)	  of	  the	  mountain?	  	  If	  one	  has	  the	  phenomenological	  description	  of	  being	  a	  human	  person,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  be	  without	  the	  feelings	  of	  consummate	  conduct	  and	  optimal	  appropriateness?	  	  Having	  lost	  their	  inherent	  heartminding	  (liangxin	  良心),	  is	  like	  the	  mountain	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  axes	  and	  hatchets.	  	  Daily	  being	  denuded,	  how	  could	  the	  mountain	  possibly	  maintain	  its	  original	  luxuriant	  beauty?	  	  Losing	  the	  nourishing	  effect	  of	  rhythmic	  breathing	  with	  day	  and	  night,	  the	  cultivation	  of	  morning	  moral	  energy	  (pingdan	  zhi	  qi	  平旦之氣),	  and	  because	  his	  likes	  and	  dislikes	  were	  originally	  ever	  so	  comparable	  to	  ordinary	  persons	  by	  only	  a	  slight	  difference	  in	  innate	  moral	  ability	  (其好惡與人相近也
者幾希),	  but	  with	  daily	  artificial	  effort	  to	  the	  contrary	  one's	  original	  moral	  capacity	  dries	  up	  like	  a	  dead	  tree.	  	  Having	  a	  moral	  nature	  like	  a	  dead	  tree,	  and	  not	  having	  the	  sufficient	  effects	  of	  resting	  nourishment	  and	  night	  moral	  energies	  (ye	  qi	  夜氣),	  he	  becomes	  indistinguishable	  from	  a	  brute.	  	  People	  observe	  his	  brutishness	  and	  can't	  even	  fathom	  that	  he	  once	  had	  moral	  potential.	  	  Is	  this	  the	  original	  situation	  (lit.	  'feelings'	  qing	  情)	  of	  human	  persons?	  	  For	  anything,	  if	  it	  receives	  proper	  nourishment	  it	  will	  grow,	  but	  if	  it	  doesn't	  it	  will	  perish.	  Kongzi	  said,	  "practicing	  vigilance	  it	  is	  preserved.	  	  Being	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  Ethics	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  Graham	  argues	  instead	  that	  the	  term	  always	  refers	  to	  “what	  is	  essential”	  or	  “genuine”	  in	  every	  context.	  	  Puett	  has	  us	  consider	  Chad	  Hansen’s	  rejection	  of	  Graham’s	  position	  regarding	  the	  non-­‐normative	  denotation	  of	  qing	  情.	  	  Hansen	  argues	  that:	  Graham’s	  explanation	  that	  qing	  somehow	  goes	  from	  meaning	  “reality”	  (cum	  “essence”)	  to	  meaning	  “passions”	  is	  also	  unsettling.	  	  It	  still	  requires	  that	  the	  term	  shifted	  from	  referring	  to	  something	  metaphysical	  and	  objective	  (reality,	  essence,	  or	  the	  facts)	  to	  referring	  to	  something	  subjective	  and	  psychological	  (passions)….	  Postulating	  such	  a	  radical	  meaning	  change	  also	  violates	  the	  principle	  of	  humanity’s	  call	  for	  explanation	  on	  analogy	  to	  us.	  	  Our	  words	  would	  hardly	  be	  intelligible	  if	  they	  arbitrarily	  changed	  meaning	  so	  radically	  while	  no	  one	  seemed	  to	  notice.20	  	  Hansen’s	  contention	  then	  is	  that	  qing	  lacks	  a	  unified	  conceptual	  core	  and	  is	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  cluster	  concept	  that	  incorporates	  all	  of	  our	  “reality-­‐induced	  discrimination	  or	  distinction	  making	  reactions.”	  	  Such	  a	  “reality	  feedback	  loop”	  can	  clearly	  include	  things	  like	  “pleasure,	  anger,	  sadness,	  fear,	  love,	  hate,	  desire”	  (the	  Seven	  Emotions	  of	  classical	  Confucian	  moral	  psychology),	  but	  the	  term	  itself	  refers	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  representing	  reality	  and	  not	  to	  embodied	  emotions	  per	  se.	  	  	  	   Michael	  Puett	  goes	  to	  the	  “Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Conditions”	  (Xingzimingchu	  
《性自命出》)	  text	  to	  claim	  that	  both	  Graham	  and	  Hansen	  are	  mistaken	  in	  their	  respective	  subjectivizing	  and	  objectifying	  positions	  regarding	  the	  possible	  meanings	  of	  qing	  情.	  	  Puett	  argues	  that	  qing	  in	  its	  pre-­‐Qin	  (particularly	  in	  its	  Chu	  楚 cultural	  context)	  refers	  to	  something	  like	  a	  “dispositional	  responsiveness”	  which	  clearly	  involves	  a	  strong	  emotional	  component	  of	  existential	  awareness	  regarding	  ethically	  salient	  situations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Chad	  Hansen,	  “Qing	  (Emotions)	  in	  Pre-­‐Buddhist	  Chinese	  Thought”,	  in	  Joel	  Marks	  and	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  Emotions	  in	  Asian	  Thought:	  A	  Dialogue	  in	  Comparative	  Philosophy	  (Albany:	  SUNY	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  195.	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   I	  think	  Puett	  is	  basically	  correct	  in	  his	  interpretation	  of	  qing	  情	  within	  the	  
Xingzimingchu	  《性自命出》.	  	  However,	  by	  problematizing	  the	  implicit	  fact/value	  dichotomy	  expressed	  in	  modern,	  post-­‐Humean	  English,	  Puett	  doesn’t	  really	  do	  much	  in	  way	  of	  contextualizing	  qing情	  in	  a	  non-­‐foundational,	  pluralistic	  ars	  contextualis.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  offer	  some	  representative	  passages	  of	  the	  way	  qing情	  is	  used	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts.	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  provide	  some	  philosophical	  insights	  derived	  from	  what	  the	  neo-­‐pragmatist	  Hilary	  Putnam	  has	  termed	  a	  "pragmatic	  moral	  realism."	  	  And,	  finally,	  I	  will	  be	  aiming	  to	  show	  how	  these	  early	  Confucian	  authors	  made	  use	  of	  something	  akin	  to	  Putnam’s	  pragmatist	  contention	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  and	  undesirable	  to	  disentangle	  “fact”	  from	  “value”	  in	  our	  practical	  dealings	  with	  a	  thoroughly	  relational	  and	  interdependent	  bio-­‐family-­‐socially-­‐constituted	  cosmos.	  	   A	  real	  problem	  for	  any	  engaged	  ethical	  experience	  is	  seeking	  to	  practically	  understand	  the	  ontology	  of	  human	  freedom.	  	  Given	  the	  obvious	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  naturally	  social	  beings,	  how	  is	  it	  that	  we	  can	  realize	  a	  power	  to	  act	  from	  our	  own	  personal	  tian	  天 commanding	  sense	  of	  responsibility?	  	  Particularly	  given	  the	  dialogic	  social	  ontology	  which	  constitutes	  our	  experience	  of	  personality—i.e.	  the	  manifold	  of	  roles	  and	  relations	  that	  we	  inhabit	  in	  our	  unfolding	  embodied	  narratives	  in	  the	  world—how	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  realize	  a	  power	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  transform,	  and	  not	  merely	  adapt,	  to	  our	  manifold	  multiplicity	  of	  life	  situations?	  	  To	  begin	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  these	  perhaps	  unanswerable	  questions	  that	  emerge	  out	  of	  an	  onto-­‐hermeneutical	  approach	  to	  thinking	  through	  human	  experience,	  we	  do	  well	  to	  offer	  an	  interpretive	  framework	  for	  understanding	  three	  early	  Confucian	  texts—the	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Wuxingpian,	  the	  Xingzimingchu,	  and	  the	  Mencius.	  	  These	  texts,	  one	  well-­‐known	  as	  the	  effective	  consummation	  of	  the	  architectonic	  of	  the	  Confucian	  Four	  Books	  and	  two	  recently	  excavated	  texts	  formerly	  lost	  to	  tradition,	  can	  offer	  a	  meliorative	  stage	  for	  thinking	  through	  what	  I	  will	  here	  in	  this	  section	  be	  calling	  an	  onto-­‐affective	  approach	  to	  ethics.	  	   This	  onto-­‐hermeneutical	  section	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  excursus	  into	  Martin	  Heidegger’s	  famous	  essay	  “What	  is	  Metaphysics?”	  (1929)	  in	  order	  to	  situate	  what	  such	  an	  approach	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  Being	  of	  beings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  onto-­‐affective	  “irruption”	  or	  “encounter"	  can	  possibly	  mean.	  	  I	  will	  also	  show	  how	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  Dasein	  falls	  short	  of	  adequately	  dealing	  with	  the	  manifold	  affects	  that	  command	  ontological	  and	  ethical	  significance.	  	  Next,	  I	  will	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  the	  onto-­‐affective	  in	  a	  line	  that	  stretches	  from	  Baruch	  Spinoza	  through	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  culminating	  in	  Giles	  Deleuze.	  	  These	  philosophers	  attempt	  to	  think	  “life	  affirmation”	  (conatus)	  and	  give	  a	  rich	  account	  of	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  affective	  experience	  serves	  as	  a	  precognitive	  or	  even	  pre-­‐personal	  ground	  from	  which	  any	  agency	  might	  emerge.	  	  Finally,	  I	  will	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  qing	  情	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  thought	  in	  light	  of	  the	  question	  of	  practical	  freedom.	  	  Chung-­‐Ying	  Cheng’s	  onto-­‐hermeneutic	  methodology	  will	  be	  employed	  in	  this	  section	  through	  laying	  out	  an	  Yi	  易	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  “comprehensive	  observation”	  (guan	  觀)	  and	  “mood-­‐affect	  attunement”	  (xian	  咸,	  
gan	  感)	  in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  I	  am	  working	  with.	  	   In	  What	  is	  Metaphysics?	  Heidegger	  passes	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  content	  and	  methodology	  of	  the	  tradition	  of	  Occidental	  philosophy	  with	  us	  at	  least	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since	  Aristotle.	  	  Rather	  he	  moves	  right	  in	  to	  the	  question	  which	  “can	  be	  asked	  only	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  questioner	  as	  such	  is	  present	  together	  with	  the	  question,	  that	  is,	  is	  placed	  in	  question.”21	  	  He	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  inquire	  after	  the	  grounds	  of	  any	  and	  all	  possible	  ways	  of	  knowing	  the	  world.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  modern	  science	  Heidegger	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “trinity”	  of	  epistemic	  factors	  guiding	  our	  modern	  world	  construction—“relation	  to	  the	  world,	  attitude,	  and	  irruption.”	  	  Modern	  Dasein	  is	  disclosed,	  according	  to	  Heidegger,	  in	  this	  threefold	  way:	  That	  to	  which	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  refers	  are	  beings	  themselves—and	  nothing	  besides.	  That	  from	  which	  every	  attitude	  takes	  its	  guidance	  are	  beings	  themselves—and	  nothing	  further.	  That	  with	  which	  the	  scientific	  confrontation	  in	  the	  irruption	  occurs	  are	  beings	  themselves—and	  beyond	  that	  nothing.22	  	  But	  as	  becomes	  clear	  in	  a	  series	  of	  extremely	  reductio	  arguments,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  think	  the	  Nothing	  at	  the	  ground-­‐abyss	  of	  all	  beings	  if	  all	  we	  are	  relying	  upon	  is	  a	  conception	  of	  humanity	  as	  animal	  rationale.	  	  But	  modern	  science	  needs	  to	  think	  the	  No-­‐thing	  if	  it	  wants	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  and	  possibly	  overcome	  its	  own	  nihilism.	  	  So	  “if	  the	  nothing	  itself	  is	  to	  be	  questioned,”	  then	  “we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  encounter	  it”	  somehow.	  	  But	  how?	  	  If	  the	  “nothing	  is	  the	  complete	  negation	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  beings,”	  then	  clearly	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  think	  this	  negation	  as	  long	  as	  we	  remain	  on	  the	  level	  of	  representational	  rationality	  (either	  in	  its	  pure	  form	  as	  logic	  and	  mathematics	  or	  in	  its	  empirical	  determination	  as	  experimental	  science).	  	  How	  then	  is	  an	  acquaintance,	  if	  not	  knowledge,	  of	  no-­‐thing-­‐ness	  possible?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  “What	  is	  Metaphysics?”	  in	  Martin	  Heidegger:	  Basic	  Writings,	  ed.	  David	  Farell	  Krell	  (Harper	  Collins,	  1993),	  p.93.	  22	  Ibid.,	  p.95.	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   Building	  off	  of	  his	  freshly	  realized	  insights	  from	  the	  working	  out	  of	  Being	  and	  
Time	  (1927),	  Heidegger	  turns	  more	  directly	  in	  this	  particular	  essay	  to	  “moods”	  (Bestimmung)	  in	  order	  to	  disclose	  the	  No-­‐thing	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  groundlessly	  grounding	  the	  Being	  of	  beings.	  	  Moods	  are	  ontologically	  prior	  to	  our	  mental	  representations	  and	  rational	  interpretations	  of	  things.	  	  Situations	  that	  we	  encounter	  disclose	  the	  primordial	  way	  it	  always	  is	  with	  "the	  Nothing."	  	  Although	  we	  always	  already	  remain	  incapable	  of	  grasping	  beings	  as	  a	  totality	  in	  an	  intellectual-­‐rational	  manner,	  it	  remains	  true	  that	  “no	  matter	  how	  fragmented	  our	  everyday	  existence	  may	  appear	  to	  be.	  .	  .	  it	  always	  deals	  with	  beings	  in	  a	  unity	  of	  the	  ‘whole,’	  if	  only	  in	  a	  shadowy	  way.”23	  	  Heidegger	  goes	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  moods,	  as	  a	  “being	  attuned,”	  are	  what	  allow	  us	  	  to	  find	  ourselves	  belonging	  among	  beings	  as	  a	  whole:	  The	  founding	  mode	  of	  attunement	  [die	  Befindlichkeit	  der	  Stimmung]	  not	  only	  reveals	  beings	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  various	  ways,	  but	  this	  revealing—far	  from	  being	  merely	  incidental—is	  also	  the	  basic	  occurrence	  of	  our	  Da-­‐sein.	  	  What	  we	  call	  a	  “feeling”	  is	  neither	  a	  transitory	  epiphenomenon	  of	  our	  thinking	  and	  willing	  behavior	  nor	  simply	  an	  impulse	  that	  provokes	  such	  behavior	  nor	  merely	  a	  present	  condition	  we	  have	  to	  put	  up	  with	  somehow	  or	  other.24	  	  In	  this	  onto-­‐affective	  analysis	  of	  Being	  disclosure	  Heidegger	  only	  considers	  four	  fundamental	  moods	  of	  Dasein—excitement,	  joy,	  boredom	  and	  anxiety.	  	  Excitement	  entails	  a	  kind	  of	  complete	  absorption	  or	  clinging	  “to	  this	  or	  that	  particular	  being,	  precisely	  in	  our	  everyday	  preoccupations.”	  	  Joy	  is	  considered	  to	  involve	  a	  similar	  absorption,	  not	  in	  things	  that	  preoccupy	  us,	  but	  in	  the	  “presence	  of	  the	  Dasein—and	  not	  simply	  of	  the	  person—of	  a	  human	  being	  whom	  we	  love.”	  	  Boredom	  as	  a	  “drifting	  here	  and	  there	  in	  the	  abysses	  of	  our	  existence	  like	  a	  muffling	  fog,	  removes	  all	  things	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.	  p.99.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.100.	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and	  human	  beings	  and	  oneself	  along	  with	  them	  into	  a	  remarkable	  indifference.”25	  	  While	  all	  three	  of	  these	  moods	  can	  reveal	  beings	  as	  a	  whole,	  they	  simultaneously	  conceal	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  No-­‐thing.	  	  But	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  need	  to	  overcome	  the	  nihilism	  we	  have	  been	  thrown	  into.	  	  Moreover,	  Heidegger	  gives	  this	  question	  added	  urgency	  by	  claiming	  that	  “without	  the	  original	  revelation	  of	  the	  nothing,	  no	  
selfhood	  and	  no	  freedom”26—which	  is	  also	  the	  practical	  ethical	  question	  that	  provoked	  this	  onto-­‐affective	  inquiry	  to	  begin	  with.	  	   Although	  these	  basic	  grounding	  moods	  disclose	  us	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  beings—	  somewhat	  akin	  to	  what	  John	  Dewey,	  taking	  a	  cue	  from	  Charles	  Santiago	  Peirce,	  called	  “the	  qualitative	  immediacy	  of	  situations”—they	  also	  simultaneously	  close	  us	  off	  from	  encountering	  the	  no-­‐thing	  beyond	  beings.	  	  Heidegger	  turns	  to	  anxiety	  as	  a	  uniquely	  attuned	  mood	  that	  puts	  us	  directly	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  no-­‐thing.	  	  Using	  the	  insights	  of	  Soren	  Kierkegaard’s	  treatment	  of	  angst—a	  generalized	  fear	  of	  nothing	  in	  particular—Heidegger	  shows	  how	  “in	  the	  face	  of	  anxiety	  all	  utterance	  of	  the	  ‘is’	  falls	  silent”	  and	  the	  nothing	  is	  revealed.	  	  Heidegger	  claims	  that	  anxiety	  of	  this	  onto-­‐affective	  disclosure	  does	  indeed	  occur	  in	  our	  experience,	  although	  it	  is	  quite	  rare:	  By	  this	  anxiety	  we	  do	  not	  mean	  the	  quite	  common	  anxiousness,	  ultimately	  reducible	  to	  fearfulness,	  which	  all	  too	  readily	  comes	  over	  us.	  	  Anxiety	  is	  basically	  different	  from	  fear.	  	  We	  become	  afraid	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  or	  that	  particular	  being	  that	  threatens	  us	  in	  this	  or	  that	  respect.	  	  Because	  fear	  possesses	  this	  trait	  of	  being	  “fear	  in	  the	  face	  of”	  and	  “fear	  for,”	  he	  who	  fears	  and	  is	  afraid	  is	  captive	  to	  the	  mood	  in	  which	  he	  finds	  himself….Anxiety	  does	  not	  let	  such	  confusion	  arise.	  	  Much	  to	  the	  contrary,	  a	  peculiar	  calm	  pervades	  it.	  	  Anxiety	  is	  indeed	  anxiety	  in	  the	  face	  of.	  .	  .	  but	  not	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  or	  that	  thing.27	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.,	  p.99.	  26	  Ibid.,	  p.103	  [Italics	  added	  for	  emphasis].	  27	  Ibid.,	  p.100.	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In	  anxiety	  we	  say	  “one	  feels	  ill	  at	  ease	  [es	  ist	  einem	  unheimlich].”	  	  This	  uncanny	  feeling	  lets	  us	  feel	  as	  if	  “we	  can	  get	  no	  hold	  on	  things”	  and	  therefore	  allows	  the	  No-­‐thing	  to	  disclose	  itself.	  	  	  	   In	  this	  fundamental	  ontological	  mood	  of	  anxiety,	  Dasein	  is	  “held	  out	  into	  the	  open.”	  	  Indeed,	  for	  Heidegger,	  anxiety	  is	  not	  a	  fundamentally	  pessimistic	  mood.	  	  For	  as	  Heidegger	  suggests,	  some	  of	  the	  “daring	  ones,”	  who	  go	  beyond	  the	  petty	  “Oh,	  yes”	  and	  “Oh,	  no”	  of	  the	  chatter	  of	  "the	  They"	  (das	  Man),	  can	  feel	  an	  anxiety	  that	  “cannot	  be	  opposed	  to	  joy	  or	  even	  to	  the	  comfortable	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  tranquilized	  bustle.	  	  It	  stands—outside	  all	  such	  opposition—in	  secret	  alliance	  with	  the	  cheerfulness	  and	  gentleness	  of	  creative	  longing.”28	  	  But,	  even	  with	  this	  being	  the	  case,	  we	  have	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  whether	  Heidegger’s	  treatment	  of	  onto-­‐disclosive	  moods	  is	  sufficient	  to	  the	  task	  of	  disclosing	  the	  liberating	  No-­‐thing-­‐ness	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  things.	  	  Of	  course,	  Heidegger’s	  later	  “poetic	  ontology”	  does	  more	  to	  think	  the	  “creative	  longing”	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  thrown	  Dasein.	  	  In	  considering	  the	  onto-­‐affective	  ethics	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism,	  we	  will	  also	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  return	  to	  this	  question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mood	  of	  a	  deep	  anxiety	  (arising	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  for	  how	  it	  is	  with	  things)	  and	  moods	  of	  musicality/joy	  (as	  a	  creative	  affirmation	  of	  life	  and	  its	  possibilities).	  	   Another	  thinker	  who	  has	  presented	  a	  deep	  challenge	  to	  most	  fundamental,	  and	  therefore	  most	  unquestioned,	  tradition	  of	  Western	  ontotheology,	  is	  Baruch	  Spinoza.	  	  In	  his	  Ethics,	  Spinoza	  reveals	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  Being	  as	  a	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  possible	  and	  actual	  modes	  of	  bodily	  substance	  with	  body—i.e.,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.106	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corporeal	  substance—being	  understood	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  possible	  as	  including	  mental	  images,	  affect	  images,	  and	  all	  modes	  of	  re-­‐presentation	  that	  a	  living	  human	  organism/person	  complex	  engages	  in	  in	  any	  construction	  of	  the	  sensible.	  	  But	  as	  Jacques	  Ranciere	  argues	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  Aesthetics	  a	  social	  ontology	  that	  takes	  seriously	  the	  ethico-­‐political	  implications	  of	  aesthetic	  practices	  needs	  to	  show	  how	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  “univocity	  of	  predicates	  that	  modifies	  the	  modes	  of	  substance”	  (Spinoza)	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  sensible.	  	  Ranciere	  identifies	  any	  specific	  political	  and	  ethical	  problems	  facing	  us	  as	  always	  referring	  somehow	  back	  to	  the	  basic	  question	  of	  how	  to	  achieve	  a	  just	  “distribution	  of	  the	  sensible.”	  	  The	  distribution	  of	  
the	  sensible	  as	  defined	  by	  Ranciere	  claims	  that	  “system	  of	  self-­‐evident	  facts	  of	  sense	  perception	  that	  simultaneously	  discloses	  the	  existence	  of	  something	  in	  common	  and	  the	  delimitations	  that	  define	  the	  respective	  parts	  and	  positions	  within	  it.”	  And	  this	  basic	  onto-­‐affective	  dynamic	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  rather	  Kantian	  way	  as	  the	  “system	  of	  a	  priori	  forms	  determining	  what	  presents	  itself	  to	  sense	  experience.”29	  	  For	  Ranciere,	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  “that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  politics	  be	  raised…at	  the	  level	  of	  sensible	  delimitation	  of	  what	  is	  common	  to	  the	  community,	  the	  forms	  of	  its	  visibility	  and	  of	  its	  organization.”	  	  One	  biopolitical	  lesson	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  an	  ontological	  inquiry	  at	  this	  level	  of	  political-­‐aesthetic	  practice	  is	  that	  “arts	  only	  ever	  lend	  to	  projects	  of	  domination	  or	  emancipation	  what	  they	  are	  able	  to	  lend	  to	  them,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  quite	  simply,	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  Politics	  of	  Aesthetics	  (Continuum,	  2004),	  p.13.	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they	  have	  in	  common	  with	  them:	  bodily	  positions	  and	  movements,	  functions	  of	  speech,	  the	  parceling	  out	  of	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  invisible.”30	  	   Ranciere	  is	  part	  of	  the	  tradition	  of	  French	  thinkers	  of	  a	  socializing	  ontology	  including	  Deleuze.	  	  And	  like	  Deleuze,	  Ranciere	  is	  interested	  in	  uncovering	  the	  sites	  of	  domination	  and	  emancipation	  at	  the	  level	  of	  bio-­‐political	  micropractices	  of	  self-­‐creation	  and	  world-­‐constitution.	  	  If,	  as	  Spinoza	  understood	  the	  point	  of	  Ethics	  to	  be	  a	  striving	  for	  perfection	  (understood	  as	  a	  passing	  from	  a	  state	  of	  ontological	  increase	  rather	  than	  diminution	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  agential	  sites	  of	  power	  (potentia	  agendi),	  then	  it	  follows	  naturally	  that	  “everything	  that	  increases	  or	  enhances	  our	  power	  of	  acting	  is	  good,	  and	  that	  which	  diminishes	  or	  restrains	  it	  is	  bad;	  and	  we	  only	  know	  good	  and	  bad	  through	  the	  feeling	  of	  joy	  or	  sadness	  of	  which	  we	  are	  conscious.”31	  	  These	  onto-­‐affective	  feelings	  hold	  us	  out	  into	  the	  openness	  of	  our	  freedom	  to	  determine	  our	  fundamental	  ethical	  orientation.	  	  This	  ethical	  orientation	  is	  not	  to	  be	  captured	  either	  in	  the	  mental	  faculty,	  the	  feeling	  faculty	  (understood	  primarily	  as	  passions—i.e.	  passive	  feelings),	  or	  from	  a	  foundationally	  determined	  discrete	  willing	  faculty.	  	  Rather,	  this	  historical	  a	  priori	  of	  our	  subjective	  consciousness	  (which	  is	  always	  already	  a	  conscience)	  is	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  body	  or	  em-­‐bodi-­‐ment	  for	  Spinoza.	  	  This	  is	  not	  some	  crude	  reductionism	  of	  ethical	  experience	  to	  the	  system	  coordinates	  mapped	  out	  onto	  reductively	  understood	  mechanical-­‐biological	  space	  in	  terms	  of	  patterns	  discovered	  in	  processes	  of	  species	  selection,	  natural	  selection,	  and	  sexual	  selection—although	  such	  scientific	  information	  can	  of	  course	  be	  helpful	  in	  ruling	  out	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  p19.	  31	  From	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Spinoza:	  Practical	  Philosophy	  (City	  Lights,	  1988)	  in	  the	  attached	  glossary	  of	  Spinozist	  terminology,	  p.71.	  	  This	  particular	  passage	  is	  commenting	  upon	  Spinoza’s	  Ethics	  (IV,	  8).	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other	  reductivist	  approaches	  to	  ethics	  that	  reduce	  the	  ethical	  subject	  to	  one	  or	  another	  fictitious	  metaphysical	  “faculty.”	  	  Rather,	  for	  Spinoza,	  since	  “the	  power	  of	  acting	  is	  what	  opens	  the	  capacity	  for	  being	  affected	  to	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  things,	  a	  thing	  is	  good	  insofar	  as	  it	  ‘disposes	  the	  body	  that	  it	  can	  be	  affected	  in	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  ways’”32	  and	  vice	  versa	  a	  thing	  is	  bad,	  insofar	  as	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  decomposition	  or	  decadence	  of	  our	  corporeal	  being.	  	  This	  composition	  (harmonizing)	  and	  decomposition	  (conflict)	  model	  of	  ethical	  determination	  resonates	  with	  a	  Confucian	  sensibility	  as	  to	  the	  ontological	  dimensions	  of	  qing	  情.	  	  	   	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  be	  presenting	  how	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  onto-­‐affective	  approach	  to	  ethics	  can	  help	  us	  achieve	  powers	  to	  transform	  situations	  towards	  greater	  life	  integration	  and	  steer	  them	  away	  from	  destructive	  violence	  and	  coercion	  in	  experience.	  	  If	  it	  is	  truly	  the	  case	  that,	  as	  Spinoza	  claims,	  “we	  don’t	  even	  know	  what	  a	  body	  can	  do,”	  then	  we	  certainly	  shouldn’t	  denigrate	  bodily	  experience	  in	  deference	  to	  some	  supposedly	  disembodied	  rational	  intellect	  or	  some	  pure	  faculty	  of	  willing.	  	  The	  Confucian	  tradition	  grounded	  in	  an	  Yijing	  cosmology	  of	  guan	  觀	  and	  gan	  感	  	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  viable	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  the	  body	  to	  get	  at	  an	  onto-­‐affective	  dimension	  of	  creative	  agential	  experience.	  	   In	  an	  essay	  on	  the	  onto-­‐hermeneutical	  significance	  of	  the	  recently	  discovered	  "Human	  Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Commanding	  Situations"	  《性自命出》	  Cheng	  Chung-­‐Ying	  argues	  that	  “any	  theory	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  self	  we	  must	  recognize	  that	  the	  human	  self	  has	  to	  have	  an	  inner	  content	  that	  enables	  itself	  to	  know	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  we	  may	  find	  eventually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ethics	  (IV,	  38)	  quoted	  from	  Deleuze,	  p.71.	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an	  autonomy	  of	  will	  that	  can	  make	  moral	  choice	  and	  adopt	  a	  norm	  to	  follow	  in	  action.”33	  	  He	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  certain	  excavated	  texts	  reveal	  an	  important	  development	  of	  Confucius’	  teachings	  on	  human	  self	  and	  moral	  cultivation:	  The	  formation	  of	  this	  concept	  of	  self	  is	  not	  transcendent	  nor	  transcendental	  but	  ascertained	  on	  experiential	  grounds	  of	  observation	  and	  reflection	  on	  feeling	  and	  perception.	  What	  we	  have	  witnessed	  is	  an	  onto-­‐genesis	  of	  various	  feelings	  and	  dispositions	  under	  a	  fundamental	  conception	  of	  self,	  which	  presents	  itself	  in	  the	  practice	  and	  performance	  of	  virtues.	  I	  shall	  call	  this	  Chinese	  metaphysics	  “onto-­‐generative	  metaphysics	  of	  human	  self”	  (ziwo	  
benti	  xingshangxue	  自我本體形上學)	  in	  distinction	  from	  the	  ontological	  metaphysics	  or	  simply	  ontology	  of	  the	  Greek	  kind.	  	  A	  particular	  line	  of	  Confucian	  thinking	  that	  I	  am	  philosophically	  reconstructing	  here,	  is	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage.	  	  While	  individual	  authorship	  is	  always	  a	  problematic	  way	  from	  which	  to	  approach	  pre-­‐Qin	  texts,	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  thematic	  and	  contextual	  resonance	  between	  texts	  historically	  attributed	  to	  Zisizi	  (Zhongyong	  and	  
Wuxingpian)	  and	  the	  Mencius.	  	  I	  will	  briefly	  lay	  out	  the	  role	  of	  onto-­‐affectivity	  in	  the	  WXP	  and	  Mencius	  before	  going	  to	  another	  excavated	  text	  that	  I	  think	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  onto-­‐affective	  account	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  moral	  emotions	  and	  ethical	  virtuosities.	  	   In	  the	  WXP	  the	  central	  concern	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  four	  basic	  Confucian	  virtues—ren	  仁,	  yi	  義,	  li	  禮,	  zhi	  智—and	  the	  embodied	  unity	  of	  these	  virtuosities—
sheng	  聖—can	  come	  to	  be	  formed	  within	  a	  person.	  	  Confucian	  “virtuosity”	  (de	  德)	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  that	  power	  (virtus)	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  “get”	  (de	  得)	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  most	  extensive	  and	  intensive	  web	  of	  human	  and	  natural	  relations,	  which	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  See	  Cheng,	  “ON	  INTERNAL	  ONTO-­‐GENESIS	  OF	  VIRTUOUS	  ACTIONS	  IN	  THE	  WU	  XING	  PIAN”,	  
Journal	  of	  Chinese	  Philosophy,	  Supplement	  to	  Volume	  37	  (2010)	  142–158.	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turn	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  intensification	  of	  this	  very	  agential	  power.	  	  Clearly	  this	  power	  of	  agency	  is	  related	  to	  human	  affections	  in	  a	  fundamental	  way.	  	  The	  author	  of	  the	  ZY	  is	  concerned	  to	  show	  how	  “happiness,	  anger,	  sadness,	  joy”	  (xi	  nu	  ai	  le	  喜怒哀樂)—the	  four	  basic	  affects	  of	  Confucian	  moral	  psychology—are	  related	  to	  ethical	  self-­‐cultivation.	  	  Before	  these	  four	  basic	  affects	  emerge	  (weifa	  未發)	  heart-­‐minding	  (xin	  
心)	  is	  in	  nascent	  equilibrium	  (zhong	  中);	  but	  given	  the	  inevitable	  need	  for	  action	  these	  affects	  will	  be	  expressed	  as	  the	  qualitative-­‐atmospheric	  background	  of	  human	  thinking,	  feeling,	  and	  action.	  	  So	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  think	  through	  these	  moods	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  made	  rhythmically	  compatible	  with	  the	  original	  equilibrium	  (fa	  er	  
jiezhongjie	  發而皆中節),	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  a	  harmony	  (he	  和)	  with	  our	  basic	  human	  dispositions	  and	  commanding	  experience	  while	  promoting	  an	  ethically	  integrative	  (cheng	  誠)	  process	  of	  virtuosic	  formation.	  	   The	  WXP	  also	  provides	  an	  onto-­‐affective	  account	  of	  how	  virtuous	  conduct	  can	  be	  "internally"	  formed.	  	  The	  WXP	  begins	  with	  the	  following:	  Consummate	  humanity	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  called	  ‘virtuousic	  conduct’;	  not	  being	  formed	  within	  it	  is	  just	  called	  ‘conduct’.	  	  Optimal	  appropriateness	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  called	  ‘virtuousic	  conduct’;	  not	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  just	  called	  ‘conduct’.	  	  Ritual	  propriety	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  called	  ‘virtuousic	  conduct’;	  not	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  just	  called	  ‘conduct’.	  	  Wisdom	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  called	  ‘virtuousic	  conduct’;	  not	  being	  formed	  within	  it	  is	  just	  called	  ‘conduct’.	  	  Sagacity	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  called	  ‘virtuousic	  conduct’;	  not	  being	  formed	  within	  is	  just	  called	  ‘conduct’.	  	  There	  are	  five	  types	  of	  virtuousic	  conduct,	  harmonized	  these	  are	  called	  virtuosity;	  	  the	  first	  four	  types	  of	  conduct	  harmonized	  is	  called	  ‘efficacy.’	  	  Efficacy	  is	  the	  way	  of	  humanity;	  virtuosity	  is	  the	  way	  of	  tian.34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34仁形於內，謂之德之行；不形於內，謂之行。義形於內，謂之德之行；不形於內，謂之行。禮形
於內，謂之德之行；不形於內，謂之行。智形於內，謂之德之行；不形於內，謂之行。聖形於內，
謂之德之行；不形於內謂之行。德之行五，和謂之德；四行和，謂之善。善，人道也；德，天道。	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What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  from	  this	  passage	  is	  that	  "virtuosity"	  de	  德	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  efficacy	  in	  conduct,	  i.e.	  a	  social	  harmony	  achieved	  by	  creating	  a	  society	  governed	  by	  the	  norms	  and	  values	  of	  ren,	  yi,	  li,	  zhi.	  	  Confucian	  onto-­‐generative	  de	  德	  rather	  is	  an	  accumulated	  agential	  power	  that	  resonates	  with	  the	  creative	  integrative	  powers	  of	  tian.	  	  Mencius	  holds	  that	  “creative	  integrity	  is	  the	  way	  of	  heaven.	  	  While	  thinking	  through	  this	  creative	  integrity	  is	  the	  way	  of	  humanity"35	  	  (誠者，天之道也；
思誠者，人之道也).	  	  Here	  Sagacity	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  ability	  to	  achieve	  a	  creative	  integrity	  akin	  to	  cosmic-­‐cultural	  ideals	  of	  "commanding	  way-­‐making"	  or	  tiandao	  天
道.	  	  	  	   The	  following	  section	  of	  the	  WXP	  begins	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  means	  by	  which	  one	  cultivates	  this	  cosmic	  creative	  integrity	  in	  their	  person.	  	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  a	  Confucian	  onto-­‐affective	  approach	  to	  self-­‐cultivation:	  Without	  worry	  formed	  centrally	  in	  the	  heart-­‐mind,	  the	  authoritative	  person	  cannot	  have	  wisdom	  formed	  centrally	  in	  their	  heart-­‐minding	  processes.	  	  And	  without	  wisdom	  formed	  centrally	  in	  their	  heart-­‐minding,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  happiness.	  	  Without	  happiness	  there	  is	  no	  feeling	  of	  security.	  	  Without	  a	  feeling	  of	  security,	  there	  is	  no	  joy.	  	  And	  without	  joy	  there	  is	  no	  virtuosity.36	  	  The	  authoritative	  person	  (i.e.	  one	  who	  commits	  themselves	  to	  a	  lifelong	  project	  of	  Confucian	  self-­‐cultivation)	  can	  rely	  upon	  the	  basic	  ontologically	  disclosive	  moods	  as	  reliable	  indicators	  of	  ethical	  growth.	  	  Cheng	  Chung-­‐Ying	  observes	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  WXP	  holding	  “misgiving	  (you	  憂)	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  virtue”	  it	  is	  certainly	  verifiable	  in	  our	  lived	  experience	  that	  in	  “resolving	  an	  anxious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  Mencius,	  離樓上.	  36君子無中心之憂則無中心之智，無中心之智則無中心之悅，無中心之悅則不安，不安則不樂，不
樂則無德。	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problem	  of	  life…we	  have	  to	  look	  in	  our	  mind	  for	  a	  way-­‐out	  and	  when	  we	  get	  a	  way-­‐out,	  we	  not	  only	  come	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  but	  we	  experience	  a	  certain	  joy	  at	  the	  same	  time.”37	  	   The	  Mengzi	  provides	  a	  theory	  as	  to	  what	  kind	  of	  problems	  in	  life	  should	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  basic	  anxiety	  that	  discloses	  how	  it	  is	  with	  our	  ethical	  agency:	  Mengzi	  said,	  "What	  differentiates	  the	  authoritative	  person	  from	  the	  common	  lot	  of	  humanity	  is	  preservation	  of	  heart-­‐minding.	  	  An	  authoritative	  person	  preserves	  their	  heart-­‐minding	  through	  consummate	  humanity	  and	  ritual	  propriety.	  .	  Thus	  an	  authoritative	  person	  has	  a	  lifelong	  anxious	  concern,	  not	  just	  a	  one	  morning	  worry.	  	  What	  is	  the	  content	  of	  this	  concerning	  anxiety?	  	  Shun	  was	  a	  person.	  	  I	  am	  also	  a	  person.	  	  Shun	  sets	  a	  moral	  patterning	  for	  the	  world	  that	  can	  be	  gifted	  to	  subsequent	  generations,	  but	  I	  haven’t	  distinguished	  myself	  yet	  even	  from	  a	  common	  villager.	  	  This	  is	  indeed	  something	  to	  worry	  about.	  	  What	  should	  I	  be	  anxious	  about?	  	  To	  be	  like	  Shun,	  that	  is	  it.	  	  If	  an	  authoritative	  person	  is	  without	  worry	  then	  if	  it	  is	  not	  consummate	  conduct,	  it	  won’t	  be	  done;	  if	  it	  is	  not	  ritually	  proper,	  it	  won’t	  be	  carried	  out.	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  trifling	  worry	  that	  comes	  up,	  an	  authoritative	  person	  will	  not	  give	  it	  much	  thought.38	  	  Unlike	  Heidegger’s	  treatment	  of	  anxiety	  as	  an	  onto-­‐disclosive	  wherein	  what	  is	  revealed	  is	  “No-­‐thing	  in	  particular”,	  the	  onto-­‐affective	  disclosure	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  has	  specific	  ethical	  content	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  exemplary	  person—the	  historical	  sage	  king	  Shun.	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   Mengzi	  6A6	  takes	  the	  four	  basic	  virtuosities	  of	  the	  Confucian	  ethical	  project	  of	  self	  cultivation	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  four	  onto-­‐affective	  “sprouts”	  of	  discernible	  feeling:	  Mencius	  said,	  “With	  respect	  to	  the	  affections	  (qing	  情),	  they	  are	  capable	  (ke	  
可)	  of	  being	  directed	  towards	  good	  conduct,	  this	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  saying	  human	  nature	  is	  good.	  	  If	  one	  acts	  contrary	  to	  good	  conduct,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  their	  raw	  material.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  compassion	  and	  empathy	  is	  in	  reach	  of	  everyone.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  shame	  and	  dislike	  is	  in	  reach	  of	  everyone.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  reverence	  and	  respect	  is	  in	  reach	  of	  everyone.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  is	  in	  reach	  of	  everyone.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  compassion	  and	  empathy	  is	  consummate	  humanity.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  shame	  and	  dislike	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  optimal	  appropriateness.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  reverence	  and	  respect	  is	  ritual	  propriety.	  	  The	  heart	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  is	  wisdom.	  	  Consummate	  humanity,	  optimal	  appropriateness,	  ritual	  propriety,	  and	  wisdom	  are	  not	  imposed	  on	  my	  self	  from	  without.	  	  They	  are	  rooted	  here	  in	  my	  embodied	  person,	  only	  we	  do	  not	  think	  upon	  them.	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  said,	  “Seek	  it	  and	  it	  will	  be	  found,	  let	  it	  go	  and	  it	  will	  be	  lost.”	  	  People	  differ	  in	  their	  degrees	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  in	  lesser	  or	  greater	  amounts,	  this	  is	  because	  they	  are	  unable	  (buneng	  不能)	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  their	  potential.	  	  To	  quote	  the	  Odes:	  Tian	  generates	  the	  teeming	  multitudes	  and	  each	  thing/situation	  has	  its	  norm.	  When	  the	  people	  take	  up	  the	  beautiful	  and	  fitting,	  their	  liking	  is	  indeed	  esteemed	  virtuosity.”	  	  Confucius	  said,	  “Whoever	  made	  this	  poem	  certainly	  has	  an	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  way!	  So	  it	  is	  that	  each	  thing/situation	  has	  its	  norm	  and	  when	  the	  people	  take	  up	  the	  beautiful	  and	  fitting,	  their	  liking	  is	  indeed	  esteemed	  virtue.”39	  	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  somaesthetically	  considers	  persons	  and	  situations	  in	  navigating	  the	  complexities	  of	  ethical	  experience.	  	  In	  a	  qing	  情	  discourse	  of	  "sympathetic	  resonance"	  (gan	  感)	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  personal	  relationships	  can	  be	  described	  using	  a	  rich	  array	  of	  emotional	  language	  and	  imaginative	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responsiveness	  can	  prescribe	  a	  nuanced	  discourse	  of	  responsibilities.	  	  Confucian	  role-­‐focused	  somaesthetics	  avoids	  psychologizing	  the	  moral	  emotions	  as	  either	  subjective	  expressions	  of	  a	  discrete	  individual	  or	  as	  mere	  solipsistic	  constructions	  of	  purportedly	  objective	  ethical	  facts	  and	  norms.	  	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  offers	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  material	  account	  of	  moral	  affect	  within	  a	  qi-­‐based	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	  By	  avoiding	  both	  psychological	  and	  physiological	  reductionist	  accounts	  of	  ethical	  sensibility,	  Confucian	  somaesthetics	  provides	  a	  dynamic	  and	  transactional	  account	  of	  human	  nature	  (xing	  性)	  and	  conduct.	  	  	  	   The	  model	  of	  disengaged	  rationality	  familiar	  to	  the	  Western	  ontotheological	  tradition	  of	  ethics	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  embodied	  practices	  of	  personal	  cultivation	  within	  Confucianism.	  	  But	  Confucian	  somaesthetics	  is	  best	  not	  considered	  as	  the	  other	  of	  Reason,	  for	  this	  presupposes	  the	  possibility	  of	  disentangling	  fact	  from	  value	  or	  Objectivity	  from	  Subjectivity.	  	  The	  activity	  of	  "heartminding"	  xin心	  in	  Confucian	  ethical	  deliberation	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  clear	  and	  distinct	  line	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  “knowing”	  and	  “feeling”	  of	  persons,	  things,	  and	  events	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  function	  of	  heartminding	  is	  to	  “think”	  (si	  思),	  and	  this	  introduces	  the	  possibility	  of	  creatively	  responding	  (as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  reacting)	  to	  situations	  in	  imaginative	  ways.	  	  It	  is	  only	  by	  “reflecting	  on	  things	  close	  at	  hand”	  (jinsi近思),	  that	  is	  by	  cultivating	  an	  awareness	  of	  our	  own	  bodies	  as	  relationally	  constituted	  and	  constituting,	  that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve	  the	  power	  (de德)	  to	  transform	  experience	  in	  an	  ameliorative	  fashion.	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   When	  Puett	  refers	  to	  something	  like	  a	  “dispositional	  responsiveness”	  which	  clearly	  involves	  a	  strong	  affective	  dimension,	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  this	  non-­‐dualistic	  structure	  of	  	  experience	  that	  doesn't	  make	  the	  metaphysical	  move	  of	  dichotomizing	  reason	  and	  emotion.	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  XZMC,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  offer	  one	  more	  passage	  from	  the	  Mencius	  that	  reveals	  more	  of	  the	  onto-­‐affective	  significance	  of	  qing	  
情:	   Mencius	  said,	  “The	  source	  of	  the	  spring	  is	  sprouting	  forth,	  unceasing	  through	  night	  and	  day.	  	  It	  fills	  up	  every	  space	  and	  then	  goes	  forth,	  advancing	  to	  the	  four	  seas.	  	  It	  is	  because	  it	  has	  a	  source	  like	  this	  that	  such	  an	  achievement	  is	  possible.	  	  To	  be	  without	  a	  source,	  is	  like	  during	  the	  season	  of	  heavy	  rains	  when	  after	  a	  deluge	  the	  water	  covers	  the	  land,	  but	  after	  a	  short	  while	  it	  dries	  up.	  	  Thus	  the	  consummate	  person	  is	  ashamed	  that	  his	  reputation	  will	  exceed	  his	  ‘essence/feeling’	  (qing	  情).”40	  	  Here	  the	  authoritative	  person’s	  shame	  is	  a	  result	  of	  their	  reputation	  exceeding	  their	  achieved	  ethical	  essence.	  	  But	  as	  we	  have	  been	  arguing,	  for	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  tradition	  of	  correlative,	  somaesthetic	  thinking	  "essence"	  is	  synonymous	  with	  configured	  affect	  as	  an	  ethical	  achievement.	  	  The	  initial	  feelings	  and	  natural	  moods	  of	  a	  person	  are	  the	  basic	  materials	  from	  which	  Sagely	  perception	  and	  action	  is	  realized.	  	  All	  this	  ameliorative	  growth	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  qi	  氣	  accumulation	  and	  configuration	  as	  the	  
Mengzi	  frequently	  reiterates.41	  	   The	  XZMC	  also	  begins	  with	  an	  onto-­‐hermeneutic	  analysis	  of	  the	  onto-­‐affective	  dimensions	  of	  embodied	  moral	  psychology:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  離樓下.	  孟子曰：「原泉混混，不舍晝夜。盈科而後進，放乎四海，有本者如是，是之取爾。苟
為無本，七八月之閒雨集，溝澮皆盈；其涸也，可立而待也。故聲聞過情，君子恥之。」	  41	  See	  his	  important	  doctrine	  of	  ‘oceanic	  qi”	  浩然之氣.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Mencius	  recognizes	  that	  “qi	  is	  what	  fills	  up	  the	  body”	  (氣，體之充也)	  and	  that	  this	  entails	  a	  kind	  of	  growth	  in	  both	  intensity	  and	  expansiveness	  (至剛，至大)	  that	  culminates	  in	  the	  Great	  Body	  of	  the	  Sage	  (聖之大
體──與天地上下同流).	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“investigating	  things”	  (格物至知)	  while	  gan	  is	  the	  internal	  onto-­‐affective	  feeling	  that	  reveals	  an	  “immanently	  transcendent”	  source	  of	  meaning	  and	  ethical	  agency.	  	  	  	   With	  this	  section	  completed	  it	  should	  become	  more	  readily	  evident	  that	  thinking	  through	  the	  embodied	  affects	  can	  serve	  as	  the	  ground	  from	  which	  ethical	  agency	  is	  realized	  and	  receives	  proper	  orientation.	  	  The	  onto-­‐hermeneutic	  Confucian	  project	  places	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  internal	  onto-­‐genesis	  of	  virtuosic	  conduct	  and	  as	  such	  resonates	  with	  onto-­‐affective	  thinkers	  like	  Spinoza,	  Heidegger,	  and	  Deleuze.	  	  Here	  I	  have	  just	  been	  trying	  to	  open	  a	  space	  for	  further	  philosophical	  conversation.	  	  One	  thing	  that	  the	  excavated	  texts	  have	  done	  is	  to	  further	  solidify	  the	  need	  for	  contemporary	  thinkers	  interested	  in	  Confucian	  thought	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  role	  of	  affect	  in	  ethical	  experience.	  	  Affects	  (moods,	  feelings,	  sentiments,	  passions)	  should	  not	  be	  ignored	  in	  thinking	  about	  ethical	  value	  and	  creative	  agency.	  	  As	  the	  materially	  motivational	  force	  that	  turns	  thought	  into	  action,	  and	  as	  the	  means	  of	  perceiving	  the	  subtle	  (both	  felt	  fringe	  and	  atmospheric	  background)	  aspects	  of	  ethically	  salient	  situations,	  affect	  is	  indeed	  indispensible	  for	  non-­‐foundational,	  non-­‐ideal	  ethical	  theory	  and	  the	  embodied	  practices	  of	  self-­‐cultivation.	  	  A	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  lineage	  then	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  offer	  us	  in	  contemporary	  discourse,	  since	  it	  presents	  a	  unique	  account	  of	  affect	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  heartminding	  (xin	  心)	  and	  nature	  naturing	  (xing	  性).	  III.	  Pragmatism	  and	  Affect	  Theory	  	   	  I	  will	  first	  give	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  classical	  American	  pragmatist	  tradition,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  William	  James	  and	  John	  Dewey	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  conceptualized	  emotions.	  	  The	  non-­‐subjective	  character	  of	  emotions	  can	  be	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developed	  using	  James’	  famous	  article	  “What	  is	  an	  emotion?”	  (1884),	  wherein	  he	  develops	  the	  well-­‐known	  and	  oft-­‐criticized	  James-­‐Lange	  theory	  of	  emotions.	  	  In	  this	  theory	  the	  qualitative-­‐phenomenological	  feel	  of	  individual	  emotions	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  actually	  mere	  epiphenomenon	  of	  a	  more	  holistic	  organism-­‐environment	  transaction.	  	  We	  don’t	  first	  feel	  afraid	  in	  the	  internal	  theatre	  of	  our	  subjective	  minds	  and	  then	  look	  around	  for	  an	  object	  to	  be	  afraid	  of.	  	  As	  James	  would	  describe	  it,	  rather,	  we	  feel	  fearful	  because	  we	  find	  ourselves	  enmeshed	  in	  existentially	  problematic	  situations	  that	  are	  actually	  full-­‐of-­‐fear	  (or	  at	  least	  of	  fear-­‐inducing	  properties).	  	  Such	  a	  vitalistic	  and	  somaesthetically	  critical	  understanding	  of	  practical	  agency	  involves	  our	  bodily	  organism	  and	  felt	  personal	  sense	  of	  agency	  in	  "objective"	  biological-­‐cultural	  transactions	  with	  ecological	  conditions.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  imagine	  coming	  across	  a	  hungry	  tiger	  in	  the	  forest	  in	  the	  act	  of	  hunting,	  it	  certainly	  wouldn’t	  be	  the	  case	  that	  we	  would	  first	  provide	  a	  mental	  representation	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  only	  then	  experience	  subjective	  physiological	  symptoms	  such	  as	  an	  increased	  pulse	  rate	  and	  intense	  desire	  for	  flight	  (or	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  fight).	  	  Rather,	  in	  such	  extreme	  cases,	  the	  inherent	  danger	  of	  the	  situation	  leads	  directly	  to	  certain	  physiological	  responses	  of	  a	  practically-­‐engaged	  organism	  seeking	  its	  own	  biological	  self-­‐preservation.	  	  Such	  immediate	  experiences	  of	  truth-­‐tracking	  "emotions"	  are	  what	  James'	  has	  in	  mind	  in	  developing	  his	  pragmatic	  moral	  psychology.	  	  More	  nuanced	  examples	  of,	  say,	  feeling	  depressed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  	  realizing	  certain	  existential	  roles	  and	  interpersonal	  relationships	  are	  also	  clearly	  instances	  of	  a	  reality-­‐tracking	  function	  that	  can	  practically-­‐orient	  our	  affective	  discoveries.	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  We	  can	  also	  explore	  James’	  development	  of	  his	  early	  statement	  in	  one	  of	  his	  most	  speculatively	  metaphysical	  works—Pure	  Experience	  (1907).	  	  The	  chapter	  “The	  Place	  of	  Affectional	  Facts	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Pure	  Experience”	  will	  guide	  the	  flow	  of	  this	  section	  and	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  will	  influence	  the	  philosophical	  temperament	  of	  this	  entire	  dissertation.	  	  Here	  James	  argues	  that	  our	  experience	  of	  "subjective"	  thoughts	  and	  "objective"	  things	  are	  "absolutely	  homogeneous	  as	  to	  their	  material,	  and	  that	  their	  opposition	  is	  only	  one	  of	  relation	  and	  of	  function."44	  	  For	  James,	  there	  is	  no	  "thought-­‐stuff	  different	  from	  thing-­‐stuff"	  but	  rather	  the	  more	  "inner"	  or	  "subjective"	  aspects	  of	  our	  experience	  and	  the	  more	  "outer"	  or	  "objective"	  aspects	  are	  aspectually	  cut	  from	  the	  "same	  identical	  piece	  of	  'pure	  experience'."45	  	  	  	   James	  takes	  a	  functionalist	  account	  of	  subjective	  values	  and	  objective	  facts,	  insofar	  as	  the	  "central	  point	  of	  the	  pure-­‐experience	  theory	  is	  that	  'outer'	  and	  'inner'	  are	  names	  for	  two	  groups	  into	  which	  we	  sort	  experiences	  according	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  act	  upon	  their	  neighbors."46	  	  He	  cites	  his	  own	  collaborative	  James-­‐Lange	  theory	  of	  emotions—wherein	  the	  physiology	  of	  embodied	  affect	  epistemically	  and	  ontologically	  precedes	  any	  subjective	  experience	  of	  emotion—as	  evidence	  of	  this	  pure-­‐experience	  functionalism.	  	  He	  also	  points	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  emotional	  experience	  in	  the	  "aesthetic"	  and	  "rhetorical"	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  merely	  descriptive	  uses	  of	  language:	  We	  discover	  beauty	  just	  as	  we	  discover	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  things.	  	  Training	  is	  needed	  to	  make	  us	  expert	  in	  either	  line.	  	  Single	  sensations	  also	  may	  be	  ambiguous.	  	  Shall	  we	  say	  an	  'agreeable	  degree	  of	  heat,'	  or	  an	  'agreeable	  feeling'	  occasioned	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  heat?	  	  Either	  will	  do;	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  William	  James,	  Collected	  Works,	  p.1206.	  45	  Ibid.,	  p.1206.	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.1207.	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language	  would	  lose	  most	  of	  its	  esthetic	  and	  rhetorical	  value	  were	  we	  forbidden	  to	  project	  words	  primarily	  connoting	  our	  affections	  upon	  the	  objects	  by	  which	  the	  affections	  are	  aroused.	  	  The	  man	  is	  really	  hateful;	  the	  action	  really	  mean;	  the	  situation	  really	  tragic—all	  in	  themselves	  and	  quite	  apart	  from	  our	  opinion.	  	  We	  even	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  weary	  road,	  a	  giddy	  height,	  a	  jocund	  morning	  or	  a	  sullen	  sky.47	  	  	  	  James	  also	  cites	  a	  psychological	  study	  regarding	  multiple	  personality	  disorder	  wherein	  subjects	  fail	  to	  perceive	  a	  difference	  in	  their	  own	  bodily	  movement	  from	  the	  movement	  of	  others	  in	  their	  experience.	  	  James	  thinks	  that	  all	  of	  this	  points	  to	  a	  "primitive	  stage	  of	  perception	  in	  which	  discriminations	  afterwards	  needful	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  made."48	  James	  also	  points	  out	  the	  "shifting	  place	  of	  'secondary	  qualities'	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy"	  as	  another	  instance	  of	  "excellent	  proof	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  'inner'	  and	  'outer'	  are	  not	  coefficients	  with	  which	  experiences	  come	  to	  us	  aboriginally	  stamped"	  but	  are	  rather	  the	  "results	  of	  a	  later	  classification	  performed	  by	  us	  for	  particular	  needs."	  	   James	  argues	  convincingly	  within	  his	  pure	  experience	  theory	  that	  "there	  is	  no	  original	  spirituality	  or	  materiality	  in	  being,	  intuitively	  discerned"	  but	  "only	  a	  translocation	  of	  experiences	  from	  one	  world	  to	  another"	  a	  "grouping	  of	  them	  with	  one	  set	  or	  another	  of	  associates	  for	  definitely	  practical	  or	  intellectual	  ends."49	  	  And	  regarding	  the	  "persistent	  ambiguity	  of	  relations"	  James	  simply	  holds	  that	  they	  are	  undeniably	  "parts	  of	  pure	  experience"	  not	  being	  mental	  or	  physical	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  nonetheless	  they	  are	  thought	  of	  and	  experienced	  as	  having	  a	  reality	  capable	  of	  pragmatic	  or	  functional	  description	  in	  medias	  res.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.,	  p.1209.	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.,	  p.1211.	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   Simply	  put,	  the	  reason	  that	  our	  "epithets	  of	  value"	  have	  a	  fundamentally	  "ambiguous	  or	  amphibious	  status"	  as	  appearing	  in	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  is,	  according	  to	  James,	  that	  our	  "body	  itself	  is	  the	  palmary	  instance	  of	  the	  ambiguous."	  	  James	  elaborates	  this	  somaesthetic	  focal	  point	  as	  follows:	  Sometimes	  I	  treat	  my	  body	  purely	  as	  a	  part	  of	  outer	  nature.	  	  Sometimes,	  again,	  I	  think	  of	  it	  as	  'mine,'	  I	  sort	  it	  with	  the	  'me,'	  and	  then	  certain	  local	  changes	  and	  determinations	  in	  it	  pass	  for	  spiritual	  happenings.	  	  Its	  breathing	  is	  my	  'thinking,'	  its	  sensorial	  adjustments	  are	  my	  'attention,'	  its	  kinesthetic	  alterations	  are	  my	  'efforts,'	  its	  visceral	  perturbations	  are	  my	  'emotions.'	  The	  obstinate	  controversies	  that	  have	  arisen	  over	  such	  statements	  as	  these	  (which	  sound	  so	  paradoxical,	  and	  which	  can	  yet	  be	  made	  so	  seriously)	  prove	  how	  hard	  it	  is	  to	  decide	  by	  bare	  introspection	  what	  it	  is	  in	  experiences	  that	  shall	  make	  them	  either	  spiritual	  or	  material.	  	  It	  surely	  can	  be	  nothing	  intrinsic	  in	  the	  individual	  experiences.	  	  It	  is	  their	  way	  of	  behaving	  towards	  each	  other,	  their	  system	  of	  relations,	  their	  function;	  and	  all	  these	  things	  vary	  with	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  find	  it	  opportune	  to	  consider	  them.50	  	  	  John	  Dewey	  gives	  a	  similar	  pragmatic	  account	  of	  emotions,	  but	  he	  avoids	  some	  of	  the	  more	  unfortunate	  rhetorical	  characterizations	  that	  have	  lead	  some	  to	  read	  James’	  theory	  (ironically)	  either	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  biological	  reductionism,	  psychological	  behaviorism	  or	  an	  instance	  of	  naive	  spiritualism	  or	  moral	  objectivism.	  	  In	  Art	  as	  Experience	  (1930)	  Dewey	  articulates	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	  kind	  of	  “atmospheric	  quality”	  theory	  of	  emotional	  and	  ethical	  experience:	  An	  act	  of	  perception	  proceeds	  by	  waves	  that	  extend	  serially	  throughout	  the	  entire	  organism.	  	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  no	  such	  thing	  in	  perception	  as	  seeing	  or	  hearing	  plus	  emotion.	  	  The	  perceived	  object	  or	  scene	  is	  emotionally	  pervaded	  throughout.	  	  When	  an	  aroused	  emotion	  does	  not	  permeate	  the	  material	  that	  is	  perceived	  or	  thought	  of,	  it	  is	  either	  preliminary	  or	  pathological.51	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Ibid.,	  p.1213.	  51	  John	  Dewey,	  Art	  as	  Experience	  (1930),	  p.55.	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In	  a	  fascinating	  article—“Thought	  in	  the	  Strenuous	  Mood:	  Pragmatism	  as	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  Feeling”52—Richard	  Shusterman	  provides	  a	  helpful	  synthesis	  of	  aspects	  of	  both	  the	  Jamesian	  and	  Deweyean	  lines	  of	  thought	  regarding	  affectivity.	  	  Importantly,	  Shusterman	  provides	  a	  clear	  conceptual	  distinction	  between	  “feeling”,	  “emotion”	  and	  “mood”	  and	  explores	  the	  import	  these	  semantic	  connotations	  have	  for	  developing	  a	  pragmatically-­‐oriented	  ethical	  theory.	  	  As	  a	  motivational	  bridge	  between	  thought	  and	  action,	  pragmatism	  as	  a	  philosophy	  of	  feeling	  provides	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  approaching	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  on	  the	  epistemological,	  ontological,	  and	  ethical	  implications	  of	  affectivity.	  	  Having	  presented	  this	  classical	  pragmatist	  account	  of	  affectivity	  we	  can	  see	  how	  Hilary	  Putnam’s	  account	  of	  
pragmatic	  moral	  realism	  can	  be	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  resonate	  with	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  as	  both	  an	  illuminating	  normative	  framework	  and	  a	  viable	  metaethical	  position.53	  IV.	  Confucian	  Affect	  and	  Moral	  Sentiment	  Theory	  	   In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  develop	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  position	  on	  qing	  and	  show	  how	  it	  resonates	  with	  pragmatic	  moral	  realism.	  	  First,	  I	  will	  put	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  into	  philosophical	  dialogue	  with	  another	  important	  voice	  in	  analytic	  metaethics—Michael	  Slote’s	  contemporary	  version	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism.	  	  Initially,	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  and	  Slote’s	  position	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  common	  ground.	  	  After	  a	  deeper	  analysis,	  however,	  despite	  the	  presence	  of	  much	  shared	  philosophical	  material,	  at	  a	  fundamental	  level	  Slote	  is	  still	  working	  within	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Richard	  Shusterman,	  "Thought	  in	  the	  Strenuous	  Mood:	  Pragmatism	  as	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  Feeling,"	  in	  
New	  Literary	  History,	  vol.	  43,	  number	  3,	  Summer	  2012,	  pp.	  433-­‐454.	  53	  I	  largely	  derive	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Putnam's	  non-­‐foundationalist	  moral	  realism	  primarily	  from	  his	  Ethics	  without	  Ontology	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2004).	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rather	  limiting	  perspective	  wherein	  reason	  and	  sentiment	  are	  dichotomized	  in	  a	  pernicious	  and	  reductive	  psychologism;	  whereas	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  tries	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  entirety	  of	  human	  experience	  in	  a	  somaesthetically	  sensitive	  manner.	  In	  his	  Moral	  Sentimentalism	  (2010)	  Michael	  Slote	  presents	  his	  version	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism—a	  comprehensive	  theoretic	  position	  that	  he	  claims	  can	  provide	  a	  systematic	  account	  of	  normative	  ethics,	  metaethics,	  and	  moral	  education.	  	  The	  key	  to	  his	  entire	  project	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  empathy.	  	  Slote	  defines	  “empathy”	  as	  “the	  cement	  of	  the	  moral	  universe.”54	  For	  Slote,	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  any	  viable	  sentimentalist	  approach	  to	  ethics	  is	  to	  ground	  our	  use	  of	  morally	  evaluative	  language	  and	  ethically	  discursive	  practices	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  non-­‐judgmental	  (i.e.	  non-­‐moral)	  phenomenon.	  	  The	  problem	  as	  he	  sees	  it	  with	  much	  of	  the	  previous	  sentimentalist	  literature	  (including	  his	  philosophical	  hero—David	  Hume),	  is	  that	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  the	  sentiment(s)	  used	  to	  ground	  our	  ethically	  evaluative	  practices	  implicitly	  contain	  the	  moral	  concepts	  that	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  explain.	  	  Simply	  put,	  either	  we	  appeal	  to	  a	  non-­‐sentimental	  (i.e.	  Rational—utilitarian	  or	  deontological)	  account	  or	  we	  employ	  some	  non-­‐evaluative	  sentiments	  to	  ground	  our	  evaluative	  frameworks.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  coherent	  sentimentalist	  account	  cannot	  be	  viciously	  circular	  and	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  derive	  an	  ‘ought’	  from	  an	  ‘is’—which	  runs	  counter	  to	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  (quite	  inappropriately)	  as	  Hume’s	  Law.	  	   It	  is	  precisely	  empathy	  that	  Slote	  believes	  can	  fulfill	  these	  theoretical	  tasks.	  	  Slote	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  term	  “empathy”	  is	  an	  early	  twentieth	  century	  English	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Slote,	  Moral	  Sentimentalism,	  p.14.	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translation	  of	  the	  German	  word	  Einfuehlung	  (lit.	  “feeling	  into”).	  	  And	  Slote’s	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  classical	  sentimentalists	  (David	  Hume	  and	  Adam	  Smith)	  used	  the	  term	  “sympathy”	  to	  refer	  in	  different	  contexts	  to	  both	  what	  we	  currently	  mean	  by	  “sympathy”	  and	  “empathy”	  respectively.	  	  This	  failure	  to	  distinguish	  between	  sympathy	  and	  empathy	  may	  also	  have	  lead	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  come	  to	  a	  coherent	  systematic	  normative	  and	  metaethical	  theory	  grounded	  in	  a	  singularly	  sentimental	  phenomenon.	  	  Slote	  provides	  a	  rough	  and	  ready	  definitional	  distinction	  between	  ‘sympathy’	  and	  ‘empathy’	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  colloquial	  “feeling	  someone’s	  pain”	  (e.g.	  Bill	  Clinton)	  and	  merely	  “feeling	  for	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  pain.”	  The	  former	  type	  of	  feeling	  then	  refers	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  empathy	  and	  the	  latter	  to	  sympathy.	  	  	  	   What	  matters	  in	  determining	  the	  meaning	  of	  morally	  evaluative	  terms	  for	  Slote	  is	  getting	  clear	  about	  the	  appropriate	  empathic	  concern	  we	  have	  towards	  ethically-­‐salient	  situations.	  	  Slote	  thinks	  that	  what	  matters	  most	  is	  the	  first-­‐person	  (phenomenological)	  standpoint	  of	  moral	  agency	  and	  this	  is	  what	  empathic	  concern	  is	  directed	  towards	  in	  grounding	  moral	  approval	  and	  disapproval.	  	  On	  the	  first-­‐order,	  normative	  level	  we	  empathize	  with	  persons,	  and	  animals.	  	  Slote	  doesn’t	  really	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  empathizing	  with	  plants	  and	  inanimate	  objects,	  although	  he	  does	  mention	  Wang	  Yangming	  in	  his	  introduction	  as	  a	  Confucian	  philosopher	  concerned	  with	  “empathy”,	  and	  Wang	  would	  seem	  to	  countenance	  such	  empathic	  phenomenon.	  	  But	  what	  matters	  morally	  is	  “an	  account	  of	  approval	  and	  disapproval	  that	  focuses	  on	  agential	  traits	  and	  the	  standpoint	  of	  those	  who	  possess	  them,	  rather	  than	  on	  (empathy	  with)	  the	  effects	  such	  traits	  have	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	  others.”55	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ibid.,	  p.33.	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   What	  Slote	  is	  doing	  then	  is	  pushing	  the	  Hutchensonian-­‐Humean	  line	  of	  moral	  sense	  theory	  away	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  “utility”	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  agent.	  	  By	  making	  such	  a	  move,	  Slote	  believes	  we	  can	  better	  accommodate	  for	  the	  advantages	  a	  deontological	  or	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  approach	  might	  have	  while	  avoiding	  the	  associated	  ontological	  and	  ethical	  pitfalls.	  	  Moral	  approval	  and	  disapproval	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  third-­‐person	  empathic	  response	  to	  the	  first-­‐order	  empathic	  caring	  of	  (moral)	  
agents.	  	  Here	  I	  would	  question	  Slote’s	  interpretive	  mechanism	  in	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  spell	  out	  what	  he	  means	  by	  agency,	  and	  he	  can’t	  possibly	  mean	  full-­‐blown	  “moral”	  agency	  (due	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  circularity	  he	  wishes	  to	  avoid).	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  a	  singular	  “psychological	  state”	  can	  do	  the	  work	  that	  he	  want	  it	  to.	  	  And	  given	  that	  this	  is	  how	  Slote	  describes	  empathy—in	  entirely	  psychological	  terms—	  we	  are	  left	  wondering	  about	  the	  physiological,	  relational,	  and	  sociobiological	  aspects	  of	  empathy.	  	  It	  seems	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  Slote's	  non-­‐normative	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  empathy	  can	  account	  for	  agency	  in	  any	  sense,	  but	  what	  Slote	  seems	  to	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  describing	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  navigate	  situations	  in	  our	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  managing	  the	  economy	  of	  our	  empathic	  capacities	  and	  responses.	  	  Slote	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  an	  advantage	  of	  his	  theory	  that	  one	  unified	  sentimental	  capacity—empathy—is	  used	  to	  explain	  both	  our	  first-­‐order	  responses	  to	  situations	  and	  our	  higher-­‐order	  evaluations	  of	  ourselves	  and	  others	  in	  a	  moral	  language.	  	  	  	   The	  phenomenology	  of	  ethically	  evaluative	  empathy	  comes	  for	  Slote	  in	  terms	  of	  phenomenological/affective	  “warmth	  or	  tenderness”	  (approval)	  and	  “chill”	  (disapproval).	  	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “approval	  is	  primarily	  an	  attitude	  toward	  an	  agent,	  not	  toward	  those	  the	  agent	  is	  concerned	  about,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  wondered	  how	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empathically	  feeling	  (some	  of)	  the	  warmth	  the	  agent	  feels	  toward	  others	  can	  constitute	  approval	  of	  the	  agent,	  and	  the	  same	  point	  can,	  of	  course,	  be	  made	  about	  coldness	  and	  disapproval	  as	  well.”56	  	  Slote	  defends	  moral	  objectivity	  with	  a	  pseudo	  reference-­‐fixing	  account	  for	  moral	  language	  a	  la	  Saul	  Kripke's	  treatment	  of	  naming	  and	  definite	  descriptions.	  	  I	  say	  “pseudo”	  Kripkean,	  because	  Slote	  is	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Kripke	  gives	  a	  causal	  account	  of	  semantic	  reference	  that	  would	  entail	  an	  a	  posteriori	  definition	  of	  moral	  terms	  like	  “good”	  and	  “right.”	  	  Moreover,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  Kripke	  himself	  never	  attempted	  to	  apply	  his	  semantic	  theory	  of	  reference	  to	  ethically	  evaluative	  language	  games	  of	  any	  variety.	  	  Simply	  put,	  Slote	  thinks	  that	  the	  “warmth”	  and	  “chill”	  we	  feel	  by	  way	  of	  empathic	  contagion	  is	  the	  same	  whether	  we	  are	  reacting	  to	  an	  immediate	  situation	  (with	  or	  without	  ethical	  content)	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  feeling	  we	  have	  directed	  towards	  an	  agent	  in	  terms	  of	  moral	  evaluation.	  	  It	  is	  Kripkean	  because	  although	  the	  empathic	  feeling	  might	  be	  the	  same,	  the	  causal	  source	  or	  origin	  makes	  all	  the	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  fixing	  semantic	  reference.	  	   While	  giving	  up	  an	  “exact	  analogy	  with	  reference-­‐fixing	  in	  the	  case	  of	  color	  and	  natural	  kind	  terms”	  Slote	  does	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  “it	  is	  a	  priori	  that	  actions	  are	  morally	  good	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  express	  or	  reflect	  agential	  warmth”	  and	  his	  argument	  depends	  upon	  “an	  a	  priori	  fixing	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘morally	  good’	  (or	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  goodness)	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  warmed	  by	  the	  warmth	  of	  (evinced	  by)	  an	  agent	  or	  agents.”57	  Even	  setting	  aside	  the	  worries	  I’ve	  already	  mentioned	  regarding	  Slote’s	  failure	  to	  specify	  exactly	  what	  he	  means	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Ibid.,	  p.38.	  57	  Ibid.,	  p.63.	  
	   90	  
“agency”	  in	  this	  context,	  given	  that	  it	  obviously	  cannot	  be	  moral	  agency	  at	  this	  level,	  we	  can	  still	  be	  worried	  about	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  “experience	  of	  being	  warmed	  by	  the	  warmth”	  of	  another.	  	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  of	  heat	  generated	  in	  Slote's	  approach	  without	  necessarily	  casting	  any	  light	  on	  normative	  and	  metaethical	  issues.	  	  Slote	  does	  go	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  “what	  fixes	  or	  helps	  to	  fix	  the	  reference	  is	  not	  some	  thin,	  subjective	  notion	  of	  experience	  but,	  rather,	  certain	  experiences	  as	  
directed	  toward	  others	  and	  as	  reflecting	  what	  others	  feel.”58	  	  This	  sounds	  promising,	  but	  given	  that	  he	  has	  already	  defined	  empathy	  as	  a	  purely	  “psychological	  state”	  it	  seems	  that	  he	  undercuts	  a	  lot	  of	  potential	  ground	  for	  arriving	  at	  a	  robust	  conception	  of	  empathic	  caring	  that	  allows	  for	  objectivity,	  or	  at	  least	  strong	  intersubjectivity,	  in	  morals.	  	  	  	   The	  attempt	  to	  ground	  morals	  in	  a	  pre-­‐judgmental,	  yet	  shared,	  realm	  of	  sentimental	  experience	  is	  going	  to	  face	  certain	  challenges.	  	  Slote	  nicely	  summarizes	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  sentimentalism	  is	  bound	  to	  face:	  The	  fact	  that	  certain	  nonjudgmental	  empathy-­‐derived	  attitudes	  or	  feelings	  toward	  (the	  ways)	  agents	  (treat	  others)	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  positive	  and	  negative	  lends	  definite	  support	  to	  the	  view	  that	  they	  are,	  respectively,	  attitudes	  of	  approval	  and	  disapproval.	  	  If	  what	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  here	  isn’t	  full-­‐blown	  moral	  approval	  or	  disapproval,	  then	  at	  the	  very	  least	  it	  can	  be	  plausibly	  viewed	  as	  the	  ur-­‐phenomenon	  of	  moral	  approval	  and	  disapproval,	  and	  if	  we	  can	  now	  use	  what	  we	  have	  said	  about	  these	  (ur-­‐)attitudes	  to	  clarify	  moral	  judgments	  and	  any	  sort	  of	  (full-­‐blown)	  moral	  approval	  and	  disapproval	  that	  springs	  from	  or	  requires	  moral	  judgment,	  then	  the	  sentimentalist	  approach	  will	  be	  largely	  vindicated	  or	  at	  least	  made	  to	  seem	  somewhat	  plausible	  way	  of	  doing	  metaethics.59	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Ibid.,	  p.63.	  59	  Ibid.,	  p.47.	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Here	  I	  think	  Slote	  comes	  rather	  close	  to	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  approach	  to	  ethical	  discourse.	  	  For	  these	  Confucians	  “the	  moral	  way	  begins	  with	  feeling”	  (道始於情)	  ,	  but	  “feeling”	  in	  this	  Confucian	  line	  is	  much	  more	  holistic	  and	  dynamic	  than	  Slote’s	  notion	  of	  empathy	  because	  it	  considers	  the	  normative	  role	  that	  the	  affections	  play	  in	  a	  broadly	  pragmatic	  and	  vitalistic	  notion	  of	  correlative	  experience.	  	  Slote	  gets	  a	  lot	  of	  mileage	  out	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  empathy—everything	  from	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  justice	  to	  a	  perspective	  on	  international	  relations,	  and	  even	  a	  ground	  for	  scientific	  objectivity!	  	  It	  seems	  at	  times	  that	  “empathy”	  for	  Slote	  functions	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  magical	  philosopher’s	  stone	  to	  conjure	  up	  for	  solving	  any	  and	  all	  ethical	  and	  metaethical	  problems.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  briefly	  lay	  out	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  critique	  of	  Slote’s	  position,	  yet	  still	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  broadly-­‐conceived	  sentimentalist	  approach	  (or	  affect	  theory)	  to	  normative	  ethics	  and	  metaethical	  theory	  might	  be	  the	  best	  philosophical	  and	  practical	  option	  available	  to	  us.	  V.	  Si-­‐Meng	  Ethical	  Feelings	  in	  the	  "Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Commanding	  Situations"	  
Xingzimingchu	  性自命出	  	  	  	   This	  Si-­‐Meng	  critique	  will	  be	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  Slote’s	  reductive	  understanding	  of	  moral	  sentiment	  entirely	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  rather	  abstract	  notion	  of	  empathy.	  	  Since	  Slote	  doesn’t	  adequately	  theorize	  empathy	  as	  an	  embodied	  and	  transactional	  phenomena,	  his	  approach	  is	  liable	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  a	  biological	  reductionism	  by	  taking	  the	  complexities	  of	  moral	  life	  and	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  be	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  instinct	  (e.g.	  mirror	  neurons,	  etc.).	  	  Si-­‐Meng	  somaesthetics	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  holistic	  account	  of	  moral	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perception	  and	  ethical	  cultivation	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  entirety	  of	  human	  experience	  vitally	  grounded	  in	  relational	  somaticity	  and	  affectivity—viz.,	  our	  "biocultural	  legacy	  as	  personal	  centers	  of	  human	  becoming"	  (tianrenheyi	  天人合一).	  	   The	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  text	  "Nature	  Emerges	  from	  Conditions"60	  to	  show	  how	  in	  terms	  of	  normative	  and	  metaethical	  discourse	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  moving	  beyond	  the	  two	  leading	  potentially	  viable	  positions	  in	  moral	  sentimentalism—Simon	  Blackburn’s	  expressivism	  or	  “quasi-­‐realism”	  and	  John	  McDowell	  and	  David	  Wiggins’	  “primary	  quality	  realism”	  or	  “sensible	  subjectivism”	  perceptivism.	  	  I	  have	  been	  arguing	  that	  some	  kind	  of	  broadly	  conceived	  moral	  sentimentalism,	  or	  affect	  theory	  approach,	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  navigate	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  contemporary	  ethical	  theory	  towards	  a	  more	  ecstatically	  naturalistic	  and	  pragmatic	  conception	  of	  moral	  realism.	  	  Here	  I	  wish	  to	  reveal	  how	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  allows	  for	  going	  beyond	  some	  of	  the	  central	  issues	  that	  divide	  the	  expressivist	  and	  perceptivist	  versions	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism.	  	  If	  the	  concept	  qing	  情	  is	  appropriately	  understood	  beyond	  any	  ontologically	  distinct	  fact/value	  dichotomy,	  it	  leads	  rather	  easily	  into	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Many	  authoritative	  interpreters	  of	  the	  recently	  excavated	  Guodian	  materials	  would	  take	  issue	  with	  my	  lumping	  the	  Xingzimingchu	  in	  with	  more	  obviously	  Si-­‐Meng	  originating	  texts	  like	  the	  Wuxing	  and	  
LuMu	  Gong	  wen	  Zisi.	  	  In	  fact,	  I	  take	  a	  rather	  radical	  position	  in	  viewing	  the	  entire	  cache	  of	  Guodian	  texts	  (even	  the	  obviously	  Daoist	  materials)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  intimate	  personal	  library	  (a	  library	  that	  the	  tomb	  occupant	  wished	  to	  take	  with	  him	  into	  the	  shadowy	  regions	  of	  Chu	  conceptions	  of	  immortality)	  of	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  inspired	  scholar.	  	  In	  providing	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  textual	  similarities	  (including	  material	  culture	  like	  the	  specific	  scripts	  and	  length	  of	  bamboo	  strips)	  and	  conceptual	  resonances	  emerging	  between	  individual	  texts	  of	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  Scoot	  Cook	  cites	  the	  work	  of	  Liu	  Zeliang	  ,	  "Cong	  Guodian	  Chujian	  kan	  xian-­‐Qin	  ru-­‐dao	  guanxi	  de	  yanbian,"	  pp.	  9-­‐10	  in	  asserting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  "greater	  coherence	  at	  work	  in	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  as	  a	  larger	  whole,	  seen	  as	  a	  purposeful	  selection	  built	  around	  a	  central	  core	  of	  Confucian	  texts	  with—perhaps—certain	  alterations	  made	  as	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  the	  texts	  conform	  to	  a	  more	  general	  set	  of	  philosophical	  principles	  in	  harmony	  with	  that	  nucleus."	  (The	  Bamboo	  Texts	  of	  Guodian	  v.	  I,	  p.107).	  	  It	  is	  to	  this	  "more	  general	  set	  of	  philosophical	  principles",	  or	  perhaps	  more	  accurately	  "general	  philosophical	  vision"	  that	  I	  mean	  to	  attribute	  to	  a	  decidedly	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  thinking.	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ethically	  relevant	  experience	  without	  setting	  up	  a	  strict	  ontological	  divide	  between	  
subjective	  expressions	  of	  value	  preference	  and	  the	  passive	  perception	  of	  a	  supposedly	  antecedent	  order	  of	  objective	  moral	  qualities.	  	   In	  short,	  what	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethical	  thinking	  allows	  us	  to	  do	  is	  develop	  a	  holistic	  vision	  of	  ethical	  experience	  that	  articulates	  a	  comprehensive	  conception	  of	  ethical	  truth	  grounded	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  imaginative	  moral	  potential	  and	  a	  corresponding	  ameliorative	  conception	  of	  ethical	  agency	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  
discovering	  and	  creatively	  realizing	  this	  prospective	  yet	  "true"	  ethical	  order.	  	  Doing	  full	  justice	  to	  our	  capacity	  to	  function	  in	  the	  world	  as	  creative	  ethical	  agents	  (more	  akin	  to	  moral	  artists	  than	  passive	  spectators	  of	  an	  antecedently	  fixed,	  static,	  block-­‐universe	  of	  value),	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  thinking	  ("embodied	  reflection"	  fanshen	  反身,	  "thinking	  through	  creative	  integrity"	  sicheng	  思誠)	  begins	  with	  a	  creative	  appreciation	  of	  our	  ethical	  potential	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  embodied	  moral	  affects	  and	  culminates	  in	  a	  description	  of	  sagely	  ease	  in	  realizing	  	  ameliorative	  praxis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  familial	  and	  sociopolitically	  stipulated	  roles	  and	  relationships.	  	   Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethics	  is	  holistic	  because	  it	  avoids	  the	  intellectualist	  pitfalls	  of	  isolating	  one	  of	  either	  two	  poles	  of	  our	  embodied	  experience.	  	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinkers	  don't	  abstract	  a	  rationally	  determined	  character	  from	  the	  complexity	  of	  ethical	  situations	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  enmeshed	  in—a	  kind	  of	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐Many	  model	  of	  moral	  agency.	  	  Nor	  does	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  theory	  attempt	  to	  abstractly	  identify	  certain	  antecedently	  existing	  static	  features	  of	  situations	  or	  rationally	  determined	  principles	  by	  which	  to	  dogmatically	  assert	  ethical	  truths.	  	  In	  contrast,	  what	  we	  discover	  is	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  mutual	  belonging	  and	  the	  emergent	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becoming	  of	  ethical	  agency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  affectively	  charged	  and	  relationally	  embodied	  experience	  of	  role	  identity	  (minglun	  明倫):	  Liking	  and	  disliking	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  our	  natures.	  	  What	  we	  like	  and	  what	  we	  dislike	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  things	  (wu	  物).61	  	  Effectiveness	  and	  ineffectiveness	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  our	  (moral)	  natures.	  	  What	  we	  are	  perfecting	  (i.e.	  making	  more	  effective)	  and	  what	  we	  fail	  to	  perfect	  upon	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  dispositionality	  (shi	  
勢).	  	  Our	  natural	  dispositions	  are	  the	  central	  thing	  and	  events	  (wu	  物)	  are	  what	  call	  this	  out	  as	  specific	  expressions.	  	  The	  bronze	  and	  jade	  bells	  will	  not	  sound	  unless	  chimed.	  	  Although	  persons	  have	  a	  (moral)	  natural	  disposition,	  if	  the	  heartminding	  is	  not	  called	  forth	  it	  won't	  be	  expressed.	  	  Every	  heartminding	  process	  has	  an	  intentionality,	  and	  there	  is	  nothing	  it	  is	  incapable	  of	  in	  concert;	  the	  (moral)	  natural	  disposition	  not	  being	  capable	  of	  acting	  on	  its	  own	  accord	  is	  just	  like	  the	  mouth	  being	  unable	  to	  speak	  on	  its	  own	  [without	  the	  interaction	  of	  air	  and	  the	  received	  semantic-­‐syntactic	  tradition	  of	  specific	  languages].62	  	  We	  see	  here	  how	  the	  idea	  of	  reciprocally	  informing	  processes	  of	  an	  organism-­‐environment	  transaction	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  ethical	  experience.	  	  Here	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  valorize	  either	  the	  expressivist	  or	  perceptualist	  side	  of	  the	  analytic	  debate	  within	  the	  metaethics	  of	  moral	  sentimentalism	  here	  because	  the	  possibility	  of	  moral	  perception	  emerges	  equiprimordially	  with	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  expression.	  	   The	  term	  xing	  性	  in	  the	  text	  is	  appropriately	  translated	  either	  as	  "nature"	  or	  "disposition"	  as	  long	  as	  we	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  it	  doesn't	  refer	  to	  an	  ontologically	  static	  essence	  or	  metaphysically	  independent	  (aseity)	  order	  of	  being.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  In	  here	  and	  what	  follows	  wu	  物	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  "things"	  or	  pragmata	  in	  a	  decidedly	  process	  and	  event	  oriented	  ontology.	  	  C.S.	  Peirce	  developed	  the	  term	  pragmatism	  from	  Immanuel	  Kant's	  distinction	  between	  an	  a	  priori	  determined	  "practical"	  (practische)	  order	  of	  categorical	  imperatives	  and	  an	  a	  posteriori,	  experimental	  domain	  of	  hypothetically	  determinate	  "things"	  (pragmata).	  	  62好恶，性也。所好所恶，物也。善不善性也，所善所不善，势也。凡性为主，物取之也。金石之
有声，弗扣不鸣，人之虽有性，心弗取不出。凡心有志也，无与不可，性不可独行	  犹口之不可独
言也。(2)	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always	  used	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  to	  refer	  to	  processes	  of	  becoming	  fully	  human	  or	  a	  
nature	  naturing.	  	  Thus	  it	  always	  already	  has	  an	  aspirational	  (normative)	  and	  ontological	  (descriptive)	  sense.	  	  Here	  I	  have	  taken	  to	  including	  (moral)	  in	  parentheses	  before	  "naturing"	  xing	  性	  just	  to	  highlight	  the	  implicit	  (only	  in	  English)	  normative	  connotations	  that	  the	  term	  has	  in	  certain	  contexts:	  As	  far	  as	  one's	  (moral)	  nature	  goes:	  it	  either	  is	  moved,	  flows,	  transacts	  with	  things,	  is	  sharpened	  by	  experience,	  is	  expressed,	  nourished,	  or	  it	  grows.	  	  What	  moves	  our	  nature	  is	  eventful	  unfolding	  of	  things	  (wu	  物).	  	  What	  causes	  our	  nature	  to	  flow	  is	  delight	  (yue	  悅).	  	  What	  causes	  transactions	  to	  occur	  is	  given	  dispositional	  structures	  (gu	  故).	  	  What	  causes	  our	  nature	  to	  be	  sharpened	  (i.e.	  resolutely	  focused)	  is	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義).	  	  What	  expresses	  our	  nature	  is	  the	  disposition	  of	  things	  (shi	  勢).	  	  What	  nourishes	  our	  nature	  is	  habit	  (xi	  習).	  	  What	  grows	  our	  (moral)	  nature	  is	  authoritative	  way-­‐making	  (dao	  道).63	  	  "Authoritative	  way-­‐making"	  is	  my	  preferred	  translation	  of	  dao	  道	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethical	  context	  because	  it	  prefaces	  the	  personalization	  and	  gerundive	  aspects	  of	  creatively	  making	  a	  way	  forward	  in	  a	  world	  that	  is	  inherently	  pluralistic	  and	  ameliorative	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  realizing	  previously	  pregnant	  moral	  potentials:	  Authoritative	  way-­‐making	  is	  a	  way	  that	  gathers	  things	  meaningfully	  together.	  	  In	  matters	  of	  authoritative	  way-­‐making	  it	  is	  the	  arts	  of	  heartminding	  that	  are	  vitally	  central.	  	  Authoritative	  way-­‐making	  has	  four	  specific	  arts.	  	  Only	  the	  way-­‐making	  of	  human	  persons	  can	  be	  articulated	  (ke	  dao	  可道).	  	  The	  other	  three	  arts	  are	  just	  way-­‐making.64	  	  This	  passage	  rather	  mysteriously	  refers	  to	  the	  "four	  arts"	  (si	  shu	  四術)	  of	  "authoritative	  way-­‐making".	  	  The	  text	  avers	  any	  explicit	  mention	  of	  the	  "non-­‐"	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63凡性，或动之，或逆之，或交之，或厉之，或出之，或养之，或长之。凡动性者，物也；逆性者，
悦也；交性者，故也；厉性者，义也；出性者，势也；养性者，习也；长性者，道也。(4)	  64道者，群物之道。凡道，心术为主。道四术，唯人道为可道也。其三术者，道之而已。(6)	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"extra-­‐"	  human	  modes	  of	  creative	  way-­‐making	  and	  chooses	  instead	  to	  focus	  explicitly	  on	  the	  modes	  of	  creative	  ethical	  way-­‐making	  particular	  to	  the	  human	  experience.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  text	  focuses	  on	  the	  realization	  of	  moral	  categories	  and	  modes	  of	  ethical	  evaluation	  derivative	  from	  an	  honest	  assessment	  of	  our	  affective	  capacities	  as	  human	  persons	  and	  the	  transformative	  potentials	  that	  music	  and	  ritual	  performance	  have	  in	  ameliorating	  our	  bioculturally	  "given"	  potentials:	  Sages	  consider	  the	  temperaments	  of	  things	  in	  articulating	  (moral)	  categories.	  	  They	  observe	  the	  order	  of	  appearance	  of	  things	  and	  flow	  into	  teaching	  directly.	  	  They	  embody	  optimal	  appropriateness	  and	  bring	  rhythmic	  order	  to	  their	  experience.	  	  They	  bring	  reasonable	  coherence	  (li	  理)	  to	  their	  affections	  (qing	  情)	  in	  their	  (moral)	  expressions	  and	  sense	  impressions.	  	  After	  all	  this	  they	  return	  to	  education.	  	  Education	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  moral	  virtuosity	  is	  born	  in	  the	  center	  of	  their	  personality.65	  	  And	  the	  text	  continues	  to	  explore	  the	  somaesthetic	  potentials	  of	  ritual	  and	  music	  in	  terms	  of	  beautifying	  the	  expression	  and	  perfecting	  the	  perception	  of	  moral	  value	  in	  the	  world:	  Paying	  utmost	  attention	  to	  their	  appearance	  and	  comportment	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  refined	  order	  is	  manifest	  in	  their	  displayed	  character.	  	  The	  authoritative	  person	  (junzi	  君子)	  beautifies	  their	  affective	  dispositions	  (qing	  情),	  valorizes	  optimal	  appropriateness,	  perfects	  their	  comportment,	  improves	  their	  demeanor,	  takes	  joy	  in	  authoritative	  way-­‐making,	  and	  delights	  in	  education.	  	  This	  is	  why	  they	  are	  so	  reverent	  (jing	  敬).66	  	  Most	  interestingly	  is	  the	  appreciation	  of	  embodied	  moral	  affect	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  physiological	  expression	  of	  feelings	  like	  joy	  and	  sadness	  as	  filtered	  through	  experiences	  of	  relational	  moral-­‐affective	  influence	  (e.g.	  shared	  laughter	  and	  musical	  enjoyment):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65圣人比其类而论会之，观其先后，而逆训之，体其义而节度之，理其情而出入之，然后复以教。
教，所以生德于中者也。(8)	  66致容貌，所以度节也。君子美其情，贵其义，善其节，好其容，乐其道，悦其教，是以敬焉。(10)	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Laughter	  is	  the	  shallow	  expression	  of	  ritual	  propriety.	  	  Musical	  enjoyment	  is	  the	  deep	  expression	  of	  ritual	  propriety.	  	  Sound	  (sheng	  聲)	  emerges	  from	  the	  sincere	  expression	  of	  feelings.	  	  Only	  then	  can	  it	  penetrate	  deeply	  into	  the	  heartminding	  of	  human	  persons.	  	  Upon	  hearing	  the	  sound	  of	  laughter	  fresh	  delight	  is	  experienced.	  	  Upon	  hearing	  the	  sound	  of	  choral	  singing	  one's	  heartminding	  is	  made	  exuberant.	  	  Upon	  hearing	  the	  sounds	  of	  the	  zither	  and	  lute	  one	  is	  brought	  to	  an	  intense	  emotional	  state	  culminating	  in	  a	  sigh.	  	  Observing	  the	  Lai	  and	  Wu	  ballads	  one	  is	  stimulated	  to	  be	  affectively	  ordered	  and	  motivated	  for	  action.	  	  Upon	  observing	  the	  Shao	  and	  Xia	  odes	  one	  is	  brought	  to	  a	  state	  wherein	  they	  wish	  to	  make	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  be	  frugal.	  	  In	  singing	  and	  thinking	  the	  heartminding	  is	  moved.	  .	  .upon	  dwelling	  on	  the	  music	  for	  a	  sustained	  period	  one	  is	  able	  to	  reflect	  upon	  the	  process	  of	  perfecting	  (fanshan	  反善)	  and	  to	  become	  more	  resolutely	  careful	  (shen	  慎).	  	  One's	  (moral)	  expression	  and	  perception	  is	  made	  fluid	  and	  effective	  (churu	  ye	  
shun	  出入也順).	  	  This	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  moral	  virtuosity	  (de	  德).	  	  The	  music	  of	  Zheng	  and	  Wei	  should	  not	  be	  listened	  to.	  	  The	  music	  of	  the	  ancients	  is	  capable	  of	  affecting	  fundamental	  transformation	  of	  the	  heartminding	  process.	  	  Excessive	  music	  can	  harm	  the	  heartminding	  by	  creating	  excessive	  desire.	  	  It	  is	  all	  a	  matter	  of	  educating	  persons.	  	  The	  Lai	  and	  Wu	  ballads	  calls	  us	  out	  and	  the	  Shao	  and	  Wu	  ballads	  affect	  us	  profoundly.67	  	  	   The	  realization	  of	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  entails	  a	  deep	  appreciation	  of	  the	  role	  relational	  potentials	  of	  persons	  as	  they	  come	  to	  inhabit	  their	  corresponding	  moral	  landscapes	  of	  affectively	  attuned	  value	  expressions	  and	  perceptions.	  	  The	  
Analects	  17.2	  has	  Confucius	  express	  a	  pragmatic	  metaphysics	  of	  persons—in	  terms	  of	  our	  bioculturally	  "given"	  natures	  we	  are	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same—or,	  at	  least,	  uninterestingly	  different;	  and	  it	  is	  only	  with	  assiduous	  practice	  that	  we	  can	  come	  to	  individuate	  ourselves	  in	  any	  meaningfully	  ethical	  sense.68	  	  It	  is	  only	  with	  the	  




乐龙（动）指（嗜），皆教其人者也。《赉》、《武》乐取，《韶》、《夏》乐情。(11)	  68子曰：「性相近也，習相遠也。」The	  Master	  said:	  "The	  (moral)	  nature	  of	  persons	  is	  relatively	  approximate.	  	  It	  is	  only	  with	  habitual	  cultivation	  that	  distinctive	  differences	  emerge."	  
	   98	  
concerted	  cultivation	  of	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  that	  a	  person	  begins	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  refined	  moral	  appreciation:	  Realizing	  the	  utmost	  enjoyment	  of	  music	  there	  must	  be	  tragic	  feeling	  (bei	  悲).	  	  It	  is	  all	  a	  matter	  of	  realizing	  the	  utmost	  affectional	  experience.	  	  Sadness	  and	  joy	  are	  close	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  feelings	  (xingqingxiangjin	  性情相
近),	  this	  is	  because	  their	  heartminding	  processes	  are	  not	  far	  from	  each	  other.	  	  Crying	  comes	  upon	  us	  in	  a	  wave	  of	  sudden	  emotion	  and	  only	  slowly	  diminishes	  in	  intensity.	  	  Joy	  comes	  upon	  is	  as	  a	  deep	  and	  abiding	  awareness	  of	  the	  ineluctable	  tragedy	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  things.	  	  This	  is	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  take	  a	  vast	  affective	  perspective	  in	  thinking.69	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking,	  such	  moral	  appreciation	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  an	  embodied	  and	  affectively	  charged	  experience—simultaneously	  the	  expression	  and	  
perception	  of—a	  potentially	  ameliorative	  transformation	  of	  ethical	  reality:	  	  Thinking	  upon	  experiencing	  worry	  (you	  懮)	  we	  are	  affected	  by	  a	  tragic	  feeling.	  	  Thinking	  upon	  feeling	  joy	  we	  experience	  elation.	  	  The	  function	  of	  thinking	  	  is	  the	  deepening	  of	  our	  personal	  experience	  of	  heartminding	  (fansizhiyong	  xinweishen	  凡思之用，心為甚).	  	  Deep	  appreciation	  (lit.	  sighing	  in	  admiration)	  is	  the	  true	  method	  of	  heartminding.	  	  When	  the	  sound	  of	  sighing	  admiration	  changes	  so	  does	  the	  heartminding.	  	  When	  the	  heartminding	  process	  is	  transformed	  so	  is	  the	  expressed	  sound	  of	  admiration.70	  	  It	  is	  a	  definite	  mistake	  to	  consider	  the	  somaesthetic	  and	  affective	  appreciation	  of	  moral	  potential	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethics	  as	  an	  essentially	  blind	  or	  irrational	  affair.	  	  A	  central	  component	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethics	  is	  the	  vital	  role	  that	  "creative	  ethical	  thinking"	  (si	  思)	  plays	  in	  crafting	  the	  particular	  structure	  that	  the	  moral	  imagination	  will	  project	  out	  into	  the	  familial-­‐social-­‐cosmic	  web	  of	  interdependent	  relationality.	  	  Despite	  being	  decidedly	  aesthetic	  in	  orientation	  (it	  requires	  imagination	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69凡至乐必悲，哭亦悲，皆至其情也。哀、乐，其性情相近也，是故其心不远。哭之动心也，浸杀，
其央恋恋如也，戚然以终。乐之动心也，浚深鬰陶，其央则流如也悲，悠然以思。(12)	  70凡忧，思而后悲；凡乐，思而后忻。凡思之用，心为甚。叹，思之方也，其声变则其心变，其心
变则其声亦然。	  (13)	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adaptability	  over	  mechanistic,	  rational	  determinations)	  it	  is	  far	  from	  a	  haphazard	  or	  blind	  process	  that	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucians	  are	  advertising.	  	  Indeed,	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  requires	  us	  to	  critically	  engage	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  our	  family	  born	  feelings	  into	  the	  sociopolitical	  realm:	  The	  hardest	  part	  of	  (moral)	  learning	  is	  the	  seeking	  after	  one's	  authentic	  heartminding.71	  	  Following	  upon	  what	  one	  does	  in	  action	  is	  close	  to	  getting	  it,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  as	  effective	  (and	  fast	  acting)	  as	  employing	  the	  affective	  dimensions	  of	  musical	  enjoyment.	  	  Even	  if	  one	  is	  capable	  of	  carrying	  out	  one's	  duties,	  if	  you	  are	  incapable	  of	  realizing	  authentic	  heartminding	  it	  will	  not	  be	  valued.	  	  If	  the	  seeking	  after	  one's	  heartminding	  is	  artificially	  affected	  it	  will	  not	  be	  achieved.	  	  It	  can	  be	  known	  that	  people	  are	  incapable	  of	  realization	  due	  to	  artificial	  affectation.	  	  In	  the	  happening	  of	  ten	  distinct	  (moral)	  errors,	  a	  unique	  process	  of	  heartminding	  must	  be	  present	  in	  each	  one.	  	  Upon	  inspection	  how	  can	  it	  be	  possible	  for	  the	  authentic	  feelings	  (qing	  情)	  to	  be	  hidden?72	  	  So	  far	  from	  advocating	  a	  blind	  emotional	  or	  sentimental	  appraisal	  (or	  reaction)	  to	  ethically	  problematic	  situations,	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  promotes	  an	  authoritative	  appreciation	  of	  ethical	  value	  in	  concrete	  embodiment	  and	  affectively	  charged	  experience.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  however	  that	  different	  domains	  of	  role	  ethical	  experience	  get	  relationally	  articulated	  with	  different	  types	  of	  affective	  strategies	  for	  responding	  appropriately.	  	  While	  some	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  reading	  certain	  passages	  of	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  as	  offering	  a	  contrasting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  This	  passage	  calls	  to	  mind	  the	  Mengzi's	  adage	  about	  the	  singular	  point	  of	  (moral)	  learning	  being	  the	  "seeking	  after	  the	  lost	  heartmind"	  (xuewenzhidao	  wu	  ta,	  qiu	  qi	  fangxin	  er	  yi	  學問之道無它，求其
放心而已).	  	  See	  Mengzi	  6A11,	  孟子曰：「仁，人心也；義，人路也。舍其路而弗由，放其心而不知
求，哀哉！人有雞犬放，則知求之；有放心，而不知求。學問之道無他，求其放心而已矣。」Mengzi	  said,	  "Consummate	  conduct	  is	  the	  heartminding	  of	  authoritative	  persons.	  	  Optimal	  appropriateness	  is	  the	  existential	  path	  of	  authoritative	  persons.	  	  To	  lose	  one's	  path	  and	  have	  nowhere	  to	  tread	  from	  or	  to	  lose	  one's	  heart	  and	  have	  no	  idea	  where	  to	  seek	  it—what	  a	  tragedy!	  	  When	  people	  lose	  their	  chickens	  and	  dogs	  they	  know	  to	  seek	  after	  them.	  	  But	  when	  one	  loses	  their	  heartminding	  capacities	  they	  don't	  even	  know	  to	  seek	  after	  them.	  	  The	  point	  of	  learning	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  to	  seek	  out	  and	  recover	  the	  lost	  capacities	  of	  authoritative	  heartminding."	  72凡学者隶［求］其心为难。从其所为，近得之矣，不如以乐之速也。唯［虽］能其事，不能其心，
不贵。求其心有为也，弗得之矣。人之不能以为（伪）也，可知也。其过十举，其心必在焉，察其
见者，情安失哉？(15)	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philosophical	  or	  metaethical	  position	  from	  Mengzi's	  defense	  of	  an	  "internalist"	  position	  regarding	  the	  ethical	  cultivation	  of	  "consummate	  humanity"	  (ren	  仁)	  and	  "optimal	  appropriateness"	  (yi	  義),	  I	  take	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Zhongyong	  insofar	  as,	  "consummate	  humanity	  is	  the	  virtuosity	  of	  being	  human,	  wherein	  affection	  for	  one's	  parents	  is	  the	  most	  vital	  thing;	  optimal	  appropriateness	  is	  the	  virtuosity	  of	  acting	  appropriately	  (or	  fittingly,	  yi	  宜),	  wherein	  honoring	  of	  (morally)	  worthy	  persons	  is	  the	  most	  vital	  thing."73	  	  In	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  we	  often	  find	  a	  kind	  of	  complementary	  or	  contrapuntal	  pairing	  of	  ren	  仁	  and	  yi	  義	  in	  such	  texts	  as	  the	  "Wu	  xing",	  "Liu	  de"	  and	  in	  the	  	  "Yucong	  I"	  we	  find	  the	  parallel	  passage:	  [Those	  who	  are	  thick	  with	  consummate	  humanity	  but	  thin]	  on	  optimal	  appropriateness	  are	  held	  close	  but	  not	  honored;	  [those	  who]	  are	  thick	  with	  optimal	  appropriateness	  but	  thin	  on	  consummate	  humanity	  are	  honored	  but	  not	  held	  close.74	  	  	  And	  even	  though	  these	  texts	  maintain	  an	  internal/external	  distinction	  between	  ethical	  domains	  of	  discourse	  it	  refers	  primarily	  to	  a	  role-­‐relational	  distinction,	  and	  not	  an	  ontological	  dichotomy,	  between	  intimate	  family	  experience	  and	  more	  ritually	  formalized	  modes	  of	  sociopolitical	  conduct:	  Consummate	  humanity	  is	  born	  from	  authoritative	  human	  persons.	  	  Optimal	  appropriateness	  is	  born	  from	  way-­‐making.	  	  One	  is	  born	  from	  within;	  the	  other	  is	  born	  from	  without.75	  	  Consummate	  humanity	  pertains	  to	  the	  internal.	  	  Optimal	  appropriateness	  pertains	  to	  the	  external.	  	  Ritual	  propriety	  and	  music	  are	  held	  in	  common.76	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73仁者人也，親親為大；義者宜也，尊賢為大,	  ZY	  20	  74	  厚於仁，薄於義，親而不尊。厚於義，薄於仁，尊而不親。(Strips	  77,	  82,	  79).	  75	  仁生於人，義生於道。或生於內，或生於外。("Yucong	  I"	  strips	  22-­‐23).	  76	  仁，內也。義，外也。禮樂，共也。("Liu	  de"	  strip	  26).	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In	  a	  passage	  from	  the	  "Xing	  zi	  ming	  chu"	  that	  finds	  close	  parallels	  with	  received	  material	  from	  the	  Liji	  and	  Mengzi	  we	  see	  clearly	  that	  the	  internal/external	  distinction	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  an	  ontological	  dichotomy	  or	  psychological	  dualism	  within	  our	  experience,	  but	  rather	  refers	  directly	  to	  different	  domains	  of	  ethical	  life	  that	  require	  a	  more	  intimate	  response	  of	  caring	  affect	  or	  a	  more	  formal	  response	  of	  ritualized	  conduct:	  When	  affecting	  order	  within	  the	  household	  gates,	  lenience	  is	  to	  be	  desired;	  when	  governing	  those	  beyond	  the	  household	  gates,	  decisiveness	  is	  to	  be	  desired.77	  	  So	  instead	  of	  a	  psychological	  dualism	  or	  an	  onto-­‐epistemic	  foundationalism	  that	  would	  separate	  distinct	  domains	  of	  ethical	  deliberation,	  what	  we	  have	  here	  is	  the	  presupposition	  of	  one	  seamless	  whole	  body	  of	  ethical	  wisdom	  that	  applies	  itself	  to	  unique	  ethical	  situations	  by	  taking	  account	  of	  historically-­‐funded,	  embodied	  experience.	  	  We	  can	  of	  course	  fruitfully	  employ	  guiding	  rules	  of	  thumb,	  without	  needing	  abstract	  moral	  principles,	  in	  order	  to	  direct	  our	  ethical	  investigations	  into	  our	  immediate	  experience	  of	  (moral)	  affectivity.	  	   Moral	  truth	  then	  is	  literally	  a	  "true-­‐ing"	  of	  our	  "bioculturally"	  endowed	  feelings	  so	  as	  to	  realize	  an	  optimal	  perception	  or	  appreciation	  of	  potential	  value	  schemas	  culminating	  in	  a	  gathering	  of	  virtuosic	  energies	  (de	  德)	  strenuously	  aiming	  at	  bringing	  about	  the	  amelioration	  of	  our	  shared,	  interpersonal	  experience.	  	  This	  process	  certainly	  involves	  a	  	  deep	  appreciation	  of	  the	  affective,	  embodied,	  and	  imaginative	  aspects	  of	  our	  experience,	  but	  also	  inevitably	  presupposes	  a	  reliance	  upon	  critical	  thinking	  and	  creative	  intelligence	  in	  "investigating"	  value	  realizations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  門內之治，慾其宛也。門外之治，慾其制也。(Strips	  58-­‐59).	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in	  our	  everyday	  experience	  of	  becoming	  consummately	  human	  together	  in	  relationships	  and	  role	  performances:	  Investigation	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  optimal	  appropriateness.	  	  Optimal	  appropriateness	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  reverence.	  	  Reverence	  is	  how	  we	  bring	  appropriate	  order	  to	  events.	  	  Genuineness	  (du	  篤)	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  consummate	  conduct	  (ren	  仁).	  	  Consummate	  conduct	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  our	  true	  (moral)	  natures	  (xing	  性).	  	  Our	  true	  (moral)	  nature	  is	  synonymous	  with	  'growth'	  (sheng	  生).78	  	  Doing	  one's	  utmost	  (zhong	  忠)	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  sincerity	  in	  relationships	  (xin	  信).	  	  Sincerity	  in	  relationships	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  true	  affection	  (qing	  情).	  	  True	  affection	  emerges	  from	  our	  (moral)	  natures.79	  	  The	  real	  enemy	  within	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  then	  isn't	  a	  radically	  "evil"	  propensity	  or	  some	  purported	  "original	  sin"	  in	  our	  inborn	  natures	  acting	  against	  rationally	  defined	  moral	  inclinations	  (cf.	  Kant's	  "crooked	  timber	  of	  humanity),	  but	  rather	  is	  any	  lack	  of	  imagination	  and	  empathic	  consideration	  for	  the	  vital	  potentials	  we	  have	  in	  any	  given	  moment	  for	  ameliorating	  our	  situational	  self-­‐becoming	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  embodied	  relationships	  and	  our	  familial-­‐social-­‐political	  role	  performances.	  	  We	  should	  be	  so	  very	  careful	  then	  in	  guarding	  against	  incipient	  and	  actual	  hypocrisy	  (i.e.	  anytime	  where	  feeling	  and	  intention	  don't	  coalesce	  leading	  us	  to	  engage	  in	  coercive	  conduct),	  even	  more	  so	  than	  we	  are	  watchful	  of	  the	  manifest	  propensities	  persons	  may	  have	  for	  overtly	  selfish	  or	  destructive	  behavior:	  The	  artificiality	  of	  human	  action	  should	  be	  detested.	  	  With	  artificiality	  comes	  miserliness,	  and	  with	  miserliness	  comes	  calculation.	  	  When	  selfish	  calculation	  begins	  there	  is	  no	  end	  to	  it.	  	  Resolute	  carefulness	  (shen	  慎)	  is	  the	  method	  of	  realizing	  consummate	  conduct.	  	  Having	  realized	  consummate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  This	  may	  sound	  similar	  to	  the	  Gaozian	  contention	  in	  Mengzi	  6A3	  that	  "our	  nature	  is	  our	  biological	  life"	  (shengzhe	  wei	  xing	  生之謂性).	  	  However,	  I	  read	  sheng	  生	  as	  vital	  growth	  here	  in	  part	  because	  I	  place	  the	  Xingzimingchu	  text	  as	  part	  of	  (or	  at	  least	  closely	  related	  to)	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  corpus	  of	  Confucian	  writings	  and	  not	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Gaozi-­‐Yangist	  tradition	  of	  moral	  skepticism/nihilism.	  79察，义之方也。义，敬之方也。敬，物之节也。笃，仁之方也。仁，性之方也。性或生之。忠，
信之方也。信，情之方也。情出于性。(16)	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conduct,	  even	  with	  (moral)	  faults	  there	  is	  no	  judgmental	  detesting	  involved.	  	  Timely	  accomplishment	  is	  the	  method	  of	  achieving	  goals.	  	  With	  (moral)	  error	  there	  is	  always	  regret.	  	  Not	  exercising	  resolute	  carefulness	  (shen	  慎)	  is	  a	  sure	  way	  to	  come	  into	  error.80	  	  Just	  as	  Mengzi	  7A181	  says	  it	  is	  by	  engaging	  fully	  without	  remainder	  with	  our	  affective	  and	  embodied	  experience—or	  "exhausting	  our	  heartminding"	  (jinqixin	  盡
其心)	  that	  we	  can	  come	  to	  realize	  our	  ourselves	  most	  fully	  and	  authentically	  in	  the	  relational	  fabric	  of	  our	  role-­‐constituted	  lives.	  	  Instead	  of	  abstracting	  from	  our	  lived-­‐experience	  using	  rationally	  deterministic	  algorithms	  for	  adjudicating	  between	  conflicting	  interests—be	  they	  altruistic	  or	  egoistic—instead,	  since	  we	  are	  always	  already	  involved	  in	  medias	  res,	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  "working	  out	  from	  within"82	  the	  transactional	  dynamics	  of	  our	  lived	  experiences	  of	  the	  ordinary.	  	  Only	  by	  more	  fully	  and	  authentically	  engaging	  with	  our	  embodied	  affects	  can	  we	  hope	  to	  realize	  the	  ameliorative	  potentials	  haunting	  our	  focal	  awareness	  from	  the	  fringes	  of	  a	  futurity	  marked	  by	  tian-­‐endowed	  processes	  of	  becoming	  divine:	  The	  human	  affects	  can	  certainly	  bring	  us	  delight.	  	  If	  we	  act	  according	  to	  the	  affections,	  then	  even	  if	  there	  is	  (moral)	  error	  there	  will	  not	  be	  detestation.	  	  If	  we	  act	  not	  according	  to	  the	  affections	  even	  if	  something	  difficult	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80凡人伪为可恶也。伪斯吝矣，吝斯虑矣，虑斯莫与之结矣。慎，仁之方也。然而其过不恶。速，
谋之方也，有过则咎。人不慎斯有过，信矣。(20)	  81孟子曰：「盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。存其心，養其性，所以事天也。殀壽不貳
，修身以俟之，所以立命也。」	  Mengzi	  said:	  "By	  fully	  engaging	  in	  affective	  experience	  one	  can	  realize	  their	  nature.	  	  By	  realizing	  one's	  nature	  one	  can	  realize	  their	  biocultural	  endowment	  (tian	  天).	  	  By	  resolutely	  focusing	  the	  feelings	  one	  can	  then	  nourish	  their	  nature,	  and	  this	  is	  how	  we	  serve	  tian.	  	  Premature	  death	  or	  long	  life	  make	  no	  difference	  here.	  	  In	  cultivating	  the	  unique	  body-­‐person	  and	  in	  waiting	  upon	  tian,	  this	  is	  how	  we	  establish	  ourselves	  in	  the	  commanding	  fate	  of	  tian."	  82	  To	  translate	  the	  idea	  of	  "processes	  of	  celestial	  and	  human	  becoming	  unique	  together"	  (tianrenheyi	  
天人合一)	  so	  central	  to	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethical	  corpus,	  I	  borrow	  the	  phrase	  "working	  out	  from	  within"	  from	  Peter	  Hershock.	  	  In	  Valuing	  Diversity:	  Buddhist	  Reflections	  on	  Realizing	  a	  more	  Equitable	  
Global	  Future	  (SUNY,	  2012),	  Hershock	  persuasively	  argues	  that	  we	  take	  diversity	  as	  an	  achievement	  concept	  that	  refers	  primarily	  to	  "a	  value	  crucial	  to	  working	  out	  from	  within	  the	  global	  dynamics	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  to	  change	  the	  way	  things	  are	  changing	  in	  a	  shared	  commitment	  to	  improvising	  and	  sustaining	  ever	  more	  equitable	  modalities	  of	  human-­‐with-­‐planetary	  flourishing."	  (p.2).	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accomplished	  it	  will	  not	  be	  valued.	  	  If	  we	  have	  the	  affections	  of	  persons,	  even	  if	  what	  we	  set	  out	  to	  achieve	  isn't	  accomplished,	  we	  will	  still	  have	  their	  trust.83	  	  	  	  	   There	  is	  an	  intimate	  connection	  then	  presupposed	  here	  between	  the	  achievement	  of	  social-­‐political	  order	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  any	  authentically	  embodied	  set	  of	  moral-­‐affective	  dispositions	  to	  act	  in	  our	  familial-­‐socially	  stipulated	  roles.	  	  By	  entering	  fully	  and	  imaginatively	  into	  the	  creative	  processes	  of	  being	  configured	  by	  our	  unique	  set	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  role	  performances,	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  contribute	  more	  fully	  to	  the	  amelioration	  of	  collective	  human	  experience	  that	  spans	  intergenerational	  across	  time,	  backwards	  into	  the	  biocultural	  tradition	  of	  ancestral	  wisdom	  (tian	  天命)	  and	  prospectively	  into	  the	  potentialities	  of	  
tian-­‐inspired	  living:	  Beautifying	  the	  affections	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  there	  can	  be	  trust	  even	  without	  verbal	  articulation.	  	  Perfecting	  our	  (moral)	  natures	  is	  why	  there	  can	  be	  cases	  wherein	  even	  without	  explicit	  ethical	  education	  the	  people	  are	  morally	  steadfast	  (weijiao	  er	  minheng	  未教而民恆).	  	  It	  is	  an	  implicit	  blessing	  that	  the	  people	  can	  be	  made	  active	  without	  the	  offering	  of	  rewards.	  	  And	  it	  is	  because	  people	  have	  reverent	  awe	  in	  their	  heartminding	  that	  there	  can	  be	  (moral)	  fear	  without	  threat	  of	  punishment.	  	  Being	  materially	  poor,	  but	  the	  people	  still	  hold	  them	  in	  esteem.	  	  This	  is	  the	  power	  of	  moral	  virtuosity	  (de	  德).	  	  Impoverished	  but	  still	  gathering	  together,	  this	  is	  an	  effect	  of	  authoritative	  way-­‐making.84.	  .	  .	  Authoritative	  persons	  who	  cling	  to	  their	  (moral)	  aspirations	  (zhizhi	  执志)	  are	  bound	  to	  have	  a	  glorious	  heartminding.	  	  When	  they	  open	  their	  mouths	  to	  speak	  there	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  quickly	  achieved	  trust.	  	  The	  ritual	  propriety	  between	  host	  and	  guest	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  ordered	  in	  terms	  of	  ethical	  comportment,	  and	  the	  ritual	  propriety	  of	  ritual	  sacrifices	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  ordered	  in	  terms	  of	  reverence.	  	  The	  ritual	  mourning	  period	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  full	  of	  sincere	  expressions	  of	  grief	  and	  sorrow.	  	  Authoritative	  persons	  take	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83凡人情为可悦也。茍以其情，唯（虽）过不恶；不以其情，唯（虽）难不贵。茍有其情，唯（虽）
未之为，斯人信之矣。(21)	  84未言而信，有美情者也。未教而民恒，性善者也。未赏而民劝，含福者也。未型（刑）而民畏，
有心畏者也。贱而民贵之，有德者也。贫而民聚焉，有道者也。(22)	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authentic	  heartminding	  to	  be	  vitally	  central	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  their	  embodied	  persons.85	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapter	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  cultivated	  and	  creatively	  focused	  (moral)	  affect	  in	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  We	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  how	  relationally	  constituted	  and	  role-­‐defined	  embodied	  moral	  affect	  can	  achieve	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  by	  resolutely	  caring	  for	  the	  potentials	  of	  unique	  human	  becoming	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  "each"	  center	  of	  affective-­‐moral	  personal	  energies	  that	  is	  embodied	  in	  historically	  conditioned	  and	  culturally	  embedded	  human	  persons.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85君子执志必有夫光光之心，出言必有夫柬柬之信，宾客之礼必有夫齐齐之容，祭祀之礼必有夫齐
齐之敬，居丧必有夫恋恋之哀。君子身以为主心。(28)	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Chapter	  Three:	  "Resolute	  Becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  as	  a	  Non-­‐Foundational	  
Ground	  for	  Agential	  Realism	  in	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics	  
	  	   This	  chapter	  is	  constellated	  by	  four	  interwoven	  themes.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  will	  be	  considering	  the	  role	  of	  the	  body	  and	  performativity	  in	  reconstructing	  a	  concept	  of	  ethical	  agency	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  embodied	  and	  performative	  aspects	  of	  personal	  becoming,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  cast	  our	  attention	  upon	  the	  transactional	  and	  vitalist	  notion	  of	  "matter-­‐energy"	  or	  "psycho-­‐physical	  stuff"	  (qi	  氣)—an	  important	  and	  innovative	  concept	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophy	  that	  draws	  no	  hard	  and	  fast	  ontological	  divisions	  between	  the	  biological,	  social,	  and	  spiritual	  dimensions	  of	  embodied	  experience.	  	  By	  focusing	  through	  qi	  氣	  we	  can	  better	  realize	  a	  dynamic	  conception	  of	  ethical	  agency	  that	  makes	  no	  foundationally	  individualistic	  presuppositions	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  casting	  of	  persons	  in	  their	  uniquely	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationships.1	  	  Secondly,	  we	  will	  be	  exploring	  the	  dynamics	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  selving	  processes	  and	  transactional	  realizations	  of	  agency	  in	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  that	  takes	  a	  qi-­‐based	  physiognomy	  of	  persons	  quite	  seriously	  because	  there	  is	  no	  purported	  Reality/Appearance	  dichotomy	  to	  appeal	  to	  in	  denigrating	  natural	  embodiment	  by	  reifying	  individualized	  characters	  in	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐Many	  substance	  ontology	  of	  persons.	  	  By	  taking	  a	  confident	  leap	  into	  the	  field	  of	  comparative	  phenomenology	  of	  relationally	  constituted	  personalism	  we	  are	  better	  situated	  to	  understand	  the	  unique	  hermeneutical	  presuppositions	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  embodied	  thinking	  (or	  Somaesthetics).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By	  casting	  I	  mean	  to	  indicate	  both	  the	  ritual	  performance	  of	  a	  unique	  agency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  one's	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationships	  and	  highlight	  the	  imaginative	  "appreciation"	  of	  unique	  persons	  in	  their	  potential	  sociopolitical	  positions	  of	  differential	  power	  relationships	  which	  are	  in	  turn	  imaginatively	  (i.e.	  "ritually")	  grounded	  in	  ethically	  authoritative	  (i.e.	  non-­‐coercive)	  hierarchies	  of	  benefactors	  and	  beneficiaries	  (shangxia	  zhifen	  上下之分).	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Thus	  we	  can	  get	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  ethical	  epoche	  that	  this	  thinking	  can	  open	  up	  onto	  the	  basic	  ground	  of	  human	  becomings	  or	  dynamic	  "selving"	  processes—what	  the	  early	  Confucians	  called	  "vital	  plurisingularity"	  or	  "unique	  relational	  potential"	  (du	  獨).2	  	  In	  this	  section	  comparative	  hermeneutics	  of	  self-­‐realization	  and	  conceptions	  of	  personal	  uniqueness	  will	  be	  explored	  to	  help	  clarify	  the	  murky	  and	  complicated	  processes	  of	  realizing	  ethical	  agency	  in	  "non-­‐ideal"	  contexts.	  	  The	  guiding	  non-­‐ideal	  theoretical	  question	  will	  be	  how	  to	  best	  approach	  the	  "blooming,	  buzzing	  confusion"	  of	  messy	  selving	  processes	  in	  ethical	  projects	  of	  becoming	  consummately	  human	  as	  a	  unique	  agency	  in	  worlds	  of	  real	  precarity	  and	  fleeting	  promise.	  	  Next,	  we	  will	  be	  tracing	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  genealogy	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  or	  "carefully	  realizing	  one's	  personal	  uniqueness/ritual	  potential"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  in	  the	  living	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  	  Although	  we	  will	  be	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  some	  core	  passages	  from	  classical	  texts	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage,	  we	  will	  also	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  how	  this	  living	  tradition	  continues	  to	  exert	  a	  profound	  influence	  over	  the	  development	  of	  Confucian	  thinking	  regarding	  ethical,	  political,	  and	  even	  religious	  discourses.	  	  In	  the	  final	  section	  I	  will	  be	  introducing	  the	  work	  of	  Karen	  Barad—a	  feminist	  philosopher	  of	  science—who	  has	  initiated	  a	  quantum	  theory	  of	  agential	  realism	  that	  we	  can	  avail	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  the	  early	  Confucians	  "vital	  singularity"	  (du	  獨)	  doesn't	  refer	  to	  an	  ontologically	  discrete	  entity	  such	  that	  a	  mathematical	  abstraction	  could	  apply	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  trait	  of	  personhood—thus	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  use	  the	  term	  "plurisingularity"	  to	  highlight	  the	  non-­‐foundational	  becoming	  one	  and	  returning	  to	  the	  many	  dynamic	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Confucian	  correlative	  cosmology.	  However,	  du	  獨	  does	  reference	  an	  always	  creative	  site	  of	  unique	  self	  becoming	  that	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  the	  aggregated	  total	  of	  experienced	  roles	  and	  relationships.	  	  For	  more	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  "selving"	  see	  Irene	  Fast's	  Selving:	  A	  
Relational	  Theory	  of	  Self	  Organization	  (1998).	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ourselves	  of	  in	  articulating	  a	  reconstructed,	  non-­‐foundational	  conception	  of	  moral	  agency	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	  I.	  Commanding	  Vital	  Energies	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism	  Emulating	  the	  former	  kings	  in	  broad	  outline	  yet	  incognizant	  of	  their	  unifying	  traditions,	  they	  were	  boastful	  and	  ambitious	  nonetheless,	  while	  sundry	  and	  scattered	  in	  learning	  and	  experience.	  	  They	  fabricated	  a	  doctrine	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  archaic	  past	  and	  called	  it	  the	  "five	  conducts"	  (wuxing	  五行);	  it	  was	  unorthodox	  to	  the	  extreme	  and	  lacking	  in	  any	  standards,	  abstruse,	  and	  incomprehensible,	  cryptic	  and	  unintelligible.	  	  They	  thereupon	  adorned	  their	  words	  to	  lend	  reverence	  to	  [their	  doctrine],	  saying:	  "These	  are	  truly	  the	  words	  of	  the	  former	  gentleman	  (Confucius!)"—Zisi	  sang	  the	  lead	  in	  this,	  and	  Meng	  Ke	  chimed	  along.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐Xunzi3	  Mengzi	  said:	  "A	  junzi	  has	  five	  modes	  of	  teaching:	  there	  is	  the	  transformation	  that	  is	  like	  the	  coming	  of	  a	  timely	  rain;	  there	  is	  the	  'completion	  of	  ''virtuosic	  potential'	  (de	  德),	  there	  is	  the	  procurement	  and	  management	  of	  wealth;	  there	  is	  dialogue	  and	  inquiry;	  there	  is	  private	  cultivation	  as	  well.	  	  These	  five	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  junzi	  carries	  out	  their	  teaching.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐Mengzi4	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  for	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  imaginatively	  empathic	  'reflection'	  (si	  思)	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  ethical	  'responsibility'5	  or	  'optimal	  appropriateness'	  (yi	  義)	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  internalist	  standard	  of	  ethical	  excellence	  or	  moral	  virtuosity	  (zhishanzhimei	  盡善盡美)	  by	  providing	  a	  truly	  qualitative	  criterion	  for	  assessing	  the	  trajectory	  of	  personal	  growth	  in	  vital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3略法先王而不知其統，	  然而（猶）材劇志大，聞見雜博。案往舊造說，謂之五行，甚辟違而無類
，幽隱而無說，閉約而無解。案飾其辭，而祇敬之，曰：此真先君子之言也。子思唱之，孟軻和之
。「....」	  4孟子曰：「君子之所以教者五：有如時雨化之者，有成德者，有達財者，有答問者，有私淑艾者
。此五者，君子之所以教也。」	  5	  As	  has	  already	  been	  indicated	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  there	  is	  a	  real	  difficulty	  in	  identifying	  a	  discrete	  ethical	  domain	  of	  philosophical	  discourse	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  prudential,	  the	  aesthetic,	  the	  biological,	  the	  political,	  the	  familial,	  etc.	  can	  be	  distinguished	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  a	  distinct	  domain	  of	  oughts	  from	  the	  uniquely	  ethical	  as	  a	  theoretical	  domain	  of	  discourse.	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potentiality	  (de	  德)	  of	  culturally	  creative	  persons	  involved	  in	  democratic	  experiments	  in	  living	  (minweiben	  民為本).	  	  The	  "commanding	  values"	  (tianming	  天
命)	  implicit	  in	  the	  fluid	  becoming	  of	  anthropocosmic	  'vital	  energies'	  (qi	  氣)	  will	  be	  explored	  via	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  project	  of	  "resolute	  becoming	  "	  (shendu	  慎獨),	  "preserving	  one's	  heart	  and	  nourishing	  one's	  vitality"	  (cunxin	  
yangxing	  	  存心養性).	  	  and	  'creativity'	  (cheng	  誠).	  A	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  embodied,	  relational,	  and	  fully	  naturalized	  moral	  psychology	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  cultivation	  can	  also	  help	  us	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  "unwavering	  heart"	  (budongxin	  不動心)	  and	  	  the	  "moral	  physiognomy"	  involved	  in	  any	  Si-­‐Meng	  concept	  of	  a	  'Sagehood'	  (sheng	  聖).	  	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  "sage"	  (shengren	  聖人)	  will	  also	  be	  considered	  for	  its	  ameliorative	  potential	  as	  an	  inspirational	  regulative	  ideal	  within	  contemporary	  democratic	  cultures	  and	  institutions	  (both	  in	  culturally-­‐institutionally	  liberal	  and	  illiberal	  or	  a-­‐liberal	  democratic	  contexts).	  	   Exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  values	  in	  lived	  experience	  is	  a	  fascinating	  field	  for	  philosophical	  research—indeed	  the	  task	  of	  articulating	  an	  edifying	  speculative	  metaphysics	  should	  place	  our	  embodied,	  value-­‐laden	  experience	  front	  and	  center	  in	  this	  postmodern	  culture	  of	  ours	  that	  shuns	  any	  "transcendental	  pretense"	  and	  all	  totalizing	  metanarratives	  that	  would	  seek	  some	  value-­‐neutral	  "view	  from	  nowhere"	  from	  which	  to	  secure	  an	  epistemic	  foundation	  for	  deciding	  how	  things	  [ought	  to]	  hang	  together	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  	  Quite	  a	  few	  interpreters	  of	  Confucian	  philosophy	  have	  argued	  for	  an	  "aesthetic"	  reading	  of	  central	  concepts	  like	  'virtuosic	  potential'	  de	  德	  and	  'optimal	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appropriateness'	  yi	  義.	  	  The	  Shuowenjiezi	  lexicon	  claims	  that	  'beauty'	  and	  'efficacy'	  have	  a	  similar	  "meaning":	  《羊部》美：甘也。从羊从大。羊在六畜主給膳也。美
與善同意.	  	  But	  what	  would	  it	  actually	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  "beauty"	  and	  "(moral)	  efficacy"6	  have	  the	  same	  semantic	  significance?	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  etymological	  connotations	  of	  being	  related	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  auspicious	  animal—considering	  the	  concrete	  importance	  that	  sheep	  have	  had	  and	  continue	  to	  have	  in	  maintaining	  and	  nourishing	  the	  nutritional	  and	  ritual	  fabric	  of	  so	  many	  individuals,	  families	  and	  communities,	  another	  important	  and	  interesting	  affinity	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  'aesthetic'	  and	  the	  'ethical'	  realms	  of	  experience	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  early	  Confucian	  insistence	  on	  "focusing	  the	  familiar"	  (zhongyong	  中庸)	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  enchant	  the	  ordinary	  and	  make	  the	  secular	  sacred	  through	  the	  performance	  of	  ritual	  technologies	  and	  musical	  virtuosity	  aimed	  at	  realizing	  creative	  individuality	  and	  communal	  flourishing	  out	  of	  the	  raw	  materials	  of	  life	  as	  we	  "originally"	  find	  ourselves	  entangled	  in	  fluid	  webs	  of	  relationality	  (renxing	  ⼈人性).	  	  Human	  "nature"	  is	  understood	  here	  both	  "immediately"	  as	  unrefined	  impulse	  and	  "mediately"	  as	  ritually	  aestheticized	  desire	  and	  intentionality.	  	  Such	  attention	  to	  aesthetic	  detail	  and	  “ritual	  performativity"	  (lirong	  禮容)	  plays	  a	  paramount	  role	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  and	  will	  be	  continually	  referred	  to	  throughout	  this	  dissertation	  to	  defend	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  there	  is	  no	  distinction	  drawn	  between	  "the	  Good"	  as	  such	  or	  things	  "intrinsically"	  valuable-­‐-­‐understood	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ontologically	  discrete	  axiological	  essentialism-­‐-­‐and	  things	  merely	  "instrumentally"	  good	  or	  good	  for	  a	  particular	  purpose.	  	  The	  means-­‐ends	  continuum	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  fully	  integrated.	  	  John	  Dewey's	  idea	  of	  "ends-­‐in-­‐view"	  is	  a	  good	  way	  to	  think	  about	  Ruist	  shan	  善.	  	  So	  there	  is	  really	  no	  need	  to	  introduce	  the	  qualifier	  "moral"	  when	  talking	  about	  efficacy.	  	  Dewey	  provocatively	  suggests	  that	  "all	  growth	  in	  maturity	  consists	  in	  
not	  immediately	  giving	  way	  to	  [immediate	  impulse]	  but	  in	  remaking	  them	  in	  their	  first	  manifestation	  through	  consideration	  of	  the	  consequences	  they	  will	  occasion	  if	  they	  are	  acted	  upon—an	  operation	  which	  is	  equivalent	  to	  judging	  or	  evaluating	  them	  as	  means	  operating	  in	  connection	  with	  extra-­‐personal	  conditions	  also	  as	  means"	  (447).	  	  See	  his	  Theory	  of	  Valuation.	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holistically	  aestheticized	  view	  of	  persons	  as	  irreducibly	  significant	  sites	  of	  becoming	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  in	  transforming	  an	  initially	  diffuse	  field	  of	  relationships	  into	  a	  dynamic	  and	  resolutely	  role-­‐focused	  experience	  of	  commanding	  responsibility.	  	  	   	  It	  is	  my	  contention	  here	  that	  a	  sufficiently	  'reconstructed'7	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucianism	  can	  offer	  us	  a	  particularly	  persuasive	  account	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethical	  values	  and	  modes	  of	  ecstatic	  value	  realization	  out	  of	  an	  aestheticized	  stylization	  of	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  conditions	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  inhabiting	  as	  unique	  persons.	  	  	  	   A	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  Warring	  States	  period	  philosophical	  lineage	  known	  as	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  family	  of	  thought	  (simeng	  sixiang	  思孟儒家)	  is	  still	  coming	  into	  focus	  for	  us	  as	  contemporary	  interpreters	  of	  a	  living	  Confucian	  tradition.	  	  	  With	  the	  ongoing	  excavation	  of	  certain	  texts—like	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  for	  instance—a	  significant	  hermeneutic	  challenge	  emerges	  for	  scholars	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  and	  other	  early	  "lineages"	  or	  "schools"	  of	  Confucian	  philosophy.	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  historical	  emergence	  of	  various	  branches	  of	  Confucianism	  during	  the	  Warring	  States	  period	  is	  quite	  certainly	  more	  complex	  than	  Hanfeizi's	  assertion	  that	  the	  Confucians	  simply	  split	  into	  eight	  schools	  (儒分為八)	  during	  this	  formative	  epoch.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  As	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  appropriate	  this	  idea	  of	  reconstruction	  from	  the	  Deweyan	  corpus	  wherein	  he	  argues	  for	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  statically	  dualistic	  concepts	  of	  traditional	  Western	  philosophy	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  post-­‐Darwinian	  dynamic	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  as	  an	  implement	  for	  transforming	  our	  social-­‐cum-­‐natural	  relationships	  that	  constitute	  worlds	  of	  meaning	  (Umwelt).	  	  I	  also	  intend	  to	  point	  to	  the	  urgent	  task	  of	  reconceptualizing	  certain	  classically	  Confucian	  categories—like	  the	  three	  cords	  and	  five	  relationships	  (san	  gang	  wu	  chang	  三綱五常)—in	  light	  of	  a	  radical	  reassessment	  of	  sexual,	  gender,	  and	  class	  based	  notions	  of	  role	  identities	  and	  corresponding	  capabilities.	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   It	  should	  be	  an	  entirely	  uncontroversial	  claim	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  excavated	  texts	  calls	  for	  responsible	  intertextual	  and	  contextualized	  re-­‐interpretations	  of	  the	  classical	  Confucian	  canon.	  	  However,	  any	  hermeneutics	  of	  classifying	  and	  interpreting	  excavated	  texts	  according	  to	  received	  tradition	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  serious	  difficulties.	  	  Scott	  Cook	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  translation	  and	  commentary	  of	  the	  complete	  corpus	  of	  Guodian	  texts,	  speaks	  of	  a	  "greatest	  danger"	  in	  examining	  these	  texts	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  "affiliation	  with	  intellectual	  lineages,"	  both	  received	  historically	  as	  part	  of	  a	  living	  Confucian	  tradition	  of	  intertextuality	  and	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  (re)construct	  lineages	  of	  early	  Confucian	  thought	  out	  of	  the	  new	  material.	  	  Since	  we	  inevitably	  bring	  our	  received	  prejudices	  to	  bear	  on	  excavated	  textual	  material	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  within	  a	  received	  textual	  tradition	  rests	  upon	  the	  very	  historicity	  of	  evolving	  traditions	  of	  interpretation	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  we	  "put	  our	  prejudices	  at	  risk"	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  contextualize	  the	  Guodian	  materials	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  responsibly	  imagined	  or	  "reconstructed"	  lineages	  of	  thought.	  	  These	  are	  philosophical	  lineages	  that,	  "whatever	  their	  ontological	  status,	  certainly	  developed	  over	  time,	  [and]	  we	  are	  always	  in	  danger	  of	  judging	  the	  texts	  against	  those	  later	  developments,	  with	  which	  we	  are	  in	  most	  cases	  intimately	  more	  familiar."8	  	  	  Cook	  highlights	  a	  tendency	  amongst	  scholars	  to	  look	  for	  intertextual	  resonance	  and	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  philosophical	  coherence	  of	  certain	  'doctrines'	  (yan	  言	  and	  shuo	  說)	  conceived	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  direct	  transmissions	  of	  teacher-­‐student	  lineages	  of	  thought:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Cook,	  Guodian	  p.68.	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[The]	  Si-­‐Meng	  notion	  of	  "seeking	  it	  within	  one's	  self"	  (qiu	  zhu	  ji	  求諸己)	  and	  "Pang	  Pu	  himself	  stressed	  early	  on	  how	  not	  only	  the	  "Wu	  xing,"	  but	  also	  such	  texts	  as	  "Yucong	  1-­‐3,	  "Xing	  zi	  ming	  chu,"	  and	  indeed	  all	  the	  Confucian	  texts	  of	  the	  Guodian	  corpus	  approach	  the	  problem	  of	  human	  ethics	  from	  an	  internal	  perspective,	  in	  which	  Heaven's	  mandate	  (tianming	  天命)	  is	  decreed	  through	  the	  endowment	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  to	  be	  sought	  within	  rather	  than	  something	  to	  be	  emulated	  externally,	  a	  perspective	  that	  equally	  characterizes	  both	  the	  "Zhong	  yong"	  and	  the	  Mengzi.	  	  It	  is	  a	  certain	  internalist	  understanding	  then	  of	  the	  cultivation	  and	  expression	  of	  'virtuosic	  potential'	  (de	  德)	  that	  allows	  scholars	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  received	  texts	  and	  the	  excavated	  materials	  and	  to	  make	  claims	  of	  a	  unified	  conceptual	  scheme	  emerging	  from	  a	  shared	  lineage	  of	  teachings.	  	   But	  this	  tendency	  to	  look	  for	  conceptual	  coherence	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  pigeon-­‐hole	  thinkers	  can	  be	  very	  problematic	  as	  well.	  	  In	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Guodian	  materials	  Cook	  refers	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  classify	  texts	  according	  to	  an	  internalist/externalist	  dichotomy:	  There	  are,	  naturally,	  objections	  to	  be	  raised	  against	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  [Si-­‐Meng]	  association,	  especially	  as	  any	  individual	  Guodian	  text	  can	  potentially	  be	  argued	  to	  espouse,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  a	  philosophy	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  of	  the	  texts	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  [Si-­‐Meng]	  lineage.	  	  The	  "Xing	  zi	  ming	  chu"	  in	  particular	  forms	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  such	  criticisms,	  insofar	  as	  the	  inherent	  goodness	  of	  human	  nature	  (xing	  性)	  is	  a	  key	  philosophical	  position	  in	  both	  the	  "Zhong	  yong"	  and,	  more	  explicitly,	  the	  Mengzi,	  whereas	  the	  inherent	  moral	  status	  of	  xing	  in	  this	  Guodian	  text	  is	  neutral	  or	  ambiguous	  at	  best,	  and	  for	  all	  those	  who,	  like	  Pang	  Pu,	  see	  in	  it	  a	  fundamentally	  "internalist"	  orientation,	  just	  as	  many	  others	  would	  stress	  its	  emphasis	  on	  "external"	  education	  and	  align	  it	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  Xunzi.	  	  Part	  of	  my	  own	  interpretive	  project	  rests	  upon	  rejecting	  any	  essentialist	  or	  foundationalist	  reading	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  as	  being	  dependent	  upon	  an	  ideological	  assertion	  regarding	  the	  "inherent	  goodness	  of	  human	  nature"	  wherein	  "human	  nature"	  is	  understood	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  purported	  metaphysical	  claim	  (i.e.	  an	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essence	  or	  ground	  that	  transcends	  our	  embodiment,	  historicity	  and	  cultural	  specificity	  as	  unique	  human	  persons).	  	  Instead,	  I	  seek	  to	  contextualize	  the	  notion	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  internalism	  within	  a	  thoroughly	  relational	  framework	  and	  a	  process-­‐oriented	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  the	  development	  of	  moral	  virtuosities	  as	  being	  internal	  or	  intrinsic	  (nei	  內)	  then	  what	  we	  mean	  is	  that	  such	  exemplary	  traits	  accrue	  to	  holistically	  conceived	  persons	  in	  narrative	  processes	  of	  bodily	  becoming.	  	  We	  need	  to	  avoid	  thinking	  of	  virtue	  and	  character	  as	  some	  reified	  psychological	  inwardness	  or	  as	  mere	  expressions	  of	  metaphysically	  innate	  essences.	  	  Rather,	  what	  we	  have	  occurring	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  thinking	  about	  "human	  becomings"	  is	  an	  appreciation	  of	  certain	  edifying	  and	  more	  or	  less	  stable	  traits	  of	  fluidly	  realized	  natural	  complexes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relational	  interdependence,	  ontological	  becoming,	  and	  cultural	  contextualism.	  	   While	  it	  is	  indeed	  possible	  that	  the	  Guodian	  texts	  offer	  a	  unified	  presentation	  of	  a	  particular	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  teaching,	  perhaps	  we	  are	  best	  advised	  not	  to	  anachronistically	  impose	  our	  received	  prejudices	  regarding	  an	  internalist/externalist	  framework	  upon	  these	  texts.	  	  By	  performing	  a	  kind	  of	  hermeneutical	  epoche	  as	  it	  were—that	  is,	  refraining	  from	  desiring	  to	  pigeonhole	  these	  materials	  in	  some	  idealized	  Mengzian,	  Gaozian,	  Xunzian	  or	  in	  any	  early	  Ruist	  lineage	  whatsoever—"we	  may	  come	  to	  see	  the	  Guodian	  Confucian	  texts,	  while	  each	  approaching	  their	  central	  concerns	  from	  different	  angles,	  may	  after	  all	  derive	  from	  a	  coherent	  philosophy	  in	  which	  the	  cultivation	  of	  both	  inner	  sincerity	  and	  outward	  forms	  of	  learned	  behavior	  are	  equally	  important,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  dogmatic	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separation	  of	  the	  two	  was	  still	  a	  philosophical	  nightmare	  of	  which	  they	  had	  not	  even	  begun	  to	  dream."9	  	  	  	  	   In	  a	  way	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  Pang	  Pu,	  Chen	  Lai	  argues	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  internalist	  reading	  of	  the	  'Xingzimingchu'	  and	  suggests	  that	  it	  likely	  emerged	  from	  the	  teachings	  of子游.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  could	  find	  some	  degree	  of	  confirmation	  in	  Xunzi's	  claim	  that	  Zisizi	  and	  Mengzi	  "sang	  in	  harmony"	  with	  Zi	  You's	  teaching.	  	  Chen	  Lai	  even	  claims	  that	  we	  can	  consider	  Zi	  You	  and	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  to	  be	  part	  of	  "one	  system"	  (子游之儒與子思之儒本一系)10	  	  While	  Chen	  stops	  short	  of	  identifying	  the	  
Xingzimingchu	  as	  entirely	  of	  one	  mind	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage,	  he	  does	  think	  that	  its	  presentation	  of	  an	  open-­‐ended,	  dynamic,	  and	  transactional	  understanding	  of	  "human	  nature"	  and	  the	  corresponding	  modes	  of	  realizing	  ethical	  agency	  (perception	  and	  performance)	  that	  such	  a	  relational	  concept	  of	  persons	  requires	  is	  certainly	  consistent	  with	  the	  following	  five	  core	  concepts	  that	  Chen	  takes	  to	  be	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  school:	  	  1)	  'caring	  for	  uniqueness'	  (shendu慎獨)	  	  2)	  'somaesthetic	  cultivation'	  (xiushen修身)	  3)	  'affectionate	  regard	  for	  the	  people'	  (qinmin親民)	  	  4)	  'seeking	  or	  returning	  to	  one's	  self'	  (求己,	  反己,	  反求諸己)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Cook,	  p.121.	  10	  Chen,	  p.11.	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5)	  a	  "democratic"	  understanding	  of	  'loyalty'	  忠—i.e.	  an	  understanding	  that	  demands	  a	  relationally	  reflexive	  critique	  of	  sovereign	  power	  when	  it	  is	  not	  being	  employed	  in	  the	  vital	  interests	  of	  the	  people.11	  	   While	  wishing	  to	  avoid	  the	  interpretive	  folly	  of	  reading	  received	  prejudice	  into	  the	  excavated	  texts,	  Scott	  Cook	  argues	  that	  if	  "we	  can	  first	  manage	  to	  put	  all	  such	  preconceptions	  [viz.	  preconceptions	  regarding	  the	  lineage—Si-­‐Mengian,	  Gaozian,	  Xunzian	  or	  what	  have	  you]	  behind	  us"	  we	  may	  come	  to	  see	  the	  Guodian	  Confucian	  texts	  as	  orbiting	  around	  a	  philosophically	  coherent	  constellation	  of	  uniquely	  Si-­‐Meng	  concerns	  about	  the	  cultivation	  of	  both	  inner	  integrity	  and	  outward	  forms	  of	  ritually	  appropriate	  behavior	  that	  are	  equally	  important,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  "dogmatic	  separation	  of	  the	  two	  was	  still	  a	  philosophical	  nightmare	  of	  which	  they	  had	  not	  even	  begun	  to	  dream."	  	  Thus	  Cook	  reads	  the	  Guodian	  texts	  more	  as	  precursors	  or	  moments	  of	  transformation	  of	  what	  might	  have	  happened	  "between	  the	  teachings	  of	  Kongzi	  and	  Mengzi"	  (kongmengzhijian	  孔孟之間)	  and	  less	  as	  ideological	  or	  metaphysical	  statements	  about	  'human	  nature'	  (renxing	  人性)	  and	  its	  purportedly	  "heavenly	  endowments"	  (tianming	  天命).	  	  Nevertheless,	  Cook	  is	  confident	  in	  outlining	  four	  features	  of	  the	  Guodian	  cache	  of	  texts	  that	  have	  clear	  conceptual	  affinities,	  if	  not	  downright	  philosophical	  unity,	  with	  the	  received	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  such	  as	  the	  Zhongyong	  and	  Mengzi.	  	  The	  four	  features	  are:	  	  	  1)	  "heaven	  and	  human	  endowment"	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  inseparability	  of	  tian	  and	  
ren	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  one's	  ethical	  potential;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  Chen	  Lai	  陳來，帛書《五行》與簡帛研究	  (新知三聯，2009).	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  2)	  "the	  paths	  to	  virtuous	  conduct"—concepts	  like	  shendu	  慎獨,	  fanji	  反己,	  and	  cheng	  
誠	  as	  methods	  or	  techniques	  of	  "caring	  for	  the	  self"	  and	  working	  on	  one's	  "ethical	  substance"';	  	  3)	  "education,	  moral	  suasion,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  tradition";	  	  4)	  "musical	  harmony	  and	  the	  symphony	  of	  virtues"—a	  depiction	  of	  ethical	  excellence	  and	  Sagehood	  that	  highlights	  the	  rhythmic	  qualities	  and	  ethically	  improvisational	  capabilities	  of	  Confucian	  Sagely	  exemplars.	  	   While	  it	  is	  certainly	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  to	  make	  any	  definitive	  judgments	  regarding	  the	  historical	  objectivity	  or	  plausibility	  of	  positing	  any	  such	  distinct	  philosophical	  "lineages"	  that	  any	  specific	  excavated	  text	  ought	  to	  be	  placed	  in,	  I	  don't	  think	  that	  this	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  cause	  for	  hermeneutic	  lamentation.	  	  For	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  me	  that	  a	  much	  more	  important	  and	  urgent	  task	  is	  to	  present	  a	  viable	  philosophical	  "reconstruction"	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  discourse	  through	  creative	  interpretations	  and	  responsible	  appropriations	  of	  notion	  like	  creative	  ethical	  'reflection'	  (si	  思)	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  practices	  of	  'caring	  for	  vital	  singularity/personal	  uniqueness'	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  and	  'creatively	  integrating'	  (cheng	  
誠)	  one's	  habitual	  dispositions	  and	  vital	  impulses	  as	  part	  of	  an	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  project	  of	  ritually	  transforming	  the	  cosmos	  from	  the	  inside	  out.	  	  In	  brief,	  it	  will	  be	  my	  contention	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  conceptual	  affinities	  listed	  above	  by	  Chen	  Lai,	  Scott	  Cook	  and	  others,	  that	  we	  can	  find	  within	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  a	  coherent	  and	  compelling	  vision	  of	  ethical	  cultivation	  and	  moral	  psychology	  that	  offers	  a	  rather	  provocative	  and	  sui	  generis	  understanding	  of	  "reflective	  ethical	  engagement"	  (si	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思)—a	  notion	  of	  ethical	  engagement	  or	  deep	  relational	  entanglement	  that	  foregrounds	  the	  lived-­‐body	  in	  its	  experience	  of	  role-­‐focused	  affect,	  narrative	  imagination,	  and	  creative	  integrity	  that	  structures	  our	  uniquely	  endowed	  capacities	  for	  personal	  and	  democratic	  amelioration.	  	  One	  might	  critically	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  just	  my	  own	  wishful	  thinking	  in	  looking	  to	  the	  distant	  past	  to	  help	  elucidate	  the	  potentials	  of	  the	  present	  moment,	  and	  perhaps	  I'm	  just	  another	  instance	  of	  a	  naively	  romantic	  Confucian	  philosopher	  trying	  to	  emulate	  "the	  former	  kings	  in	  broad	  outline	  yet	  [remaining]	  incognizant	  of	  their	  unifying	  traditions",	  or	  a	  scholar	  that	  is	  "boastful	  and	  ambitious	  nonetheless,	  while	  sundry	  and	  scattered	  in	  learning	  and	  experience"	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  "fabricate	  a	  doctrine	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  archaic	  past"	  that	  is	  "lacking	  in	  any	  standards,	  abstruse,	  and	  incomprehensible,	  cryptic	  and	  unintelligible."	  	  	  It	  is	  likely	  the	  case	  that	  such	  criticisms	  probably	  apply	  to	  me	  as	  well,	  it	  is	  still	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  even	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case	  I	  can	  still	  provide	  my	  own	  unique	  signature	  upon	  a	  line	  of	  thinking	  begun	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Zisizi	  and	  Meng	  Ke—a	  line	  of	  thinking	  gifted	  to	  me	  by	  my	  own	  esteemed	  teachers,	  colleagues	  and	  friends	  on	  this	  lifelong	  journey	  of	  Confucian	  learning	  for	  oneself	  (wei	  ji	  zhi	  xue	  為己之學).	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  a	  deeply	  shared	  joy	  (tongle	  同樂)	  to	  be	  part	  of	  this	  ongoing	  and	  vital	  conversation	  of	  a	  committed	  Ruist	  "way	  of	  learning"	  (daotong	  道統).	  	  And	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Richard	  Rorty's	  post-­‐metaphysical	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  as	  the	  art	  of	  intelligent	  and	  edifying	  conversation	  across	  spatio-­‐temporal	  regions	  and	  traditions—let	  us	  strive	  to	  keep	  the	  comparative	  philosophical	  conversation	  going.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  In	  particular	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  living	  tradition	  of	  Ruist	  "Dao	  learning"	  (daoxue	  
道學)	  and	  follow	  Steve	  Angle's	  provocative	  suggestion	  of	  engaging	  in	  "rooted	  global	  philosophy"	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II.	  Moral	  Beauty,	  Virtuosic	  Conduct,	  and	  Si-­‐Meng	  Moral	  Physiognomy	  	   A	  common	  thread	  uniting	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  discourse	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  effects	  that	  moral	  cultivation	  have	  on	  one's	  physiology	  in	  terms	  of	  ethically	  expressive	  demeanors	  and	  embodied	  performances.	  	  The	  somaesthetic	  aspect	  of	  ethical	  performativity	  will	  be	  highlighted	  here,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  role	  	  that	  ‘countenance’	  (se	  色)	  plays	  in	  expressing	  ethically	  consummate	  agency	  as	  an	  communicatively	  effective	  nexus	  of	  qi	  氣-­‐	  charged	  relationality.	  	  Through	  considering	  how	  moral	  performance	  is	  evaluated	  somaesthetically	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  better	  imagine	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  biopolitical	  strategies	  for	  resisting	  violent	  coercion	  and	  fascist	  oppression	  in	  all	  their	  pernicious	  forms.	  	   Once	  upon	  being	  asked	  about	  “family	  reverence”	  (xiao	  孝)—a	  concern	  obviously	  most	  central	  to	  the	  Confucian	  ethical	  project—Confucius	  responded:	  Showing	  the	  proper	  countenance	  is	  difficult	  (se	  nan	  色難).	  	  As	  for	  the	  young	  contributing	  their	  energies	  when	  there	  is	  work	  to	  be	  done,	  and	  deferring	  to	  their	  elders	  when	  there	  is	  wine	  and	  food	  to	  be	  had—how	  can	  merely	  doing	  these	  things	  be	  considered	  showing	  proper	  family	  reverence?13	  	  For	  Confucius,	  poor	  performance	  in	  acting	  out	  one's	  role	  responsibilities	  matters	  most	  significantly	  in	  evaluating	  ethically	  salient	  conduct	  and	  identifying	  truly	  exemplary	  persons.	  	  Even	  if	  one	  were	  to	  “go	  through	  the	  motions”	  of	  carrying	  out	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Angle,	  2002).	  	  I	  aspire	  to	  put	  my	  roots	  down	  as	  a	  Confucian	  scholar	  but	  always	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  contributing	  to	  a	  larger	  conversation	  aimed	  at	  a	  creative	  fusion	  of	  horizons	  across	  philosophical	  traditions	  and	  culturally	  sedimented	  wisdom.	  	  We	  might	  problematize	  the	  language	  of	  "global"	  philosophy	  following	  Spivak's	  critique	  of	  colonial	  discourse	  (the	  globe	  is	  an	  abstract	  space	  that	  we	  can	  quantitatively	  measure,	  whereas	  the	  planet	  is	  a	  concrete	  place	  that	  we	  inhabit	  as	  earthly	  creatures	  marked	  by	  irreducible	  vulnerability	  and	  apophantic	  finitude).	  	  For	  more	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  discourse	  in	  the	  task	  of	  articulating	  a	  responsible	  "planetary"	  cross-­‐cultural	  conversation	  regarding	  the	  wisdom	  of	  life	  (salim)	  see	  Jea	  Sophia	  Oh,	  A	  Postcolonial	  Planetary	  
Ecotheology	  of	  Life	  (Sopher	  Press,	  2011),	  p.33.	  13	  Analects	   2.8:	  子夏問孝。子曰：「色難。有事，弟子服其勞；有酒食，先生饌，曾是以為孝乎？」The	  translation,	  with	  a	  slight	  adjustment	  is	  from	  Roger	  Ames’	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  A	  Vocabulary	  (2011),	  p.171.	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the	  ostensibly	  identifiable	  ethical	  duties	  required	  of	  them	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  of	  their	  familial	  and	  socially	  defined	  roles,	  if	  the	  performance	  of	  these	  role-­‐based	  responsibilities	  were	  to	  leave	  anything	  to	  be	  desired	  in	  terms	  of	  appropriately	  deferential	  bodily	  demeanor,	  deferential	  countenance	  and	  somaesthetic	  style,	  then	  the	  overall	  relational	  dynamic	  would	  most	  surely	  diminished	  and	  the	  role-­‐focused	  
responsibility	  would	  be	  less	  than	  optimally	  realized.	  	  If	  we	  take	  books	  nine	  through	  eleven	  of	  the	  Analects	  seriously	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  exemplary	  profile	  or	  paradigmatic	  portrait	  of	  the	  performative	  virtuosity	  that	  was	  revelatory	  of	  the	  “timely	  Sage”14	  himself,	  then	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  kind	  of	  exemplars	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  in	  our	  own	  uniquely	  situated	  projects	  of	  realizing	  optimal	  appropriateness	  in	  our	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities	  and	  relationships.	  	  As	  Roger	  Ames	  argues	  “it	  is	  precisely	  these	  passages,	  remembering	  as	  they	  do	  the	  existential	  moments	  in	  the	  life	  lived	  by	  Confucius	  himself,	  that	  are	  most	  revealing	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  appropriate	  conduct	  of	  a	  scholar-­‐official	  (shi	  士)	  participating	  in	  the	  daily	  activities	  of	  the	  court	  was	  at	  once	  highly	  formalized	  and	  intensely	  personal:	  the	  cut	  of	  his	  robes,	  the	  cadence	  of	  his	  stride,	  his	  keen	  sense	  of	  context	  and	  proprieties,	  his	  posture	  and	  facial	  demeanor,	  his	  profound	  expression	  of	  reverent	  attention,	  his	  tone	  of	  voice,	  his	  gestures	  of	  deference,	  even	  the	  rhythm	  of	  his	  breathing.”15	  	  Confucius’	  skill	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Sheng	  zhi	  shi	  zhe	  聖之時者	  “the	  timely	  Sage”	  is	  a	  phrase	  coined	  by	  Mencius	  to	  depict	  Confucius’	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  improvise	  ethically	  in	  a	  way	  rather	  reminiscent	  of	  a	  virtuosic	  Jazz	  artist.	  	  "Riding	  the	  blue	  note"	  through	  the	  seeming	  dissonance	  and	  transitions	  of	  a	  life	  to	  achieve	  a	  harmonious	  outcome	  certainly	  requires	  moral	  artistry	  and	  improvisational	  skill.	  	  But	  the	  "timely	  sage"	  can	  flow	  through	  the	  dissonant	  transitions	  without	  losing	  sight	  of	  the	  more	  settled	  values	  and	  propensities	  of	  their	  lived	  experience.	  15	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.173.	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ethical	  actor	  in	  terms	  of	  effortlessly	  adjusting	  his	  countenance,	  posture,	  and	  breath	  to	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  is	  the	  revealed	  in	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  the	  Lunyu:	  On	  passing	  through	  the	  entrance	  way	  to	  the	  Duke’s	  court,	  Confucius	  would	  bow	  forward	  from	  the	  waist	  as	  though	  the	  gateway	  were	  not	  high	  enough.	  	  While	  in	  attendance,	  he	  would	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  entranceway;	  on	  passing	  through,	  he	  would	  not	  step	  on	  the	  raised	  threshold.	  	  On	  passing	  by	  the	  empty	  throne,	  his	  countenance	  would	  change	  visibly,	  his	  legs	  would	  bend,	  and	  in	  his	  speech	  he	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  breathless.	  	  He	  would	  lift	  the	  hem	  of	  his	  skirts	  in	  ascending	  the	  hall,	  bow	  forward	  from	  the	  waist,	  and	  hold	  in	  his	  breath	  as	  though	  having	  difficulty	  with	  his	  breathing.	  	  On	  leaving	  and	  descending	  the	  first	  steps,	  he	  would	  relax	  his	  expression	  and	  regain	  his	  composure.	  	  He	  would	  glide	  briskly	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  steps,	  and	  returning	  to	  his	  place,	  he	  would	  resume	  a	  reverent	  posture.16	  	  While	  this	  performance	  of	  Confucius	  may	  strike	  some	  as	  a	  rather	  obsequious	  spectacle,	  Roger	  Ames	  persuasively	  reminds	  us	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  through	  the	  performance	  of	  such	  somaesthetic	  virtuosity	  that	  a	  more	  profound	  and	  sustainable	  “communal	  fabric”	  can	  come	  into	  being:	  [Li	  禮—‘ritual	  proprieties’]	  have	  a	  somatic	  dimension	  whereby	  body	  is	  often	  more	  effective	  than	  language	  in	  communicating	  the	  deference	  necessary	  to	  strengthen	  the	  bonds	  among	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  various	  communal	  life	  forms.	  	  Witness	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Confucius’s	  body	  expresses	  li	  in	  his	  appearance	  at	  court	  recounted	  in	  the	  passage	  above.	  	  Li	  have	  a	  profoundly	  affective	  aspect	  wherein	  feelings	  suffuse	  and	  fortify	  the	  relational	  activities,	  providing	  the	  communal	  fabric	  a	  tensile	  strength	  that	  resists	  rupture.	  	  Refinement	  through	  the	  performance	  of	  li	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  each	  participant	  engaged	  in	  the	  profoundly	  aesthetic	  project	  of	  becoming	  consummate	  as	  a	  person.17	  	  The	  basic	  onto-­‐political	  fact	  of	  human	  plurality	  here	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  a	  plurality	  of	  uniquely	  aesthetic	  projects—projects	  that	  take	  "a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Analects	  10.4:	  「入公門，鞠躬如也，如不容。立不中門，行不履閾。過位，色勃如也，足躩如
也，其言似不足者。攝齊升堂，鞠躬如也，屏氣似不息者。出，降一等，逞顏色，怡怡如也。沒階
趨進，翼如也。復其位，踧踖如也。」Translation	  from	  Ames	  (2011),	  p.173. 17	  Ames,	  p.174.	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life..."18	  or	  what	  the	  late	  Foucault	  called	  our	  "ethical	  substance"19	  as	  their	  primordial	  material.	  	  	  The	  early	  Confucian	  insistence	  on	  “resolute	  becoming”	  (shen	  qi	  du	  慎其
獨),	  particularly	  within	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage,	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  cultivating	  relational	  virtuosity	  (ren	  仁)	  and	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義)	  in	  one’s	  uniquely	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationships.	  	  Mengzi	  describes	  an	  ideal	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  in	  terms	  of	  realizing	  a	  “flood-­‐like	  qi”	  (haoran	  zhi	  qi	  浩然之氣)	  that	  is	  most	  extensive	  (zhida	  至大)	  in	  empathic	  scope	  and	  most	  resolutely	  focused	  (zhigang	  
至剛)	  in	  terms	  of	  unique	  concern	  and	  ethical	  motivation.20	  	   Mengzi	  was	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  performative	  significance	  of	  bodily	  comportment	  and	  of	  the	  salience	  of	  an	  ethically	  expressive	  countenance.	  	  The	  text	  describes	  the	  countenance	  of	  a	  sage	  in	  metaphorical	  terms	  with	  the	  analogy	  of	  a	  jade-­‐like	  luster:	  What	   an	   authoritative	   person	   “natures”	   is	   the	   rooting	   of	   consummate	  conduct,	   appropriateness,	   ritual	   propriety,	   and	   wisdom	   in	   the	   heart.	   	   This	  gives	   rise	   to	   a	   glossy	   coloration	   seen	   on	   the	   face,	   replete	   in	   the	   back,	   and	  spread	  throughout	   the	   four	   limbs.	   	  The	   four	   limbs	  don’t	  speak	  and	  yet	   they	  are	  expressive.21	  	  Mengzi	  said,	  “Physical	  form	  and	  countenance	  are	  apportioned	  by	  tian.	  	  But	  only	  a	  Sage	  can	  consummate	  their	  physiognomy.”22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  For	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  Deleuzean	  idea	  including	  the	  significant	  ellipsis	  see	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  "Absolute	  Immanence".	  	  As	  a	  technical	  term	  "A	  life..."	  is	  a	  "pure	  dance	  of	  words"	  wherein	  "the	  ellipsis	  take	  the	  indefinite	  meaning	  of	  the	  particle	  'a'	  to	  its	  limit."	  	  Agamben	  claims	  that	  the	  "technical	  term	  a	  
life	  ...	  expresses	  this	  transcendental	  determinability	  of	  immanence	  as	  singular	  life,	  its	  absolutely	  virtual	  nature	  and	  its	  definition	  through	  this	  virtuality	  alone."	  	  For	  Deleuze	  a	  life	  ...	  "contains	  only	  virtual	  entities.	  	  It	  is	  composed	  of	  virtualities,	  events,	  singularities.	  	  What	  one	  calls	  virtual	  is	  not	  something	  lacking	  in	  reality."	  19	  See	  Foucault	  on	  aphrodisia	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  v.	  1-­‐3.	  20	  See	  Mengzi	  2A2.	  21君子所性，仁義禮智根於心。其生色也，睟然見於面、盎於背。施於四體，四體不言而喻。	  22孟子曰:「形色，天性也。惟聖人然後可以踐形。」	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In	  fact,	  the	  physiognomic,	  gestural	  and	  performative	  aspects	  of	  appropriate	  ethical	  conduct	  are	  so	  vitally	  important	  for	  the	  Mengzi	  that	  the	  text	  even	  considers	  it	  possible	  to	  become	  a	  sage	  by	  merely	  "faking	  it"	  for	  long	  enough:	  “the	  sages	  Yao	  and	  Shun	  natured	  (xing	  性之)	  [consummate	  conduct],	  the	  generals	  Tang	  and	  Wu	  embodied	  (shenzhi	  身之)	  it,	  and	  the	  five	  hegemons	  feigned	  it	  (jiazhi	  假之).	  	  Who	  is	  to	  say	  that	  upon	  feigning	  it	  long	  enough	  they	  didn’t	  actually	  have	  it?”23	  	  The	  Mengzi	  consistently	  proclaims	  that	  any	  purported	  reality/appearance	  distinction	  with	  regards	  to	  ethical	  "character"24	  dissolves	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  authoritative	  ethical	  conduct,	  “if	  you	  wear	  the	  clothes	  of	  a	  Yao,	  speak	  the	  words	  of	  Yao,	  and	  generally	  act	  like	  Yao,	  then	  you	  are	  a	  Yao.”25	  	   But	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  Mengzi	  and	  the	  early	  Confucians	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  potential	  ethical	  counterfeits	  or	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  moral	  hypocrisy.	  	  The	  Mengzi	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  genuineness	  of	  one’s	  performance,	  ranging	  anywhere	  from	  the	  realization	  and	  maintenance	  of	  political	  authoritativeness	  to	  the	  intimate	  space	  of	  sharing	  a	  meal	  with	  family	  and	  friends,	  is	  inevitably	  made	  manifest	  in	  physiognomy,	  “one	  who	  desires	  a	  good	  name	  can	  even	  pass	  up	  on	  ruling	  a	  country	  of	  a	  thousand	  chariots;	  but	  if	  he	  is	  not	  the	  real	  deal	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  even	  within	  the	  space	  of	  sharing	  a	  simple	  meal	  of	  a	  bowl	  of	  millet	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Mencius	  7A30.	  24	  See	  "Were	  the	  Confucian's	  Virtuous?	  A	  Response	  to	  Kupperman"	  (In	  Ames	  and	  Rosemont	  
Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  A	  Moral	  Vision	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  2016).	  	  A	  role	  ethical	  understanding	  of	  "character"	  is	  aesthetically	  grounded	  in	  a	  narrative	  project	  of	  imbuing	  a	  life	  with	  ethical	  significance	  via	  the	  narrative	  appropriation	  of	  ritual	  propriety	  and	  role-­‐based	  virtuosity.	  	  Excellence	  in	  activity	  not	  a	  reified	  sense	  of	  "character"	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  one-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐many	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  ethical	  subjectivity,	  which	  is	  common	  to	  much	  of	  Aristotelian	  inspired	  Virtue	  Ethics.	  25	  Mencius,	  6B2.	  
	   124	  
bean	  soup.”26	  	  It	  is	  through	  our	  expressive	  countenance	  that	  we	  come	  to	  manifest	  our	  unique	  physiognomic	  traits	  and	  dynamic	  qi	  configurations	  as	  coalescing	  into	  a	  more	  or	  less	  coherent	  sense	  of	  ethical	  agency	  with	  social	  reality.	  	  The	  kind	  of	  social	  recognition	  that	  a	  role-­‐focused	  conception	  of	  responsibility	  entails	  commands	  a	  deep	  appreciation	  of	  difference	  as	  radical	  human	  plurality	  and	  diversity,	  and	  entails	  a	  kind	  of	  methodological	  pluralism	  that	  goes	  way	  beyond	  anything	  that	  the	  classically	  liberal	  tradition	  in	  the	  West	  has	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  call	  for	  mere	  'toleration'	  of	  incommensurable	  comprehensive	  doctrines	  or	  competing	  visions	  of	  a	  good	  life	  for	  society	  as	  an	  aggregation	  of	  discrete,	  foundational	  individuals.	  	  	   It	  is	  precisely	  in	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  uniquely	  situated	  and	  narratively	  charged	  countenances	  that	  we	  inevitably	  begin	  to	  understand	  persons	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  web	  of	  relationality.	  	  And	  only	  with	  such	  understanding	  active	  can	  we	  hope	  to	  imaginatively	  get	  the	  most	  out	  of	  situations	  via	  the	  ameliorative	  application	  of	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (yi	  義).	  	  But	  how	  can	  the	  Mengzi	  be	  so	  sure	  that	  by	  appreciating	  the	  countenance	  of	  another	  person	  we	  can	  truly	  begin	  to	  know	  their	  uniqueness?	  	  This	  idea	  of	  relational	  potential	  as	  constituting	  the	  unique	  web	  of	  relationality	  out	  of	  which	  we	  can	  realize	  creative	  agency	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  fixed,	  metaphysical	  notions	  of	  "character"	  or	  any	  moral	  psychology	  that	  would	  reify	  a	  determinate	  pattern	  of	  becoming	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐many	  substance	  metaphysics	  of	  persons.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Mencius	  7B11:	  	  「好名之人，能讓千乘之國；苟非其人，簞食豆羹見於色。」See	  also	  2A3	  for	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  counterfeiture.	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  Another	  significant	  question	  we	  should	  raise	  is	  whence	  comes	  the	  Mengzian	  confidence	  that	  a	  jade-­‐like	  countenance	  of	  "authoritative	  persons"	  (junzi	  君子)	  or	  Sages	  can	  truly	  “transform”	  persons	  and	  their	  relational	  dynamics	  just	  in	  mere	  passing?	  	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  ethical	  physiognomy?	  	  	  Is	  there	  a	  kind	  of	  supernatural	  or	  mystic	  ideology	  implicit	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  writings	  on	  ethical	  physiognomy	  or	  can	  we	  understand	  these	  texts	  in	  an	  ecstatically	  naturalist	  manner?	  These	  and	  other	  related	  questions	  can	  only	  be	  approached	  experimentally	  in	  the	  space	  of	  our	  everyday	  lives,	  in	  the	  routine	  bodily	  habits	  and	  styles	  of	  comportment	  that	  make	  us	  who	  we	  are.	  	  	  The	  somaesthetic	  energies	  that	  we	  inhabit	  in	  course	  of	  our	  daily	  dealings	  and	  relational	  transactions	  are	  all	  we	  have	  to	  work	  with	  in	  	  ameliorating	  our	  ethical	  and	  political	  lives.	  	  And	  such	  ameliorative	  projects	  can	  be	  assessed	  from	  a	  Confucian	  standpoint	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  somaesthetic	  energetics	  or	  qi-­‐based	  psychoanalysis	  of	  all	  "selving"	  processes.	  	  Following	  Mengzi’s	  definition	  of	  the	  lived-­‐body	  as	  a	  "vessel	  of	  vital	  energies"	  (ti	  chong	  qi	  體，沖氣也),27	  we	  can	  assess	  ethical	  agency	  without	  appeal	  to	  abstract	  notions	  of	  principle,	  virtue	  or	  character.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  presupposed	  that	  we	  can	  make	  concrete	  evaluations	  of	  the	  qualitative	  flows	  of	  qi	  energy	  within	  a	  person's	  overall	  life.	  	  Such	  modes	  of	  appraisal	  necessarily	  involve	  a	  phenomenological,	  or	  radically	  empirical,	  approach—a	  hermeneutics	  of	  selving	  that	  pays	  constant	  respect	  to	  a	  deeply	  tacit	  dimension	  of	  personal	  becoming.	  	  Any	  attempt	  at	  full	  articulation	  of	  the	  selving	  process	  at	  a	  level	  of	  explicitly	  propositional	  or	  analytic	  discourse	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  deficient	  or	  hermeneutically	  distorting	  in	  some	  way.	  	  However,	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  Ru	  model	  of	  ethical	  appraisal	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Mengzi	  2A2.	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performative,	  embodied	  agency	  must	  involve	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  holistic	  well-­‐being	  or	  transactional	  health	  of	  unique	  persons	  in	  the	  disclosure	  of	  their	  ethical	  agency	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  over	  time	  and	  in	  relational	  contexts.	  	  	  Such	  relational	  thinking	  is	  what	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  foregrounding	  of	  the	  expressiveness	  of	  the	  body	  is	  capable	  of	  achieving.	  For	  example,	  the	  Mengzi	  advertises	  that	  "in	  appreciating	  people	  nothing	  is	  better	  than	  the	  eyes"	  (cunhuren	  moshan	  yu	  muzi	  存乎人，莫善於目子).	  	   	  	  Rather	  than	  presupposing	  a	  simplistic	  and	  superstitious	  physiognomic	  reading	  (kanxiang看像)	  of	  persons,	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  approach	  to	  ethical	  evaluation	  requires	  a	  diachronic	  and	  deeply	  relational	  understanding	  of	  selving	  process	  aiming	  to	  determine	  the	  overall	  quality	  and	  trajectory	  of	  the	  growth	  potentials	  of	  ethical	  agency	  (de	  德)	  and	  a	  role-­‐focused	  ends-­‐in-­‐view	  ideal	  of	  creative	  personal	  integration	  (cheng	  誠).	  III.	  Ethical	  Agency,	  Wordless	  Teaching,	  and	  Caring	  for	  Relational	  Potential	  
	   In	  the	  Mengzi	  we	  discover	  a	  persuasive	  presentation	  of	  ethical	  agency	  and	  a	  relationally	  constituted	  sense	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility.	  	  This	  all	  happens	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  sustained	  philosophical	  argument,	  discoverable	  in	  a	  series	  of	  narrative	  contexts,	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  situating	  agential	  realist	  formations	  in	  the	  locus	  of	  familial,	  social,	  and	  religious	  networks	  of	  transactional	  becoming.	  	  A	  Mengzian	  vision	  of	  ethical	  agency	  gives	  full	  appreciative	  attention	  to	  the	  disclosive	  truth	  conditions	  of	  the	  radically	  pluralistic	  potentials	  of	  lived	  democratic	  experience.	  	  The	  Mengzi	  repeatedly	  claims	  that	  the	  virtuosic	  potentials	  (de	  德)	  of	  any	  person	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  amelioratively	  transform	  situations,	  even	  without	  explicitly	  articulating	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a	  set	  of	  rationally	  determined	  rules	  or	  moral	  principles	  by	  which	  to	  a	  priori	  navigate	  lived	  experience:	  	  Mengzi	  said:	  "A	  junzi	  has	  five	  modes	  of	  teaching:	  there	  is	  the	  transformation	  that	  is	  like	  the	  coming	  of	  a	  timely	  rain;	  there	  is	  the	  'completion	  of	  ''virtuosic	  potential'	  (de	  德),	  there	  is	  the	  procurement	  and	  management	  of	  wealth;	  there	  is	  dialogue	  and	  inquiry;	  there	  is	  private	  cultivation	  as	  well.	  	  These	  five	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  junzi	  carries	  out	  their	  teachings.28	  	  	   Such	  "wordless	  teaching"	  (buyan	  zhi	  jiao	  不言之教)	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  surrounding	  de	  德	  discourse	  	  in	  both	  early	  "Confucian"	  and	  "Daoist"	  schools	  of	  thought	  from	  the	  Warring	  States	  period.29	  	  Indeed,	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  Daoist	  and	  Confucian	  materials	  in	  the	  Guodian	  tomb	  leads	  to	  speculation	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  pronounced	  ideological	  divisions	  had	  even	  begun	  to	  been	  drawn	  yet.	  	  It	  also	  leads	  one	  to	  wonder	  whether	  the	  tomb	  occupant	  himself	  wasn't	  an	  adherent	  of	  a	  particular	  Si-­‐Meng	  line	  of	  Ruist	  philosophy	  and	  had	  found	  certain	  conceptual	  affinities	  and	  textual	  resonances	  between	  the	  Daodejing,	  Taiyishengshui	  and	  some	  of	  the	  more	  onto-­‐cosmologically	  speculative	  and	  ethically	  provocative	  "Confucian"	  texts	  like	  the	  Wuxingpian	  and	  Xingzimingchu.30	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28孟子曰：「君子之所以教者五：有如時雨化之者，有成德者，有達財者，有答問者，有私淑艾者
。此五者，君子之所以教也。」	  29	  Of	  course,	  as	  attested	  by	  the	  transdisciplinary	  and	  "interfaith"	  nature	  of	  the	  Guodian	  tomb	  occupant's	  library,	  thinkers	  from	  the	  Warring	  States	  milieu	  were	  not	  working	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  such	  hard	  and	  fast	  traditional	  boundaries	  clearly	  demarcating	  philosophical	  "schools"	  were	  operative.	  	  A	  strong	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  a	  shared	  conceptual	  framework	  or	  "cluster",	  operating	  with	  some	  basic	  metaphysical	  assumptions	  held	  in	  common	  across	  different	  intellectual	  "ways"	  (dao	  道)	  regarding	  a	  Yin-­‐Yang	  correlative	  cosmology,	  existed	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  horizon	  of	  intelligibility	  for	  all	  of	  the	  Warring	  States	  philosophers,	  even	  including	  the	  Mohists	  and	  Legalists	  who	  on	  first	  glance	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  "rationalist"	  order	  of	  interpretation.	  30	  For	  an	  insightful	  study	  on	  the	  unique	  idea	  of	  correlative	  "order"	  in	  Chu	  philosophical	  texts	  (both	  proto-­‐Daoist	  and	  more	  Ruist)	  see	  Wang,	  Zhongjiang	  (trans.	  Misha	  Tadd)	  Order	  in	  Early	  Chinese	  
Excavated	  Texts:	  Natural,	  Supernatural,	  and	  Legal	  Approaches.	  	  The	  section	  on	  "oneness"	  in	  late	  Zhou	  and	  pre-­‐Qin	  philosophical	  discourse	  puts	  the	  Guodian	  found	  Taiyishengshui	  《太一生水》into	  a	  broad	  philosophical	  and	  illuminating	  intertextual	  conversation.	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   The	  pervasive	  idea	  of	  an	  embodied	  'moral	  physiognomy',	  and	  the	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  assess	  the	  ethical	  "stuff"	  of	  someone,	  merely	  based	  upon	  the	  perception	  of	  superficial	  markers	  such	  as	  their	  'jade-­‐like	  complexion'	  is	  called	  into	  question	  by	  the	  
Xunzi	  in	  a	  chapter	  explicitly	  aimed	  at	  these	  purportedly	  "superstitious"	  and	  "heterodox"	  teachings	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage.31	   	  	   What	  Xunzi	  is	  intent	  on	  criticizing	  is	  the	  ease	  in	  which	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  expressionism	  can	  all	  too	  easily	  lead	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  hypocrisy	  in	  which	  people	  without	  the	  requisite	  "internalized"	  virtuosity	  or	  cultivated	  'virtual	  potential'	  (de	  德)	  find	  themselves	  in	  positions	  of	  authority	  and	  relationally	  commanding	  deference.	  	  In	  such	  situations,	  merely	  acting	  in	  accord	  with	  their	  appropriate	  tasks	  and	  mandated	  duties	  emergent	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  roles	  and	  relationships	  they	  are	  inhabiting	  (tianming	  天命)	  becomes	  highly	  problematic	  and	  conducive	  to	  hypocrisy	  and	  coercion	  as	  such	  hypocrites	  are	  occupying	  roles	  and	  positions	  of	  recognizable	  authority	  and	  employing	  deceitful	  appearances	  and	  methods	  to	  cover	  up	  their	  lack	  of	  true	  virtuosity.	  	  	   Mengzi	  was	  said	  to	  have	  "professed	  the	  intrinsic	  efficacy	  of	  our	  natural	  dispositions	  and	  extoled	  the	  virtuosity	  of	  Yao	  and	  Shun."32	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  difference	  between	  Xunzi	  and	  Mengzi	  on	  the	  question	  of	  "human	  nature"	  or	  "natural	  dispositions"	  (renxing	  人性)	  is	  not	  really	  about	  a	  debate	  over	  a	  purportedly	  fixed	  ontological	  essence	  determining	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  human	  being	  in	  terms	  of	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  being	  included	  in	  an	  "ethically"	  normative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  the	  "Against	  Physiognomy"	  (feixiang	  非相)	  chapter	  of	  the	  Xunzi.	  32道性善，言比稱堯舜	  
	   129	  
category	  of	  definitional	  evaluation.	  	  Rather	  this	  in-­‐house	  debate	  is	  really	  more	  of	  a	  question	  regarding	  the	  respective	  emphasis	  that	  these	  particular	  Confucian	  thinkers	  placed	  upon	  intrinsic	  existential	  phenomena	  like	  affect,	  correlatively-­‐constitutive	  interpersonal	  relationships,	  bodily	  expressive	  moral	  charisma,	  	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  ritual	  propriety	  and	  sagely	  exemplars	  in	  constructing	  a	  shared	  social	  grammar	  by	  which	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  ethical	  evaluation.	  	  Such	  intrinsic	  ethical	  focus	  (nei	  內)	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  a	  more	  extrinsic	  reliance	  upon	  features	  and	  phenomena	  of	  a	  potentially	  more	  stable	  realm	  of	  inherited	  social	  institutions,	  cultural	  patterns,	  formal	  education	  and	  established	  rituals	  and	  music.	  	  The	  Mengzi	  takes	  a	  rather	  positive	  view	  of	  certain	  morally	  creative	  persons—so-­‐called	  'Sages'	  and	  'worthies'	  (shengxian	  聖賢)—	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  effect	  ethical	  transformation	  within	  their	  particular	  communities	  via	  authoritative	  and	  virtuosic	  performances	  of	  ritually	  appropriate	  and	  ethically	  exemplary	  conduct.	  	  It	  is	  through	  an	  embodied	  virtuosic	  command	  of	  communicative	  capabilities—listening	  to	  the	  most	  pressing	  concerns	  of	  the	  multitudes	  and	  realizing	  wisdom	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ethically	  persuasive	  speech—that	  an	  ameliorative	  transformation	  of	  the	  relational	  fabric	  of	  society	  is	  made	  possible.	  	  We	  will	  consider	  later	  how	  this	  ritually	  idealized	  communicative	  model	  of	  Sagehood	  informs	  a	  uniquely	  Ruist	  understanding	  of	  democratic	  agency	  within	  a	  relationally	  constituted,	  process-­‐oriented	  and	  event-­‐consummated	  metaphysical	  framework	  of	  a	  qi	  氣	  based	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	   	  The	  Xunzi,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seems	  to	  reserve	  a	  much	  more	  suspicious	  hermeneutics	  for	  the	  capacities	  individuals	  have	  to	  effectively	  realize	  ameliorative	  growth.	  And	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  he	  is	  much	  more	  realistically	  attuned	  to	  the	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potential	  dangers	  of	  moral	  hypocrisy	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  governance	  and	  public	  life	  more	  generally—hence	  the	  need	  for	  extrinsic	  ritual	  and	  legal	  codes	  (fa	  法).	  	  There	  might	  be	  another	  point	  of	  fundamental	  disagreement	  between	  these	  schools	  of	  Confucian	  thought	  represented	  here	  in	  the	  tradition	  by	  the	  philosophical	  figures	  of	  Xunzi	  and	  Mengzi.	  	  This	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  not	  only	  was	  it	  a	  matter	  of	  emphasis	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ethical	  impact	  of	  virtuosic	  or	  charismatic	  exemplars,	  but	  also	  the	  "nature	  good	  vs.	  nature	  crude"	  xingshan	  性善	  /	  xing	  e	  性惡	  distinction	  might	  also	  point	  to	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	  potential	  of	  our	  'vital	  energies'	  qi	  氣	  and	  the	  role	  that	  they	  can	  play	  in	  the	  achievement	  of	  virtuosic	  conduct	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  exemplary	  traits	  (i.e.	  sagely	  natural	  complexes	  guiding	  our	  embodied	  selving	  processes).	  	  	  Responsibly	  translating	  the	  conceptual	  clustering	  associated	  with	  these	  two	  poles	  of	  early	  Confucian	  theories	  of	  human	  nature,	  we	  should	  take	  shan	  善	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  pragmatic	  efficiency—i.e.	  "good	  for.	  .	  .",	  "good	  with.	  .	  .",	  "good	  to.	  .	  .",	  etc.,	  and	  not	  some	  purportedly	  essentialized	  notion	  of	  purely	  moral	  goodness	  qua	  moral	  goodness.	  	  Likewise,	  we	  should	  read	  the	  Xunzian	  line	  of	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  "crude"	  (e	  惡)	  or	  unrefined	  sensibility	  structure—that	  is,	  the	  brute	  desires	  for	  food,	  drink,	  and	  sex	  without	  aesthetic	  or	  ritual	  reflection	  upon	  the	  "point"	  of	  such	  embodied	  pursuits	  and	  how	  to	  optimize	  relational	  flourishing	  in	  a	  family-­‐social-­‐cosmic	  nexus	  of	  entangled	  processes	  of	  human	  becoming.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  I	  borrow	  Kurtis	  Hagen's	  translation	  of	  "crude	  nature"	  (xing	  e	  性惡)	  to	  highlight	  the	  decidedly	  non-­‐ontotheological	  presuppositions	  in	  this	  Ruist	  debate.	  	  See	  his	  "Artifice	  and	  Virtue	  in	  the	  Xunzi"	  Dao	  (Hagen,	  K.	  Dao	  (2003)	  3:	  85.)	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   For	  now,	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  all	  early	  Confucian	  projects	  of	  ethical	  cultivation	  would	  share	  this	  kind	  of	  broadly	  understood	  'aesthetic	  holism'	  in	  terms	  of	  thinking	  through	  vital	  ethical	  and	  political	  questions	  like:	  what	  is	  the	  optimal	  life	  course	  for	  a	  uniquely	  situated	  human	  person	  like	  myself?	  	  What	  would	  constitute	  a	  harmonious	  and	  well-­‐integrated	  life	  given	  the	  facticity	  of	  my	  uniquely	  situated	  relational	  responsibilities	  focused	  by	  a	  manifold	  of	  roles?	  	  What	  should	  I	  do	  in	  terms	  of	  navigating	  the	  complexity	  of	  harmonizing	  a	  diverse	  and	  constantly	  changing	  set	  of	  role	  identities	  over	  the	  course	  of	  life?	  How	  to	  balance	  competing	  claims	  on	  my	  vital	  energies	  and	  ethical	  focus?	  	  What	  habits	  and	  intentional	  practices	  are	  most	  efficacious	  in	  terms	  of	  attempting	  to	  lead	  a	  virtuosic	  life	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  democratic	  flourishing	  of	  the	  communicating	  community	  of	  which	  one's	  personal	  life	  is	  a	  vital	  part?34	  	   Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  give	  theoretically	  coherent	  and	  definitive	  systematic	  accounts	  of	  the	  Good	  Life	  according	  to	  some	  supposedly	  universal	  set	  of	  valid	  dictates	  of	  reason,	  the	  Ruist	  tradition	  of	  ethical-­‐political	  thinking	  avers	  such	  speculation	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  concrete	  and	  embodied	  conception	  of	  wisdom	  that	  works	  best	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  "pointing"	  directly	  to	  exemplary	  persons	  who	  serve	  as	  ethical	  constellations	  and	  regulative	  ideals	  for	  the	  democratic	  community	  becoming	  more	  harmonious	  a	  plurisingularity	  together.	  	  Such	  ethical	  "pointing"	  or	  embodied	  indexicality	  works	  best	  by	  allusive	  or	  poetic	  descriptions	  of	  exemplary	  persons	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34子曰：「不曰『如之何如之何』者，吾末如之何也已矣。」Analects	  15.16	  The	  phrase	  "what	  to	  do?"	  (ruzhihe	  如之何)	  appears	  a	  total	  of	  143	  times	  in	  the	  database	  of	  pre-­‐Qin	  Ruist	  texts	  at	  ctext.org.	  	  Although	  this	  phrase	  is	  not	  referencing	  anything	  like	  autonomous	  choice	  it	  does	  highlight	  the	  uniquely	  transactional	  and	  participatory	  (peitian	  配天)	  nature	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  creative	  agency.	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there	  more	  or	  less	  sedimented	  traits	  and	  such	  presentations	  often	  function	  better	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  fecund	  ambiguity	  or	  indirect	  form	  of	  communication.	  	  Sometimes	  there	  is	  even	  a	  kind	  of	  Ruist	  apophantic	  theology	  of	  tian	  天	  discourse	  that	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  holistically	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  somaesthetic	  awareness	  of	  the	  entire	  "bodyheartminding"	  (xin	  心)	  of	  persons,	  and	  cannot	  function	  merely	  on	  the	  level	  of	  verbal	  discursive	  formations—after	  all,	  "does	  tian	  speak?"	  	  (天何言?)	  	   The	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  "silent	  illumination"	  and	  charismatic	  ethical	  transformation	  occurring	  beyond	  verbal	  articulation	  can	  be	  found	  even	  in	  the	  more	  "externalist"	  (外)	  writings	  of	  the	  Xunzi:	  
Nothing	  is	  more	  efficacious	  for	  the	  authoritative	  person	  in	  nourishing	  their	  feeling	  and	  thinking	  than	  to	  be	  effectively	  and	  creatively	  integrated	  in	  their	  habitual	  configurations	  of	  vital	  energy	  (cheng	  誠).	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  else	  to	  concern	  oneself	  with	  other	  than	  aiming	  at	  the	  utmost	  of	  creative	  integration...the	  "perfection"	  of	  the	  authoritative	  person's	  virtuosic	  efficacy	  is	  such	  that	  even	  in	  silence	  it	  is	  expressed,	  prior	  to	  the	  bestowal	  of	  service	  or	  favors	  one	  is	  treated	  like	  family,	  and	  without	  displaying	  anger	  one	  is	  held	  in	  reverence	  and	  respect.	  	  This	  is	  because	  authoritative	  persons	  act	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  vital	  command	  of	  things	  (shun	  ming	  順命)	  by	  caring	  for	  their	  unique	  potential	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	  The	  efficacious	  employment	  of	  a	  course	  of	  action	  (dao	  道)	  is	  such	  that	  without	  creative	  integration	  of	  habit	  energies	  there	  is	  no	  unique	  individuality.	  	  And	  without	  individuality	  there	  is	  no	  signature	  style,	  and,	  thus	  even	  through	  the	  direct	  expression	  of	  one's	  countenance	  or	  via	  verbal	  articulation	  the	  people	  will	  be	  unwilling	  to	  follow	  the	  moral	  charge.	  	  If	  they	  do	  follow	  the	  charge,	  it	  will	  be	  with	  hesitation	  and	  doubt.	  	  The	  heavens	  and	  earth	  are	  vast	  and	  sublime,	  but	  without	  creative	  integration,	  nature	  itself	  cannot	  transform	  things.	  	  The	  wisdom	  of	  the	  sage	  is	  like	  this;	  without	  creative	  integration	  the	  people	  cannot	  be	  transformed.35	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35君子養心莫善於誠，致誠則無它事矣......君子至德，嘿然而喻，未施而親，不怒而威，夫此順命，
以慎其獨者也。善之為道者，不誠則不獨，不獨則不形，不形則雖作於心，見於色，出於言，民猶
若未從也，雖從必疑。天地為大矣，不誠則不能化萬物。聖人為知矣，不誠則不能化萬民。	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It	  should	  be	  clear	  by	  now	  then	  that	  to	  approach	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Ruist	  thinking	  to	  develop	  a	  reconstructed	  Ruist	  democratic	  metaphysics	  of	  persons	  as	  becoming	  creatively	  integrated	  in	  the	  course	  of	  living	  role-­‐focused	  agency,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  responsibly	  situate	  persons	  in	  their	  vital	  contexts	  of	  relationality	  that	  is	  always	  a	  qi-­‐manifested	  plurisingularity	  of	  persons.	  	  This	  is	  why	  the	  Mengzi	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  epistemically	  mistaken	  not	  to	  seek	  virtuosic	  potential	  in	  qi	  if	  we	  can't	  get	  at	  it	  at	  the	  level	  of	  explicit	  verbal	  discourse	  or	  comprehensive	  philosophical	  doctrines	  (yan	  言).36	  	  	   The	  previously	  cited	  passage	  of	  the	  Xunzi	  that	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  as	  a	  resolute	  focus	  on	  optimizing	  personal	  relational	  potential	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ritually	  stipulated	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  value	  structures	  (li	  禮)	  should	  already	  alert	  us	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  author(s)	  of	  the	  Xunzi	  may	  have	  been	  rhetorically	  overplaying	  the	  true	  philosophical	  differences	  between	  them	  and	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Ruists	  on	  the	  question	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  In	  fact,	  since	  Confucius	  himself	  was	  said	  to	  have	  seldom	  talked	  about	  "nature"	  (xing	  性)	  many	  of	  the	  subsequent	  philosophical	  divisions	  in	  Ruist	  thinking	  can	  be	  read	  as	  attempts	  to	  articulate	  a	  coherent	  conception	  of	  the	  moral	  psychology	  of	  persons.	  	  We	  might	  read	  the	  Xunzi	  as	  being	  a	  development	  of	  the	  "overcome	  the	  self	  with	  ritual	  propriety"	  (keji	  fu	  li	  克
己復禮)	  model	  found	  in	  the	  Analects.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  character	  ji	  
己	  is	  frequently	  used	  in	  pre-­‐Qin	  sources	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  cause	  of	  fault	  or	  error	  in	  addressing	  ethical	  and	  political	  situations.	  	  The	  open-­‐ended	  aspect	  of	  the	  selving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  Mengzi	  on	  articulating	  the	  method	  of	  cultivating	  "oceanic	  qi"	  (haoranzhiqi	  浩然之氣)	  in	  2A2.	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process	  is	  on	  display	  in	  this	  character	  though	  as	  it	  is	  also	  used	  to	  reference	  a	  reflexive	  ethical	  sensibility.	  	  In	  a	  very	  interesting	  passage	  from	  the	  Xunzi	  we	  see	  how	  the	  ideal	  of	  not	  leaving	  "relational	  virtuosity"	  (ren	  仁)	  even	  for	  a	  space	  of	  a	  meal	  doesn't	  make	  Yan	  Hui	  an	  exemplar	  for	  blind	  conformism	  to	  predetermined	  ritualistic	  principles,	  but	  actually	  "overcoming"	  ji	  己	  can	  only	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  context	  of	  self-­‐love	  (ziai	  自愛):	  Zilu	  came	  upon	  the	  Master	  in	  repose.	  	  Confucius	  said:	  "You!	  What	  do	  you	  make	  of	  wisdom	  (zhi	  知)?	  And	  what	  do	  you	  make	  of	  relational	  virtuosity	  (ren	  仁)?"	  	  Zilu	  responded:	  "A	  wise	  person	  gets	  others	  to	  acknowledge	  them,	  and	  a	  ren	  person	  gets	  others	  to	  love	  them."	  	  Confucius	  said:	  "You	  can	  be	  a	  scholar-­‐official."	  	  Next	  Zigong	  arrived.	  	  Confucius	  asked,	  "Ci!	  	  What	  do	  you	  make	  of	  wisdom	  (zhi	  知)?	  And	  what	  do	  you	  make	  of	  relational	  virtuosity	  (ren	  仁)?"	  	  Zigong	  responded,	  "The	  wise	  person	  knows	  others,	  and	  the	  ren	  person	  loves	  others."	  	  Confucius	  said,	  "You	  can	  be	  an	  authoritative	  person	  (junzi	  君子)	  amongst	  scholar-­‐officials."	  	  Finally,	  Yan	  Hui	  enters.	  	  Confucius	  asked,	  "Hui!	  What	  do	  you	  make	  of	  wisdom	  (zhi	  知)?	  And	  what	  do	  you	  make	  of	  relational	  virtuosity	  (ren	  仁)?"	  	  Yan	  Hui	  said:	  "A	  wise	  person	  knows	  themselves	  and	  a	  
ren	  person	  loves	  themselves	  (ziai	  自愛)."	  	  Confucius	  said,	  "You	  can	  be	  an	  enlightened	  authoritative	  person	  (ming	  junzi	  明君子)."37	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  passage	  is	  important	  to	  show	  the	  philosophical	  convergence	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  and	  Xunzian	  thinking	  regarding	  relationally	  constituted	  persons	  and	  the	  ritual	  performance	  of	  ethical	  agency.	  	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  more	  egoist	  language	  of	  ji	  己	  as	  something	  to	  be	  overcome	  or	  at	  least	  reflected	  upon	  is	  jettisoned	  here	  by	  Yan	  Hui	  and	  is	  replaced	  with	  the	  more	  gerundive	  sense	  of	  self	  as	  intra-­‐spection	  (zi	  
自)	  that	  also	  points	  to	  the	  spontaneity	  (ziran	  自然)	  of	  becoming	  more	  creatively	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integrated	  in	  a	  role-­‐focused	  commanding	  responsibility.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Xunzi	  author(s)	  here	  in	  the	  use	  of	  Yan	  Hui	  as	  an	  interlocutor	  focusing	  on	  "self-­‐love"	  (ziai	  自愛)	  gives	  us	  an	  alternative	  but	  resonant	  vocabulary	  for	  talking	  about	  the	  moral	  phenomenology	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  that	  actually	  bridges	  the	  two	  traditions	  of	  early	  Ruism.	  IV.	  Agential	  Realism	  and	  Non-­‐Foundational	  Si-­‐Meng	  Moral	  Agency	  	   This	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  notion	  of	  'matter-­‐ing'	  as	  it	  unfurls	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  meanings	  in	  a	  contemporary	  spaces	  and	  anti-­‐foundational	  discursivity.	  	  Process-­‐oriented	  metaphysics—as	  generalized	  theoretical	  descriptions	  of	  the	  way	  the	  ten-­‐thousand	  things	  hang	  together	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  term—don't	  rely	  upon	  any	  transcendental	  or	  foundational	  notions	  of	  an	  arche	  or	  substance,	  or	  any	  other	  ontotheological	  transcendental	  concepts	  of	  absolute	  ipseity	  to	  explain	  the	  dualistic	  relationship	  between	  Form	  and	  Matter.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  material	  singularity	  will	  be	  a	  starting	  point	  as	  we	  explore	  notions	  of	  experimental	  metaphysics	  and	  transactional	  potential	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  these	  ideas	  to	  a	  process	  notion	  of	  vibrant	  materialism.	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  by	  accepting	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  metaphysics	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  or	  "transactional	  plurisingularity"	  in	  dialogue	  with	  Karen	  Barad's	  (et.	  al)	  theory	  of	  agential	  realism	  we	  can	  realize	  greater	  clarity	  regarding	  the	  aporia	  of	  pernicious	  conformism	  within	  Confucian	  Role	  ethics.	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  by	  abandoning	  any	  foundationalist	  liberal	  choice	  paradigms	  and	  instead	  adopting	  a	  thoroughly	  transactional	  notion	  of	  agentially	  realistic	  freedom	  wrought	  within	  role	  performances	  and	  material	  enactments	  of	  disclosive	  relationality,	  we	  can	  better	  respond	  to	  concerns	  that	  the	  obsession	  with	  traditional	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roles	  and	  encumbering	  relationships	  within	  Confucian	  Role	  ethics	  stultifies	  the	  growth	  of	  creative	  agency	  and	  coercively	  enforces	  an	  unhealthy	  degree	  of	  conservatism.	  	   In	  discussing	  the	  ways	  that	  Confucianism	  has	  been	  "manufactured"	  by	  Western	  interpreters	  since	  the	  Jesuit	  missionaries	  sent	  back	  their	  first	  attempts	  at	  translation,	  Roger	  Ames	  points	  out	  that	  it	  has	  usually	  been	  an	  aggressively	  conservative	  presentation	  of	  the	  Ru-­‐literati	  tradition	  following	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Confucius'	  innovative	  transmissions	  that	  has	  predominated	  in	  Western	  imaginations.	  	  Confucianism	  "has	  all	  too	  often	  been	  appropriated	  by	  the	  powers-­‐that-­‐be	  to	  reinforce	  class	  and	  gender	  inequities"	  or	  as	  a	  "dry-­‐as-­‐bones	  catechism—a	  form	  of	  political	  indoctrination	  to	  be	  foisted	  upon	  witless	  school	  children	  for	  their	  ostensive	  moral	  edification."38	  In	  reviewing	  how	  thinkers	  like	  G.W.F.	  Hegel,	  Bertrand	  Russell,	  and	  John	  Dewey	  variously	  characterized	  Confucianism	  as	  being	  responsible	  for	  an	  unhealthy	  conservatism	  and	  traditional	  (patriarchal,	  monarchic)	  inertia	  in	  classical	  Chinese	  culture,	  Ames	  also	  considers	  how	  contemporary	  cross-­‐cultural	  comparative	  hermeneutics	  can	  replicate	  this	  pattern	  of	  (celebratory	  and	  deprecatory)	  orientalism.	  	  Ames	  critically	  interrogates	  Zhang	  Longxi's	  rather	  Hegelian	  sounding	  characterization	  of	  Chinese	  language	  as	  being	  essentially	  on	  the	  material	  and	  concrete	  side	  of	  a	  abstract/concrete,	  Form/Matter	  set	  of	  dualistic	  presuppositions:	  The	  Chinese	  language,	  as	  seen	  in	  this	  formulation,	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  language	  of	  concrete	  things	  and	  specific	  objects,	  a	  language	  bogged	  down	  in	  matter	  and	  unable	  to	  rise	  above	  the	  ground	  of	  materiality	  and	  literality	  toward	  any	  spiritual	  height.	  	  The	  judgment	  is	  thus	  not	  on	  Chinese	  translation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Roger	  Ames,	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.19.	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particular	  foreign	  words	  and	  concepts,	  but	  on	  the	  very	  nature	  and	  ability	  of	  the	  Chinese	  language	  as	  a	  whole.39	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  rectify	  or	  at	  least	  ameliorate	  the	  trend	  of	  denigratory	  orientalism	  in	  comparative	  philosophy	  and	  sinology	  more	  generally,	  Ames	  makes	  use	  of	  Hilary	  Putnam's	  notion	  of	  internal	  realism	  to	  critique	  the	  naively	  realist	  assumptions	  behind	  much	  of	  these	  trends	  of	  critiquing	  supposedly	  romantic	  anti-­‐podalism	  or	  celebratory	  orientalism:	  	  Elements	  of	  what	  we	  call	  'language'	  or	  'mind'	  penetrate	  so	  deeply	  into	  what	  
we	  call	  'reality'	  that	  the	  very	  project	  of	  representing	  ourselves	  as	  being	  
'mappers'	  of	  something	  'language-­‐independent'	  is	  fatally	  compromised	  from	  
the	  start.	  Like	  Relativism,	  but	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  Realism	  is	  an	  impossible	  attempt	  to	  view	  the	  world	  from	  Nowhere.	  .	  .	  	  The	  Confucian	  persuasion	  of	  "embodying	  our	  experience"	  (ti	  體)	  and	  "pursuing	  a	  ritual	  propriety	  in	  our	  roles	  and	  relations"	  (li	  禮)	  differs	  from	  Putnam	  only	  in	  that	  it	  is	  more	  radical,	  going	  beyond	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  philosophical	  preoccupation	  with	  'language'	  and	  'mind'	  to	  claim	  that	  our	  entire	  psychophysical	  persons	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  assimilating	  and	  transforming	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  experienced.40	  	  	  Taking	  a	  stand	  against	  all	  forms	  of	  metaphysical	  essentialism	  that	  would	  postulate	  "block	  universes"	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  comparative	  hermeneutics,	  truly	  correlative	  
thinking	  seeks	  not	  "closure	  in	  patterns	  of	  fixed	  regularity"	  but	  instead	  aims	  at	  "synthetic"	  and	  "open-­‐ended,	  aesthetic	  disclosures	  in	  ad	  hoc	  unities	  constituted	  by	  unique	  details."41	  	  	   In	  imagining	  a	  more	  inclusive,	  democratic,	  and	  pragmatically	  reconstructed	  set	  of	  "regulative	  ideals"	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  received	  Confucian	  tradition	  (in	  the	  four	  East	  Asian	  "streams"	  of	  China,	  Korea,	  Vietnam,	  and	  Japan	  and	  in	  its	  diffusion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.33.	  40	  Ibid.,	  pp.21-­‐22.	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.26.	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throughout	  the	  world)	  Roger	  Ames	  joins	  forces	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  Bertrand	  Russell	  and	  Ambrose	  King	  who	  in	  their	  own	  ways	  advocated	  a	  "revitalized	  Confucianism"	  wherein	  the	  "traditional	  emphasis	  upon	  family	  feeling	  as	  both	  the	  entry	  point	  and	  the	  substance	  of	  moral	  competence"	  is	  complimented	  with	  a	  "more	  robust	  framework	  of	  regulative	  ideals	  directed	  at	  preempting	  the	  all-­‐to-­‐frequent	  misuse	  of	  intimate	  relationships"	  capable	  of	  giving	  rise	  to	  "nepotism,	  cronyism	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  and	  political	  corruption"	  and	  more	  intimate	  forms	  of	  violence	  and	  coercion.	  	  Ames	  comes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  just	  as	  "intimacy	  needs	  the	  restraining	  complement	  of	  integrity,	  concrete	  family	  feelings	  require	  the	  guiding	  complement	  of	  some	  form	  of	  more	  general	  ideals."42	  	  	   In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  present	  some	  of	  the	  experimental	  metaphysical	  inquiries	  of	  Karen	  Barad,	  and	  explore	  ways	  in	  which	  her	  agential	  realist	  perspective	  can	  provide	  a	  productive	  space	  in	  which	  to	  have	  dialogue	  aimed	  at	  "revitalizing"	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  wherein	  resolute	  becoming	  as	  "resolute	  human	  becoming"	  shendu	  慎獨	  can	  provide	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  ground	  from	  which	  to	  imaginatively	  develop	  the	  kind	  of	  regulative	  ideals	  we	  need	  to	  "reconstruct"	  a	  non-­‐coercive,	  inclusive,	  post-­‐patriarchal,	  creatively	  democratic	  Confucianism	  for	  the	  present	  moment.	  	   Karen	  Barad	  is	  a	  physicist	  and	  feminist	  philosopher	  who	  realized	  the	  possibility	  of	  creatively	  integrating	  two	  fields	  of	  discourse	  in	  a	  unified	  theory	  of	  matter	  mattering.	  	  Things	  matter	  because	  bodies	  matter	  in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  ways.	  	  Barad	  builds	  on	  a	  tradition	  from	  Spinoza	  through	  Deleuze	  that	  questions	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  p.35.	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animate/inanimate	  ontological	  difference	  in	  a	  conceptual	  space	  of	  reasons	  playing	  within	  a	  generative	  language	  game	  guided	  by	  the	  basic	  presupposition	  of	  vibrant	  matter	  or	  that	  all	  things	  are	  "alive"	  in	  	  and	  matter	  ethically	  speaking.43	  	   Barad	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  history	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  matter	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  philosophy	  can	  be	  read	  for	  the	  most	  part	  as	  a	  series	  of	  dismissive	  strategies	  of	  exclusion	  for	  an	  unruly	  and	  inconceivable	  subject	  of	  discourse.	  	  She	  accepts	  this	  historical	  situation	  as	  a	  lamentable	  given	  but	  agrees	  largely	  with	  the	  set	  of	  patriarchal,	  authoritarian,	  racist,	  classist	  strategies	  of	  domination	  masked	  in	  philosophical	  ideologies	  of	  exclusion,	  because	  for	  any	  discursive	  formation	  there	  is	  always	  already	  a	  process	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  going	  on.	  	  Discursive	  materiality	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  "boundary	  making	  processes"	  and	  on	  an	  agential	  realist	  account,	  matter	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  fixed	  substratum,	  or	  a	  passive	  stuff	  awaiting	  the	  formal	  imprint	  of	  culture	  or	  history,	  it	  is	  always	  already	  an	  intra-­‐actional	  historical	  affair	  of	  "congealing	  of	  agency"	  as	  an	  enactive	  process.	  	  This	  idea	  of	  congealing	  
agency	  is	  helpful	  in	  formulating	  a	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  "resolute	  becoming"	  慎獨	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  cluster	  of	  concepts	  ranging	  from	  a	  qi氣-­‐based	  vocabulary	  wherein	  material	  refinement	  (jing	  精	  to	  shen	  神)	  culminates	  in	  "creative	  integrity"	  (cheng	  誠).	  	   Barad	  asks	  the	  poignant	  question,	  “Where	  did	  we	  ever	  get	  the	  strange	  idea	  that	  nature—as	  opposed	  to	  culture—is	  ahistorical	  and	  timeless?	  	  We	  are	  far	  too	  impressed	  by	  our	  own	  cleverness	  and	  self-­‐consciousness.	  .	  .	  .	  We	  need	  to	  stop	  telling	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  be	  drawing	  largely	  upon	  one	  significant	  essay	  of	  Barad's	  to	  introduce	  her	  version	  of	  agential	  realism	  and	  put	  it	  in	  conversation	  with	  Si-­‐Meng	  insights.	  	  See	  Karen	  Barad,	  "Posthumanist	  Performativity:	  Toward	  an	  Understanding	  of	  How	  Matter	  Comes	  to	  Matter"	  [Signs:	  
Journal	  of	  Women	  in	  Culture	  and	  Society	  2003,	  vol.	  28,	  no.3].	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ourselves	  the	  same	  old	  anthropocentric	  bedtime	  stories."44	  Instead	  of	  "anthropocentric	  bedtime	  stories"	  what	  we	  now	  need	  are	  newly	  written	  anthropocene	  sermons	  or	  manifestos	  as	  calls	  to	  agential	  action.	  	   Both	  metaphysical	  realism	  and	  social	  constructivism	  presuppose	  a	  "representationalist"	  account	  of	  semantics	  and	  epistemology.	  	  But	  a	  "performative	  understanding	  of	  discursive	  practices	  challenges	  the	  representationalist	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  words	  to	  represent	  preexisting	  things."	  	  And,	  for	  Barad,	  performativity,	  properly	  understood,	  is	  not	  "an	  invitation	  to	  turn	  everything	  (including	  material	  bodies)	  into	  words;	  on	  the	  contrary	  performativity	  is	  precisely	  a	  contestation	  of	  the	  excessive	  power	  granted	  to	  language	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  real."	  	  We	  have	  to	  see	  language	  is	  mattering	  in	  embodied	  processes	  and	  social	  ontologies	  that	  get	  beyond	  the	  part/whole	  mereology	  of	  persons	  embedded	  in	  totalizing	  metaphysical	  narratives.	  	  If	  we	  see	  language	  games	  (including	  the	  most	  serious	  ones)	  as	  always	  a	  performative	  utterance	  of	  bodies	  in	  socially-­‐ritually	  constituted	  spaces,	  then	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  get	  a	  grasp	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  techniques	  (gongfu	  
功夫)	  as	  found	  in	  texts	  like	  the	  "Great	  Learning"	  and	  Focusing	  the	  Familiar.	  	   Barad	  criticizes	  both	  dogmatic	  realists	  and	  naive	  constructivists	  in	  not	  being	  sufficiently	  materialist	  in	  orientation.	  	  But	  her	  materialism	  is	  a	  materialism	  with	  a	  twist	  of	  vibrancy	  informed	  by	  a	  performative	  theory	  of	  body:	  [B]oth	  scientific	  realists	  and	  social	  constructivists	  believe	  that	  scientific	  knowledge	  (in	  its	  multiple	  representational	  forms	  such	  as	  theoretical	  concepts,	  graphs,	  particle	  tracks,	  photographic	  images)	  mediates	  our	  access	  to	  the	  material	  world;	  where	  they	  differ	  is	  on	  the	  question	  of	  referent,	  whether	  scientific	  knowledge	  represents	  things	  in	  the	  world	  as	  they	  really	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid.,	  Barad	  is	  quoting	  a	  passage	  from	  Steve	  Shaviro	  (1997).	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are	  (i.e.,	  "Nature")	  or	  "objects	  that	  are	  the	  product	  of	  social	  activities	  (i.e.,	  "Culture"),	  but	  both	  groups	  subscribe	  to	  representationalism.45	  	  Barad	  wishes	  to	  have	  us	  move	  from	  any	  ontotheological	  representationalist	  accounts	  of	  "correspondences"	  between	  descriptions	  of	  reality	  (e.g.	  Mirror	  of	  Nature)	  to	  more	  materially	  discursive	  practices	  of	  vibrantly	  enacted	  doings/actions.	  	  	  Liberal	  social	  theories	  and	  traditional	  scientific	  accounts	  of	  knowledge	  alike	  "owe	  much	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  world	  is	  composed	  of	  individuals"—just	  atoms	  swirling	  in	  the	  void.	  	  	  	  But	  "the	  idea	  that	  beings	  exist	  as	  individuals	  with	  inherent	  attributes,	  anterior	  to	  their	  representation,	  is	  a	  metaphysical	  presupposition	  that	  underlies	  the	  belief	  in	  political,	  linguistic,	  and	  epistemological	  forms	  of	  representationalism."	  	  Representationalism	  is	  the	  "belief	  in	  the	  ontological	  distinction	  between	  representations	  and	  that	  which	  they	  purport	  to	  represent....that	  which	  is	  represented	  is	  held	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  all	  practices	  of	  representing."	  	  And	  for	  Barad	  all	  such	  representationalist	  accounts	  rest	  on	  a	  fundamental	  and	  pernicious	  philosophical	  fiction	  of	  atomism.	  	   It	  would	  be	  better	  then	  if	  we	  replaced	  Democritus'	  dream	  of	  atoms	  in	  the	  void	  and	  Descartes'	  delusion	  of	  an	  ontological	  gap/cut	  as	  ideological	  building	  blocks	  for	  naive	  Reality/Appearance	  Realism	  (i.e.	  matter	  as	  object	  of	  representation	  or	  passive	  entity	  for	  phenomenological	  impressionism)	  with	  a	  more	  robustly	  quantum	  conception	  of	  things:	  I	  want	  to	  encourage	  doubt	  about	  [the]	  presumption	  that	  representations	  (that	  is,	  their	  meaning	  or	  content)	  are	  more	  accessible	  to	  us	  than	  the	  things	  they	  supposedly	  represent.	  	  IF	  there	  is	  no	  magic	  language	  through	  which	  we	  can	  unerringly	  reach	  out	  directly	  to	  its	  referents,	  why	  should	  we	  think	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  language	  that	  magically	  enables	  us	  to	  reach	  out	  directly	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Ibid.,	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its	  sense	  or	  representational	  content?	  	  The	  presumption	  that	  we	  can	  know	  what	  we	  mean,	  or	  what	  our	  verbal	  performances	  say,	  more	  readily	  than	  we	  can	  know	  the	  objects	  those	  sayings	  are	  about	  is	  a	  Cartesian	  legacy,	  a	  linguistic	  variation	  on	  Descartes'	  insistence	  that	  we	  have	  a	  direct	  and	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  contents	  of	  our	  thoughts	  that	  we	  lack	  towards	  the	  "external"	  world.46	  	  	  Atomism	  as	  an	  ontological	  position	  is	  of	  the	  same	  ilk	  with	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  given	  that	  Wilfred	  Sellars	  has	  famously	  debunked.	  	  We	  do	  better	  to	  follow	  Hilary	  Putnam's	  "Realism	  with	  a	  Human	  Face"	  and	  the	  pragmatic	  insistence	  on	  overturning	  the	  asymmetrical	  faith	  many	  unrepentant	  persons	  have	  in	  representationalism	  as	  a	  sedimented	  Cartesian	  habit	  of	  mind	  in	  epistemology	  and	  ethical-­‐political	  matters.	  	  Barad	  reminds	  us	  that	  it	  is	  going	  to	  take	  a	  "healthy	  skepticism	  toward	  Cartesian	  doubt	  to	  be	  able	  to	  begin	  to	  see	  an	  alternative."	  	   It	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  overcome	  these	  deeply	  entrenched	  habits	  of	  the	  mind	  in	  trying	  to	  think	  outside	  of	  a	  representationalist,	  atomistic,	  foundationalist	  framework.	  	  We	  always	  risk	  being	  surreptitiously	  corrupted	  by	  the	  very	  schemas	  we	  are	  seeking	  liberation	  from	  by	  replicating	  a	  new	  "God	  in	  the	  gaps"	  to	  replace	  the	  old	  monotheism.	  	  Barad	  quotes	  Rosa	  Bradiotti	  to	  highlight	  the	  non-­‐foundational	  urge	  in	  thinking	  location	  without	  atomistic	  representation:	  To	  be	  in	  process	  or	  transition	  does	  not	  place	  the	  thinking	  subject	  outside	  history	  or	  time	  […].	  A	  location	  is	  an	  embedded	  and	  embodied	  memory:	  it	  is	  a	  set	  of	  counter-­‐memories,	  which	  are	  activated	  by	  the	  resisting	  thinker	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  the	  dominant	  representations	  of	  subjectivity.	  A	  location	  is	  a	  materialist	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  site	  of	  co-­‐production	  of	  the	  subject,	  and	  thus	  anything	  but	  an	  instance	  of	  relativism.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Ibid.,	  Barad	  is	  quoting	  from	  Joseph	  Rouse	  (1997,	  p.209).	  47	  Ibid,	  (Bradiotti	  2006,	  199).	  	  This	  insight	  is	  similar	  to	  Deleuze's	  take	  on	  the	  naive	  realism	  of	  ordinary	  language	  philosophy:	  "As	  long	  as	  we	  stick	  to	  things	  and	  words	  we	  can	  believe	  that	  we	  are	  speaking	  of	  what	  we	  see,	  that	  we	  see	  what	  we	  are	  speaking	  of,	  and	  that	  the	  two	  are	  linked."	  (Deleuze	  1988,	  65).	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  Barad	  prefers	  to	  speak	  of	  agency	  (without	  individual	  agents)	  instead	  of	  subjectivity	  (perhaps	  losing	  some	  of	  the	  Foucaultian	  post-­‐structuralist	  precision	  in	  understanding	  biopolitical	  strategies	  of	  subject	  formation).	  	  But	  with	  Bradiotti	  she	  wishes	  to	  think	  of	  a	  "host	  of	  material-­‐discursive	  forces"—social,	  cultural,	  psychic,	  economic,	  natural,	  physical,	  biological,	  geopolitical,	  geological,	  et	  cetera—that	  are	  always	  operating	  to	  shape	  our	  lived	  experience.	  	  Agential	  realism	  is	  indeed	  realist	  because	  it	  ceases	  to	  deploy	  the	  comforting	  bedtime	  stories	  of	  immaterial	  subjectivity	  or	  foundational	  atomism	  and	  instead	  focuses	  on	  the	  host	  of	  material-­‐discursive	  forces	  always	  already	  at	  play	  in	  shaping	  our	  experience	  in	  the	  world.	  	  For	  Barad	  agential	  realism	  is	  an	  account	  of	  "technoscientific	  and	  other	  practices	  that	  takes	  feminist,	  antiracist,	  poststructuralist,	  queer,	  Marxist,	  science	  studies,	  and	  scientific	  insights	  seriously."	  	   With	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  "metaphysics	  of	  relata"	  of	  "words"	  and	  "things"	  coming	  into	  contact	  in	  some	  representationalist	  bedtime	  story,	  Barad	  insists	  that	  we	  rely	  instead	  upon	  a	  clear-­‐eyed	  agential	  realist	  account	  so	  that	  "it	  is	  once	  again	  possible	  to	  acknowledge	  nature,	  the	  body,	  and	  materiality	  in	  the	  fullness	  of	  their	  becoming	  without	  resorting	  to	  the	  optics	  of	  transparency	  or	  opacity,	  the	  geometrics	  of	  absolute	  exteriority	  or	  interiority,	  and	  the	  theoretization	  of	  the	  human	  as	  either	  pure	  cause	  or	  pure	  effect	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  remaining	  resolutely	  accountable	  for	  the	  role	  'we'	  play	  in	  the	  intertwined	  practices	  of	  knowing	  and	  becoming."	  	  Barad's	  agential	  realism	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  "experimental	  metaphysics"	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Emerson,	  James,	  Dewey,	  Whitehead,	  et.	  al	  that	  is	  more	  interested	  to	  see	  what	  kind	  of	  lives	  we	  can	  live	  by	  accepting	  a	  novel	  metaphysical	  conception	  of	  matter	  and	  spirit;	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rather	  than	  being	  preoccupied	  with	  getting	  it	  right	  (a	  totalizing	  system	  to	  explain	  everything)	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  getting	  on	  with	  it.	  	   The	  quantum	  dimension	  of	  Barad's	  theory	  of	  agential	  realism	  is	  developed	  in	  dialogue	  with	  Albert	  Einstein	  and	  Niels	  Bohr	  on	  "spooky	  action	  at	  a	  distance"	  and	  quantum	  entanglement	  more	  generally.	  	  Barad	  develops	  her	  theory	  of	  "agential	  intra-­‐action"	  by	  explicating	  Bohr's	  take	  on	  "position"	  and	  "momentum"	  (e.g.	  of	  light	  as	  'particle	  and	  'wave'	  function	  of	  assemblage	  of	  experimentation	  not	  representation).	  	  Apparently	  for	  Bohr	  we	  must	  accept	  a	  both/and	  dialectic	  of	  pure	  becoming	  to	  even	  hope	  to	  understand	  quantum	  entanglement.	  	  Another	  glaring	  paradox	  for	  traditional	  representationalist	  metaphysics	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  "relations	  without	  preexisting	  relata."	  	  But	  it	  is	  "through	  specific	  agential	  intra-­‐actions	  that	  the	  boundaries	  and	  properties	  of	  the	  'components'	  of	  phenomena	  become	  determinate	  and	  that	  particular	  embodied	  concepts	  become	  meaningful"	  so	  on	  such	  a	  quantum	  theory	  of	  agency	  we	  don't	  have	  to	  posit	  relata	  before	  relations	  (a	  welcome	  presupposition	  for	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  indeed).	  	   Drawing	  on	  the	  language	  of	  Bohr's	  quantum	  theory,	  Barad	  urges	  us	  to	  stop	  appealing	  to	  a	  "Cartesian	  cut"	  that	  would	  seek	  to	  representationally	  realize	  a	  Subjective/Objective	  split	  in	  any	  observable	  phenomenon	  and	  instead	  stay	  faithful	  to	  things	  by	  taking	  an	  "agential	  cut"	  maybe	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  refined	  expression	  of	  musical	  sensibility	  than	  an	  ontological	  dissector’s	  knife.	  	  An	  "agential	  cut"	  seeks	  "local	  resolution	  within	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  inherent	  ontological	  indeterminacy"	  and	  "relata	  do	  not	  preexist	  relations;	  rather,	  relata-­‐within-­‐phenomena	  emerge	  through	  specific	  intra-­‐actions."	  Such	  relational	  ontology	  entails	  a	  "reworking	  of	  the	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traditional	  notion	  of	  causality"	  and	  this	  is	  something	  that	  a	  nuanced	  exploration	  of	  early	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  the	  embodied	  moral	  psychology	  of	  persons	  and	  material-­‐discursive	  agency	  can	  contribute	  to	  future	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  discussions	  regarding	  agency	  and	  causality.	  	  A	  most	  fruitful	  area	  is	  how	  to	  understand	  a	  "propensity	  of	  things"	  (shi勢)	  	  and	  "commanding	  situations"	  (ming	  命)	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  causality.	  	  Finding	  quantum	  entanglements	  between	  pre-­‐Qin	  theories	  of	  agency	  and	  causation	  and	  contemporary	  discussions	  in	  feminist	  epistemology	  is	  an	  exciting	  proposition	  to	  be	  sure.48	  	   Barad	  attempts	  to	  think	  through	  the	  "wave-­‐particle	  duality	  paradox"	  as	  resolved	  by	  Bohr	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  "the	  objective	  referent	  is	  not	  some	  abstract,	  independently	  existing	  entity	  but	  rather	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  light	  intra-­‐acting	  with	  the	  apparatus."	  	  	  She	  actual	  rejects	  the	  so-­‐called	  Heisenberg	  "uncertainty"	  principle	  because	  true	  indeterminacy	  is	  different	  from	  anthropocentric	  uncertainty.	  	  Since	  "apparatuses	  are	  dynamic	  (re)configurings	  of	  the	  world,	  specific	  agential	  practices/intra-­‐actions/performances	  through	  which	  specific	  exclusionary	  boundaries	  are	  enacted	  [and	  they	  are	  decidedly	  not]	  "static	  arrangements	  in	  the	  world."	  	  Barad	  highlights	  the	  performative	  and	  vibrant	  possibilities	  of	  matter	  mattering	  using	  the	  language	  of	  apparatuses	  as	  "open-­‐ended	  practices."	  	  And	  since	  "boundaries	  do	  not	  sit	  still"	  any	  purported	  Nature/Culture	  dualism	  is	  untenable	  and	  instead	  a	  bipolar	  natureculture	  dynamism	  is	  populated	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  "agential	  intra-­‐actions	  of	  multiple	  apparatuses	  of	  bodily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  See	  for	  example	  Francois	  Jullien	  On	  the	  Propensity	  of	  Things	  and	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Efficacy	  for	  an	  excellent	  study	  on	  classical	  Chinese	  theories	  of	  non-­‐foundational,	  correlative	  thinking	  about	  causality	  and	  non-­‐coercive	  agency.	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production."	  	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  through	  such	  dynamic	  exclusionary	  and	  open-­‐ended	  inclusionary	  "practices	  that	  the	  differential	  boundaries	  between	  'humans'	  and	  'nonhumans,'	  'culture'	  and	  'nature,'	  the	  'social'	  and	  the	  'scientific'	  are	  constituted"	  or	  enacted.	  	  	  The	  world	  just	  "is	  intra-­‐activity	  in	  its	  differential	  mattering."	  	  	  That	  is,	  for	  Barad,	  it	  is	  through	  various	  ongoing	  intra-­‐actions	  that	  "phenomena	  come	  to	  matter—in	  both	  senses	  of	  the	  word."	  	  Instead	  of	  foundational	  subjects	  or	  sovereign	  sites	  of	  metaphysically	  supernaturalist	  libertarian	  freedom,	  what	  Barad	  brings	  to	  our	  attention	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  as	  discursively	  embodied	  freedom	  as	  a	  host	  of	  material	  configurations.	  	  Instead	  of	  simple	  power	  differentials	  then	  we	  must	  seek	  a	  language	  of	  flow	  and	  dynamism	  to	  capture	  the	  subtle	  nuances	  involved	  in	  experiences	  of	  freedom	  and	  creative	  agency:	  The	  world	  is	  a	  dynamic	  process	  of	  intra-­‐activity	  in	  the	  ongoing	  reconfiguring	  of	  locally	  determinate	  causal	  structures	  with	  determinate	  boundaries,	  properties,	  meanings,	  and	  patterns	  of	  marks	  on	  bodies.	  	  This	  ongoing	  flow	  of	  
agency	  through	  which	  'part'	  of	  the	  world	  makes	  itself	  differentially	  intelligible	  to	  another	  'part'	  of	  the	  world	  and	  through	  which	  local	  causal	  structures,	  boundaries,	  and	  properties	  are	  stabilized	  and	  destabilized	  does	  not	  take	  place	  in	  space	  and	  time	  but	  in	  the	  making	  of	  spacetime	  itself.	  	  The	  world	  is	  and	  
ongoing	  open	  process	  of	  mattering	  through	  which	  "mattering"	  itself	  acquires	  meaning	  and	  form	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  different	  agential	  possibilities.49	  	  The	  primary	  "unit"	  then	  in	  agential	  realism	  is	  not	  "words"	  and	  "things"	  but	  "material-­‐discursive	  practices"	  through	  which	  boundaries	  are	  provisionally	  constituted	  and	  virtually	  enacted.	  	  Such	  dynamic	  intra-­‐action	  is	  agency.	  	  Agency	  is	  not	  an	  attribute	  of	  things	  to	  be	  described	  in	  some	  representationalist	  ontology,	  but	  rather	  is	  itself	  the	  "ongoing	  reconfigurings	  of	  the	  world."	  	  This	  non-­‐foundational	  post-­‐anthropocentric	  vision	  of	  agency	  is	  what	  Barad	  means	  by	  a	  post-­‐humanist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ibid.,	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"performative	  metaphysics"	  wherein	  materiality	  and	  discursivity	  are	  intertwined	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  apparatuses	  of	  agency	  production	  and	  not	  assumed	  to	  be	  some	  ready-­‐made	  feature	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  or	  some	  purely	  cultural	  artifice.	  	   Discursive	  practices	  are	  not	  synonymous	  with	  "language"	  as	  the	  sum	  total	  of	  verbal	  communication	  rather	  they	  are	  expressive	  of	  the	  "(re)configurings	  of	  the	  world	  through	  which	  local	  determinations	  of	  boundaries,	  properties,	  and	  meanings	  are	  differentially	  enacted."	  	  They	  are	  just	  "causal	  intra-­‐actions"	  	  as	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (du	  獨)	  that	  is	  diffused	  uniformly	  throughout	  the	  world	  of	  "commanding	  situations"	  (tianming	  天命).	  	  The	  ability	  to	  be	  creative	  "on	  par	  with	  tian"	  (peitian	  配
天)	  is	  not	  then	  some	  expression	  of	  humanistic	  hubris	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Ruists,	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  the	  vital	  source	  of	  creativity	  that	  pervades	  all	  things	  in	  varying	  degrees	  of	  flowing	  configurations	  of	  agency.	  	  	  For	  Barad	  matter	  is	  vibrant	  because	  it	  thinks,	  feels,	  and	  is	  desiring	  agency:	  Matter,	  like	  meaning,	  is	  not	  an	  individually	  articulated	  or	  static	  entity.	  	  Matter	  is	  not	  little	  bits	  of	  nature,	  or	  a	  blank	  slate,	  surface,	  or	  site	  passively	  awaiting	  signification;	  nor	  is	  it	  an	  uncontested	  ground	  for	  scientific,	  feminist,	  or	  Marxist	  theories.	  	  Matter	  is	  not	  a	  support,	  location,	  referent,	  or	  source	  of	  sustainability	  for	  discourse.	  	  Matter	  is	  not	  immutable	  or	  passive.	  	  It	  does	  not	  require	  the	  mark	  of	  an	  external	  force	  like	  culture	  or	  history	  to	  complete	  it.	  	  Matter	  is	  always	  already	  an	  ongoing	  historicity.50	  	  	  	  Matter	  is	  a	  vital	  configuration	  of	  pure	  becoming	  and	  ultimate	  singularities	  actively	  realizing	  various	  degrees	  of	  agential	  creativity.	  	  On	  an	  agential	  realist	  account,	  matter	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  static	  substance	  or	  underlying	  foundation	  for	  formal	  impressions;	  rather,	  "matter	  is	  substance	  in	  its	  intra-­‐active	  becoming-­‐-­‐not	  a	  thing,	  but	  a	  doing,	  a	  congealing	  of	  agency.	  	  Matter	  is	  a	  stabilizing	  and	  destabilizing	  process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Ibid.	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of	  iterative	  intra-­‐activity."	  	  As	  already	  mentioned	  the	  phrase	  "congealing	  of	  agency"	  is	  particularly	  apt	  for	  thinking	  through	  the	  processes	  of	  qi-­‐concertion	  and	  refinement	  involved	  in	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  as	  embodied	  self-­‐cultivation	  (功夫 gongfu).	  	  	   Since	  for	  Barad,	  "discursive	  practices	  and	  material	  phenomena	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  externality	  to	  one	  another.	  .	  ."	  a	  yinyang	  aspectual	  narrative	  account	  of	  agency	  and	  the	  of	  correlative	  concepts	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  a	  productive	  inter-­‐cultural	  conversation	  in	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  Confucian	  focus-­‐field	  process	  cosmology	  and	  relational	  ontology	  of	  persons.	  	  Because	  "material-­‐discursive	  practices	  are	  specific	  iterative	  enactments—agential	  intra-­‐actions—through	  which	  matter	  is	  differentially	  engaged	  and	  articulated	  (in	  the	  emergence	  of	  boundaries	  and	  meanings)",	  the	  reconfiguring	  of	  material-­‐discursive	  fields	  of	  possibilities	  in	  the	  iterative	  dynamics	  of	  intra-­‐activity	  itself	  is	  agency.	  	  This	  discursive	  quantum	  account	  of	  agency	  is	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  decentered,	  distributed	  notion	  of	  shi勢-­‐causality	  and	  nature	  naturing	  through	  commanding	  situations	  (xingming性命)	  agency	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  perspective.	  	  Matter	  "comes	  to	  matter	  through	  the	  iterative	  intra-­‐activity	  of	  the	  world	  in	  its	  becoming"	  and	  this	  contemporary	  Spinozist	  set	  of	  assumptions	  about	  natura	  naturata	  and	  natura	  
naturans	  is	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  the	  "incipient	  tendencies"	  (weifa	  未發)	  and	  "expressed	  affects"	  (yifa	  已發)	  as	  described	  in	  the	  moral	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  
Zhongyong	  on	  the	  embodied	  ars	  contextualis	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨).	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   Indeed,	  "bodies	  are	  not	  objects	  with	  inherent	  boundaries	  and	  properties;	  they	  are	  material-­‐discursive	  phenomena."	  	  And	  the	  lived	  ti	  體-­‐bodies	  that	  Deborah	  Sommer	  describes	  as	  a	  polysemous	  corpus	  of	  rhizomatic	  becoming	  are	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  rule.	  	  The	  etymology	  of	  體	  indicates	  a	  trans-­‐form-­‐ative	  structure	  of	  ritualizing	  potential.	  	  A	  structure	  that	  is	  stable	  enough	  to	  undergo	  changes	  without	  losing	  its	  fluid	  form,	  but	  also	  adaptable	  enough	  to	  be	  receptive	  of	  new	  ritual	  energies	  and	  creative	  potentialities	  for	  edifying	  ethical	  transformation	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities	  in	  freshly	  realized	  commanding	  situations.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Deweyan	  reconstruction	  in	  philosophy	  is	  just	  tracking	  the	  truth	  of	  experience	  in	  claiming	  that	  democratic	  growth	  is	  the	  only	  ethically	  regulative	  ideal.	  	  	  	   Barad	  claims	  that	  her	  version	  of	  agential	  realism	  is	  post-­‐humanist	  insofar	  as	  it	  jettisons	  any	  Enlightenment	  promises	  of	  total	  liberation	  of	  human	  potential	  in	  utopian	  social	  arrangements.	  	  It	  is	  also	  post-­‐humanist	  in	  that	  it	  decenters	  the	  agential	  cut	  outside	  of	  narrowly	  circumscribed	  anthropocentric	  fields	  of	  discourse:	  On	  an	  agential	  realist	  account,	  agency	  is	  cut	  loose	  from	  its	  traditional	  humanist	  orbit.	  	  Agency	  is	  not	  aligned	  with	  human	  intentionality	  or	  subjectivity.	  	  Nor	  does	  it	  merely	  entail	  resignification	  or	  other	  specific	  kinds	  of	  moves	  within	  a	  social	  geometry	  of	  antihumanism.	  	  Agency	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  intra-­‐acting;	  it	  is	  an	  enactment,	  not	  something	  that	  someone	  or	  something	  has.	  .	  .	  Agency	  is	  not	  an	  attribute	  whatsoever—it	  is	  "doing"/"being"	  in	  its	  intra-­‐activity.	  	  Agency	  is	  the	  enactment	  of	  iterative	  changes	  to	  particular	  practices	  through	  the	  dynamics	  of	  intra-­‐activity.51	  	  	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  agential	  realist	  framework	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  philosophical	  lineage.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  the	  label	  post-­‐humanist	  probably	  won't	  fit	  any	  Confucian	  style	  of	  thinking	  due	  to	  the	  pervasive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.,	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"anthropocosmic"	  (tianrenheyi	  天人合一)	  boundary	  articulations	  that	  resonate	  throughout	  the	  tradition.	  	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  readily	  obvious	  that	  Confucian	  ecological	  humanism	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  pernicious	  anthropocentrism	  of	  the	  dominant	  Western	  (Greco-­‐Christian)	  ontotheological	  tradition.	  	  Pragmatism,	  agential	  realism,	  hermeneutic	  phenomenology	  and	  other	  reformations	  of	  the	  regnant	  foundationalism	  in	  philosophy	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  explored	  as	  we	  strive	  with	  moral	  imagination	  to	  reconstruct	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  agency	  for	  the	  present	  moment.	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Chapter	  Four:	  Comparative	  Philosophy,	  Phenomenology	  and	  Hermeneutics:	  A	  
Methodological	  Interlude	  I.	  Phenomenology	  and	  Hermeneutics	  	   Hermeneutics	  is	  the	  philosophical	  project	  of	  attempting	  to	  understand	  possible	  understandings	  of	  any	  and	  all	  possible	  interpretive	  stances.	  	  It	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  asymptotically	  ideal	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  various	  modes	  of	  understanding	  that	  might	  be	  revealed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  any	  person's	  transaction	  with	  their	  intersubjective	  lifeworld.	  	  Phenomenology,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  its	  broadest	  definitional	  sense	  is	  the	  embodied	  pursuit	  of	  truth	  free	  of	  all	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  abstraction.	  	  Phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics	  both	  deal	  predominantly	  with	  human	  experience	  and	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  from	  our	  uniquely	  embodied	  perspectives.	  	  	  From	  its	  earliest	  inception,	  with	  Edmund	  Husserl's	  rallying	  cry	  to	  "return	  to	  the	  things	  themselves,"	  phenomenology	  has	  been	  a	  highly	  contested	  philosophical	  discipline.	  	  Some	  have	  wanted	  to	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  rigorous	  science	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  realizing	  clear	  and	  distinct	  conceptual	  analysis,	  while	  others	  have	  more	  professed	  an	  imperfect,	  non-­‐ideal	  practice	  of	  an	  existentially	  embodied	  discipline	  of	  trying	  to	  make	  optimal	  sense	  of	  things	  via	  a	  vital	  poetics	  of	  life.	  	  	   	  Philosophical	  hermeneutics,	  an	  attempted	  marriage	  of	  these	  two	  aforementioned	  philosophical	  traditions,	  from	  its	  conception	  has	  been	  concerned	  with	  making	  sense	  of	  textual	  interpretation	  within	  living	  traditional	  matrices	  of	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embodied	  meaning-­‐making.	  	  In	  a	  1975	  essay	  "Phenomenology	  and	  Hermeneutics"1	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  explains	  and	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  philosophical	  disciplines.	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  be	  introducing	  this	  particular	  essay	  and	  considering	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  emergent	  field	  of	  decolonized	  inter-­‐cultural	  comparative	  philosophy.	  	   For	  our	  present	  purposes	  of	  reconstructing	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  interpretation	  regarding	  ethical	  resoluteness	  and	  creative	  agency	  of	  persons	  in	  a	  thoroughly	  relational	  cosmological	  context,	  it	  will	  prove	  beneficial	  for	  us	  to	  appropriate	  some	  of	  Ricoeur's	  findings	  as	  we	  attempt	  to	  think	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  becoming	  a	  relationally	  flourishing	  human	  person	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  narratively	  embodied	  experience.	  	  It	  should	  become	  readily	  evident	  that	  the	  subject	  matter	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  in	  our	  reconstitution	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  and	  creative	  agency	  is	  a	  fluid,	  process	  notion	  of	  relational	  "selving."	  	  As	  such,	  we	  can	  only	  approach	  understanding	  these	  traditional	  textual	  materials	  if	  we	  open	  ourselves	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  transformed	  in	  the	  horizon	  of	  relational,	  inter-­‐cultural	  interpretation	  made	  evident	  by	  the	  unfolding	  of	  an	  emergent	  discursive-­‐matter	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  	  慎獨)	  —that	  is,	  over	  one's	  transactional	  ritual	  potential—and	  the	  "creative	  integration"	  (cheng	  誠)	  of	  one's	  resolute	  ethical	  agency.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  'Phenomenology	  and	  Hermeneutics,'	  from	  Nous	  9	  (1975):	  85-­‐102.	  	  Reprinted	  in	  
Ricoeur:	  From	  Text	  to	  Action	  (Continuum	  2008),	  p.23-­‐50.	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II.	  Departing	  from	  Foundationalist	  Phenomenology	  with	  the	  Myth	  of	  the	  Given	  	   Ricoeur	  begins	  his	  essay	  with	  a	  disavowal	  of	  doing	  any	  comparative	  history	  of	  modern	  philosophy.	  	  Rather	  he	  claims	  that	  he	  has	  set	  out	  to	  pursue	  the	  question	  of	  the	  "destiny"	  of	  philosophy	  as	  phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics.	  	  His	  essay	  seeks	  to	  be	  a	  "debate	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  philosophy	  can	  still	  be	  pursued"2	  in	  the	  present	  milieu.	  	  He	  posits	  the	  following	  two	  theses	  for	  deeper	  consideration:	  (1)	  What	  hermeneutics	  has	  ruined	  is	  not	  phenomenology	  but	  one	  of	  its	  interpretations,	  namely,	  its	  idealistic	  interpretation	  by	  Husserl	  himself	  (i.e.	  Husserlian	  idealism).	  (2)	  Beyond	  a	  simple	  opposition	  there	  exists,	  between	  phenomenology	  and	  hermeneutics,	  a	  mutual	  belonging—phenomenology	  remains	  the	  
unsurpassable	  presupposition	  of	  hermeneutics	  and	  phenomenology	  cannot	  constitute	  itself	  without	  a	  hermeneutical	  presupposition.	  	  	   The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  essay	  seeks	  to	  show	  that	  the	  foundational	  presuppositions	  of	  Husserlian	  idealism	  presuppose	  a	  kind	  of	  hermeneutical	  consciousness	  and	  therefore	  Ricoeur	  is	  able	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  foundational	  egology	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  "belonging"	  to	  tradition	  understood	  as	  a	  dynamic	  horizon	  of	  meaningful	  possibilities.	  	   It	  is	  evident	  that	  Husserl's	  desire	  to	  set	  phenomenology	  on	  the	  firm	  ground	  of	  a	  rigorous	  science	  couldn't	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  using	  the	  natural	  sciences	  to	  orient	  or	  begin	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  origins	  of	  conscious	  experience.	  	  Thus	  we	  have	  the	  first	  "schematic	  thesis"	  of	  Husserlian	  idealism	  that	  (a)	  "the	  ideal	  of	  scientificity	  proclaimed	  by	  phenomenology	  is	  not	  in	  continuity	  with	  the	  sciences,	  their	  axioms	  and	  their	  foundational	  enterprise:	  the	  'ultimate	  justification'	  that	  constitutes	  phenomenology	  is	  of	  a	  different	  order."	  (24)	  	  It	  is	  a	  question	  of	  origins	  as	  a	  Selbst-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Ibid.	  p.23.	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Begrundung	  [self-­‐grounding]	  that	  interests	  the	  Husserl	  of	  the	  Logical	  Investigations.	  	  Secondly,	  we	  have	  the	  thesis	  (b)	  that	  "the	  foundation	  in	  principle	  is	  of	  the	  order	  of	  intuition;	  to	  found	  is	  to	  see.	  .	  .the	  priority.	  .	  .of	  intentional	  fulfillment	  as	  opposed	  to	  any	  philosophy	  of	  deduction	  or	  construction."	  	  Ricoeur	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  "field	  of	  experience"	  in	  this	  intuitional	  capacity	  of	  the	  self-­‐grounding	  subject	  of	  idealist	  phenomenology:	  The	  key	  concept	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  that	  of	  an	  Erfahrungsfeld	  [field	  of	  experience].	  	  The	  strangeness	  of	  phenomenology	  lies	  entirely	  therein:	  from	  the	  outset,	  the	  principle	  is	  a	  'field'	  and	  the	  first	  truth	  an	  'experience.'	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  all	  'speculative	  constructions,'	  every	  question	  of	  principle	  is	  resolved	  through	  vision.	  	  I	  just	  spoke	  of	  strangeness:	  for	  is	  it	  not	  astonishing	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  (and	  thanks	  to)	  the	  critique	  of	  empiricism,	  experience	  in	  the	  strict	  empirical	  sense	  is	  surpassed	  only	  in	  an	  'experience'?	  	  This	  synonymy	  of	  
Erfahrung	  signifies	  that	  phenomenology	  is	  not	  situated	  elsewhere,	  in	  another	  world,	  but	  rather	  is	  concerned	  with	  natural	  experience	  itself,	  insofar	  as	  the	  latter	  is	  unaware	  of	  its	  meaning.	  	  Consequently,	  however	  much	  the	  emphasis	  may	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  a	  priori	  character,	  on	  the	  reduction	  to	  the	  eidos,	  on	  the	  role	  of	  imaginative	  variations,	  and	  even	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  'possibility,'	  it	  is	  still	  and	  always	  the	  character	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  underlined	  (one	  has	  only	  to	  consider	  the	  expression	  'intuitive	  possibilities'.3	  	  Thus	  we	  can	  see	  that	  although	  Husserl	  was	  rejecting	  the	  dogmatism	  of	  scientism	  and	  any	  and	  all	  attempts	  to	  ground	  the	  "field	  of	  experience"	  upon	  epistemic	  foundations	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  the	  bracketing	  of	  the	  "natural	  attitude"	  requires	  that	  one	  return	  to	  an	  originary	  experience	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  as	  only	  an	  active	  and	  imaginative	  participant	  can	  in	  beginning	  with	  our	  natural	  intuitions	  of	  being	  an	  embodied,	  familially-­‐embedded,	  and	  socially-­‐constituted	  person.	  	   The	  third	  schematic	  thesis	  of	  Husserlian	  idealism	  is	  that	  (c)	  "the	  place	  of	  plenary	  intuition	  is	  subjectivity.	  	  All	  transcendence	  is	  doubtful;	  immanence	  alone	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.,	  p.25.	  Husserl	  quote	  from	  Hua	  5:142.	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indubitable."4	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  problematic	  claims	  of	  Husserlian	  idealism	  insofar	  as	  it	  presupposes	  a	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"	  or	  a	  purely	  immanent/immediate	  form	  of	  consciousness.	  	  And	  it	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  thesis	  (d)	  that	  "subjectivity	  thus	  promoted	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  the	  transcendental	  is	  not	  empirical	  consciousness,	  [but]	  the	  object	  of	  psychology."5	  	  Instead,	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  reduction	  or	  "the	  philosophical	  conversion"	  that	  separates	  a	  "noetics	  or	  no-­‐ology"	  from	  an	  empirically	  grounded	  psychology.	  	  Finally,	  we	  have	  the	  idea	  that	  (e)	  "awareness	  that	  sustains	  the	  work	  of	  reflection	  develops	  its	  own	  ethical	  implications:	  reflection	  is	  thus	  the	  immediately	  self-­‐responsible	  act."6	  	  For	  Husserl,	  the	  "supremely	  autonomous"	  or	  "foundational"	  act	  of	  self-­‐positing	  is	  "at	  the	  same	  time—in	  the	  same	  breath,	  so	  to	  speak—epistemological	  and	  ethical.	  .	  .The	  self	  assertive	  character	  of	  the	  foundation	  constitutes	  the	  philosophical	  subject	  as	  responsible	  subject.	  	  This	  is	  the	  philosophizing	  subject	  as	  such."7	  	  	   As	  we	  move	  on	  to	  see	  how	  Ricoeur	  deconstructs	  idealist	  phenomenology	  with	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  historicist	  hermeneutics,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  useful	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  dynamic	  of	  exercising	  constant	  vigilance	  over	  one's	  unique	  plurisingularity	  and	  transactional	  ritual	  potential	  as	  itself	  an	  embodiment	  of	  creative	  ethical	  agency	  (shendu	  慎獨).	  	  Such	  "resolute	  becoming"	  has	  been	  likened	  to	  a	  Husserlian	  epoche	  by	  some	  contemporary	  sinologists.8	  	  It	  is	  important	  that	  we	  understand	  such	  claims	  in	  light	  of	  the	  hermeneutical	  critique	  of	  Husserlian	  idealism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.,	  p.25.	  5	  Ibid.,	  p.26.	  6	  Ibid.,	  p.27.	  7	  Ibid.	  8	  See	  Liang	  Tao	  (2008).	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rather	  than	  in	  an	  ontologically	  foundationalist	  mode	  of	  approaching	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  project	  of	  ethical	  self-­‐cultivation.	  	   In	  the	  tradition	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  analytic	  philosophy	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"	  has	  also	  received	  much	  attention.	  	  Wilfred	  Sellars	  is	  well	  known	  for	  his	  attack	  on	  the	  “myth	  of	  the	  given”	  and	  his	  development	  of	  a	  coherentist	  epistemology	  and	  functional	  role/inferentialist	  semantics.	  	  A	  Sellarsian	  position	  deconstructs	  any	  possibility	  of	  an	  epistemological	  piece	  of	  experience	  functioning	  as	  a	  certainty	  or	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  "given."	  	  Here	  is	  a	  formalization	  of	  Sellars’	  argument	  that	  the	  given	  is	  a	  myth,	  from	  “Empiricism	  and	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Mind”:	  1.	  	   A	  cognitive	  state	  is	  epistemically	  independent	  if	  it	  possesses	  its	  epistemic	  status	  independently	  of	  its	  being	  inferred	  or	  inferable	  from	  some	  other	  cognitive	  state.	  	   [Definition	  of	  epistemic	  independence]	  	  2.	  	   A	  cognitive	  state	  is	  epistemically	  efficacious	  —	  is	  capable	  of	  epistemically	  supporting	  other	  cognitive	  states	  —	  if	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  those	  other	  states	  can	  be	  validly	  inferred	  (formally	  or	  materially)	  from	  its	  epistemic	  status.	  	   [Definition	  of	  epistemic	  efficacy]	  3.	  	   The	  doctrine	  of	  the	  given	  is	  that	  any	  empirical	  knowledge	  that	  p	  requires	  some	  (or	  is	  itself)	  basic,	  that	  is,	  epistemically	  independent,	  knowledge	  (that	  g,	  h,	  i,	  …)	  which	  is	  epistemically	  efficacious	  with	  respect	  to	  p.	  	   [Definition	  of	  doctrine	  of	  the	  given]	  4.	  	   Inferential	  relations	  are	  always	  between	  items	  with	  propositional	  form.	  	   [By	  the	  nature	  of	  inference]	  5.	  	   Therefore,	  non-­‐propositional	  items	  (such	  as	  sense	  data)	  are	  epistemically	  inefficacious	  and	  cannot	  serve	  as	  what	  is	  given.	  	   [From	  2	  and	  4]	  6.	  	   No	  inferentially	  acquired,	  propositionally	  structured	  mental	  state	  is	  epistemically	  independent.	  	   [From	  1]	  7.	  	   Examination	  of	  multiple	  candidates	  for	  non-­‐inferentially	  acquired,	  propositionally	  structured	  cognitive	  states	  indicates	  that	  their	  epistemic	  status	  presupposes	  the	  possession	  by	  the	  knowing	  subject	  of	  other	  empirical	  knowledge,	  both	  of	  particulars	  and	  of	  general	  empirical	  truths.	  	   [From	  Sellars’	  analyses	  of	  statements	  about	  sense-­‐data	  and	  appearances	  in	  Parts	  1-­‐IV	  of	  EPM	  and	  his	  analysis	  of	  epistemic	  authority	  in	  Part	  VIII]	  8.	  	   Presupposition	  is	  an	  epistemic	  and	  therefore	  an	  inferential	  relation.	  	   [Assumed	  (See	  PRE)]	  9.	  	   Non-­‐inferentially	  acquired	  empirical	  knowledge	  that	  presupposes	  the	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possession	  by	  the	  knowing	  subject	  of	  other	  empirical	  knowledge	  is	  not	  epistemically	  independent.	  	   [From	  1,	  7,	  and	  8]	  10.	  	  Any	  empirical,	  propositional	  cognition	  is	  acquired	  either	  inferentially	  or	  non-­‐inferentially.	  	   [Excluded	  middle]	  11.	  	  Therefore,	  propositionally	  structured	  cognitions,	  whether	  inferentially	  or	  non-­‐inferentially	  acquired,	  are	  never	  epistemically	  independent	  and	  cannot	  serve	  as	  the	  given.	  	  	   [6,	  9,	  10,	  constructive	  dilemma]	  12.	  	  Every	  cognition	  is	  either	  propositionally	  structured	  or	  not.	  	   [Excluded	  middle]	  13.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  no	  item	  of	  empirical	  knowledge	  can	  serve	  the	  function	  of	  a	  given.	  	   [5,11,	  12,	  constructive	  dilemma]9	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  this	  argument	  concludes	  with	  something	  that	  it	  is	  "reasonable"	  to	  accept	  all	  things	  considered,	  but	  doesn't	  itself	  presuppose	  an	  a	  priori	  conception	  of	  reason	  as	  something	  given	  to	  natural	  experience.	  	  	  We	  can	  now	  return	  to	  Richard	  Rorty's	  use	  of	  Sellars'	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"10	  in	  his	  post-­‐linguistic	  turn	  brand	  of	  neopragmatism	  that	  in	  no	  way	  relies	  upon	  a	  pre-­‐verbal,	  exta-­‐textual,	  realm	  of	  (pre)conscious	  naturalized	  experience.	  	  For,	  within	  a	  Rortyan	  version	  of	  neopragmatism	  it	  is	  axiomatic	  that	  all	  experience	  is	  linguistically	  mediated	  and	  culturally	  coded.	  	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  post-­‐linguistic	  turn	  insight	  is	  perfectly	  consonant	  with	  William	  James'	  postulate,	  dictum,	  and	  generalized	  conclusion	  of	  radical	  empiricism:	  	  The	  postulate	  is	  that	  the	  only	  things	  that	  shall	  be	  debatable	  among	  philosophers	  shall	  be	  things	  definable	  in	  terms	  drawn	  from	  experience.	  [Things	  of	  an	  unexperiencable	  nature	  may	  exist	  ad	  libitum,	  but	  they	  form	  no	  part	  of	  the	  material	  for	  philosophic	  debate.]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	  formalized	  argument	  of	  the	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"	  is	  extracted	  from	  William	  DeVries	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  entry:	  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/	  (accessed	  1/2/2018).	  10	  See	  Rorty's	  "World	  Well	  Lost"	  in	  Consequences	  of	  Pragmatism.	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   The	  statement	  of	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  relations	  between	  things,	  conjunctive	  as	  well	  as	  disjunctive,	  are	  just	  as	  much	  matters	  of	  direct	  particular	  experience,	  neither	  more	  so	  nor	  less	  so,	  than	  the	  things	  themselves.	  	   The	  generalized	  conclusion	  is	  that	  therefore	  the	  parts	  of	  experience	  hold	  together	  from	  next	  to	  next	  by	  relations	  that	  are	  themselves	  part	  of	  experience.	  	  The	  directly	  apprehended	  universe	  needs,	  in	  short,	  no	  extraneous	  trans-­‐empirical	  connective	  support,	  but	  possesses	  in	  its	  own	  right	  a	  concatenated	  or	  continuous	  structure.11	  	  Jamesian	  interest	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  natural	  experience	  leaves	  Rorty	  rather	  nonplussed	  insofar	  as	  he	  displayed	  little	  or	  no	  patience	  for	  metaphysical	  speculations	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  any	  supposedly	  overarching	  connective	  tissue	  from	  which	  experience	  grew	  in	  both	  its	  linguistic	  and	  extra-­‐linguistic	  capacities	  and	  significance.	  Rorty	  selectively	  emphasizes	  the	  "deconstructive"	  or	  "therapeutic"	  aspects	  of	  Dewey's	  Experience	  and	  Nature	  in	  claiming	  that,	  "it	  is	  easier	  to	  think	  of	  the	  book	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  nobody	  needs	  a	  metaphysics,	  rather	  than	  as	  itself	  a	  metaphysical	  system."	  	   For	  Rorty,	  Dewey's	  naturalistically	  "metaphysical"	  magnum	  opus	  is	  not	  an	  "empirical	  metaphysics"	  but	  a	  "historico-­‐sociological	  study	  of	  the	  cultural	  phenomenon	  called	  'metaphysics.'"	  Rorty	  suggests	  that	  we	  cannot	  serve	  both	  Locke	  and	  Hegel—or	  an	  diachronic,	  atomized	  empiricism	  and	  a	  synchronic	  historicist	  ontology.	  However,	  Rorty	  recognizes	  and	  appreciates	  Dewey's	  persistent	  desire	  to	  wish	  to	  write	  a	  "naturalistic	  (cultural)	  metaphysics"—despite	  Santayana's	  and	  others	  contention	  that	  this	  was	  indicative	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  oxymoronic	  paradox:	  This	  is	  the	  extend	  and	  method	  of	  my	  "metaphysics":—the	  large	  and	  constant	  features	  of	  human	  sufferings,	  enjoyments,	  trials,	  failures	  and	  successes	  together	  with	  the	  institutions	  of	  art,	  science,	  technology,	  politics,	  and	  religion	  which	  mark	  them,	  communicate	  genuine	  features	  of	  the	  world	  within	  which	  man	  lives.	  	  The	  method	  differs	  no	  whit	  from	  that	  of	  any	  investigator	  who,	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  The	  Writings	  of	  William	  James,	  p.314.	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making	  certain	  observations	  and	  experiments,	  and	  by	  utilizing	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  ideas	  available	  for	  calculation	  and	  interpretation,	  concludes	  that	  he	  really	  succeeds	  in	  finding	  out	  something	  about	  some	  limited	  aspect	  of	  nature.	  	  If	  there	  is	  any	  novelty	  in	  Experience	  and	  Nature,	  it	  is	  not,	  I	  should	  say,	  this	  "metaphysics"	  which	  is	  that	  of	  the	  common	  man,	  but	  lies	  in	  the	  use	  made	  of	  the	  method	  to	  understand	  a	  group	  of	  special	  problems	  which	  have	  troubled	  philosophy.12	  	  	  Sidney	  Hook,	  a	  student	  of	  Dewey's	  and	  writing	  during	  his	  communist	  conversion	  stage,	  comments	  on	  the	  appropriate	  place	  of	  philosophy	  in	  criticizing	  cultural	  presuppositions	  and	  deeply	  held	  ethical-­‐political	  value	  schemas:	  Traditional	  metaphysics	  has	  always	  been	  a	  violent	  and	  logically	  impossible	  attempt	  to	  impose	  some	  parochial	  scheme	  of	  values	  upon	  the	  cosmos	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  or	  undermine	  a	  set	  of	  existing	  social	  institutions	  by	  a	  pretended	  deduction	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  Reality.	  .	  .	  .	  But	  once	  crack	  the	  shell	  of	  any	  metaphysical	  doctrine,	  what	  appears	  is	  not	  verifiable	  knowledge	  but	  a	  directing	  bias	  .	  .	  .	  the	  preeminent	  subject	  matter	  of	  philosophy	  has	  been	  the	  relation	  between	  things	  and	  values.13	  	  What	  we	  might	  with	  to	  call	  "Dewey's	  Dilemma"	  regarding	  metaphysical	  speculation	  is	  characterized	  by	  Rorty	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  	  EITHER	  Dewey's	  metaphysics	  differs	  from	  'traditional	  metaphysics'	  in	  not	  having	  a	  directing	  bias	  concerning	  social	  values	  because	  Dewey	  has	  found	  an	  'empirical'	  way	  of	  doing	  metaphysics	  which	  abstracts	  from	  any	  such	  biases	  and	  values,	  OR	  else	  when	  Dewey	  falls	  into	  his	  vein	  of	  talking	  of	  the	  'generic	  traits	  manifested	  by	  existences	  of	  all	  kinds'	  he	  is	  in	  slightly	  bad	  faith.14	  	  For	  philosophy	  is	  either	  viewed	  as	  a	  spectatorial	  or	  participatory	  discipline	  of	  life.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  either	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  a	  God's	  eye	  view	  from	  Nowhere	  (sub	  species	  
aeternitas)	  or	  an	  embodied	  and	  experimental	  precarious	  essay	  in	  working	  out	  democratically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interpretive	  communities	  of	  communication	  an	  effective	  "instrument	  of	  social	  change"	  or	  a	  philosophical	  reconstruction.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  John	  Dewey,	  "Half-­‐hearted	  Naturalism"	  (1927).	  13	  See	  Sidney	  Hook,	  John	  Dewey	  (1939).	  14	  See	  Rorty,	  p.74.	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   The	  dissolution	  of	  pseudo-­‐problems	  (the	  problems	  of	  philosophers—e.g.	  the	  discourse	  of	  logical	  empiricism)	  and	  the	  turn	  to	  an	  effective	  cultural	  criticism	  (the	  problems	  of	  everyday	  men	  and	  women)	  is	  strenuously	  argued	  for	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Dewey's	  naturalistic	  metaphysics:	  Intellectual	  prophecy	  is	  dangerous;	  but	  if	  I	  read	  the	  signs	  of	  the	  times	  aright,	  the	  next	  synthetic	  movement	  in	  philosophy	  will	  emerge	  when	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  arts	  has	  become	  the	  object	  of	  reflective	  attention	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  sciences	  have	  been	  made	  the	  objects	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  when	  their	  full	  import	  is	  grasped.15	  	  Rorty	  reads	  Dewey	  as	  attempting	  to	  make	  naturalistically	  "systematic"	  sense	  out	  of	  the	  critical	  turn	  from	  a	  Kantian	  architectonic	  of	  a	  priori	  Reason	  to	  Hegelian	  historicism.	  	  Rorty	  sees	  Dewey	  as	  just	  another	  thinker	  in	  a	  naturalistic-­‐contextualistic	  line	  including	  the	  likes	  of	  Nietzsche,	  Dilthey,	  Cassirer,	  Habermas,	  Foucault,	  Derrida,	  Cavell,	  Danto	  and	  anyone	  who	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  "cultural	  matrix"	  out	  of	  which	  the	  social	  sciences	  have	  emerged.	  	  For	  Rorty,	  "Dewey	  is	  just	  the	  philosopher	  one	  might	  want	  to	  reread	  if	  one	  were	  turning	  from	  Kant	  to	  Hegel,	  from	  a	  'metaphysics	  of	  experience'	  to	  a	  study	  of	  cultural	  development."16	  	   Rorty	  thinks	  that	  he	  pinpoints	  the	  tension	  in	  Dewey's	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  as	  being	  an	  attempt	  to	  impossibly	  synthesize	  the	  empiricist	  and	  historicist	  urges	  in	  speculative,	  critical	  thinking	  about	  cultural	  matrices	  of	  conceptual	  and	  evaluative	  frameworks.	  	  Rorty	  actually	  endorses	  Dewey's	  failed	  attempt	  at	  metaphysical	  synopsis	  in	  a	  qualified	  sense:	  Sympathetic	  expositors	  of	  Dewey-­‐as-­‐metaphysician—such	  as	  Hofstadter,	  who	  describes	  "the	  aim	  of	  metaphysics,	  as	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  existence"	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  Dewey,	  (1930).	  16	  Rorty,	  p.76.	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the	  "discovery	  of	  the	  basic	  types	  of	  involvements	  and	  their	  relationships"—	  cannot,	  I	  think,	  explain	  why	  we	  need	  a	  discipline	  at	  that	  level	  of	  generality,	  nor	  how	  the	  results	  of	  such	  "discoveries"	  can	  be	  anything	  but	  trivial.	  	  Would	  anyone—including	  Dewey	  himself—really	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  discipline	  that	  could	  somehow	  do	  for	  "the	  basic	  types	  of	  involvement,"	  something	  left	  undone	  by	  novelists,	  sociologists,	  biologists,	  poets,	  and	  historians?	  	  All	  one	  might	  want	  a	  philosopher	  to	  do	  is	  to	  synthesize	  the	  novels,	  poems,	  histories,	  and	  sociologies	  of	  the	  day	  into	  some	  larger	  unity.	  	  But	  such	  syntheses	  are,	  in	  fact,	  offered	  us	  on	  all	  sides,	  in	  every	  discipline.17	  	  Rorty	  sees	  "the	  philosopher"	  qua	  'intellectual"	  as	  inevitably	  engaged	  in	  projects	  of	  synthesis,	  but	  wants	  to	  deflate	  any	  pretensions	  to	  metaphysical	  transcendence	  or	  overarching	  systemic	  completion	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cultural	  criticism.	  	  But	  Dewey	  himself	  shared	  this	  suspicion	  regarding	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  transcendental	  pretense.	  	  Dewey	  found	  the	  root	  problem	  to	  lie	  in	  a	  faulty	  notion	  of	  atomized,	  foundationalist,	  ahistoricist	  psychology	  of	  persons.	  	  When	  psychology	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  totalizing	  discipline	  capable	  of	  encompassing	  all	  aspects	  of	  experience,	  the	  empirical	  and	  social	  "psychology	  as	  method"	  perspective	  is	  unfortunately	  left	  out	  of	  the	  cultural	  conversation.	  	  Dewey	  considers	  the	  notion	  of	  "Self-­‐consciousness"	  in	  light	  of	  accepting	  the	  demythologizing	  tasks	  set	  for	  us	  when	  embracing	  the	  epistemological	  myth	  of	  the	  given:	  We	  may	  see	  how	  the	  matter	  stands	  by	  inquiring	  what	  would	  be	  the	  effect	  upon	  philosophy	  if	  self-­‐consciousness	  were	  not	  an	  experienced	  fact,	  i.e.,	  if	  it	  were	  not	  one	  actual	  stage	  in	  that	  realization	  of	  the	  universe	  by	  an	  individual	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  constituting	  the	  sphere	  of	  psychology.	  	  The	  result	  would	  be	  again,	  precisely,	  that	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  philosophy,	  under	  any	  theory	  of	  its	  nature	  whatever,	  is	  possible.	  	  Philosophy,	  it	  cannot	  be	  too	  often	  repeated,	  consists	  simply	  in	  viewing	  things	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis	  or	  in	  ordine	  ad	  
universum.	  .	  .	  .	  To	  deny,	  therefore,	  that	  self-­‐consciousness	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  psychological	  experience	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  philosophy.18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Rorty,	  ibid.	  18	  See	  Dewey,	  Early	  Works	  1,	  p.52.	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Rorty	  reads	  Dewey's	  later	  attempts	  to	  do	  justice	  "both	  to	  his	  earlier	  belief	  that	  the	  Kant-­‐Hegel-­‐Green	  critique	  of	  empiricism	  was	  the	  key	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  man,	  and	  to	  his	  growing	  distrust	  of	  philosophy	  as	  a	  view	  of	  the	  universe	  sub	  specie	  
aeternitatis"	  as	  a	  sincere	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  culture	  along	  more	  democratic	  and	  non-­‐coercive	  (i.e.	  anti-­‐fascist)	  lines.	  	  Dewey's	  own	  lament	  that	  he	  should've	  retitled	  
Experience	  and	  Nature	  as	  Culture	  and	  Nature	  would	  seem	  to	  lend	  credence	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  concept	  "experience"	  has	  outworn	  its	  Lockean	  and	  Hegelian	  welcome	  in	  a	  post-­‐metaphysical	  culture	  of	  interpretation.	  	  Rorty	  thinks	  it	  is	  silly	  to	  keep	  seeking	  a	  trans-­‐cultural	  ground	  for	  a	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  of	  experience	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  irreducibly	  cultural	  dimensions	  of	  specific	  linguistic	  discursive	  formations:	  This	  viewpoint	  would	  not	  be	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis,	  since	  it	  would	  emphasize	  precisely	  the	  temporality	  and	  contingency	  which	  Augustine	  and	  Spinoza	  used	  the	  notion	  of	  'eternity'	  to	  exclude.	  	  But	  it	  would	  resemble	  traditional	  metaphysics	  in	  providing	  a	  permanent	  neutral	  matrix	  for	  future	  inquiry.	  	  Such	  a	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  would	  say,	  'Here	  is	  what	  experience	  is	  really	  like,	  before	  dualistic	  analysis	  has	  done	  its	  fell	  work.19	  	  Rorty,	  like	  Santayana	  before	  him,	  thinks	  that	  'Naturalistic	  metaphysics'	  is	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms:	  "One	  can	  put	  this	  point	  best,	  perhaps,	  by	  saying	  that	  no	  man	  can	  serve	  both	  Locke	  and	  Hegel."	  The	  longstanding	  debate	  between	  Empirical	  vs.	  Historical	  methods	  in	  philosophy	  can	  only	  be	  set	  aside	  if	  we	  give	  up	  seeking	  ahistorical,	  foundationalist	  grounds	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  experience.	  	   But	  if	  we	  consider	  briefly	  how	  Dewey	  "(re)solved"	  the	  Mind-­‐Body	  question	  within	  his	  comprehensive	  naturalistic	  metaphysical	  vision	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  think	  twice	  about	  Rorty's	  overly	  sanguine	  view	  of	  a	  post-­‐metaphysical	  cultural	  matrix.	  	  It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Rorty,	  ibid.	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would	  seem	  that	  a	  naturalist	  vs.	  supernaturalist	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  continues	  to	  rear	  its	  ugly	  head	  in	  current	  ethico-­‐political	  "culture	  wars."	  	  	  	   Dewey's	  transactional	  account	  of	  mind	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  deep	  commitment	  to	  creative	  democracy	  as	  a	  regulative	  ideal	  of	  all	  interpretive	  communities	  in	  naturalistic	  experience:	  Feelings	  make	  sense;	  as	  immediate	  meanings	  of	  events	  or	  objects,	  they	  are	  sensations,	  or	  more	  properly,	  sensa.	  	  Without	  language,	  the	  qualities	  of	  organic	  action	  that	  are	  feelings	  are	  pains,	  pleasures	  odors,	  noises,	  tones,	  only	  potentially	  and	  proleptically.	  	  With	  language,	  they	  are	  discriminated	  and	  identified.	  	  They	  are	  then	  "objectified";	  they	  are	  immediate	  traits	  of	  things.	  	  This	  "objectification"	  is	  not	  a	  miraculous	  ejection	  from	  the	  organism	  or	  soul	  into	  external	  things,	  nor	  an	  illusory	  attribution	  of	  psychical	  entities	  to	  physical	  things.	  	  The	  qualities	  never	  were	  "in"	  the	  organism;	  they	  always	  were	  qualities	  of	  interactions	  in	  which	  both	  extra-­‐organic	  things	  and	  organisms	  partake.20	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  relational	  emergence	  of	  mind	  takes	  ontological	  and	  axiological	  precedence	  over	  any	  purportedly	  discrete	  naturalistic	  relata	  finds	  a	  nice	  conceptual	  analogy	  with	  the	  following	  illustration.	  	  If	  you	  look	  closely	  you	  will	  agree	  that	  no	  clearly	  and	  distinctly	  demarcated	  triangles	  exist	  in	  the	  picture.	  	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  creative	  perception	  yields	  unmistakable	  triangulation	  patterns	  emergent	  in	  the	  following	  gestalt-­‐shifting	  image:	  	  
	  The	  perceivable	  triangles	  are	  just	  emergent	  aesthetic	  phenomenon	  arising	  when	  natural	  experience	  comes	  into	  sufficiently	  complicated	  interpretive	  dynamics.	  	  	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Dewey,	  ibid.	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this	  dissertation	  I	  am	  going	  to	  be	  arguing	  that	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  theory	  can	  speak	  of	  the	  true	  "self"	  and	  creative	  "agency"	  in	  a	  similar	  non-­‐foundational,	  gestalt-­‐shifting	  manner.	  	  We	  don't	  need	  any	  metaphysical	  illusions	  to	  support	  the	  discourse	  on	  ethical	  agential	  realism	  emergent	  in	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  thinking	  through	  role-­‐bearing	  persons.	  	   Rorty	  recognizes	  Dewey's	  justifiable	  desire	  to	  find	  a	  "unified"	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  ("to	  gain	  knowledge	  is	  to	  solve	  problems")	  but	  he	  rejects	  his	  attempt	  to	  place	  everything	  in	  one	  continuous	  naturalistic	  web	  of	  interpretation:	  "one	  does	  not	  need	  to	  find	  'continuities'	  between	  nervous	  systems	  and	  people,	  or	  between	  'experience'	  and	  'nature'	  to	  address	  problems."	  	  Rorty	  thinks	  that	  Dewey	  "blew	  up	  notions	  like	  'transaction'	  and	  'situation'	  until	  they	  sounded	  as	  mysterious	  as	  'prime	  matter'	  or	  'thing-­‐in-­‐itself.'"	  	  According	  to	  Rorty,	  Dewey	  "made	  it	  sound	  as	  if	  what	  the	  table	  really	  was,	  was	  neither	  an	  ugly	  brown	  thing	  whose	  hard	  edges	  bumped	  people,	  nor	  yet	  a	  swirl	  of	  particles,	  but	  something	  common	  to	  both	  —sheer	  potentiality,	  ready	  to	  be	  transformed	  in	  a	  situation."	  	   While	  I	  appreciate	  Rorty's	  post-­‐metaphysical	  aestheticism	  and	  turn	  towards	  cultural	  politics,	  I	  don't	  think	  this	  is	  a	  fair	  criticism	  of	  Dewey's	  basic	  "metaphysical"	  project.	  	  Dewey's	  notion	  of	  "qualitative	  immediacy"	  and	  logic	  of	  "situations"	  doesn't	  seek	  the	  kind	  of	  metaphysical	  systemization	  as	  closure	  that	  Rorty	  wants	  to	  purge	  from	  his	  earlier	  transcendental	  psychologism.	  	  Rather,	  Dewey's	  thinking	  is	  always	  situated	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  radical	  empiricism	  and	  doesn't	  admit	  anything	  into	  discourse	  that	  can't	  potentially	  be	  experienced,	  nor	  does	  he	  leave	  anything	  out	  that	  can	  be	  similarly	  experienced.	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   Rorty	  thinks	  that	  dissolving	  the	  pseudo-­‐problems	  of	  philosophers	  and	  redescribing	  culture	  so	  as	  to	  better	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  persons	  is	  all	  that	  we	  need	  to	  learn	  from	  Dewey:	  	  	  Dewey,	  I	  suggested	  earlier,	  was	  not	  as	  good	  at	  dissolving	  philosophical	  problems	  as	  the	  followers	  of	  either	  the	  early	  or	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein—but	  he	  had	  a	  larger	  aim	  in	  view.	  	  He	  wanted	  to	  sketch	  a	  culture	  that	  would	  not	  continually	  give	  rise	  to	  new	  versions	  of	  the	  old	  problems,	  because	  it	  would	  no	  longer	  make	  the	  distinctions	  between	  Truth,	  Goodness,	  and	  Beauty	  which	  engender	  such	  problems.21	  	  I	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  learn	  so	  much	  more	  from	  Dewey's	  corpus	  of	  writing.	  	  Dewey	  shares	  with	  many	  post-­‐Wittgensteinian	  philosophers	  a	  vision	  of	  philosophy	  as	  therapy	  wherein	  the	  goal	  of	  Philosophy	  (big	  P	  understood	  as	  a	  systematic	  and	  conceptually	  rigorous	  space	  of	  reasons)	  is	  to	  make	  itself	  obsolete	  wherein	  philosophy	  (little	  p	  understood	  as	  a	  cultural	  "criticism	  of	  criticisms"	  intellectually	  kibitzes	  in	  an	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  and	  inter-­‐cultural	  landscape	  of	  imaginative	  moral	  vistas).	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Rorty	  when	  he	  says	  that	  we	  need	  to	  embrace	  Dewey's	  "will	  to	  Truth"	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  quest	  for	  increased	  power	  in	  democratic	  relationality	  and	  not	  as	  some	  static	  "accuracy	  of	  representation."	  	  Rorty	  and	  I	  both	  would	  embrace	  the	  post-­‐scientistic/logically	  positivist	  culture	  ushered	  in	  by	  Dewey's	  writings	  wherein	  any	  attempt	  to	  "break	  down	  this	  notion	  [of	  representationalist	  Truth],	  if	  scientific	  inquiry	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  adapting	  and	  coping	  rather	  than	  copying,	  the	  continuity	  between	  science,	  morals,	  and	  art	  would	  become	  apparent."	  	  Classical	  or	  Paleo-­‐Pragmatists	  who	  embrace	  a	  democratic	  pluralism	  and	  
radical	  empiricism	  should	  also	  share	  with	  Neo-­‐Pragmatists	  like	  Rorty	  an	  interest	  in	  deflating	  the	  pretensions	  of	  philosophy	  by	  recognizing	  it	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.,	  p.86.	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particularly	  arcane	  literary	  discipline.	  	  We	  out	  to	  then	  put	  aside	  a	  "big	  P"	  pretension	  to	  seriousness	  and	  instead	  embrace	  a	  critically	  ironic	  attitude	  towards	  our	  "final	  vocabularies"	  by	  putting	  our	  deeply	  held	  philosophical	  presuppositions	  at	  risk:	  [T]he	  spirit	  of	  seriousness	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  an	  intellectual	  world	  in	  which	  human	  life	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  attain	  an	  end	  beyond	  life,	  an	  escape	  from	  freedom	  into	  the	  atemporal.	  	  The	  conception	  of	  such	  a	  world	  is	  still	  built	  into	  our	  education	  and	  our	  common	  speech,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  attitude	  of	  philosophers	  toward	  their	  work.	  	  But	  Dewey	  did	  his	  best	  to	  help	  us	  get	  rid	  of	  it,	  and	  he	  should	  not	  be	  blamed	  if	  he	  occasionally	  came	  down	  with	  the	  disease	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  cure.22	  	  III.	  Paul	  Ricouer's	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Traditional	  Belonging:	  Navigating	  Suspicion	  and	  Faith	  	  	   In	  the	  essay	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  Ricoeur	  goes	  on	  to	  express	  an	  idea	  of	  human	  finitude	  in	  a	  positive	  light	  of	  belonging	  to	  historical	  traditions	  of	  meaning.	  	  What	  he	  calls	  the	  "first	  declaration	  of	  hermeneutics"	  is	  that	  "the	  problematic	  of	  objectivity	  presupposes	  a	  prior	  relation	  of	  inclusion	  that	  encompasses	  the	  allegedly	  autonomous	  subject	  and	  the	  allegedly	  adverse	  object."23	  	  Belonging	  is	  expressed	  by	  Heidegger	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  and	  this	  internal	  relationship	  expresses	  better	  the	  "primacy	  of	  care	  over	  the	  gaze,	  and	  the	  horizontal	  character	  of	  that	  to	  which	  we	  are	  bound."24	  	  It	  is	  this	  enacted	  and	  extended	  sense	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  that	  always	  already	  precedes	  any	  abstract	  notion	  of	  epistemological	  or	  ethical	  reflection	  in	  Ricouer's	  dual	  hermeneutics	  of	  suspicion	  and	  faith.	  	  Thus	  we	  can	  say	  that	  all	  interpretation	  presupposes	  a	  "structure	  of	  anticipation":	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Rorty,	  ibid.	  23	  Ricouer,	  p.27.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.28.	  
	   167	  
'Meaning	  which	  is	  structured	  by	  fore-­‐having,	  fore-­‐sight	  and	  fore-­‐conception,	  forms	  for	  any	  project	  the	  horizon	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  something	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  something	  (SZ,	  151;	  BT,	  193)	  	  Thus	  the	  field	  of	  interpretation	  is	  as	  vast	  as	  that	  of	  understanding,	  which	  covers	  all	  projection	  of	  meaning	  in	  a	  situation.	  	  So	  philosophical	  hermeneutics	  is	  never	  a	  unitary	  pursuit,	  but	  always	  presupposes	  a	  plurality	  of	  aims	  and	  presuppositions.	  	  Ricoeur	  demonstrates	  that	  any	  hermeneutic	  interpretive	  stance,	  in	  its	  derivation	  from	  a	  working	  philosophy	  of	  ars	  contextualis	  and	  a	  concrete	  interpretation	  of	  sacred	  texts,	  can	  be	  conceived	  along	  a	  bipolar	  spectrum	  of	  faith	  and	  suspicion:	  The	  first	  positioning	  aims	  at	  the	  restoration	  of	  a	  meaning	  addressed	  to	  the	  interpreter	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  message.	  	  It	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  willingness	  to	  listen,	  to	  absorb	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  the	  message	  in	  its	  given	  form	  and	  it	  respects	  the	  symbol,	  understood	  as	  a	  cultural	  mechanism	  for	  our	  apprehension	  of	  reality,	  as	  a	  place	  of	  revelation.	  	  This	  type	  of	  hermeneutics	  is	  animated	  by	  faith.	  	  By	  contrast,	  hermeneutics	  may	  be	  approached	  as	  the	  
demystification	  of	  meaning	  presented	  to	  the	  interpreter	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  disguise.	  	  This	  type	  of	  hermeneutics	  is	  characterized	  by	  suspicion,	  by	  a	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  given.25	  	  Ricouer	  focuses	  on	  the	  works	  of	  Marx,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Freud	  to	  articulate	  what	  he	  means	  by	  a	  hermeneutics	  of	  suspicion.	  	  It	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  the	  current	  project	  of	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  role-­‐focused	  ethics	  of	  creative	  agency	  can	  navigate	  the	  tendency	  to	  read	  living	  religious-­‐philosophical	  traditions	  as	  either	  completely	  a	  host	  of	  symbols	  deserving	  reverence	  (faith)	  or	  as	  a	  teeming	  multitude	  of	  disguised	  ideologies	  of	  oppression	  requiring	  critical	  skepticism	  (suspicion)	  in	  order	  to	  get	  beyond	  the	  mystified	  power	  dynamics	  being	  naturalized,	  essentialized	  and/or	  otherwise	  transcendentally	  legitimated.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ruthellen	  Josselson"The	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Faith	  and	  the	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Suspicion"	  in	  Narrative	  
Inquiry	  14(1),	  p.3.	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   The	  work	  of	  feminists	  philosophers	  to	  problematize	  and	  critique	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  violence	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  in	  Confucian	  texts	  and	  traditions	  represents	  an	  important	  set	  of	  voices	  that	  needs	  to	  continually	  be	  referenced	  in	  future	  projects	  of	  ameliorative	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  Confucian	  tradition.	  	  Reading	  any	  given	  array	  of	  thinkers	  and	  texts	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  living	  tradition	  requires	  a	  hermeneutic	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  precarious	  meaning	  and	  value	  and	  the	  ethical	  demand	  to	  continually	  submit	  received	  traditions	  to	  criticism	  via	  	  hermeneutics	  of	  distanciation	  and	  suspicion.26	  Robin	  Wang	  recognizes	  the	  vital	  centrality	  of	  a	  yin	  yang	  陰陽	  narrative	  cosmology	  in	  understanding	  the	  construction	  of	  Heaven	  and	  Earth	  in	  early	  Chinese	  philosophy.	  	  Yet	  she	  also	  remains	  suspicious	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  a	  reciprocity	  of	  yin	  yang	  can	  be	  used	  to	  legitimate	  structures	  and	  practices	  of	  patriarchal	  violence	  and	  oppression:	  	  "on	  the	  one	  hand,	  yinyang	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  intriguing	  and	  valuable	  conceptual	  resource	  in	  ancient	  Chinese	  thought	  for	  a	  balanced	  account	  of	  gender	  equality;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  no	  one	  can	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  inhumane	  treatment	  of	  women	  throughout	  Chinese	  history	  has	  often	  been	  rationalized	  in	  the	  name	  of	  yinyang.”27	  Lisa	  Li-­‐Hsiang	  Rosenlee	  has	  offered	  an	  interesting	  model	  of	  "cut	  and	  suture"28	  critical	  method	  to	  remove	  wholesale	  the	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  patriarchal	  gender-­‐biases	  and	  assumptions	  undergirding	  Confucian	  practices	  of	  exclusion	  and	  oppression.	  	  Instead	  of	  throwing	  out	  the	  baby	  with	  the	  patriarchal	  bathwater,	  the	  cut	  and	  suture	  model	  would	  allow	  for	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  An	  important	  work	  that	  presents	  a	  feminist	  reading	  of	  gender	  dynamics	  in	  an	  YinYang	  narrative	  cosmology	  is	  Robin	  Wang's	  Yin	  Yang:	  The	  Way	  of	  Heaven	  and	  Earth	  in	  Chinese	  Thought	  and	  Culture	  (Cambridge,	  2012).	  27	  Wang	  (2012),	  p.	  xi.	  28	  See	  Rosenlee,	  Confucianism	  and	  Women:	  A	  Philosophical	  Interpretation	  	  (SUNY,	  2006)	  p.149.	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preservation	  of	  the	  uniquely	  relational	  pattern	  of	  thinking	  about	  gender	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  that	  even	  allow	  us	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  Confucian	  feminism	  promoting	  gender	  equity	  by	  appreciating	  difference	  and	  role-­‐focused	  deference.	  	  We	  might	  wish	  to	  question	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  cut	  and	  suture	  approach	  to	  reconstructing	  a	  critical	  Confucianism	  for	  facing	  current	  predicaments	  of	  culture	  and	  gender	  oppression.	  	  If	  we	  think	  the	  "disease"	  of	  patriarchy	  runs	  too	  deep	  in	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  to	  be	  simply	  extrapolated	  using	  surgical	  metaphors,	  then	  we	  might	  also	  think	  that	  patriarchy	  is	  more	  like	  a	  cancer	  and	  we	  need	  a	  different	  set	  of	  resources	  and	  guiding	  conceptual	  metaphors	  to	  navigate	  the	  faith/suspicion	  hermeneutic	  with	  regards	  to	  reconstructing	  gender	  roles	  in	  Confucianism.	  	  I	  think	  that	  the	  non-­‐foundational,	  reconstructed	  sense	  of	  agency	  offered	  in	  this	  role-­‐focused	  reconstruction	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucianism	  can	  offer	  an	  attractive	  metaethical	  framework	  from	  which	  to	  address	  questions	  and	  projects	  aimed	  at	  transforming	  oppressive	  cultural-­‐philosophical	  presuppositions	  into	  ameliorative	  relationships	  of	  democratic	  flourishing.	  	  Thinking	  about	  gender	  dynamics	  through	  roles	  instead	  of	  metaphysical-­‐biological	  essences	  offers	  not	  only	  a	  more	  realistic	  picture	  of	  who	  we	  are	  in	  families	  and	  communities	  of	  interpretation,	  but	  also	  a	  more	  attractive	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  the	  socially	  "scripted"	  performances	  that	  structure	  our	  normative	  expectations	  on	  a	  continual	  and	  unavoidable	  basis.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  thinking	  through	  the	  background	  presuppositions	  shaping	  our	  role-­‐focused	  selves	  and	  responsibilities	  in	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  living	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.	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IV.	  Reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  Daotong	  道統	  in	  a	  Horizon	  of	  Inter-­‐Cultural	  Comparative	  Philosophy	  	  	   This	  sense	  of	  a	  fore-­‐structure	  of	  understanding	  or	  a	  belongingness	  to	  a	  predestined	  horizon	  of	  meaning	  possibilities	  resonates	  with	  a	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  sensibility.	  	  Let	  us	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  first	  three	  chapters	  of	  the	  "Expansive	  Learning"	  
Daxue	  大學	  as	  a	  window	  onto	  the	  belongingness	  of	  emergent	  ethical	  agency	  in	  Confucian	  role	  ethics:	  Way-­‐making	  of	  Expansive	  Learning	  resides	  in	  understanding	  illuminating	  virtuosity.	  	  It	  lies	  in	  renewing	  [or	  intimately	  caring	  for]	  the	  common	  people	  and	  in	  resting	  in	  optimal	  efficacy.	  	  Knowing	  where	  to	  dwell	  one	  can	  then	  focus	  one's	  energies.	  	  Focusing	  one's	  energies	  one	  can	  then	  be	  calm	  and	  collected.	  	  Being	  calm	  and	  collected	  one	  can	  then	  be	  peaceful.	  	  Being	  peaceful	  one	  can	  then	  engage	  in	  responsible	  ethical	  reflection.	  	  Engaging	  in	  responsible	  ethical	  reflection	  one	  can	  be	  self-­‐possessed.	  	  Things	  have	  root	  origins	  and	  phenomenal	  appearances.	  	  Events	  have	  consummations	  and	  beginnings.	  	  Knowing	  what	  should	  be	  prioritized	  and	  what	  should	  come	  later,	  this	  indeed	  comes	  close	  to	  authoritative	  way-­‐making.29	  	  This	  opening	  passage	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  Confucian	  ethical	  epoche	  by	  highlighting	  the	  embedded	  nature	  of	  persons	  in	  their	  familial	  and	  social	  contexts	  of	  normatively	  stipulating	  roles	  (via	  a	  familially	  focused	  social	  scripting)	  that	  naturally	  entails	  a	  creative	  regulative	  ideal	  of	  optimal	  ethical	  efficacy	  (zhishan	  至善).	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  continues	  with	  the	  following	  recipe	  for	  ethico-­‐political	  transformation:	  The	  ancient	  sages	  desiring	  to	  understand	  enlightening	  virtuosity	  in	  the	  cosmos	  would	  first	  govern	  their	  states;	  desiring	  to	  govern	  their	  states,	  they	  would	  first	  maintain	  good	  order	  in	  their	  families;	  desiring	  to	  keep	  good	  order	  in	  their	  families,	  they	  would	  first	  cultivate	  their	  embodied	  personality;	  desiring	  to	  cultivate	  their	  embodied	  personality,	  they	  would	  first	  rectify	  their	  heartminds;	  desiring	  to	  rectify	  their	  heartminds,	  they	  would	  first	  creatively	  integrate	  their	  intentionality;	  desiring	  to	  creatively	  integrate	  their	  intentionality,	  they	  would	  first	  extend	  their	  knowledge.	  	  Extending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29大學之道，在明明德，在親民，在止於至善。知止而后有定，定而后能靜，靜而后能安，安而后
能慮，慮而后能得。物有本末，事有終始，知所先後，則近道矣	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authoritative	  person	  must	  be	  ever	  so	  vigilant	  about	  their	  creative	  potential	  (gu	  junzi	  bi	  shenqidu	  ye	  故君子必慎其獨也).	  	  When	  petty	  persons	  are	  dwelling	  at	  ease	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  their	  iniquity.	  	  When	  they	  see	  an	  authoritative	  person	  however	  they	  straighten	  up	  their	  act	  and	  attach	  themselves	  to	  the	  good.	  	  In	  considering	  how	  other	  persons	  consider	  you	  there	  is	  great	  benefit	  in	  thinking	  it	  is	  like	  looking	  directly	  at	  your	  innermost	  self.	  	  This	  is	  called	  creative	  integrity	  within	  manifesting	  in	  your	  appearance	  without.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  must	  be	  ever	  so	  careful	  about	  their	  ritual	  potential	  (慎其獨).	  	  Zengzi	  said:	  "Ten	  eyes	  upon	  me,	  ten	  hands	  pointing	  me	  out,	  oh	  how	  serious	  this	  is!"	  Wealth	  adorns	  rooms,	  and	  virtue	  adorns	  persons.	  	  If	  heartminding	  is	  broadly	  cultivated	  the	  embodied	  person	  will	  be	  luxuriant.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  must	  creatively	  integrate	  their	  intentionality.31	  	  What	  we	  have	  going	  on	  here	  is	  a	  hermeneutic	  phenomenology	  regarding	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethical	  agency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  one's	  embodied,	  familial,	  sociopolitical,	  and	  cosmological	  roles	  and	  relationships.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  "knowing	  priority"	  (zhi	  
xianhou	  知先後)	  here	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  chronological	  or	  ontological	  prioritization,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  ethicoreligious	  valorization	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  emerging	  creative	  integrity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  one's	  experiential	  field	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibilities	  and	  relationships.	  	  Such	  an	  emergent	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  ethical	  agency	  should	  be	  recognized	  as	  operative	  here	  instead	  of	  presupposing	  any	  foundationalist	  model	  of	  epistemic	  certainty,	  reified	  subjectivity,	  aretaic	  character,	  or	  any	  rationally	  determined	  principal-­‐based	  theories	  of	  morality.	  	   The	  process	  of	  focusing	  a	  vast	  field	  of	  interpretation	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  ameliorative	  ethical	  agency	  inevitably	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  traditional	  fore-­‐structures	  of	  meaning	  and	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31所謂誠其意者，毋自欺也，如惡惡臭，如好好色，此之謂自謙，故君子必慎其獨也！小人閑居為
不善，無所不至，見君子而後厭然，掩其不善，而著其善。人之視	  己，如見其肺肝然，則何益矣！
此謂誠於中，形於外，故君子必慎其獨也。曾子曰：「十目所視，十手所指，其嚴乎！」富潤屋，
德潤身，心廣體胖，故君子必誠其	  意。	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effective	  ideological	  critique.	  	  Instead	  of	  viewing	  the	  possibility	  of	  ideological	  critique	  as	  the	  means	  of	  challenging	  structures	  of	  oppression	  and	  domination	  in	  human	  cultural	  formations,	  Ricoeur	  and	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  share	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  critical	  'distanciation'	  in	  a	  process	  of	  historical	  "conversation"	  with	  living	  traditions	  of	  meaning	  and	  horizons	  of	  intelligibility.	  	  Ricoeur	  insists	  that	  historico-­‐traditional	  "interpretation	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which,	  in	  the	  interplay	  of	  question	  and	  answer,	  the	  interlocutors	  collectively	  determine	  the	  contextual	  values	  that	  structure	  their	  conversation."32	  	  However,	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  that	  this	  notion	  of	  "conversation"	  with	  traditional	  structures	  of	  meaning	  goes	  beyond	  any	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  merely	  lingual	  communication	  and	  must	  include	  the	  deeply	  sedimented	  habitual	  patterns	  of	  bodily	  comportment	  and	  ethical	  conduct	  that	  constitute	  our	  relational	  dynamics	  with	  a	  historically	  saturated	  world:	  [C]onversation	  rests	  upon	  a	  relation	  that	  is	  too	  limited	  to	  cover	  the	  whole	  field	  of	  explication.	  	  Conversation,	  that	  is,	  ultimately	  dialogical	  relation,	  is	  contained	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  which	  is	  a	  face-­‐a-­‐face.	  	  The	  historical	  connection	  that	  encompasses	  it	  is	  singularly	  more	  complex.	  	  The	  'short'	  intersubjective	  relation	  is	  intertwined,	  in	  the	  interior	  of	  the	  historical	  connection,	  with	  various	  'long'	  intersubjective	  relations,	  mediated	  by	  diverse	  social	  institutions,	  social	  roles,	  and	  collectivities	  (groups,	  classes,	  nations,	  cultural	  traditions,	  etc.).	  	  The	  long	  intersubjective	  relations	  are	  sustained	  by	  a	  historical	  tradition	  of	  which	  dialogue	  is	  only	  a	  segment.	  	  Explication	  therefore	  extends	  much	  further	  than	  dialogue,	  coinciding	  with	  the	  broadest	  historical	  connection.33	  	  What	  this	  entails	  is	  that	  we	  must	  always	  being	  in	  medias	  res	  from	  where	  we	  stand	  historically	  speaking	  if	  we	  want	  to	  grow	  as	  persons	  with	  a	  resolutely	  focused	  ethical	  agency.	  	  We	  cannot	  in	  any	  autonomous	  sense	  "choose"	  what	  we	  want	  to	  inherit	  or	  reject	  from	  traditional	  fore-­‐structures	  of	  meaning.	  	  Rather,	  we	  can	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ricoeur,	  ibid.	  p.29.	  33	  Ibid.,	  p.30.	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"appropriate"	  what	  is	  truly	  efficacious	  for	  our	  personal	  growth	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationships	  and	  push	  back	  against	  that	  which	  limits	  or	  hinders	  our	  growth	  as	  responsible	  ethical	  agency.34	  	  Unlike	  the	  Husserlian	  fiction	  of	  a	  foundational	  subject	  making	  of	  traditional	  structures	  of	  meaning	  an	  "object"	  of	  historico-­‐scientific	  inquiry,	  according	  to	  Ricoeurian	  hermeneutical	  phenomenology,	  what	  we	  need	  is	  a	  "general	  theory	  of	  prejudices"	  and	  a	  "critique	  of	  ideology"	  (that	  can	  never	  be	  totalizing)	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  distanciation.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  distanciation	  is	  the	  "dialectical	  counterpart	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  belonging,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  belong	  to	  a	  historical	  tradition	  through	  a	  relation	  of	  distance	  which	  oscillates	  between	  remoteness	  and	  proximity.	  .	  .To	  interpret	  is	  to	  render	  near	  what	  is	  far	  (temporally,	  geographically,	  culturally,	  spiritually)."35	  	  	   What	  Ricoeur	  asks	  that	  we	  focus	  on	  in	  any	  project	  of	  interpretation	  is	  our	  
Lebenswelt	  [life-­‐world]	  understood	  as	  a	  historically	  saturated	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world:	  The	  return	  to	  the	  Lebenswelt	  can	  more	  effectively	  play	  this	  paradigmatic	  role	  for	  hermeneutics	  if	  the	  Lebenswelt	  is	  not	  confused	  with	  some	  sort	  of	  ineffable	  immediacy	  and	  is	  not	  identified	  with	  the	  vital	  and	  emotional	  envelope	  of	  human	  experience,	  but	  rather	  is	  construed	  as	  designating	  the	  reservoir	  of	  meaning,	  the	  surplus	  of	  sense	  in	  living	  experience,	  which	  renders	  the	  objectifying	  and	  explanatory	  attitude	  possible.36	  	  In	  short,	  what	  Ricoeur	  highlights	  is	  the	  life-­‐world	  of	  embodied	  and	  historically	  saturated	  personhood—a	  world	  that	  is	  honeycombed	  with	  imaginative	  possibilities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  this	  critical	  distanciation	  of	  the	  fore-­‐structures	  of	  Confucian	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  feminist	  reading	  of	  Confucianism	  offered	  by	  Lisa	  Li-­‐Hsiang	  Rosenlee	  in	  her	  Confucian	  
and	  Women:	  A	  Philosophical	  Translation	  (SUNY	  2007).	  	  Here	  she	  argues	  for	  a	  "cut	  and	  suture"	  model	  of	  hermeneutical	  reconstruction	  wherein	  we	  can	  cut	  out	  the	  patriarchal	  normativity	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  a	  gender	  equity	  that	  does	  full	  justice	  to	  the	  relational	  conception	  of	  persons	  that	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  promotes.	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  p.32.	  36	  Ibid.,	  p.41	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for	  meaning	  construction	  and	  prospects	  for	  vital	  interpretation.	  	  What	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  any	  text	  is	  "a	  proposed	  world	  which	  I	  could	  inhabit	  and	  in	  which	  I	  could	  project	  my	  own	  most	  possibilities"	  and	  "to	  understand	  oneself	  is	  to	  understand	  oneself	  in	  front	  of	  the	  text."37	  	   In	  order	  to	  see	  how	  Ricouer	  practices	  his	  critical	  hermeneutic	  balancing	  act	  between	  suspicion	  and	  faith,	  in	  what	  follows	  we	  will	  be	  exploring	  his	  conception	  of	  narrative	  imagination	  as	  an	  ethical	  aim	  in	  Oneself	  as	  Another.	  	  	  It	  may	  seem	  strange	  that	  in	  a	  text	  centered	  on	  the	  question	  of	  selfhood	  Ricoeur	  would	  devote	  so	  much	  space	  to	  thinking	  about	  justice.	  	  But	  this	  seeming	  peculiarity	  is	  abated	  somewhat	  when	  we	  recall	  that,	  for	  Ricoeur,	  an	  ipse-­‐idem	  dialectic	  as	  constructed	  by	  narrative	  and	  interpersonal	  relationships	  is	  secured	  from	  hyperbolic	  certainty	  (Descartes)	  and	  radical	  suspicion	  (Nietzsche)	  by	  an	  ethical	  praxis	  of	  attestation;	  which	  at	  “every	  level—linguistic,	  praxic,	  narrative,	  and	  prescriptive—will	  preserve	  the	  question	  ‘who?’	  from	  being	  replaced	  by	  the	  questions	  ‘what?	  or	  ‘why?’”38	  	  By	  an	  ipse-­‐idem	  dialectic	  Ricouer	  means	  to	  point	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  self-­‐same	  ontological	  sense	  of	  personal	  identity	  and	  a	  narratively	  construed	  commitment	  to	  ethical	  preservation	  and	  integral	  becoming	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  life.	  	  Attestation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  taking	  a	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  others	  so	  as	  to	  assure	  self-­‐constancy	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  solicitude.	  	  Attestation	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  promise,	  or	  vow,	  to	  oneself,	  or	  to	  others,	  to	  be	  there—not	  in	  a	  dogmatic	  or	  fixed	  mode	  of	  selfsameness,	  but	  in	  the	  open	  and	  solicitous	  mode	  of	  being	  true	  to	  one’s	  own	  best	  possibilities	  for	  living	  a	  good	  life	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  just	  institutions.	  	  Because	  selfhood	  is	  secured	  only	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ibid.,	  p.34-­‐35.	  38	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  p.23.	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the	  practical	  field	  of	  identifying	  and	  working	  towards	  a	  good	  life	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  just	  institutions,	  Ricoeur	  focuses	  on	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  the	  hermeneutics	  of	  selving.	  	  Although	  he	  wishes	  to	  establish	  “the	  primacy	  of	  ethics	  over	  morality”39	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  in	  Ricouer's	  thinking	  justice	  as	  a	  moral	  norm	  is	  tacked	  on	  as	  a	  deontological	  afterthought	  to	  the	  ethical	  disposition	  we	  have	  to	  live	  well	  with	  others.	  	  To	  get	  a	  better	  grasp	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  role	  that	  it	  plays	  in	  Ricouer’s	  ethics,	  we	  will	  be	  examining	  here	  his	  revised	  hermeneutical	  eudaimonism,	  his	  antipathy	  towards	  non-­‐hermeneutic	  or	  totalizing	  theories	  of	  justice,	  and	  the	  creative	  role	  that	  a	  narratively	  constituted	  moral	  imagination	  can	  play	  in	  keeping	  alive	  a	  keen	  sense	  of	  justice	  in	  striving	  to	  live	  well	  with	  and	  for	  others—even,	  perhaps	  especially	  so,	  for	  others	  who	  are	  not	  yet	  present	  in	  the	  radical	  sense	  of	  not	  yet	  having	  material-­‐ethico-­‐political	  conditions	  available	  for	  realizing	  the	  very	  discursive	  possibility	  of	  having	  a	  voice	  present	  in	  the	  ongoing	  conversations	  of	  creative	  democracy.	  	   We	  might	  consider	  Ricouer's	  ethical	  aim	  in	  Oneself	  as	  Another	  to	  be	  a	  creative	  hermenuetics	  of	  personalizing	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  categorical	  imperative	  through	  embodied	  phronesis.	  	  Since	  "authentic"	  or	  "integral"	  selving	  is	  not	  some	  ontological	  given,	  but	  is	  something	  hard	  won	  in	  the	  working	  out	  of	  our	  selving	  in	  the	  concrete	  relationships	  and	  roles	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  thrown	  into,	  Ricoeur	  takes	  a	  contextualist-­‐historicist	  approach	  towards	  clarifying	  or	  "resolving"	  the	  self	  as	  an	  ethical	  project.	  	  Mere	  conceptual	  analysis	  involving	  counterfactual	  reasoning	  replete	  with	  science	  fiction	  accounts	  of	  brain	  swapping	  and	  so	  forth	  cannot	  deal	  adequately	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.171.	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with	  the	  fundamentally	  ethical	  dynamic	  of	  self-­‐identity	  as	  a	  being	  concerned	  with	  others	  or	  with	  an	  ideal	  of	  loyalty	  to	  loyalty	  (Royce)	  as	  a	  generalized	  care	  about	  humanity.	  	  The	  last	  four	  studies	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  treatise	  on	  selfhood	  deal	  explicitly	  with	  ethics.	  	  Ricoeur	  suggests	  that	  the	  practical	  wisdom	  sought	  in	  his	  ethics	  “aims	  at	  reconciling	  Aristotle’s	  phronesis,	  by	  way	  of	  Kant’s	  Moralität,	  with	  Hegel’s	  Sittlichkeit”	  (290).	  	  Ricoeur	  privileges	  a	  teleological	  conception	  of	  ethics	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  historical	  community	  sharing	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life—or	  at	  least	  sharing	  the	  motivation	  to	  work	  out	  an	  ideal	  of	  such	  a	  life	  in	  a	  pluralistic	  conversation—and	  he	  highlights	  how	  such	  a	  conception	  infuses	  all	  of	  our	  ethical	  deliberations	  without	  determining	  in	  advance	  what	  the	  phronimos	  ought	  to	  do	  in	  any	  given	  situation.	  	  However,	  Ricouer	  sees	  “naïve	  phronesis”	  undergoing	  a	  critical	  transformation	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  struggle	  to	  free	  rational	  agents	  from	  the	  dogmas	  of	  convention,	  arriving	  at	  what	  Ricoeur	  calls	  a	  “critical	  phronesis”	  capable	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  inevitable	  conflicts	  arising	  at	  the	  level	  of	  moral	  institutions	  (self-­‐respect)	  and	  ethical	  solicitude	  for	  persons	  (self-­‐esteem).	  	  Hegelian	  Sittlichkeit,	  stripped	  of	  its	  metaphysical	  pretensions	  to	  reveal	  an	  Absolute	  Spirit	  acting	  through	  a	  representative	  State,	  is	  capable	  of	  mediating	  between	  the	  personal-­‐situational	  ethics	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Universalist	  morality	  of	  Kant:	  Reduced	  to	  modesty,	  Sittlichkeit	  now	  joins	  phronesis	  in	  moral	  judgment	  in	  situation.	  	  In	  return,	  because	  it	  has	  crossed	  through	  so	  many	  mediations	  and	  so	  many	  conflicts,	  the	  phronesis	  of	  moral	  judgment	  in	  situation	  is	  saved	  from	  any	  temptation	  of	  anomie.	  	  It	  is	  through	  public	  debate,	  friendly	  discussion,	  and	  shared	  convictions	  that	  moral	  judgment	  in	  situation	  is	  formed.40	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Ibid.,	  p.190.	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I	  would	  like	  to	  now	  examine	  how	  Ricoeur	  passes	  through	  the	  Kantian	  sieve	  of	  morality	  to	  arrive	  at	  his	  account	  of	  the	  mature	  phronimos	  who	  is	  certain	  that	  his	  self-­‐attestation	  is	  warranted,	  while	  simultaneously	  remaining	  open	  to	  the	  “art	  of	  conversion”	  in	  which	  “the	  ethics	  of	  argumentation	  is	  put	  to	  the	  test	  in	  the	  conflict	  of	  convictions.”41	  	  	   In	  the	  seventh	  study	  of	  Oneself	  as	  Another	  Ricoeur	  sets	  out	  to	  establish	  “the	  primacy	  of	  ethics	  over	  morality—that	  is,	  of	  the	  aim	  over	  the	  norm,”	  but	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  “rightful	  place”	  is	  given	  to	  “moral	  norms,	  without	  letting	  them	  have	  the	  final	  word.”42	  	  Much	  of	  post-­‐Kantian	  ethical	  theory	  that	  takes	  a	  deontological	  approach	  seriously	  has	  tended	  to	  work	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  by	  making	  room	  for	  virtuous	  character,	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  or	  utilitarian	  considerations	  within	  the	  larger	  normative	  framework	  of	  duties	  and	  obligations.	  	  By	  sharply	  defining	  the	  ethical	  perspective	  as	  that	  of	  aiming	  at	  the	  good	  life	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  just	  
institutions,	  Ricoeur	  puts	  the	  Kantian	  imperative	  to	  respect	  persons	  qua	  persons	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  ethics;	  but	  he	  does	  this	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  abstract	  justice	  doesn’t	  completely	  overshadow	  solicitude.	  	  In	  fact,	  for	  Ricoeur,	  a	  “sense	  of	  justice	  takes	  nothing	  away	  from	  solicitude;	  the	  sense	  of	  justice	  presupposes	  it,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  holds	  persons	  to	  be	  irreplaceable.	  	  Justice	  in	  turn	  adds	  to	  solicitude,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  field	  of	  application	  of	  equality	  is	  all	  of	  humanity.”43	  	  An	  ideal	  of	  justice	  as	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  (i.e.	  justice	  as	  fairness)	  is	  what	  ensures	  that	  solicitude	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  p.290.	  42	  Ibid.,	  p.171.	  	  43	  Ibid.,	  p.202.	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doesn’t	  take	  the	  form	  of	  favoritism	  or	  dogmatic	  adherence	  to	  certain	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  which	  always	  does	  violence	  to	  others	  in	  democratic	  community.	  	  Institutions	  are	  inherently	  incapable	  of	  exhibiting	  the	  kind	  of	  ethical	  sensitivity	  to	  situations	  that	  individual	  phronimos	  are	  in	  possession	  of.	  	  Therefore	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  institutions	  striving	  to	  be	  just	  provide	  for	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  formalization	  regarding	  the	  good	  in	  the	  form	  of	  laws	  and	  norms	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  contingencies	  of	  practical	  life.	  	  However,	  when	  Ricoeur	  turns	  to	  perhaps	  the	  two	  most	  plausible	  theories	  of	  justice	  presented	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century—Rawlsian	  constructivism	  and	  Habermasian	  discourse	  ethics—he	  rejects	  them	  both	  as	  no	  more	  than	  (perhaps	  useful)	  philosophical	  fictions	  grounding	  certain	  convictions	  that	  some	  people	  may	  or	  may	  not	  share	  in	  contemporary	  liberal	  democracies.	  	   It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  both	  Rawls	  and	  Habermas,	  in	  their	  own	  unique	  ways,	  carry	  on	  the	  Kantian	  legacy	  of	  ideally	  employing	  reason	  to	  arrive	  at	  irrecusable	  moral	  truths.	  	  Ricoeur	  finds	  such	  a	  theoretical	  approach	  to	  justice	  inadequate	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  life	  as	  we	  find	  it	  in	  all	  of	  its	  “discordant	  concordance”	  and	  tragic	  conflict.	  	  Ricoeur’s	  narrative	  approach	  to	  selving	  processes	  also	  shapes	  his	  thinking	  about	  justice	  as	  an	  ideal	  end-­‐in-­‐view	  and	  messianic	  "to	  come".	  	  In	  reformulating	  his	  appropriation	  of	  Kant	  and	  his	  critique	  of	  both	  Rawls'	  and	  Habermas'	  idealized	  theories,	  Ricoeur’s	  thinking	  on	  justice	  presupposes	  a	  historicist	  and	  contextually	  bound	  moral	  imagination	  informed	  by	  cultural	  narratives	  present	  in	  liberal	  democracies	  (perhaps	  even	  including	  aspects	  of	  the	  useful	  “fictions”	  that	  Rawls	  and	  Habermas	  deploy).	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   As	  we’ve	  already	  seen,	  Kantian	  morality	  is	  introduced	  by	  Ricoeur	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  single	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life	  usurps	  the	  ethical	  place	  reserved	  for	  ongoing	  open	  dialogue	  and	  solicitous	  relationality	  in	  working	  out	  appropriate	  conceptions	  of	  creative	  democracy.	  	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “the	  principal	  legacy	  of	  ethics	  to	  morality	  lies	  in	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  the	  just,	  which	  henceforth	  looks	  both	  ways:	  	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  “good”	  as	  the	  extension	  of	  solicitude	  to	  “each	  one”	  of	  the	  faceless	  members	  of	  society;	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  “legal,”	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  does	  the	  prestige	  of	  justice	  appear	  to	  dissolve	  into	  positive	  law.”44	  	  Ricoeur	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  side	  of	  justice	  oriented	  towards	  the	  good,	  as	  any	  legal	  framework	  exists	  only	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  societies’	  considered	  convictions	  regarding	  justice	  which	  presupposes	  certain	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  	  So	  when	  Kant	  describes	  autonomy	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  self-­‐legislate	  the	  moral	  law,	  Ricoeur	  sees	  this	  carried	  out	  against	  an	  implicit	  background	  teleology	  of	  freedom	  as	  actualizing	  the	  rational	  will	  of	  mankind—“It	  is	  impossible	  to	  conceive	  anything	  at	  all	  in	  the	  world,	  or	  even	  out	  of	  it,	  which	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  good	  without	  qualification,	  except	  a	  good	  will.”45	  	  	   Another	  reason	  why	  Ricoeur	  takes	  Aristotelian	  ethics	  to	  be	  primary	  to	  Kantian	  morality	  is	  found	  in	  his	  appraisal	  of	  Kant’s	  second	  formulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	  	  The	  first	  formulation—“Act	  only	  on	  that	  maxim	  through	  which	  you	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  will	  that	  it	  should	  become	  a	  universal	  law”46—is	  “unprecedented	  in	  the	  teleological	  tradition”47	  ,	  but,	  in	  a	  sense,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  logical	  extension	  of	  the	  solicitude	  for	  others	  through	  rational	  desire	  aiming	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid.,	  p.228.	  45	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Groundwork	  for	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  p.61.	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.88.	  47	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  p.208.	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universality.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  notion	  of	  universalizability	  that	  leads	  Kant	  to	  the	  second	  formulation—“Act	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  you	  always	  treat	  humanity,	  whether	  in	  your	  own	  person	  or	  in	  the	  person	  of	  any	  other,	  never	  simply	  as	  a	  means,	  but	  always	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  an	  end."48	  	  The	  universal	  idea	  of	  humanity	  is	  fleshed	  out	  somewhat	  in	  this	  formulation	  due	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  person.	  	  Although	  humanity	  is	  the	  abstract	  ideal	  of	  a	  fully	  rational	  will	  acting	  according	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  morality	  according	  to	  Kant,	  actual	  humanity	  can	  only	  be	  found	  in	  flesh	  and	  blood	  human	  persons.	  	  Thus	  Ricoeur	  reinterprets	  the	  second	  formulation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  maintain	  its	  entirely	  original	  character.	  	  For	  the	  danger	  with	  Kantian	  morality	  is	  always	  that	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  persons,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  solicitude,	  will	  be	  eradicated	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  abstract	  appeal	  to	  disinterested	  reason	  treating	  all	  rational	  agents	  identically.	  	  Ricoeur	  states	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  In	  light	  of	  the	  intimate	  dialectic	  of	  solicitude,	  the	  second	  Kantian	  imperative	  reveals	  itself	  as	  the	  seat	  of	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  two	  key	  terms:	  that	  of	  humanity	  and	  that	  of	  the	  person	  as	  an	  end	  in	  himself	  or	  herself.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  humanity	  as	  a	  singular	  term	  is	  introduced	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  abstract	  universality	  that	  governs	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy,	  without	  the	  consideration	  of	  persons.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  persons	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves,	  however,	  demands	  that	  one	  take	  into	  account	  the	  plurality	  of	  persons,	  without	  allowing	  one	  to	  take	  this	  idea	  as	  far	  as	  the	  conception	  of	  otherness…Introduced	  as	  the	  mediating	  term	  between	  the	  diversity	  of	  persons,	  the	  notion	  of	  humanity	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  lessening,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  eliminating,	  the	  otherness	  that	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  this	  diversity,	  otherness	  which	  is	  dramatized	  in	  the	  dissymmetrical	  relation	  of	  the	  power	  one	  will	  holds	  over	  another,	  opposed	  by	  the	  Golden	  Rule.49	  	  	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  desire	  to	  treat	  someone	  not	  merely	  instrumentally,	  as	  a	  reified	  thing	  amongst	  things,	  but	  as	  a	  unique	  person	  we	  have	  to	  get	  to	  know	  their	  desires,	  hopes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Kant,	  Groundwork,	  p.96.	  49	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  pp.222-­‐223.	  
	   182	  
aspirations,	  convictions,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  The	  Golden	  Rule	  is	  excessively	  informal—at	  the	  level	  of	  inclinations	  we	  can	  never	  be	  entirely	  certain	  that	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  for	  another	  is	  really	  what	  they	  want.	  	  Kant	  was	  right	  to	  see	  the	  ideal	  of	  happiness	  a	  hopelessly	  empty	  term	  if	  applied	  at	  the	  general	  level	  of	  humanity.	  	  However,	  something	  like	  Aristotelian	  eudamonia	  is	  needed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  associated	  ethical	  living	  wherein	  sympathetic	  identification	  with	  others	  and	  imaginative	  rehearsal	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  our	  conduct	  are	  the	  order	  of	  the	  day.	  	  	  	   Ricoeur	  then	  wishes	  to	  keep	  the	  Kantian	  emphasis	  on	  universality—understood	  as	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  the	  circle	  of	  concern	  open	  to	  others	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  arrived—by	  employing	  a	  concept	  of	  humanity	  wherein	  justice	  as	  equality	  of	  distribution	  reigns	  supreme.	  	  However,	  he	  tempers	  this	  universalizing	  move	  by	  highlighting	  the	  irreducible	  plurality	  of	  persons	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  qualitatively	  different	  ideals	  of	  justice	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  cheaply	  arrived	  at	  ideal	  of	  strict	  isonomy.	  	  Ricoeur	  does	  consider	  whether	  he	  hasn’t	  done	  “a	  violence”	  to	  the	  Kantian	  intention	  by	  highlighting	  the	  plurality	  of	  persons	  in	  the	  field	  of	  inclinations.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Kant	  himself	  would’ve	  been	  all	  that	  pleased	  to	  have	  such	  a	  creativly	  sympathetic	  reader	  as	  Ricoeur.	  	  For	  what	  Kant’s	  categorical	  imperative	  (in	  any	  of	  its	  formulations)	  was	  seemed	  to	  meant	  to	  accomplish	  was	  help	  break	  us	  away	  from	  our	  everyday	  identifications	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  sensuous	  inclination—freeing	  us,	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  realize	  ourselves	  as	  citizens	  of	  the	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  via	  the	  exercise	  of	  pure	  practical	  reason.	  	  The	  question	  remains	  then	  what	  exactly	  does	  Ricoeur	  desire	  to	  keep	  from	  this	  mixed	  Kantian	  heritage	  and	  how	  does	  it	  function	  in	  his	  own	  account	  of	  justice?	  	  
	   183	  
	   Perhaps	  Ricoeur	  only	  wanted	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  theorize	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  procedural	  or	  legalistic	  account	  of	  justice	  as	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  equality	  before	  the	  law	  or	  fair	  treatment	  within	  institutions.	  	  This	  is	  a	  possible	  answer,	  but	  Ricoeur	  claims	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  justice	  points	  in	  two	  directions:	  “towards	  the	  good,	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  it	  marks	  the	  extension	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships	  to	  institutions;	  and	  toward	  the	  legal,	  the	  judicial	  system	  conferring	  upon	  the	  law	  coherence	  and	  the	  right	  of	  constraint.”50	  Moreover,	  Ricoeur	  claims	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study	  he	  will	  remain	  entirely	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  good.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  even	  if	  we	  took	  a	  purely	  formalized	  or	  procedural	  view	  of	  what	  justice	  entails,	  it	  would	  always	  be	  incomplete	  and	  in	  need	  of	  further	  revision	  in	  light	  of	  the	  actual	  conditions	  of	  persons	  in	  community.	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  impossible,	  given	  Ricoeur’s	  own	  hermeneutic	  assumptions,	  to	  maintain	  a	  strict	  separation	  between	  the	  good	  and	  
legal	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  thinking	  about	  justice	  (and	  this	  is	  not	  only	  because	  the	  idea	  of	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  good	  presupposes	  institutions	  which	  must	  be	  highly	  formalized).	  	  	  	   Ricoeur’s	  contention	  is	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  formalize	  principles	  of	  justice	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  actual	  historical	  conversations	  that	  we	  ourselves	  are.	  	  Traditional	  accounts	  of	  justice	  necessarily	  infuse	  our	  imaginations	  when	  formulating	  procedures	  aimed	  at	  securing	  just	  cultures	  and	  institutions.	  	  In	  fact,	  Ricoeur	  claims,	  we	  seldom	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  completeness	  when	  thinking	  about	  what	  would	  constitutes	  an	  ideally	  just	  society.	  	  Rather,	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  immediate	  scandalization	  in	  the	  face	  of	  radical	  injustices	  and	  are	  therefore	  spurned	  on	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Ibid.,	  p.197.	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hammer	  out	  working	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  to	  come	  in	  historical-­‐material	  democratic	  conversations.	  	  Ricoeur	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  justice	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  immemorial	  origins	  of	  mythopoetic	  thinking	  within	  Greek	  tragedy	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  evoked	  as	  a	  historically	  and	  culturally	  bound	  feeling:	  [T]he	  idea	  of	  justice	  is	  better	  named	  sense	  of	  justice	  on	  the	  fundamental	  level	  where	  we	  remain	  here.	  	  Sense	  of	  justice	  and	  of	  injustice,	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  say	  here,	  for	  what	  we	  are	  first	  aware	  of	  is	  injustice:	  “Unjust!	  What	  injustice!”	  we	  cry.	  	  And	  indeed	  it	  is	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  complaint	  that	  we	  penetrate	  the	  field	  of	  the	  just	  and	  the	  unjust…The	  sense	  of	  injustice	  is	  not	  simply	  more	  poignant	  but	  more	  perspicacious	  than	  the	  sense	  of	  justice,	  for	  justice	  more	  often	  is	  lacking	  an	  justice	  prevails.51	  	  	  The	  challenge	  for	  Ricoeur	  is	  how	  to	  get	  these	  often	  diffuse	  and	  ambiguous	  convictions	  about	  what	  constitutes	  justice	  to	  provide	  the	  clarity	  and	  rigor	  necessary	  for	  legitimating	  just	  institutions.	  	  	  	  In	  what	  follows	  we	  will	  explore	  further	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  of	  two	  well-­‐known	  and	  plausible	  theories	  of	  justice	  that	  he	  ultimately	  finds	  to	  be	  incapable	  of	  adequately	  accounting	  for	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  deeply	  historicist	  and	  contingent	  nature	  of	  creatively	  democratic	  culture.	  	   As	  we've	  seen	  already	  Ricouer	  is	  interested	  in	  apporpriationg	  aspects	  of	  liberal	  (Rawlsian)	  "founding	  fictions"	  but	  reconceived	  after	  a	  critical	  hermeneutics	  of	  suspicion,	  faith,	  and	  narratively	  achieved	  reflective	  equilibrium.	  	  In	  his	  antipathy	  to	  teleological	  ethics,	  John	  Rawls	  attempted	  to	  formulate	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  that	  is	  entirely	  “political	  and	  not	  metaphysical.”52	  	  Rawls	  takes	  up	  the	  contractualist	  tradition	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  gives	  it	  a	  new	  spin.	  	  Without	  assuming	  an	  actual	  event	  of	  mutual	  agreement	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens	  in	  a	  commonwealth	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.,	  p.198.	  52	  John	  Rawls,	  "Justice	  as	  Fairness:	  Political	  not	  Metaphysical"	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  14(3):223-­‐251	  (1985).	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have	  or	  have	  possibly	  occurred	  in	  history,	  Rawls	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  heuristic	  for	  coming	  to	  a	  strictly	  procedural	  notion	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness.	  	  This	  is	  done	  with	  his	  notorious	  deployment	  of	  the	  “veil	  of	  ignorance”	  concept,	  wherein	  the	  founding	  parties	  involved	  in	  ideally	  rational	  deliberation	  about	  the	  just	  distribution	  of	  social	  goods	  are	  asked	  to	  bracket	  their	  embodied	  conceptions	  of	  a	  narratively	  construed	  good	  life	  arrived	  at	  through	  the	  contingency	  of	  social	  positioning	  and	  differentially	  displayed	  natural	  capacities.	  	  Although,	  as	  Ricoeur	  points	  out,	  in	  Rawl's	  conception	  of	  the	  ideal	  founders	  behind	  the	  veil	  “every	  party	  must	  have	  a	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  the	  general	  psychology	  of	  human	  nature	  with	  respect	  to	  fundamental	  passions	  and	  motivations;	  [and],	  the	  parties	  must	  know	  what	  every	  reasonable	  being	  is	  presumed	  to	  wish	  to	  possess,	  namely	  primary	  social	  goods	  without	  which	  the	  exercise	  of	  freedom	  would	  be	  an	  empty	  demand…[and],	  since	  the	  choice	  is	  between	  several	  conceptions	  of	  justice,	  the	  parties	  must	  have	  suitable	  knowledge	  about	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  in	  competition”	  they	  must	  also,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  “annihilate…the	  effects	  of	  contingency,	  due	  to	  nature	  as	  much	  as	  to	  social	  circumstances.”53	  	  Behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  then	  “everyone	  is	  equally	  rational	  and	  similarly	  situated,	  each	  is	  convinced	  by	  the	  same	  arguments.”54	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  unanimous	  agreement	  regarding	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  is	  secured	  by	  this	  hypothetical	  rationalist	  reduction	  of	  the	  uniuely	  embodied	  narrative	  plurality	  of	  persons.	  	  	  	   The	  by	  now	  well	  known	  critique	  of	  the	  Rawlsian	  approach,	  one	  that	  Ricoeur	  also	  levels,	  is	  that	  the	  grand	  artifice	  of	  Rawlsian	  constructivism	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  p.191.	  54	  Rawls,	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  p.139.	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an	  elaborately	  subtle	  way	  for	  Rawls	  himself	  to	  smuggle	  in	  his	  own	  considered	  convictions	  about	  the	  good	  life	  at	  the	  level	  of	  politics.	  	  The	  rational	  agent	  situated	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  must	  actually	  be	  more	  contextually	  bound	  by	  teleological	  prejudice	  than	  the	  theory	  itself	  admits.	  	  Rawls	  himself	  suggests	  that	  any	  theory	  of	  justice	  arrived	  at	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  original	  position,	  must	  be	  tested	  against	  our	  historically-­‐culturally	  realized	  “considered	  convictions”	  in	  a	  method	  of	  reflective	  equilibrium.55	  	  	  But	  it	  is	  precisely	  here	  that	  Ricoeur’s	  thesis	  is	  borne	  out	  insofar	  as	  the	  Rawlsian	  approach	  “provides	  at	  best	  the	  formalization	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  that	  it	  never	  ceases	  to	  presuppose.”56	  	  Rawls’	  “whole	  system	  of	  argumentation	  can	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  progressive	  rationalization	  of	  these	  convictions,	  when	  they	  are	  affected	  by	  prejudices	  or	  weakened	  by	  doubts.	  	  This	  rationalization	  consists	  in	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  mutual	  adjustment	  between	  conviction	  and	  theory.”57	  It	  is	  this	  notion	  of	  reflective	  equilibrium	  that	  Ricoeur	  most	  values	  in	  the	  Rawlsian	  project,	  but	  Ricoeur	  would	  have	  us	  be	  more	  intellectually	  honest	  by	  putting	  our	  considered	  convictions	  on	  the	  table,	  as	  it	  were,	  instead	  of	  surreptitiously	  presupposing	  them	  in	  a	  formalized	  apparatus	  of	  argumentation.	  	  For	  Ricoeur	  the	  founding	  fictions	  of	  contractualist	  and	  deontological	  theories	  must	  be	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  actual	  experience	  of	  associated	  living	  in	  historically	  conditioned	  democratic	  communities:	  The	  contract	  is	  found	  to	  occupy	  on	  the	  plane	  of	  institutions	  the	  place	  that	  autonomy	  claims	  on	  the	  fundamental	  plane	  of	  morality.	  	  But	  whereas	  autonomy	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  “fact	  of	  reason,”	  the	  social	  contract	  appears	  to	  be	  capable	  only	  of	  drawing	  its	  legitimacy	  from	  a	  fiction—a	  founding	  fiction,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ibid.,	  p.19.	  56	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  p.236.	  57	  Ibid.,	  p.237.	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to	  be	  sure,	  but	  a	  fiction	  nonetheless.	  	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  	  Is	  this	  because	  the	  self-­‐foundation	  of	  the	  political	  body	  lacks	  the	  basic	  attestation	  from	  which	  good	  will	  and	  the	  person	  as	  end	  in	  himself	  draw	  their	  legitimacy?	  	  Is	  it	  because	  peoples,	  enslaved	  for	  millennia	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  domination	  transcending	  their	  will	  to	  live	  together,	  do	  not	  know	  that	  they	  are	  sovereign,	  not	  by	  reason	  of	  an	  imaginary	  contract,	  but	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  will	  to	  live	  together	  that	  they	  have	  forgotten?..If	  now,	  by	  moving	  backward,	  we	  carry	  this	  doubt	  affecting	  the	  fiction	  of	  the	  contract	  back	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy,	  does	  not	  the	  latter	  also	  risk	  finding	  itself	  a	  fiction	  intended	  to	  compensate	  for	  forgetting	  the	  foundation	  of	  deontology	  in	  the	  desire	  to	  live	  well	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  
just	  institutions?58	  	  According	  to	  Ricouer,	  the	  fatal	  flaw	  with	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  any	  of	  the	  particular	  formulations	  or	  principles	  of	  a	  just	  society	  that	  he	  comes	  up	  with,	  but	  rather	  arises	  at	  a	  theoretically	  meta-­‐level	  with	  his	  reliance	  on	  a	  suspect	  circular	  mode	  of	  argumentation	  from	  behind	  a	  non-­‐transparent	  hypothetical	  "original	  position"—potentially	  masking	  all	  sorts	  of	  pernicious	  prejudice.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  it	  highly	  improbable	  that	  anyone	  is	  psychologically	  capable	  of	  carrying	  out	  a	  complete	  reduction	  of	  their	  contingently	  arrived	  at	  conceptions	  of	  ethical-­‐political	  value,	  but	  moreover	  it	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  what	  Rawls’	  theory	  is	  supposed	  to	  accomplish	  even	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  put	  oneself	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  	  As	  is	  clearly	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  libertarian-­‐anarchist	  theorists	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  communitarian-­‐Marxian	  thinkers	  on	  the	  other,	  both	  tend	  to	  find	  Rawls’	  arguments	  entirely	  unconvincing,	  it	  is	  in	  no	  way	  certain	  that	  a	  broadly	  shared	  conception	  of	  rationality	  exists	  at	  this	  particular	  juncture	  in	  late	  modern	  Western	  liberal	  democratic	  countries.	  	  It	  seems	  then	  that,	  unlike	  the	  traditional	  contractualists	  in	  political	  theory,	  Rawls	  is	  offering	  us	  an	  avowedly	  fictional	  account	  of	  what	  might	  happen	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  complete	  bracketing	  of	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Ibid.,	  p.239.	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personal	  prejudices	  and	  consider	  questions	  of	  justice	  from	  a	  purely	  rational	  point	  of	  view.	  	  But	  absent	  a	  clear	  consensus	  on	  what	  would	  count	  as	  rational	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  original	  position,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Rawlsian	  account	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  elaborate,	  yet	  largely	  unpersuasive,	  account	  of	  one	  particular	  Harvard	  philosophy	  professor’s	  considered	  convictions	  regarding	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  writ	  large	  in	  a	  recent	  iteration	  of	  ideal	  theory.	  	   By	  the	  time	  of	  Political	  Liberalism	  Rawls	  did	  recognize	  the	  need	  to	  account	  for	  the	  necessarily	  historical	  and	  tradition	  bound	  nature	  of	  political	  rationality.	  	  He	  did	  this	  by	  introducing	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  “overlapping	  consensus”	  regarding	  teleological	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  within	  reasonably	  pluralistic	  democratic	  societies.	  	  The	  “fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism”	  is	  a	  principle	  measured	  against	  the	  convergence	  of	  particular	  traditions	  about	  what	  constitutes	  goods	  necessary	  for	  a	  flourishing	  human	  life.	  	  But	  what	  the	  concept	  of	  “overlapping	  consensus”	  fails	  to	  do	  is	  provide	  a	  reasonably	  plausible	  account	  of	  how	  such	  consensus	  can	  be	  reached	  within	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  As	  the	  current	  American	  culture	  wars	  certainly	  reflect:	  it	  is	  perfectly	  possible	  to	  “tolerate”	  someone	  else’s	  considered	  convictions	  the	  way	  that	  we	  tolerate	  an	  unpleasant	  sight	  or	  odor—we	  can	  simply	  turn	  our	  ethical	  attention	  away.	  	  But	  this	  kind	  of	  liberal	  “tolerance”,	  as	  an	  active	  ignoring	  of	  the	  alterity	  and	  humanity	  of	  others,	  results	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  and	  political	  violence,	  particularly	  for	  vulnerable	  persons	  within	  current	  socio-­‐economic	  configurations	  of	  existing	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  Perhaps	  Rawls	  did	  not	  consider	  carefully	  enough	  J.S.	  Mill’s	  warnings	  against	  the	  “tyranny	  of	  the	  majority,”	  for	  he	  never	  indicated	  how	  exactly	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  could	  go	  about	  securing	  the	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“reasonable	  pluralism”	  it	  purports	  to	  protect	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  working	  towards	  hammering	  out	  a	  robust	  “overlapping	  consensus”	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  shared	  sense	  of	  rationality	  that	  would	  theoretically	  ground	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  produced	  from	  the	  original	  position.	  	  	  	   Another	  plausible	  theory	  of	  justice	  is	  found	  in	  the	  “discourse	  ethics”	  of	  Habermas	  and	  Apel.	  	  For	  these	  thinkers	  the	  actual	  pragmatics	  of	  communication	  matters	  in	  construing	  a	  theory	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  retrospective	  “fiction”	  of	  an	  original	  position	  is	  dropped	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  prospective	  account	  of	  what	  an	  “idealized	  speech	  situation”	  would	  look	  like.	  	  The	  ideal	  practical	  discourse	  is	  always	  a	  real	  discourse	  for	  Habermas.	  	  However,	  the	  Kantian-­‐cum-­‐Freudian	  view	  Habermas	  takes	  regarding	  the	  purification	  process	  of	  historically	  conditioned	  discourse	  (i.e.	  convention	  and	  tradition)	  towards	  the	  ideal	  speech	  situation	  reveals	  what	  Gadamer	  called	  the	  Enlightenment	  “prejudice	  against	  prejudice”,	  and	  as	  such	  places	  Ricoeur’s	  discursive-­‐narrative	  ethics	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  plausible	  alternative	  to	  the	  overly	  idealistic	  and	  rationalistic	  Habermasian	  approach.	  	  	  	   I	  think	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  Ricouer's	  ethical	  aim	  in	  Oneself	  as	  Another	  as	  a	  critical	  conversation	  in	  an	  expanding	  communicating	  community	  without	  needing	  to	  posit	  a	  final	  vocabulary	  or	  determinate	  moral	  convergence.	  	  	  Ricoeur’s	  ethical	  aim	  is	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  and	  non-­‐foundational	  creative	  democratic	  narrative	  requiring	  sustained	  commitment	  to	  cultivating	  ever	  more	  responsive	  moral	  imagination.	  	   The	  ideal	  speech	  situation	  of	  which	  Habermas	  attempts	  to	  liberate	  conventionally	  bound	  communication	  to	  functions	  in	  some	  respects	  like	  a	  Peircean	  ideal	  end	  of	  inquiry.	  	  The	  difference	  being	  that,	  for	  Peirce,	  scientific	  inquiry	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identifies	  a	  community	  of	  inquirers	  (real	  and	  imagined;	  past,	  present,	  and	  future)	  to	  embody	  the	  requisite	  skills	  and	  commitments	  that	  would	  ensure	  the	  practice	  of	  critical	  fallibilism	  and	  experimentalism	  as	  a	  scientific	  community	  converging	  upon	  the	  actual	  truths	  of	  reality.	  	  Habermas,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	  take	  practical	  discourse	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  domain	  of	  a	  definitive	  historical	  community,	  but	  instead	  takes	  the	  situation	  of	  a	  universal	  rationality	  that	  would	  identify	  participants	  in	  an	  idealized	  speech	  situation.	  	  The	  practice	  of	  giving	  reasons	  for	  our	  convictions	  in	  a	  free	  and	  open	  society	  is	  what	  ensures,	  for	  Habermas,	  that,	  as	  we	  approximate	  an	  ideal	  speech	  situation,	  an	  increasingly	  shared	  and	  extensive	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  for	  democratic	  society	  would	  come	  into	  view.	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  Habermas	  meant	  to	  say	  that	  we	  could	  ever	  reach	  the	  utopian	  ideal	  of	  free	  and	  totally	  uncoerced	  communication,	  or	  if	  such	  a	  goal	  serves	  as	  a	  regulative	  ideal	  in	  his	  political	  decision	  making.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  an	  ideal	  of	  political	  convergence	  carries	  with	  it	  commitments	  to	  the	  Kantian	  legacy	  of	  universalization	  in	  morality	  even	  if	  historicizing	  reason	  in	  actual	  political	  discourse,	  as	  opposed	  to	  presupposing	  it	  as	  given	  somehow	  to	  transcendental	  egos	  a	  priori.	  	  	  	   Ricoeur	  claims	  that	  Habermas	  and	  Apel’s	  morality	  of	  communication	  has	  succeeded	  in	  merging	  “the	  three	  Kantian	  imperatives	  into	  a	  single	  problematic:	  	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  following	  the	  category	  of	  unity,	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	  following	  the	  category	  of	  multiplicity,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  kingdom	  of	  ends	  following	  the	  category	  of	  totality.”59	  	  Ricoeur	  thinks	  that	  this	  merger	  is	  capable	  of	  founding	  the	  self	  “in	  a	  single	  stroke	  in	  its	  dimension	  of	  universality	  and	  in	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Ibid.,	  p.281.	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dialogic	  dimension,	  interpersonal	  as	  well	  as	  institutional”	  as	  long	  as	  we	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  difference	  in	  any	  actualization	  of	  free	  and	  open	  democratic	  communication:	  My	  thesis	  is	  that	  [the	  morality	  of	  communication]	  becomes	  fully	  authorized	  if	  it	  is	  kept	  along	  the	  regressive	  path	  of	  justification,	  thereby	  leaving	  uncovered	  the	  conflictual	  zone	  situated	  along	  the	  path	  of	  actualization.60	  	  For	  Ricoeur,	  any	  finalized	  or	  totalizing	  notions	  of	  rational	  convergence	  in	  democratic	  theory	  are	  bound	  to	  do	  violence	  to	  the	  irreducible	  plurality	  of	  persons	  by	  mitigating	  the	  demand	  placed	  upon	  us	  to	  imaginatively	  identify	  with	  the	  situation	  of	  others	  (both	  present	  in	  the	  actual	  conversation	  at	  hand	  and	  not	  yet	  at	  the	  table	  because	  denied	  a	  chance	  at	  this	  particular	  historic	  juncture	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  good	  citizen	  in	  the	  particular	  democratic	  community	  carrying	  out	  the	  conversation	  regarding	  ideals	  of	  justice).	  	   Ricoeur	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  with	  the	  Habermasian	  project	  by	  similarly	  rejecting	  the	  search	  for	  ultimate	  foundations	  in	  moral-­‐political	  discourse,	  but	  in	  a	  sense	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  more	  radically	  empirical	  than	  Habermas	  by	  recognizing	  the	  irreducible	  plurality	  of	  persons	  in	  a	  democratic	  conversation.	  	  By	  highlighting	  difference	  inherent	  in	  democratic	  life	  Ricoeur	  is	  safe	  from	  the	  totalizing	  impulse	  found	  in	  Habermas’	  purification	  project	  aiming	  at	  convergence.	  	  Ricoeur	  agrees	  with	  Claude	  Lefort	  that	  democracy	  effectively	  “accepts	  its	  contradictions	  to	  the	  point	  of	  institutionalizing	  conflict.”61	  	  Ricouer	  quotes	  approvingly	  from	  Lefort’s	  Democracy	  
and	  Political	  Theory:	  	  “Democracy	  thus	  proves	  to	  be	  the	  historical	  society	  par	  
excellence,	  a	  society	  which,	  in	  its	  very	  form,	  welcomes	  and	  preserves	  indeterminacy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Ibid.,	  p.280.	  61	  Ibid.,	  p.260.	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and	  which	  provides	  a	  remarkable	  contrast	  with	  totalitarianism	  which,	  because	  it	  is	  constructed	  under	  the	  slogan	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  man,	  claims	  to	  understand	  the	  law	  of	  its	  organization	  and	  development,	  and	  which,	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  secretly	  designates	  itself	  as	  a	  society	  without	  a	  history.”62	  	   It	  is	  with	  a	  reformed	  Hegelianism	  that	  Ricoeur	  checks	  the	  tendency	  towards	  totalitarianism	  within	  Habermasian	  discourse	  ethics.	  	  Reason	  must	  be	  understood	  within	  its	  historical	  context,	  or	  Sittlichkeit,	  otherwise	  the	  tendency	  to	  assume	  a	  totalizing	  view	  from	  nowhere	  and	  everywhere	  surreptitiously	  introduces	  itself	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  an	  idealized	  speech	  situation.	  	  Perhaps	  Habermas	  never	  really	  got	  over	  his	  Marxist	  heritage	  in	  assuming	  that	  a	  critical	  stance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  one’s	  traditions	  and	  conventions	  could	  be	  taken	  outside	  of	  history.	  	  Ricoeur	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  a	  discourse	  ethics	  that	  drops	  foundationalism	  both	  regressively	  and	  progressively,	  thus	  remaining	  more	  faithful	  to	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  democracy:	  The	  recourse	  to	  performative	  contradiction,	  for	  Habermas,	  denotes	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  admission	  that	  there	  exists	  no	  principle	  of	  replacement	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  argumentative	  practice,	  without	  this	  transcendental	  presupposition	  standing	  as	  a	  final	  justification.	  	  I	  shall	  confine	  myself	  to	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  by	  renouncing	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  ultimate	  foundation	  (which	  hermeneutics	  will	  confirm	  by	  its	  insistence	  on	  the	  finiteness	  of	  justification)	  that	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  follow	  the	  inverse	  path	  from	  that	  of	  justification.	  	  If	  indeed	  we	  admit	  along	  with	  Habermas	  himself	  that	  “the	  
moral	  intuitions	  of	  everyday	  life	  are	  not	  in	  need	  of	  clarification	  by	  the	  philosopher”	  and	  that	  the	  foundational	  enterprise	  has,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  only	  a	  therapeutic	  function,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  with	  regard	  to	  skeptical	  counterarguments	  set	  up	  as	  “professional	  ideologies”63—then	  the	  ethics	  of	  discussion	  will	  not	  simply	  involve	  an	  attempt	  to	  found	  the	  requirement	  of	  universalization	  along	  a	  regressive	  path	  but	  will	  also	  involve	  an	  examination	  along	  a	  progressive	  path	  on	  the	  level	  of	  actual	  practice.64	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Lefort,	  p.16.	  63	  Habermas,	  Moral	  Consciousness	  and	  Communicative	  Action,	  p.98.	  64	  Ricouer,	  Oneself	  as	  Another,	  p.283.	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   Ricoeur	  wishes	  to	  keep	  open	  the	  sensitivity	  to	  unique	  situations	  in	  the	  process	  of	  formalizing	  justice.	  	  The	  “historically	  and	  culturally	  determined	  character”	  of	  estimations	  regarding	  justice	  need	  to	  be	  saved	  from	  the	  purifying	  impulse	  found	  in	  Habermasian	  discourse	  ethics.	  	  Just	  as	  Kant	  employed	  a	  “strategy	  of	  purification”	  of	  the	  sensuous	  inclinations	  (including	  ideas	  of	  happiness)	  in	  freeing	  up	  pure	  practical	  reason,	  Habermas	  employs	  a	  similar	  strategy	  “against	  everything	  that	  can	  be	  placed	  under	  the	  title	  of	  convention.”65	  	  For	  Habermas,	  anything	  arrived	  at	  outside	  of	  the	  strictures	  of	  the	  ideal	  speech	  situation	  is	  prima	  facie	  suspect.	  	  Ricoeur	  would	  “like	  to	  suggest	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  argumentation	  that	  will	  allow	  it	  to	  integrate	  the	  objections	  of	  contextualism,	  while	  allowing	  the	  latter,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  requirement	  of	  universalization	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  conditions	  for	  placing	  this	  requirement	  in	  context.”66	  	  The	  problem	  with	  Habermas	  is	  not	  that	  he	  sets	  up	  an	  ideal	  of	  free	  and	  open	  discussion	  to	  determine	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  arriving	  at	  legitimate	  principles	  of	  justice,	  but	  rather	  that	  he	  assumes	  that	  absent	  such	  total	  freedom	  of	  speech	  we	  are	  hopelessly	  enmeshed	  in	  a	  corrupt	  ethical	  order.	  	  	  	   Ricouer’s	  critique	  of	  Habermas	  has	  two	  important	  results:	  	  first,	  he	  thinks	  that	  ethical-­‐political	  ideals	  of	  universalization	  need	  not	  be	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  absolute	  convergence.	  	  We	  are	  better	  off	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  embodied,	  pragmatic	  ideals	  of	  endless	  expansion	  of	  circles	  of	  care	  towards	  a	  fluid	  boundary	  concept	  of	  
humanity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  positing	  a	  fixed	  convergence	  conception	  of	  objective	  human	  flourishing	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  institutions.	  	  Secondly,	  Ricoeur	  recognizes	  that	  it	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Ibid.,	  p.286.	  66	  Ibid.,	  p.287.	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a	  false	  choice	  presented	  to	  us	  to	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  “reminiscence	  and	  hope”	  in	  Habermas.	  	  It	  is	  clearly	  a	  mistake	  to	  rule	  out	  ‘convention’	  tout	  court	  when	  we	  realize	  that	  certain	  historical	  narratives	  can	  and	  should	  exert	  a	  powerful	  influence	  in	  projects	  of	  liberation.	  	  	  	   Ricoeur	  reminds	  us	  that,	  “democracy	  is	  not	  a	  political	  system	  without	  conflicts	  but	  a	  system	  in	  which	  conflicts	  are	  open	  and	  negotiable	  in	  accordance	  with	  recognized	  rules	  of	  arbitration.”67	  	  It	  is	  because	  the	  drama	  of	  democracy	  can	  never	  decide	  upon	  public	  goods	  “in	  a	  scientific	  or	  dogmatic	  manner”	  that	  “political	  discussion	  is	  without	  conclusion.”68	  Democracy	  requires	  collective	  phronesis	  in	  working	  out	  the	  “priority	  to	  be	  granted,	  in	  a	  determined	  culture	  and	  historical	  situation,	  to	  this	  or	  that	  primary	  good	  defining	  the	  spheres	  of	  justice.”69	  	  Discourse	  ethics	  for	  Ricoeur	  then	  functions	  at	  a	  level	  of	  cultivating	  the	  aesthic	  and	  moral	  art	  of	  embodied	  conversation	  and	  historical	  narrative.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  requires	  the	  conscious	  effort	  and	  capabilities	  requisite	  to	  keep	  alive	  an	  infinite	  task	  of	  aiming	  to	  live	  well	  with	  and	  for	  others	  in	  just	  institutions	  (political,	  cultural,	  familial,	  social,	  religious—what	  the	  Confucians	  call	  "ritual"	  li	  禮).	  	  Such	  a	  deep	  ethical	  commitment	  requires,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  a	  keen	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  cultural	  narratives	  that	  define	  the	  various	  communities	  contributing	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  one’s	  narrative	  identity	  or	  selving	  process.	  	  	  	   Moreover,	  narrative	  is	  vitally	  important	  for	  Ricoeur’s	  ethics	  in	  increasing	  the	  power	  of	  our	  moral	  imagination	  to	  be	  able	  to	  sympathetically	  identify	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Ibid.,	  p.258.	  68	  Ibid.	  69	  Ibid.	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unfamiliar	  others	  in	  the	  course	  of	  realizing	  ever	  more	  expansive	  and	  intensive	  democratic	  conversations.	  	  What	  Ricoeur	  calls	  the	  “thought	  experiments	  we	  conduct	  in	  the	  great	  laboratory	  of	  the	  imaginary”70	  are	  the	  means	  of	  disclosing	  to	  us	  the	  experiences	  of	  actual	  and	  possible	  others	  in	  a	  narratively	  intimate	  fashion	  without	  having	  to	  enter	  directly	  into	  the	  personal	  lifeworld	  of	  every	  possible	  ethically	  salient	  problem	  or	  predicament.	  Embodied	  narrative	  provides	  a	  powerful	  resource	  for	  people	  to	  share	  their	  experiences	  across	  racial,	  class,	  and	  cultural	  barriers.	  	  We	  all	  have	  families	  and	  friends	  and	  strive	  with	  imagination	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  our	  experience	  in	  the	  roles	  and	  relationships	  we	  find	  ourselves	  being	  constituted	  by.	  	  The	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  narrative	  can	  perform	  “its	  functions	  of	  discovery	  and	  transformation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  reader’s	  feelings	  and	  actions,	  in	  the	  phase	  of	  the	  refiguration	  of	  action	  by	  the	  narrative.”71	  	  While	  surely	  faced	  with	  its	  own	  limitations,	  the	  narrative	  imagination	  may	  be	  our	  only	  hope	  in	  keeping	  alive	  the	  promises	  of	  creative	  democracy	  as	  an	  ethical	  ideal.	  	  When	  so	  many	  personsp	  are	  being	  systematically	  oppressed	  in	  the	  practical	  discourse	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  decision	  making,	  a	  more	  encompassing	  sense	  of	  narrative	  can	  function	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  the	  repressed	  and	  forgotten	  voices	  of	  a	  creative	  democratic	  community.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  narrative	  can	  help	  keep	  us	  open	  to	  those	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  even	  arrived	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  conversation.	  	  We	  must	  continue	  to	  strive	  to	  keep	  open	  the	  narrative	  horizons	  encompassing	  any	  current	  democratic	  vistas	  we	  may	  inhabit.	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   In	  what	  follows	  of	  our	  exploration	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  	  ethical	  agency	  in	  the	  thoroughly	  relational	  cosmology	  presupposed	  by	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  hermeneutical	  sensitivity	  will	  be	  required	  of	  us.	  	  We	  will	  not	  be	  seeking	  an	  ontologically	  foundational,	  ahistorical	  grounding	  subject	  for	  our	  ethical	  discourse,	  for	  in	  the	  hermeneutical	  phenomenology	  presupposed	  here	  "subjectivity	  must	  be	  lost	  as	  radical	  origin	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  recovered	  in	  a	  more	  modest	  role."	  	  The	  role	  that	  we	  hope	  to	  recover	  for	  agency	  is	  as	  an	  experientially	  internalist	  mode	  of	  meaningful	  revelation	  in	  the	  cosmological	  context	  of	  our	  dynamic	  relationships	  and	  the	  particular	  familial	  and	  socially	  focused	  roles	  that	  we	  occupy	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  narratively	  constituted	  life.	  	  	  To	  do	  this	  we	  will	  imaginatively	  inhabit	  the	  worlds	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  and	  creatively	  appropriate	  meaning	  for	  current	  existential	  application.	  	  To	  appropriate	  is	  "to	  make	  what	  was	  alien	  become	  one's	  own.	  	  What	  is	  appropriated	  is	  indeed	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  text.	  	  But	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  text	  becomes	  my	  own	  only	  if	  I	  disappropriate	  myself,	  in	  order	  to	  let	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  text	  be.	  	  So	  I	  exchange	  the	  me,	  master	  of	  itself,	  for	  the	  self,	  disciple	  of	  the	  text."72	  	  Let	  us	  continue	  then	  to	  make	  ourselves	  "disciples"	  of	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  corpus	  of	  texts	  and	  see	  what	  creative	  appropriations	  and	  self-­‐transformations	  might	  occur	  as	  an	  outcome.	  	  Also,	  in	  what	  follows	  we	  will	  be	  continuing	  the	  process	  of	  reconstructing	  a	  Confucian	  tradition	  of	  "gathering	  of	  way-­‐making"	  	  (daotong	  道統)	  that	  stretches	  from	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  to	  Cheng-­‐Zhu	  orthodoxy	  in	  East	  Asia	  and	  in	  growing	  cultural	  trends	  outside	  of	  historically	  Confucian	  cultures.	  	  In	  this	  project	  of	  critical	  	  reconstruction	  we	  will	  be	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  philosophical	  coherence	  or	  family	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Ricouer,	  Hermeneutic	  Phenomenology,	  p.35.	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resemblance	  of	  "way-­‐making"	  that	  we	  can	  find	  in	  this	  living	  tradition	  of	  Ruist	  (儒家)	  role-­‐focused	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  (倫理道德)	  and	  will	  be	  only	  peripherally	  dealing	  with	  the	  historical-­‐political	  responses	  to	  changing	  historical	  fortunes	  of	  governments	  employing	  Confucian	  ideology	  to	  keep	  themselves	  pure	  from	  the	  "foreign"	  philosophical	  "pollutants"	  such	  as	  Buddhism	  and	  the	  indigenous	  but	  equally	  "heterodox"	  (異端)	  tradition	  of	  philosophical	  Daoism.	  	  Moving	  away	  from	  these	  kind	  of	  ethnonationalist,	  identitarian	  abuses	  of	  Confucianism	  doesn't	  mean	  that	  we	  aren't	  going	  to	  be	  taking	  a	  stance	  in	  current	  debates	  regarding	  the	  value	  of	  Confucianism	  in	  the	  important	  task	  of	  continuing	  to	  decolonize	  philosophy	  and	  religious	  studies	  departments	  and	  in	  developing	  a	  viable	  ethical	  theory	  of	  agency	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  resist	  blustering	  dictators,	  corporate	  criminals,	  and	  all	  forms	  of	  fascist	  oppression.	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Chapter	  Five:	  The	  Contemporary	  Significance	  of	  "Resolute	  Agency"	  shendu	  慎
獨 	  	  and	  the	  Disclosure	  of	  its	  True	  Meaning	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  Horizonal	  Hermeneutics	  
	  I.	  Received	  Glosses	  of	  shendu	  慎獨	  and	  the	  hermeneutical	  challenges	  of	  excavated	  texts:	  Rereading	  "Focusing	  the	  Familiar"	  Zhongyong	  and	  "Expansive	  Learning"	  
Daxue	  after	  Guodian	  	  	  	   This	  chapter	  will	  further	  elaborate	  the	  central	  Si-­‐Meng	  concept	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨),	  which	  has	  predominantly	  been	  understood	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  	  "circumspection	  in	  private"	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  Zheng	  Xuan	  and	  Zhu	  Xi's	  historically	  authoritative	  interpretive	  glosses	  within	  an	  unfolding	  of	  Confucian	  
daotong	  orthodoxy.	  	  It	  will	  be	  my	  aim	  here	  to	  show	  that	  such	  an	  abstractly	  spatial	  and	  inwardly	  psychological	  understanding	  of	  shendu	  慎獨—as	  being	  morally	  circumspect	  while	  in	  solitary	  states	  of	  dwelling	  or	  privacy—is	  a	  distortion	  of	  the	  original	  Si-­‐Meng	  spirit	  and	  letter.	  	  And	  thus,	  these	  readings	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  more	  place-­‐based,	  narrative	  notion	  of	  creative	  agency,	  plurisingularity	  and	  
personal	  uniqueness	  that	  includes	  both	  an	  existential	  and	  temporal	  dimension	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  placed	  upon	  the	  importance	  of	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  attention	  and	  transactional	  potentials	  for	  amelioratevely	  significant	  growth.	  	  	   By	  recontextualizing	  the	  notion	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  in	  light	  of	  recovered	  archeological	  materials	  like	  the	  "Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct"	  
Wuxing	  《五行》and	  by	  hermeneutically	  situating	  the	  occurrence	  of	  this	  important	  philosophical	  phrase	  within	  received	  texts	  like	  the	  "Expansive	  Learning"	  Daxue	  《大
學》	  and	  "Focusing	  the	  Familiar"	  Zhongyong	  《中庸》,	  this	  central	  Si-­‐Meng	  concept	  can	  be	  clarified	  and	  reconstructed	  so	  as	  to	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  embodied	  ethical	  discipline	  of	  cultivating	  attentive	  virtuosity	  and	  appreciative	  vigilance	  regarding	  the	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subtle	  transformations	  of	  alethic-­‐disclosive	  self-­‐in-­‐circumstance	  (ji	  己)	  and	  the	  transactional	  potentials	  (tianming	  天命)	  that	  such	  a	  personal	  becoming	  has	  for	  realizing	  creative	  integration	  or	  dissolute	  degeneracy	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  narrative	  unfolding	  of	  personally	  unique	  "human	  nature"	  (renxing	  人性)	  as	  ethical	  achievement	  concept.	  	  Basically,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  the	  various	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  (mis)readings	  of	  du獨	  as	  a	  predominantly	  spatial	  notion	  of	  dwelling	  in	  solitude	  or	  privacy	  were	  a	  product	  of	  a	  certain	  understanding	  perpetuated	  by	  Kong	  Yingda	  and	  Zhu	  Xi's	  largely	  psychologistic	  conceptions	  of	  a	  purely	  inward	  notion	  of	  the	  heartmind	  as	  precariously	  located	  between	  selfish	  desire	  (siyu	  私慾)	  and	  heavenly	  patterning	  (tianli	  天理).	  	  By	  returning	  to	  an	  "original"	  (because	  reconstructed)	  Si-­‐Meng	  sense	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  shendu	  慎
獨	  as	  found	  in	  received	  and	  recovered	  texts	  in	  Warring	  States	  philosophical	  discourse,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  this	  phrase	  refers	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  embodied	  ethical	  technique	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  in	  role-­‐focused	  projects	  of	  ameliorative	  relationality.	  	  The	  phrase	  references	  a	  kind	  of	  spiritual	  practice	  (gongfu	  功夫)	  that	  depends	  upon	  attentional	  vigilance	  and	  circumstantial	  awareness	  aimed	  at	  optimizing	  transactional	  potentials	  and	  consolidating	  virtuosic	  habit-­‐energy	  in	  a	  radically	  relational	  cosmos	  wherein	  any	  purported	  ontological	  dichotomy	  between	  a	  purely	  public	  and	  private	  domain	  of	  consciousness	  finds	  no	  conceptual	  or	  experiential	  traction.	  	  	  	   Instead,	  the	  subtle	  workings	  of	  heartminding	  ought	  be	  understood	  affectively	  as	  concrete	  expressions	  of	  embodied	  qi-­‐patternings	  and	  personal	  trajectories	  of	  
	   200	  
possible	  growth	  that	  more	  or	  less	  concertedly	  (or	  disconcertedly)	  enter	  into	  relationships	  with	  currently	  flowing	  patterns	  of	  qi	  energies.	  	  As	  Toegye	  (退溪)	  the	  Joseon	  Neo-­‐Confucian	  put	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Four-­‐Seven	  debate	  in	  Korean	  Confucianism:	  "normative	  patterning	  (li	  理)	  and	  psychophysical	  energies	  (qi	  氣)	  are	  not	  one,	  nor	  are	  they	  different	  (buyi	  ye	  bu	  yi	  不一也不異)."1	  	  This	  embodied	  technique	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  then	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  attentively	  appreciating	  current	  relational	  qi	  networks	  and	  creatively	  imagining	  future	  possibilities	  to	  more	  optimally	  realize	  flourishing	  patterns	  of	  personal	  growth	  and	  ethical	  transformation	  in	  an	  always	  transitional	  processes	  of	  human	  becoming.	  	   Let	  us	  take	  a	  close	  look	  at	  the	  phrase	  "resolute	  becoming"	  in	  the	  opening	  passage	  of	  the	  Zhongyong:	  What	  tian	  commands	  is	  called	  natural	  dispositions.	  	  To	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  these	  dispositions	  is	  called	  creative	  way-­‐making.	  	  To	  cultivate	  way-­‐making	  is	  called	  education.	  	  As	  far	  as	  creative	  way-­‐making	  goes,	  we	  cannot	  leave	  it	  even	  for	  an	  instant.	  	  If	  it	  can	  be	  abandoned	  it	  is	  not	  true	  way-­‐making.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  are	  ever	  so	  vigilant	  about	  what	  they	  cannot	  see	  and	  ever	  so	  anxious	  about	  what	  they	  haven't	  yet	  heard.	  	  Nothing	  is	  more	  manifest	  than	  what	  is	  inchoate	  and	  incipient.	  	  Thereby	  authoritative	  persons	  always	  exercise	  the	  utmost	  care	  over	  their	  unique	  agential	  becoming	  as	  persons	  (junzi	  shen	  qi	  du	  ye	  君子慎其獨也).2	  	  Zheng	  Xuan	  glossed	  shendu	  here	  as	  being	  'circumspect	  while	  dwelling	  alone	  in	  private'3	  and	  Kong	  Yingda	  follows	  suit	  but	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  'dwelling'	  居	  to	  a	  more	  spatially	  neutral	  notion	  of	  'place'	  處,	  a	  character	  that	  may	  be	  used	  to	  apply	  just	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Michael	  Kalton,	  et.	  al,	  ed.	  The	  Four	  Seven	  Debate	  (1998).	  	  Translation	  from	  Chinese	  my	  own.	  2天命之謂性，率性之謂道，修道之謂教。道也者，不可須兒離也，可離非道也。	  	  是故君子戒慎乎
其所不睹，恐懼乎其所不聞，莫顯乎隱，莫顯乎微，故君子慎其獨也。	  3	  “慎獨者，慎其閑居之所為。小人於隱者動作言語，自以為不視睹，不見聞，則必律盡其情也。
若有占聽之者，是為顯見，甚於眾人之中為之。”[漢]	  鄭玄注，《禮記注》，第 459 頁。	  
	   201	  
as	  much	  to	  the	  "place"	  of	  privately	  manifesting	  desires	  and	  inclinations	  as	  to	  bodily	  comportment	  and	  behavior.	  	  Thus	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  heartminding	  are	  receiving	  an	  increasingly	  inward	  or	  psychologistic	  understanding	  in	  Confucian	  hermeneutical	  commentary:	  	  Thus	  "exemplary	  persons	  are	  ever	  so	  concerned	  about	  their	  privacy"	  means	  that	  even	  in	  a	  secretive	  place	  (隱微之處)	  they	  are	  afraid	  lest	  immorality	  arise.	  	  Thus	  the	  consummate	  humanity	  of	  exemplary	  persons	  exercises	  caution	  while	  dwelling	  alone	  (獨居).	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  although	  they	  are	  dwelling	  in	  private,	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  constant	  vigilance	  over	  their	  personal	  way-­‐making.4	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  Zhu	  Xi	  further	  psychologizes	  this	  particular	  passage	  by	  introducing	  a	  seemingly	  entirely	  interior	  notion	  of	  "privacy"	  of	  personalized	  psychophysical	  experience:	  "Nothing	  is	  more	  evident	  than	  the	  hidden	  and	  nothing	  is	  more	  manifest	  than	  the	  inchoate.	  	  Thus	  exemplary	  persons	  are	  ever	  so	  concerned	  about	  their	  interiority."	  :	  du	  獨	  refers	  to	  what	  others	  do	  not	  [can	  not?]	  know,	  but	  to	  that	  place	  where	  one	  alone	  knows.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  in	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  inchoate	  darkness,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  incipient	  becoming,	  although	  it	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  formed	  the	  opportune	  moment	  (幾)	  has	  already	  become	  active.	  	  Although	  others	  do	  not	  know	  it,	  one's	  self	  (己)	  alone	  knows.	  	  This	  is	  why	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  clear	  and	  evident	  in	  the	  whole	  world	  than	  this	  interiority.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  exercise	  constant	  concern	  and	  caution	  and	  always	  add	  vigilance	  to	  their	  anxiety.	  	  If	  one	  doesn't	  squash	  the	  emergence	  of	  selfish	  desire	  (人慾)	  even	  before	  it	  has	  a	  chance	  to	  develop	  and	  grow	  then	  one	  can	  even	  get	  to	  the	  extreme	  position	  of	  abandoning	  authoritative	  way-­‐making	  altogether.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4故君子慎其獨也者，以其隱微之處，恐其罪惡彰顯，故君子之人極慎其獨居。言雖曰獨居，能謹
慎守道也。”[唐]	  孔穎達，《禮記正義》，第 879 頁。	  5	  “莫見乎隱，莫顯乎微，故君子慎其獨也”：獨者，人所不知而己所獨知之地也。言幽暗之中，
細微之事，亦雖未形而幾則已動，人雖不知而己獨知之，則是天下之事無有著見明顯而過於此者。
是以君子即常戒懼，而於此憂加謹焉，所以歇人慾於將萌，而不使其滋長於隱微之中，以至離道之
遠也。《四書章句集注》，中華書局	  1983 年版,	  18 頁。	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All	  three	  of	  these	  highly	  influential	  and	  authoritative	  Confucian	  commentaries	  seem	  to	  rest	  largely	  upon	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  use	  of	  shendu	  in	  the	  Zhongyong	  text	  is	  semantically	  equivalent	  to	  a	  parallel	  passage	  in	  the	  "Expansive	  Learning"	  Daxue,	  wherein	  the	  idea	  of	  privacy	  and	  imagined	  moral	  surveillance	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  obviously	  at	  play:	  Petty	  persons	  will	  stop	  at	  nothing	  when	  engaging	  in	  immoral	  behavior	  while	  in	  leisurely	  dwelling.	  	  With	  the	  appearance	  of	  an	  authoritative	  person	  they	  will	  put	  on	  an	  air	  of	  disgust,	  abandon	  their	  iniquity	  and	  attach	  themselves	  to	  efficacious	  conduct.	  	  How	  beneficial	  it	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  way	  people	  see	  you	  as	  if	  looking	  at	  your	  inner	  affective	  landscape	  [lit.	  your	  "lungs	  and	  kidneys"].	  	  This	  is	  called	  being	  creatively	  integrated	  within	  and	  taking	  form	  without.	  	  Thus	  exemplary	  persons	  are	  ever	  so	  concerned	  about	  their	  du	  	  [aloneness].6	  	  In	  this	  passage	  Zheng	  Xuan	  glosses	  "leisurely	  dwelling"	  閑居	  as	  a	  place	  of	  "retired	  ease	  and	  avoidance	  of	  others"	  退燕避人,	  so	  shendu	  becomes	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  circumspection	  while	  in	  a	  state	  of	  presumed	  privacy—a	  kind	  of	  internalized	  ethical	  conscience	  that	  imaginatively	  posits	  an	  "authoritative	  person"	  君子	  as	  super-­‐ego	  or	  "generalized	  other"	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  witness	  consciousness	  or	  morally	  (i.e.	  inwardly	  subjective	  subjection	  to	  externally	  stipulated	  principles)	  surveillance	  mechanism	  for	  every	  aspect	  of	  conduct,	  speech,	  and	  thought;	  even	  while	  dwelling	  alone	  by	  oneself.	  	   However,	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  above	  passage	  from	  the	  Expansive	  Learning	  大學	  within	  its	  larger	  interpretive	  context,	  we	  can	  see	  clearly	  that	  it	  has	  much	  more	  to	  do	  with	  an	  experientially	  intrinsic	  state	  of	  shendu	  as	  a	  form	  of	  'ethical	  resoluteness'	  or	  'integrity'	  誠其意	  than	  it	  does	  with	  either	  an	  assumed	  interior	  state	  of	  psychology	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6小人閑居為不善，無所不至。見君子而后厭然，捨其	  不善，而著其善。人之視己，如見其肺肝然
，則何益矣。此謂誠於中形於外，故君子必慎其獨也。	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with	  some	  purely	  ontological	  sense	  of	  aloneness.	  The	  idea	  of	  cultivating	  vigilance	  about	  one's	  unique	  agential	  becoming	  as	  a	  person,	  understood	  as	  a	  relationally	  responsive	  nexus	  of	  significant	  human	  relationships	  and	  role-­‐focused	  ethical	  responsibility	  is	  central	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics.7	  	  The	  phrase	  appears	  prominently	  in	  the	  Expansive	  Learning	  (Daxue	  大學)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  appreciating	  the	  role	  of	  natural	  (moral)	  emotions	  in	  wholeheartedly	  engaging	  with	  deeply	  personal	  projects	  of	  ethicoreligious	  self-­‐cultivation:	  Creatively	  integrating	  one's	  intentionality	  (chengqiyi	  誠其意)	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  having	  no	  self-­‐delusion	  (wuziqi	  毋自欺).	  	  This	  is	  like	  despising	  noxious	  odors	  and	  loving	  beautiful	  visions.	  	  This	  is	  called	  self-­‐esteem.	  	  Thus	  the	  authoritative	  person	  must	  be	  vigilant	  about	  their	  plurisingularity/agential	  potential	  (gu	  junzi	  bi	  shenqidu	  ye	  故君子必慎其獨也).	  	  When	  petty	  persons	  are	  dwelling	  at	  ease	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  their	  iniquity.	  	  When	  they	  see	  an	  authoritative	  person	  however	  they	  straighten	  up	  their	  act	  and	  attach	  themselves	  to	  the	  good.	  	  In	  considering	  how	  other	  persons	  view	  you	  there	  is	  great	  benefit	  in	  thinking	  it	  is	  like	  looking	  directly	  at	  your	  innermost	  self.	  	  This	  is	  called	  creative	  integrity	  within	  manifesting	  in	  your	  appearance	  without.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  must	  be	  ever	  so	  vigilant	  in	  their	  plurisingularity	  (慎其獨).	  	  Zengzi	  said:	  "Ten	  eyes	  upon	  me,	  ten	  hands	  pointing	  me	  out,	  oh	  how	  serious	  this	  is!"	  Wealth	  adorns	  rooms,	  and	  virtue	  adorns	  persons.	  	  If	  the	  heartmind	  is	  broadly	  cultivated	  the	  body	  will	  be	  luxuriant.	  	  Thus	  authoritative	  persons	  must	  creatively	  integrate	  their	  intentionality.8	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Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  du	  獨	  is	  probably	  etymologically	  related	  to	  a	  canine	  creature	  isolated	  from	  its	  pack9	  and	  the	  second	  instance	  of	  the	  phrase	  in	  the	  above	  passage	  follows	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  petty	  persons	  are	  capable	  of	  when	  isolated	  in	  a	  solitary	  dwelling,	  many	  commentators,	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  Zheng	  Xuan	  and	  Zhu	  Xi's	  glossings,	  have	  understood	  shendu	  慎獨	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  ontic	  or	  existential	  notion	  of	  aloneness	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Whether	  understood	  as	  a	  physical	  sense	  of	  privacy	  or	  as	  a	  moral	  psychological	  notion	  of	  pure	  inwardness,	  both	  readings	  of	  shendu	  as	  being	  "cautious	  in	  one's	  aloneness"	  unfortunately	  would	  seem	  to	  diminish	  the	  semantic	  richness	  of	  a	  concept	  particularly	  apt	  to	  be	  understood	  correlatively	  as	  a	  creative	  pattern	  of	  dynamic	  and	  vital	  relationality.	  	   The	  intersubjective	  nature	  of	  shendu	  is	  highlighted	  by	  Tu	  Wei-­‐Ming	  as	  an	  "ordinary	  process	  of	  self-­‐education"10	  and	  he	  recommends	  "the	  art	  and	  science	  of	  'vigilant	  solitariness'	  as	  the	  authentic	  method	  of	  self-­‐cultivation":	  The	  conventional	  practice	  of	  rendering	  shendu	  as	  "watchful	  when	  one	  is	  alone"	  may	  lead	  us	  to	  think	  that	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  behaving	  properly	  in	  private	  as	  well	  in	  public.	  	  This	  interpretation	  makes	  sense,	  but	  it	  only	  scratches	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Problematik	  that	  shendu	  addresses.	  	  In	  Zhongyong，	  the	  term	  du,	  which	  may	  mean	  "being	  alone,"	  seems	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  self	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  singularity,	  uniqueness	  and	  innermost	  core.11	  	  	  	  But	  absent	  the	  notion	  of	  ontologically	  discrete	  individuals,	  what	  sense	  can	  we	  make	  of	  singularity	  of	  persons	  and	  corresponding	  ideas	  of	  ethicoreligious	  inwardness	  or	  resolute	  human	  becoming	  (i.e.	  creative	  agency)?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Shuowen	  Jiezi,	  entry	  on	  du	  獨,	  p.205 上.	  	  獨：犬相得而鬬也。从犬蜀聲。羊為羣，犬為獨也。
一曰北嚻山有獨𤞞獸，如虎，白身，豕鬣，尾如馬。	  10	  See	  Tu	  Weiming,	  Centrality	  and	  Commonality:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Confucian	  Religiousness	  (SUNY,	  1989),	  p.23.	  11	  Ibid.,	  p.109.	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   Roger	  Ames	  argues	  that	  within	  a	  collateral	  and	  co-­‐creative	  cosmology	  of	  classical	  China	  it	  is	  requisite	  "that	  one	  resort	  to	  a	  focus/field	  rather	  than	  a	  part/whole	  explanatory	  model	  in	  understanding	  the	  intrinsic	  relationships	  that	  obtain	  among	  insistent	  particulars	  and	  their	  contextualizing	  world"	  and	  that	  "in	  the	  absence	  of	  discrete,	  externally	  related	  'objects'	  or	  'things,'	  causal	  interpretations	  must	  be	  replaced	  by	  the	  intuition	  of	  situated,	  interdependent,	  synergistic,	  and	  mutually	  creative	  processes."12	  	  In	  developing	  this	  focus-­‐field	  model	  of	  creative	  agency	  and	  personal	  becoming	  Ames	  also	  appeals	  extensively	  to	  the	  recently	  excavated	  Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct（Wuxing	  《五行》）traditionally	  attributed	  to	  Zisizi,	  to	  contextualize	  vitally	  relational	  thinking	  about	  shendu	  慎獨.13	  	   In	  the	  context	  of	  discussing	  the	  experiential	  continuity	  thesis	  of	  virtuosity	  in	  
tian	  天-­‐accomplished	  sagacity	  the	  "Five	  Modes	  of	  Proper	  Conduct"	  Wuxing	  text	  poetically	  alludes	  to	  nesting	  birds:	  The	   wujiu	   nesting	   in	   the	   willow	   tree	   has	   seven	   fledglings.	   	   The	   refined	  authoritative	  person	  (junzi	  君子)	  has	  a	  singularly	  unique	  comportment.	   	  To	  be	  capable	  of	  singularity,	  one	  can	  then	  be	  said	  to	  be	  an	  authoritative	  person.	  	  The	  authoritative	  person	  remains	  vigilant	  about	  their	  singularity	  (junzi	  shen	  
qi	  du	  ye	  君子慎其獨也).14	  	  The	  text	  makes	  another	  poetic	  reference	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  birds	  in	  the	  emotionally	  laden	   situation	   of	   seeing	   off	   a	   [possibly	   estranged]	   loved	   one	   on	   for	   an	   indefinite	  duration:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  A	  Vocabulary,	  (University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2011),	  p.71.	  13	  See	  Roger	  T.	  Ames,	  "Collaterality	  in	  Early	  Chinese	  Cosmology:	  An	  Argument	  for	  Confucian	  Harmony	  (he	  和)	  as	  Creatio	  In	  Situ"	  Taiwan	  Journal	  of	  East	  Asian	  Studies,	  vol.	  2,	  no.	  1,	  June	  2005,	  pp.43-­‐70.	  14	  Wuxing,	  strip	  184.	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"The	  swallows	  go	  flying	  about,	  with	  their	  wings	  disheveledly	  displayed.	  	  The	  lady	  was	  returning	  [to	  her	  native	  state],	  and	  I	  escorted	  her	  far	  into	  the	  country.	  	  I	  looked	  until	  I	  could	  no	  longer	  see	  her,	  and	  my	  tears	  feel	  down	  like	  rain	  drops."	  	  Only	  when	  you	  are	  able	  to	  display	  your	  wings	  disheveldly	  do	  you	  understand	  the	  utmost	  sadness.	  	  A	  profound	  person	  acts	  to	  shenqidu	  慎
其獨.15	  	  This	   passage	   highlights	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   the	   inward	   comportment	   of	   the	  authoritative	   person	   is	   so	   resolutely	   focused	   on	   the	   affective	   dynamics	   of	   the	  immediate	  situation	  (qing	  情)	  so	  as	  to	  optimally	  realize	  the	  situational	  potentials	  for	  meaningful	  communication	  and	  personal	  growth.	   	  Whatever	   this	  passage	  of	  poetic	  commentary	   is	   alluding	   to,	   it	   most	   certainly	   is	   not	   a	   celebration	   of	   some	  ontologically	  discrete	  sense	  of	  psychological	  inwardness.	  	  This	  bit	  of	  Book	  of	  Odes	  Si-­‐Meng	   commentary	   reveals	   a	   deep	   appreciation	   of	   the	   relational	   potentials	   of	  persons	   in	   their	   role-­‐focused	   situations	   atmospherically	   saturated	   with	  responsibility.	  	   The	  Wuxing	  text	  also	  suggests	  that	  by	  "abandoning"	  (she	  舍)	  the	  five	  modes	  of	  virtuosic	  conduct	  as	  mere	  external	  trappings	  of	  behavior—'consummate	  conduct'	  
ren	  仁,	   'optimal	   appropriateness'	   yi	  義,	   'ritual	   propriety'	   li	  禮,	   'pragmatic	  wisdom'	  
zhi	  智,	   	   and	   'sagacity'	   sheng	  聖—one	   can	   be	   truly	   said	   to	   be	   "maintaining	   careful	  vigilance	  over	  their	  heartmind"	  (shenqixin	  慎其心).16	  And	  it	  is	  similarly	  claimed	  that	  by	  "abandoning	  the	  body"	  (sheti	  舍體)	  as	  a	  vessel	  of	  transactional	  qi	  氣	  potentiality	  that	  the	  "utmost	  inwardness"	  or	  better	  "optimal	  intrinsicality"	  (zhinei	  至內)17	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ibid.,	  strip	  185-­‐186.	  16	  Ibid.,	  strip	  223.	  17	  Ibid.,	  strip	  227.	  	  This	  passage	  is	  ambiguous	  in	  that	  the	  literal	  "housing"	  (she	  舍)	  could	  also	  mean	  'to	  abandon'.	  	  I	  prefer	  the	  former	  connotation,	  but	  the	  alternate	  reading	  is	  viable	  if	  we	  understand	  the	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realized	  in	  embodied	  shendu	  practice.	   	  Roger	  Ames	  consistently	  maintains	  that	  the	  focal	  intrinsicality	  of	  situationally	  located	  persons	  is	  always	  already	  a	  transactional,	  dynamic,	  and	  correlative	  affair:	  The	   always-­‐unique	   persons	   in	   this	   collateral	   sense—this	   daughter	   to	   this	  mother—do	  not	  "have"	  relationships,	  or	  "come	  into"	  relationships,	  but	  rather	  are	  constituted	  as	   irreducibly	  relational	  by	   those	  bonds	   that	   locate	   them	  as	  foci	  within	  the	  field	  of	  the	  big	  family.	  	  They	  begin	  as	  "we"	  rather	  than	  "I."	  	  As	  Mencius	   claims,	   "all	   things	   are	   here	   in	   me,"	   and	   most	   immediately	   and	  importantly	  among	  all	  things	  are	  one's	  family	  relations.	  	  Indeed,	  any	  putative	  "individuality"	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   either	   an	   abstraction	   from	   these	  concrete,	   native,	   and	   primarily	   acquired	   conditions,	   or	   an	   achieved	  distinctiveness	   cultivated	   in	   one's	   relations	  with	   others	   that	  makes	   one	   an	  identifiable	   object	   of	   deference.	   	   Similarly,	   any	   notion	   of	   "family"	   is	   an	  abstraction	   from	   these	   specific,	   particular	   persons	   who	   collectively	   and	  organically	  constitute	  a	  human	  nexus.	  	  Both	  particular	  persons	  and	  particular	  families	  are	  concrete	  configurations	  of	  particular	  relationships,	  and	  stand	  in	  a	  dynamic	  focus-­‐field	  relationship	  with	  one	  another.18	  	  Resolute	  focus	  in	  contexts	  of	  role-­‐focused	  familial	  and	  social	  relationships	  is	  always	  a	  product	  of	  transactional	  experience	  within	  concrete	  configurations	  of	  biopolitical	  energies	  and	  dynamics.	  	  We	  might	  wish	  to	  consider	  teacher-­‐student	  role	  reciprocity	  in	  light	  of	  this	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  persons.	  	  In	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  effective	  ethico-­‐religious	  education	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  handing	  down	  dogmatic	  catechisms	  to	  be	   recited	   by	   rote,	   but	   is	   rather	   a	   transactional	   affair	   wherein	   both	   teacher	   and	  student	  are	  transformed	  by	  processes	  of	  learning	  how	  to	  become	  more	  flourishingly	  human	  together.	  	   It	   is	  my	  position	  here	   that	  we	  understand	   the	  experience	  and	  aspiration	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  shendu	  not	  as	  the	  cultivation	  of	  some	  ontologically	  discrete	  notion	  of	  psychological	  identity	  or	  the	  preservation	  of	  some	  purportedly	  innate	  substance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  abandoned	  body	  to	  be	  that	  of	  mere	  mechanical	  performance	  of	  ritually	  expected	  modes	  of	  conduct	  and	  not	  the	  wholehearted	  engagement	  with	  the	  transactional	  potentials	  of	  any	  given	  situation.	  18	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics,	  p.144.	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stipulating	   forever	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   "essentially"	   human;	   instead,	   we	   should	  focus	   on	   transactional	   potentials	   of	   persons-­‐in-­‐process	   of	   focusing	   their	   role	  responsibilities	  as	  always	  unique	  agential	  human	  becomings.	  	  	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  role	  modeling	  becomes	  readily	  obvious.	   	  By	  role	  modeling	  here	   I	  do	  not	   mean	   to	   indicate	   the	   paradigmatic	   performance	   of	   certain	   pre-­‐established	  modes	   of	   stereotypical	   moral	   conduct.	   	   Rather,	   what	   I	   have	   in	   mind	   is	   the	  inspirational	  sharing	  of	  styles	  for	  resolutely	  focusing	  in	  exemplary	  conduct	  in	  role-­‐focused	  creativity	  (chengzhizhe	  誠之者).	  	  This	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  inspirational	  ethical	  model	  that	  aspiring	  creative	  persons	  (sicheng	  思誠者),	   those	  desiring	  to	  optimally	  realize	  their	   potentials	   for	   personal	   growth	   and	   ameliorative	   transformation,	   given	   as	   a	  concrete	  embodiment	  of	  exemplary	  selving	  in	  the	  context	  of	  way-­‐making	  (dao	  道).	  	   In	   the	   following	  section	  we	  will	  be	  continuing	   to	  explore	   the	  contemporary	  relevance	   of	   "resolute	   becoming"	   shendu	  慎獨	   in	   thinking	   about	   embodied	   ethical	  agency	   and	   the	   vulnerabilities	   and	   opportunities—the	   real	   risks	   and	   rewards—	  involved	   in	   creatively	   integrating	   via	   role-­‐focusing	   the	   manifold	   field	   of	  relationships.	  	  Since	  we	  always	  finds	  ourselves	  projected	  as	  a	  natural	  complex	  into	  a	  given	   historical	   community	   (person	   as	   organism	   and	   as	   cultural	   presence—the	  mere	  "fact	  of	  association),	  we	  are	  tasked	  with	  consolidating	  our	  virtuosic	  habits	  to	  creatively	  interpret	  and	  make	  the	  most	  of	  this	  life	  together.	  	  But	  how	  can	  we	  take	  a	  natural	  person	  and	  make	  the	  secular	  sacred	  via	  a	  web	  of	  creative	  agency	  resolutely	  becoming	  in	  a	  creatively	  democratic	  interpreting	  community	  (li	  禮)?	  	  This	  question	  will	   be	   guiding	   our	   further	   explorations	   into	   the	   non-­‐ideal	   and	   non-­‐foundational	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ethical-­‐political	   theory	   that	   presupposes	   an	   ecstatically	   naturalistic,	   secular,	  democratic	   faith.	   	  What	  we	  might	   call	   a	   pragmatic	   Confucian	   political	   theology	   is	  what	  we	  find	  ourselves	  enmeshed	  in	  given	  the	  non-­‐foundational	  and	  pragmatically	  somaesthetic	   presuppositions	   emerging	   from	   our	   reconstruction	   of	   Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	   role	   ethics.	   	   	  As	  vectors	  of	   creative	  agency	  we	  never	  make	  autonomous	  choices	  but	  our	   constantly	  asking	   "what	   to	  do?"	   in	   terms	  of	   realizing	  ameliorative	  resolutions	   for	   complex	   ethical	   problems	   and	   predicaments.	   	   Let	   us	   continue	   to	  explore	   what	   creative	   agency	   without	   autonomous	   choice	   looks	   like	   in	   Si-­‐Meng	  discourse.	  II.	  Creative	  Agency	  without	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  	   The	   Mengzi	   often	   advertises	   a	   kind	   of	   "reflective	   engagement"	   (si 思)	  understood	  as	  an	  active	  narrative	  process	  of	  role-­‐focused	  "thinking	  and	  feeling"	  that	  is	  fully	  immersed	  in	  the	  existentially	  embodied	  and	  precariously	  temporal	  processes	  of	  "nourishing	  one's	  nature"	  (yang	  qi	  xing	  養其性)—wherein	  "nature"	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  dynamic	  life	  process	  (nature	  naturing)	  involving	  both	  "bare	  life"	  and	  narrative	  constructions	   of	   a	   self-­‐in-­‐processes	   of	   accumulating	   "optimal	   appropriateness"	   (yi	  
義)	   and	   actualizing	   "vital	   potentiality"	   (de	   德)	   in	   the	   various	   roles	   and	   family-­‐resembling	   relationships	   that	  we	   experience	   in	   the	   course	   of	   our	   lives	   viewed	   as	  future-­‐oriented	  careers	  or	  as	  "extensive	  events."19	  	  	   This	   kind	   of思-­‐thinking	   or	   "reflective	   engagement"	   model	   of	   role-­‐focused	  thinking	   and	   feeling	   (affect	   theory)	   shares	   much	   in	   common	   with	   what	   Richard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  Dewey's	  "Time	  and	  Individuality"	  (1940)	  discussed	  below.	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Shusterman	  calls	  the	  6e	  model	  of	  thinking.	  	  Shusterman	  expands	  upon	  the	  4E	  model	  of	  (enacted,	  embedded,	  extended,	  and	  embodied)	  model	  of	  consciousness	  to	  include	  the	   (esthetic	   and	   ethical)	   dimensions	   in	   a	   holistic	   somaesthetic	   pragmatism.	   	   The	  	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  dimensions	  of	  our	   cultivated	   critical	   intelligence	   (empathic	  imagination	   and	   strenuous	   motivation—zhongshu	  恕忠)	   are	   at	   the	   center	   of	   the	  "heartminding	   arts"	   (xinshu	  心術)	   of	   Si-­‐Meng	   somaesthetic	   self-­‐cultivation.	   	   This	  emergent,	   non-­‐foundational	   conception	   of	   creative	   ethical	   agency	   is	   a	   radical	  departure	   from	   the	   commonly	   posited	   disengaged	   spectatorial	   stance	   of	  'contemplation'	   or	   'disinterested	   reflection'	   undergirding	   so	   much	   ethical	   and	  political	  theory	  after	  the	  enlightenment.20	  	   While	  a	  concept	  of	  ethical	  agency	  defined	  as	   	  the	  unencumbered	  exercise	  of	  an	  autonomous	  and	  rational	  will,	   is	  definitely	  not	  going	  to	  be	  a	  very	  useful	  tool	  for	  understanding	  Si-­‐Meng	  moral	  psychology,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  have	  to	  give	  up	  on	  thinking	  through	  agency	  altogether.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  feminist	  philosopher	   of	   science,	   Karan	   Barad,	   is	   quite	   prepared	   to	   speak	   of	   an	   'agential	  realism'	  wherein	  the	  fiction	  of	  an	  autonomous	  and	  sovereign	  human	  subject	  capable	  of	   exercising	   total	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   heroically	   exercised	  will-­‐power	   is	  replaced	  with	  precariously	  cooperating	  conditions	  fostering	  the	  emergence	  of	  vitally	  realized	  nexuses	  of	  relationally	  configured	  and	  concerted	  'agency.'	  	  Barad,	  and	  more	  generally	   any	   thinker	   who	   shares,	   borrowing	   Thomas	   Kasulis'	   terminology,	   an	  
intimacy,	  as	  opposed	  to	  integrity,	  orientation—viz.,	  those	  who	  embrace	  a	  relational	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  argues	  that	  the	  enlightenment	  project	  of	  rationally	  grounded	  ethical	  theory	  was	  destined	  to	  fail	  given	  its	  individualizing	  and	  atomizing	  assumptions	  about	  persons	  abstracted	  from	  historically	  determined	  horizons	  of	  meaning	  and	  value	  (i.e.	  traditions).	  	  See	  his	  After	  Virtue.	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ontology—are,	  if	  not	  comfortable	  with	  physicalist	  nihilism—e.g.	  Lucretius	  and	  some	  (bad)	   readings	   of	   Nietzsche—are	   faced	   with	   the	   task	   of	   making	   sense	   of	   ethical	  agency	   without	   relying	   upon	   a	   foundational	   agent	   or	   any	   supernatural	   powers.	  	  	  Barad	   describes	   such	   agentless	   agency	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   artfully	   managing	   fecund	  entanglements:	  	  Agency	  is	  not	  held,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  persons	  or	  things;	  rather,	  agency	  is	  an	   enactment,	   a	  matter	   of	   possibilities	   for	   reconfiguring	   entanglements.	   So	  agency	   is	  not	  about	  choice	   in	  any	   liberal	  humanist	  sense;	  rather,	   it	   is	  about	  the	   possibilities	   and	   accountability	   entailed	   in	   reconfiguring	   material-­‐discursive	   apparatuses	   of	   bodily	   production,	   including	   the	   boundary	  articulations	  and	  exclusions	  that	  are	  marked	  by	  those	  practices.21	  	  	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  the	  art	  of	  realizing	  fecund	  entanglements	  as	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  embodied	  agency	  in	  Deweyan	  pragmatism.	  	  We	  will	  be	  looking	  closely	   at	   his	   1940	   essay	   "Time	   and	   Individuality"	   as	   a	   signature	   statement	   on	  making	   sense	   of	   unique	   personal	   "identity"	   as	   a	   temporal	   process	   and	   the	  concomitant	  sense	  of	  creative	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  potential	  (transactional	  futurity)	  as	  agency.	  	   In	   "Time	   and	   Individuality"22	  John	   Dewey	   rejects	   any	   notion	   of	   potential	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  traditionally	  Aristotelian	  conception	  of	  pre-­‐determined	  essence	  awaiting	  the	  right	  external	  conditions	  to	  manifest	  a	  fixed	  teleological	  order.	  	  In	  this	  succinct	  essay	  he	  offers	  a	  radically	  prospective	  and	  pragmatic	  conception	  of	  human	  potentiality	  grounded	  in	  a	  creative	  ethic	  of	  freedom.	  	  Dewey	  argues	  that	  ideas	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  From	  New	  Materialism	  Interviews	  and	  Cartographies	  (2013)	  "Matter	  feels,	  converses,	  suffers,	  desires,	  yearns	  and	  remembers—An	  Interview	  with	  Karen	  Barad".	  	  Another	  great	  place	  to	  explore	  a	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  grounded	  in	  a	  "new	  materialist"	  feminist	  perspective	  is	  Jane	  Bennett's	  
Vibrant	  Matter:	  A	  Political	  Ecology	  of	  Things	  (Duke,	  2009).	  22	  "Time	  and	  Individuality"	  in	  John	  Dewey	  On	  Experience,	  Nature,	  and	  Freedom	  ed.	  Richard	  Bernstein	  (1960).	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"eternal	   and	   immutable	   is	   the	   consummation	  of	  mortal	  man's	  quest	   for	   certainty"	  and	   that	   the	   traditional	  divisions	  of	  post-­‐Platonic	  philosophy	   (idealist,	  materialist,	  mechanist,	  teleologist,	  realist,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  traditional	  atomistic	  form	  of	  empiricism)	  all	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  family	  failing	  of	  wishing	  to	  seek	  out	  what	  is	  "ultimately	  real	  [as]	  fixed	  and	  unchanging,	  even	  though	  they	  have	  been	  as	  far	  apart	  as	  the	  poles	  in	  their	  ideas	  	  of	  its	  constitution."23	  	  According	  to	  Dewey,	  it	  was	  only	  with	  the	  dawn	  of	  "the	  enlightenment,	   the	  eclaircissement,	   the	  Aufklarung—names	  which	  in	  the	  three	  most	   advanced	   countries	   of	   Europe	   testified	   to	   the	  widespread	   belief	   that	   at	   last	  light	   had	   dawned,	   that	   dissipation	   of	   the	   darkness	   of	   ignorance,	   superstition,	   and	  bigotry	  was	   at	  hand,	   and	   the	   triumph	  of	   reason	  was	   assured—for	   reason	  was	   the	  counterpart	   in	  man	   of	   the	   laws	   of	   nature	  which	   science	  was	   disclosing."24	  	  While	  Dewey's	   pragmatic	   naturalism	   rejects	   the	   "triumph	   of	   reason"	   as	   a	   form	   of	  epistemological	  tyranny,	  the	  move	  away	  from	  fixed	  Aristotelian	  potentialities	  to	  the	  "vista	   of	   the	   indefinite	   perfectibility	   of	   man	   was	   opened"	   leading	   eventually	   to	   a	  pragmatic	  disavowal	  of	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  ideal	  epistemic	  subject—a	  conception	  grounded	   in	   a	   "spectator	   theory	   of	   knowledge"	   and	   the	   positing	   instead	   of	   the	  ameliorative	   ideals	   socially	   imagined	   by	   a	   cultivated	   critical	   intelligence	   and	  sustained	  ethics	  of	  creative	  democracy.	  	  	  	   Dewey	   claims	   that	   it	   wasn't	   until	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   that	   "the	  doctrine	   of	   the	   subordination	   of	   time	   and	   change	   seriously	   challenged."25	  	   And	  according	   to	   Dewey	   it	   was	   Henri	   Bergson	   and	  William	   James	   that	   first	   "installed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ibid.,	  p.226.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.227.	  25	  Ibid.,	  p.228.	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change	   at	   the	   very	   heart	   of	   things"	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   speculative	   and	   naturalistic	  metaphysics	  of	  experience.	  	  According	  to	  Dewey,	  it	  was	  precisely	  these	  two	  thinkers	  who	   caused	   a	  Copernican	   revolution	   in	   thinking	   about	   life	   and	   consciousness	   and	  reinstated	  the	  importance	  of	  moral	  and	  artistic	  values	  in	  an	  "ongoing	  vital	  creative	  course.	   .	   .whose	   behavior	   and	   outcome	   are	   unpredictable	   both	   mechanically	   and	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  ends."26	  	  	  	   Dewey	   rehearses	   a	   Jamesian	   condemnation	  of	   all	   "block-­‐universe"	   thinking	  that	   is	   a	   result	   of	   a	   moribundly	   mechanistic	   conception	   of	   causation.	   	   It	   doesn't	  matter	   whether	   we	   are	   mechanistic	   materialists	   or	   supernatural	   idealists	   in	   a	  "block-­‐universe"	  philosophy:	  	  [For]	  both	  hold	   to	  a	   closed	  universe	   in	  which	   there	   is	  no	  room	   for	  novelty	  and	   adventure.	   	   Both	   sacrifice	   individuality	   and	   all	   the	   values,	   moral	   and	  aesthetic,	  which	  hang	  upon	  individuality,	  for	  according	  to	  absolute	  idealism,	  as	  to	  mechanistic	  materialism,	  the	  individual	  is	  simply	  a	  part	  determined	  by	  the	  whole	  of	  which	  he	   is	  a	  part.	   	  Only	  a	  philosophy	  of	  pluralism,	  of	  genuine	  indetermination,	  and	  of	  change	  which	  is	  real	  and	  intrinsic	  gives	  significance	  to	   individuality.	   	   It	   alone	   justifies	   the	  struggle	   in	   creative	  activity	  and	  gives	  opportunity	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  genuinely	  new.27	  	  Dewey	   uses	   quantum	   mechanics	   and	   a	   still-­‐being-­‐written,	   hermeneutically	  expansive	   biography	   of	   Abraham	   Lincoln	   as	   primary	   examples	   of	   transactional	  individuality	  as	  creative	  agency	  in	  this	  essay.	  	  Dewey	  considers	  the	  life	  of	  Lincoln	  as	  "an	  extensive	  event;	  or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  it	  is	  a	  course	  of	  events	  each	  of	  which	  takes	  up	  into	   itself	   something	  of	  what	  went	  before	  and	   leads	  on	   to	   that	  which	  comes	  after.	  	  The	  skill,	  the	  art,	  of	  the	  biographer	  is	  displayed	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  discover	  and	  portray	  the	  subtle	  ways,	  hidden	  often	  from	  the	  individual	  himself,	  in	  which	  one	  event	  grows	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid.,	  p.227.	  27	  Ibid.,	  p.229.	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out	  of	  those	  which	  preceded	  and	  enters	  into	  those	  which	  follow....Individuality	  is	  the	  
uniqueness	   of	   the	   history,	   of	   the	   career,	   not	   something	   given	   once	   for	   all	   at	   the	  beginning	  which	  then	  proceeds	  to	  unroll	  as	  a	  ball	  of	  yarn	  may	  be	  unwound.	  	  Lincoln	  made	   history.	   	   But	   it	   is	   just	   as	   true	   that	   he	  made	   himself	   as	   an	   individual	   in	   the	  history	  he	  made."28	  	  	   This	   reciprocal	   transformation	   of	   narrative	   history	   and	   transactionally	  "individual"	   potency	   is	   conceived	   by	   Dewey	   to	   be	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   all	   processes	   of	  change.	   	   It	   would	   seem	   that	   an	   animate/inanimate	   ontological	   division	   would	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  real	  change	  and	  creative	  novelty	  on	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  this	  exclusive	  division.	  	  But	  Dewey	  problematizes	  the	  ease	  in	  which	  we	  might	  think	  of	  an	  atomistic	  universe	  as	  a	  "block-­‐universe"	  deterministic	  givenness.	  	  Dewey	  considers	  so-­‐called	   "inanimate	   elements"	   and	   "the	   prevailing	   view	   has	   been	   that	   time	   and	  sequential	   change	   are	   entirely	   foreign	   to	   their	   nature."	  And	  nowhere	   is	   this	  more	  evident	   than	   in	   the	   	   "classic	   conception	   of	   atoms"29	  as	   indivisible	   and	   unalterable	  basic	   elements	   or	   building-­‐blocks	   of	   all	   things.	   	   For	   those	   that	   adhere	   to	   such	   an	  ontological	  divide	   there	   is	   thought	   to	  be	  a	  "sheer	  dualism	  between	  man	  and	  other	  things"	  (the	  truly	  animate	  vs.	  the	  merely	  mechanistic).	  	  But	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  metaphysics	   there	   have	   always	   been	   "a	   few	   daring	   souls	   who	   have	   held	   that	  temporal	   quality	   and	   historical	   career	   are	   a	  mark	   of	   everything,	   including	   atomic	  elements,	  to	  which	  individuality	  may	  be	  attributed."30	  Dewey	  could	  have	  mentioned	  Enlightenment	   thinkers	   like	   Leibniz,	   Spinoza,	   Hegel	   and	   others	  who	   attempted	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.230.	  29	  Ibid.,	  p.231.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.232.	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take	   change	   seriously	   in	   their	   respective	   modes	   of	   metaphysical	   inquiry.	   	   Or	   he	  might	   have	   taken	   a	   cue	   from	   the	   process	   metaphysician	   A.N.	   Whitehead	   by	  suggesting	  that	  present	  in	  any	  thinker	  there	  is	  an	  interplay	  of	  rational	  and	  aesthetic	  orders	   of	   interpretations—with	   the	   former	   type	   of	   thinking	   taking	   a	   Part-­‐Whole	  static	   conception	   of	   mechanistic	   causation	   and	   the	   latter	   type	   of	   thinking	  presupposing	  a	  Focus-­‐Field	  dynamic	  of	  aesthetic,	  correlative	  influence.	  	  In	  any	  event,	  Dewey	  is	  able	  to	  derive	  three	  related	  dictums	  regarding	  the	  constitution	  of	  things	  in	  a	  post-­‐relativity	  understanding	  of	  quantum	  mechanics:	  1)	  scientific	  objects	  are	  purely	  relational;	  2)	  scientific	  laws	  are	  "probability	  statements"	  or	  "statistical	  generalizations";	  3)	  Heisenberg's	  principle	  of	  uncertainty	  or	   indeterminacy	  doesn't	  allow	   for	  simple	  location.	  	  Dewey	   recognizes	   that	   so-­‐called	   natural	   "laws	   do	   not	   'govern'	   the	   activity	   of	  individuals."	  	  Instead	  they	  are	  just	  the	  "formulation	  of	  the	  frequency-­‐distributions	  of	  the	   behavior	   of	   large	   numbers	   of	   individuals	   engaged	   in	   interactions	   with	   one	  another."31	  	  	   Dewey	   later	   rejects	   the	   language	   of	   "interaction"	   as	   too	   passive	   and	   not	  relational	  enough.	  	  In	  his	  later	  works	  (after	  Experience	  and	  Nature)	  he	  preferred	  to	  speak	   instead	   of	   "transaction"	   with	   the	   "trans-­‐"	   prefix	   indicating	   the	   non-­‐foundational,	   reciprocal	   entanglement	   of	   things	   as	   abstractions	   from	   primary	  relationality.	   	  According	  to	  Dewey,	  the	  prefix	  "inter-­‐"	  would	  seem	  to	  still	  be	  caught	  up	   in	   a	   "block-­‐universe"	   mentality	   wherein	   relata	   can	   in	   some	   meaningful	  ontological	   sense	   be	   thought	   to	   pre-­‐exist	   in	   some	   form	   or	   another	   their	   various	  relationships.	   	   In	  considering	  the	  transactional	  career	  of	  Lincoln,	  Dewey	  highlights	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ibid.,	  p.236.	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the	  kind	  of	  agency	  involved	  in	  commanding	  situations	  in	  an	  "individual"	  narrative.	  	  The	  "career	  which	  is	  [Lincoln's]	  unique	  individuality	  is	  the	  series	  of	  interactions	  in	  which	  he	  was	  created	  to	  be	  what	  he	  was	  by	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  responded	  to	  the	  occasions	  with	  which	  he	  was	  presented.	  	  One	  cannot	  leave	  out	  either	  conditions	  as	  
opportunities	   nor	   yet	   unique	   ways	   of	   responding	   to	   them."32	  For	   Dewey,	   every	  "occasion	  is	  an	  opportunity	  only	  when	  it	   is	  an	  evocation	  of	  a	  specific	  event,	  while	  a	  response	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	   effect	   of	   a	   cause	  but	   is	   a	  way	  of	   using	   an	   occasion	   to	  render	   it	   a	   constituent	   of	   an	   ongoing	   unique	   history."33	  	   Dewey's	   thinking	   about	  "Individuality"	  as	  a	  transactional	  achievement	  "evoked"	  by	  commanding	  situations	  can	   only	   be	   properly	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	   temporal-­‐narrative	   (qualitative)	  development.	   	   For	   Dewey	   such	   narrative	   development	   involves	   uncertainty,	  indeterminacy,	   and	   contingency.	   	   But	   it	   is	   these	   precarious	   conditions	   of	  vulnerability	   that	   are	   the	   very	   "essence"	   of	   agency	   and	   not	   mere	   teleological	  "accidents."	  	   Despite	   wanting	   to	   blur	   the	   line	   between	   animate	   agency	   and	   inanimate	  mechanism,	   Dewey	   doesn't	   think	   that	   "physical	   and	   human	   individuality	   are	  identical,	   nor	   that	   the	   things	   which	   appear	   to	   us	   to	   be	   nonliving	   have	   the	  distinguishing	   characteristic	   of	   organisms.	   	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   inanimate	  and	  the	  animate	  is	  not	  so	  easily	  wiped	  out.	   	  But	  it	  does	  show	  that	  there	  is	  no	  fixed	  gap	   between	   them"	   and	   that	   "the	   principle	   of	   a	   developing	   career	   applies	   to	   all	  things	  in	  nature."34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.239.	  33	  Ibid.,	  (Italics	  added	  for	  emphasis).	  34	  Ibid.,	  p.236.	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   At	  this	  point	  in	  the	  essay	  Dewey	  goes	  on	  to	  introduce	  the	  so-­‐called	  "problem	  of	   time"	   as	   a	   question	   of	   merely	   quantitative	   alteration	   versus	   truly	   qualitative	  transformation.	   	   If	   all	   things	   have	   a	   temporal	   career,	   the	   important	   question	   is	  clearly	   what	   can	   we	   make	   of	   ourselves	   as	   a	   career	   and	   not	   whether	   we	   have	  freedom	  to	  act	  at	  all.	   	  But	  Dewey	  does	  recognize	   that	   "since	   it	   is	  a	  problem	   [he	   is]	  presenting,	   [he]	   shall	   assume	   that	   genuine	   transformations	   occur,	   and	   consider	  [their]	   implications."35	  	   Dewey	   goes	   on	   to	   state	   the	   problem	   both	   negatively	   as	   a	  historical-­‐metaphysical	  exclusion	  and	  positively	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  provocation:	  1)	  Negatively:	  "the	  idea	  (which	  is	  often	  identified	  with	  the	  essential	  meaning	  of	   evolution)	   is	   excluded	   that	   development	   is	   a	   process	   of	   unfolding	   what	  was	  previously	  implicit	  or	  latent."	  	  2)	  Positively:	  "potentiality	  is	  a	  category	  of	  existence,	  for	  development	  cannot	  occur	  unless	  an	  individual	  has	  powers	  or	  capacities	  that	  are	  not	  actualized	  at	  a	   given	   time.	   	   But	   it	   also	  means	   that	   these	   powers	   are	   not	   unfolded	   from	  within,	  but	  are	  called	  out	  through	  interaction	  with	  other	  things."36	  	  	  For	   Dewey,	   the	   importance	   of	   transactional	   thinking	   precludes	   any	   reductionist,	  mechanical,	  causal	  "interactionism."	   	  The	  "primacy	  of	  relationality"	  is	  embraced	  by	  Dewey	   as	   a	   background	   presupposition	   for	   all	   thinking	   through	   agency	   and	  aesthetico-­‐ethical	  creativity.	  	  This	  certainly	  resonates	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  tendency	  to	  understand	   "nature	   naturing"	   as	   "emerging	   from	   conditions/commanding	  situations"	   (xingziming	   chu	   《性自命出》).	   	   Dewey	   recognizes	   that	   while	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  revive	  the	  category	  of	  potentiality	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  individuality,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  revived	  in	  a	  different	  form	  from	  that	  of	  its	  classic	  Aristotelian	  formulation"	  because	  	  according	  to	  the	  old	  Aristotelian	  view,	  "potentialities	  are	  connected	  with	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  p.227.	  36	  Ibid.,	  p.237	  (italics	  my	  own).	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fixed	   end	   which	   the	   individual	   endeavors	   by	   its	   own	   nature	   or	   essence	   to	  actualize."37	  Instead	   of	   presupposing	   contingency	   and	   moral	   effort	   to	   be	   mere	  "accidents"	   of	   success,	   Dewey	   wants	   us	   to	   put	   a	   transactional	   understanding	   of	  change	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  thinking	  about	  individuality	  as	  an	  ethical	  achievement.	  	   Dewey	   argues	   that	   potentialities	   "must	   be	   thought	   of	   in	   terms	   of	  consequences	  of	   interactions	  with	  other	   things"	   and	   that	   "potentialities	   cannot	  be	  
known	   until	   after	   the	   interactions	   [or	   better	   'transactions']	   have	   occurred."38	  	  Dewey's	  commitment	  to	  experimentalism	  and	  fallibilism	  in	  ethical	  theory	  becomes	  readily	  obvious	  here.	  	  We	  must	  first	  assay	  an	  adventure	  (imaginatively	  or	  practically)	  before	  we	  can	  make	  any	  post	  hoc	  judgments	  as	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  course	  of	  conduct.	   	  This	   is	  the	  same	  in	  aesthetic	  matters	  of	  creation	  and	  appreciation	  and	  the	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  we	  are	  exploring	  shares	  a	  similar	  commitment	  to	  experimentalism,	   fallibilism,	   and	   a	   general	   aestheticism	   in	   matters	   of	   "optimal	  appropriateness"	   yi	  義 and	   ethical	   sensibility.	   	   Let	   us	   return	   now	   to	   exploring	   Si-­‐Meng	   thinking	   in	   the	   context	   of	   neighboring	   pre-­‐Qin	   textual	   traditions	   and	  conceptual	  clusters.	  III.	  Xunzi	  and	  Zhuangzi	  on	  "True-­‐ing"	  (shen	  慎)	  and	  "Singular	  Transforming"	  (du	  獨)	  	   We've	  already	  seen	  how	  the	  Xunzi	  criticizes	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  for	  being	  overly	  reliant	  upon	  a	  "Five	  Phases"	  (wuxing	  五行)	  relational	  cosmology	  of	  physiognomic	  appearance	  and	  for	  not	  having	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  theory	  of	  agency	  and	  ethical	  regime	  for	  self-­‐cultivation.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  some	  of	  the	  very	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ibid.,	  p.238.	  38	  Ibid.,	  p.238.	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same	  vocabulary	  that	  is	  criticized	  plays	  into	  the	  core	  conceptual	  cluster	  found	  in	  the	  
Xunzi	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  potentials	  for	  unrefined	  or	  "crude"	  (e	  惡)	  human	  nature	  to	  be	  "efficaciously	  directed"	  (xing	  shan	  性善)	  prior	  to	  ritual	  refinement.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  passage	  that	  explicitly	  references	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  ritual	  construction	  of	  creative	  agency:	  There	  is	  nothing	  more	  efficacious	  for	  an	  authoritative	  person	  to	  nourish	  their	  heartminding	  processes	  than	  creative	  integrity	  (cheng	  誠).	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  more	  important	  [for	  the	  ethical	  project]	  than	  realizing	  the	  utmost	  creative	  integrity.	  .	  .Authoritative	  persons	  when	  optimally	  potent	  (de	  德)	  don't	  need	  to	  speak	  yet	  are	  expressive,	  they	  don't	  need	  to	  act	  but	  are	  received	  with	  familial	  affection,	  they	  don't	  need	  to	  get	  angry	  yet	  they	  are	  respected.	  	  They	  can	  achieve	  such	  flowing	  command	  (shun	  ming	  順命)	  by	  concerning	  themselves	  with	  their	  creativity	  (shen	  qi	  du	  ye	  慎其獨也).	  	  For	  those	  truly	  effective	  at	  way-­‐making,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  creative	  integrity,	  there	  cannot	  be	  "transactional	  individuality"	  (du	  獨);	  without	  transactional	  individuality	  there	  can	  be	  no	  signature	  style	  (xing	  形);	  without	  signature	  style,	  although	  there	  is	  heartminding	  intentionality,	  expressive	  physiognomy,	  and	  verbal	  exhortations,	  the	  multitudes	  will	  be	  as	  if	  they	  have	  no	  exemplar—even	  if	  they	  were	  to	  follow	  an	  exemplar	  it	  would	  be	  full	  of	  doubt/hesitation	  (yi	  疑).	  	  Heaven	  and	  earth	  are	  great!	  	  Without	  "creative	  integrity"	  the	  myriad	  things	  cannot	  transform	  (hua	  化).	  	  The	  wisdom	  of	  the	  Sages	  is	  such	  that	  they	  recognize	  that	  without	  creative	  integrity	  they	  cannot	  transform	  the	  multitudes.39	  	  The	  clear	  connection	  between	  "creative	  integrity"	  and	  "transactional	  individuality"	  is	  discussed	  in	  an	  exemplarist	  theoretical	  context	  of	  "transformation"	  (hua	  化).	  	  It	  is	  by	  focusing	  one's	  refined	  sense	  of	  ritual	  comportment	  and	  relational	  efficacy	  that	  one	  can	  really	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  social	  fabric	  as	  a	  powerful	  exemplar.	  	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39君子養心莫善於誠，致誠則無它事矣.	  .	  .	  .君子至德，默然而喻，未施而親，不怒而威，夫此順命
，以慎其獨者也。善之為道者，不誠則不獨，不獨則不形，不形則雖作於心，見於色，出於言，民
猶若未從也，雖從必疑。天地為大矣，不誠則不能化萬物。聖人為知矣，不誠則不能化萬民。	  	  	  《
荀子。不苟》	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suasion	  of	  a	  Sage	  operates	  at	  a	  pre-­‐verbal	  and,	  for	  the	  Xunzi,	  even	  seemingly	  pre-­‐physiognomic	  level	  of	  relational	  flow.	  	  The	  natural	  and	  ritual	  realm	  of	  ethical-­‐political	  transformation	  is	  unified	  in	  this	  vision	  of	  "creative	  integrity"	  (cheng	  誠)	  focused	  by	  a	  ritualized	  space	  of	  reasons.	  	   The	  phrase	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  plays	  an	  important	  transitional	  role	  in	  this	  passage	  from	  "creative	  integrity"	  to	  exemplary	  Sagehood	  in	  the	  Xunzi.	  	  We	  see	  how	  "singularity"	  du	  獨	  connects	  with	  uniqueness	  and	  transactional	  individualism	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  "signature	  style"	  or	  "form"	  (xing	  形)	  flowing	  from	  realizing	  "commanding	  situations"	  (shunming	  順命).	  	  The	  transactional	  uniqueness	  or	  "ritual	  potential"	  indicates	  a	  singular	  capacity	  to	  optimally	  transform	  with	  the	  myriad	  things	  (huawanwu化萬物).	  	  Thus,	  the	  Xunzi,	  like	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  is	  working	  with	  an	  achievement	  notion	  of	  embodied	  "individuality"	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  somaesthetic	  holism	  and	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  for	  us	  to	  read	  the	  text	  as	  offering	  a	  reductionistic	  view	  of	  persons	  as	  merely	  mechanistic	  ritualized	  automatons.	  	  	  	   With	  regards	  to	  the	  "resolve"	  or	  "caring	  attention"	  (shen	  慎)	  part	  of	  the	  phrase,	  it	  occurs	  a	  total	  of	  thirty-­‐five	  times	  throughout	  the	  Xunzi.	  	  For	  example	  we	  have	  a	  number	  of	  passages	  that	  refers	  to	  "authoritative	  persons	  being	  concerned	  with	  how	  they	  are	  establishing	  themselves"	  (junzi	  shen	  qi	  suo	  li	  君子慎其所立).	  	  I	  think	  we	  benefit	  from	  putting	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  conceptual	  cluster	  into	  conversation	  not	  only	  with	  the	  Xunzi	  as	  a	  contrasting	  Confucian	  theoretical	  position,	  but	  also	  by	  considering	  the	  concepts	  du	  獨	  and	  shen	  慎	  in	  a	  text	  like	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  well.	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   This	  transactionally	  conceived	  "individualistic"	  language	  of	  "uniqueness"	  (du	  
獨)	  also	  occurs	  quite	  frequently	  in	  the	  Inner,	  Outer,	  and	  Miscellaneous	  chapters	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi.40	  	  Clearly	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  important	  pre-­‐Qin	  Daoist	  text	  employed	  this	  term	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  philosophical	  precision	  within	  their	  working	  conceptual	  clusters.	  	  While	  perhaps	  not	  as	  prevalent	  or	  central	  as	  the	  focus-­‐field	  language	  of	  "way-­‐making"	  and	  "virtuosity"	  (daode	  道德),	  the	  term	  du	  獨	  occurs	  over	  45	  times	  in	  the	  received	  Zhuangzi	  text	  and	  is	  frequently	  associated	  with	  "transformation"	  hua	  化	  and	  "heavenly/natural"	  (tian	  天).	  	  Here	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  just	  two	  passages	  from	  the	  inner	  chapters	  to	  introduce	  a	  contrasting	  but	  resonant	  conceptual	  cluster	  involving	  "transactional	  uniqueness"	  (du	  獨).	  	  In	  the	  "Virtuosic	  Completion	  Pattern/Talisman"	  (dechongfu	  德充符)	  chapter	  the	  following	  story	  culminates	  with	  a	  description	  of	  being	  completed	  by	  "tian	  天	  uniqueness":	  	  	   Hunchback	  Crawler,	  who	  was	  deformed	  and	  lipless,	  gave	  counsel	  to	  Duke	  Ling	  of	  Wei.	  	  Duke	  Ling	  was	  so	  pleased	  with	  him	  that	  in	  looking	  upon	  whole	  persons	  he	  considered	  them	  to	  have	  freakishly	  long	  necks.	  	  Jarsized	  Goiter	  gave	  counsel	  to	  Duke	  Huan	  of	  Qi.	  	  Duke	  Huan	  was	  so	  pleased	  with	  him	  that	  in	  looking	  upon	  whole	  persons	  he	  considered	  them	  to	  have	  freakishly	  long	  necks.	  	  Thus	  virtuosity	  has	  its	  growth	  and	  [physical]	  form	  has	  its	  forgetting.	  	  When	  people	  don't	  forget	  what	  they	  have	  forgotten,	  but	  forget	  what	  they	  haven't	  forgotten,	  this	  is	  called	  true/creative	  (cheng	  誠)	  forgetting.	  	  Thus	  Sages	  have	  their	  wandering—taking	  knowledge	  as	  a	  son	  of	  a	  concubine,	  promises	  and	  obligations	  as	  so	  much	  glue,	  virtuosity	  as	  a	  reception,	  and	  skill	  as	  something	  to	  sell.	  	  Sages	  have	  no	  definitive	  plans,	  so	  what	  use	  is	  knowledge?	  	  They	  are	  not	  split,	  so	  why	  do	  they	  need	  glue?	  	  They	  haven't	  lost	  anything	  so	  why	  do	  they	  need	  [to	  receive]	  virtuosity?	  	  They	  have	  no	  wares,	  so	  what	  use	  is	  mercantile	  activity?	  	  These	  four	  are	  the	  nourishment	  of	  tian	  天.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  For	  an	  interesting	  treatment	  of	  pre-­‐Qin	  conceptions	  of	  the	  "individual"—a	  contested	  term	  to	  use	  to	  describe	  unique	  personhood	  and	  ethical-­‐political	  agency	  to	  be	  sure—see	  Erica	  Brindley's	  
Individualism	  in	  Early	  China	  (2010).	  	  For	  a	  creatively	  contrasting	  position	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  using	  the	  term	  "individual"	  at	  all	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  conceptual	  cluster/constellation	  of	  early	  Chinese	  thinking	  about	  ethics	  (especially	  the	  Confucian	  tradition)	  see	  Henry	  Rosemont's	  Against	  
Individualism	  (2016).	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What	  tian	  nourishes,	  tian	  eats.	  	  Thereby	  receiving	  nourishinment	  from	  tian,	  what	  use	  is	  there	  for	  [other]	  humans?	  	  [Sages]	  have	  the	  form	  of	  a	  human,	  but	  not	  the	  characteristic	  feelings	  (qing	  情)	  of	  humans.	  	  Because	  of	  having	  human	  form	  they	  dwell	  amongst	  humans.	  	  Because	  of	  having	  no	  [characteristically]	  human	  feelings	  their	  embodied	  persons	  are	  not	  encumbered	  by	  right	  and	  wrong.	  	  So	  minute	  and	  insignificant,	  thus	  they	  are	  considered	  human.	  	  So	  grand	  and	  expansive!	  Uniquely	  completing	  tian	  (du	  cheng	  tian	  獨成天).41	  	  This	  passage	  clearly	  deconstructs	  Confucian	  expectations	  of	  ritually	  appropriate	  bodily	  form	  and	  comportment,	  and	  problematizes	  any	  rigid	  distinction	  between	  "rights"	  and	  "wrongs"	  in	  an	  objectivist	  moral	  sense.	  	  Despite	  the	  divergences,	  a	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  du	  獨	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  singular	  capacity	  for	  creatively	  transforming	  with	  things	  is	  part	  of	  a	  shared	  conceptual	  constellation	  with	  a	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  on	  agency.	  	  	  	   Another	  passage	  from	  the	  inner	  chapters	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  that	  clearly	  situates	  "singular	  potential"	  in	  a	  context	  of	  transactional	  becoming	  and	  considers	  "true"	  perception	  as	  an	  agential	  capacity	  to	  creatively	  transform	  with	  and	  through	  tian	  天	  commanding	  situations	  is	  found	  in	  the	  "Great	  Ancestral	  Teacher"	  (Da	  Zong	  Shi	  《大
宗師》)	  chapter.	  	  The	  character	  "singularity"	  du	  獨	  is	  also	  used	  here	  to	  describe	  a	  process	  of	  realizing	  singular	  transactional	  potential	  in	  working	  with	  a	  Sage	  teacher	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  creative	  way-­‐making	  exemplars:	  





。謷乎大哉！獨成其天。』For	  the	  translation	  of	  "uniquely	  completing	  tian"	  (獨成天)	  Legge	  has,	  "How	  grand	  and	  great	  is	  he	  in	  the	  unique	  perfection	  of	  his	  Heavenly	  (nature)!"	  Ziporyn	  opts	  for:	  "Vast	  and	  unmatched,	  he	  is	  alone	  in	  perfecting	  the	  Heavenly	  in	  himself."	  	  I've	  gone	  for	  a	  more	  explicitly	  non-­‐foundational	  reading	  of	  du	  獨	  here	  not	  as	  signaling	  ontological	  discreteness,	  but	  transactional	  uniqueness	  in	  a	  process	  of	  creatively	  "completing"	  tian	  天.	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Nanbo	  Zikui	  asked	  Lady	  Ju,	  "You	  are	  old	  in	  years,	  but	  your	  complexion	  is	  like	  an	  infants,	  how	  is	  this	  so?"	  	  She	  responded:	  "I've	  heard	  [inquired	  into]	  way-­‐making	  	  (dao	  道)."	  	  Nanbo	  Zikui	  said,	  "Can	  way-­‐making	  be	  acquired	  through	  learning	  (xue	  學)?"	  She	  responded:	  "No!	  	  No	  way!	  	  You	  are	  not	  the	  person	  fit	  for	  this.	  	  Now	  Puliang	  Yi	  had	  the	  raw	  materials	  (cai	  才)	  of	  Sagehood,	  but	  not	  the	  way-­‐making	  of	  a	  Sage.	  	  I	  have	  the	  way-­‐making	  of	  Sagehood,	  but	  not	  [a	  student]	  with	  the	  raw	  materials.	  	  I	  desired	  to	  teach	  him	  and	  thought	  it	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  days	  before	  he	  achieved	  Sagehood.	  	  Although	  it	  wasn't	  as	  simple	  as	  that,	  it	  is	  still	  rather	  easy	  to	  impart	  Sagely	  way-­‐making	  to	  someone	  with	  the	  raw	  materials	  for	  Sagehood.	  	  As	  if	  I	  was	  guarding	  a	  treasure,	  I	  imparted	  way-­‐making	  to	  him.	  	  After	  three	  days	  he	  could	  exteriorize	  the	  whole	  world	  (wai	  tianxia	  外天下).	  	  I	  kept	  at	  it	  with	  careful	  preservation	  (shou	  
守)	  and	  after	  seven	  days	  he	  could	  exteriorize	  pragmata	  (things/events;	  wu	  








需役，需役聞之於謳，於謳聞之玄冥，玄冥聞之參寥，參寥聞之疑始。」For	  the	  phrase	  "realizing	  unique	  potential"	  (jian	  du	  見獨)	  Legge	  translates	  it	  as	  "sees	  his	  own	  individuality"	  and	  Ziporyn	  renders	  it	  as	  "see	  the	  Singularity."	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I	  think	  both	  of	  these	  passages	  reveal	  a	  shared	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  between	  the	  Daoist	  text	  and	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  conceptual	  cluster.	  	  Despite	  obvious	  differences,	  the	  similarities	  are	  quite	  revealing	  regarding	  the	  transactional	  understanding	  of	  "individuality"	  as	  an	  embodied	  power	  to	  transform	  productively	  with	  things.	  	  Such	  agentially	  realist	  thinking	  pervades	  much	  of	  pre-­‐Qin	  philosophical	  sources	  and	  becomes	  readily	  evident	  when	  exploring	  the	  conceptual	  genealogy	  of	  the	  phrase	  
shendu	  慎獨	  in	  Confucian	  and	  Daoist	  materials.	  	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  etymological	  and	  conceptual	  connections	  between	  "true-­‐ing"	  (zhen	  眞)	  and	  "caring"	  (shen	  慎)	  in	  pre-­‐Qin	  texts.	  	  The	  Zhuangzi	  of	  course	  uses	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  "true	  person"	  (zhenren	  真人)	  as	  a	  central	  exemplary	  figure	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  various	  ideals	  of	  effortless	  action	  (wuwei	  無為)	  presented	  throughout	  the	  text.	  	  I	  use	  the	  term	  "true-­‐ing"	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  "true	  person"	  instead	  of	  terms	  like	  "authentic"	  or	  "sincere",	  because	  I	  don't	  think	  that	  the	  Daoist	  authors	  were	  working	  with	  a	  representationalist	  epistemology	  or	  had	  anything	  like	  a	  Reality/Appearance	  dichotomy	  undergirding	  their	  ontological	  speculations.	  	  The	  gerundive	  sense	  of	  "true-­‐ing",	  like	  true-­‐ing	  a	  wheel	  to	  roll	  more	  effectively,	  highlights	  the	  participatory	  and	  transactional	  sense	  of	  emergent	  agency	  presupposed	  by	  the	  non-­‐foundationalist	  theoretical	  stance	  in	  both	  pre-­‐Qin	  Daoist	  and	  Confucian	  texts.	  	  Since	  "true-­‐ing"	  can	  variantly	  be	  written	  both	  as	  zhen	  真	  and	  
zhen	  眞,	  with	  the	  latter	  character	  involving	  a	  "transforming"	  hua	  化	  radical	  component,	  the	  transactional	  nature	  of	  the	  process	  of	  "true-­‐ing"	  should	  be	  readily	  apparent	  to	  the	  philosophically	  sensitive	  and	  hermeneutically	  attuned	  reader.	  	  We	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might	  do	  better	  to	  give	  up	  the	  representationalist	  fantasy	  of	  "truth"	  altogether	  and	  talk	  instead	  about	  a	  relationally-­‐constituted	  and	  situationally-­‐sensitive	  atmospherics	  of	  trust.	  	  	   In	  fact,	  the	  character	  for	  "true-­‐ing"	  involves	  an	  "eye"	  mu	  目 component	  and	  is	  likely	  related	  to	  a	  process	  of	  somaesthetic	  perception	  involving	  a	  "straightening	  out"	  or	  "rectifying"	  (zhi	  直)	  of	  things	  in	  experience	  to	  realize	  a	  more	  readily	  flowing	  and	  productive	  course	  of	  transformations.	  	  A	  kind	  of	  post-­‐essentialist	  "theory"	  of	  truth	  as	  a	  gerundive	  process	  of	  true-­‐ing	  our	  experience—in	  its	  aesthetic-­‐ethical-­‐religious	  registers—can	  be	  drawn	  out	  in	  a	  creative	  reading	  of	  pre-­‐Qin	  Confucian	  and	  Daoist	  texts	  elaborating	  the	  idea	  of	  "singularity"	  or	  "immediate	  transactional	  becoming"	  du	  
獨	  and	  "creative	  integrity"	  (cheng	  誠).	  	  Creativity	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  optimizing	  of	  our	  uniquely	  realized	  and	  embodied	  roles	  in	  an	  aesthetically-­‐ethically-­‐religiously	  integrated	  virtuosic	  performance	  of	  non-­‐foundational	  agency.	  	  Moral	  imagination	  as	  an	  art	  of	  contextualization	  is	  realized	  through	  affective	  resonance	  and	  artistic	  resolution	  in	  a	  holistic	  process	  of	  body-­‐heart-­‐minding	  (xin	  心)	  with	  virtuosic	  agency	  (de	  德).	  	  As	  was	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  this	  non-­‐foundational	  sense	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  helpfully	  brought	  into	  focus	  by	  considering	  the	  basic	  ontological	  and	  ethical	  difference	  between	  Peirce's	  category	  of	  "firstness"	  and	  the	  hermeneutical-­‐pragmatic	  critique	  of	  the	  "myth	  of	  the	  given"	  as	  first	  articulated	  by	  Wilfred	  Sellars.	  	  We	  Confucian	  pragmatic	  naturalists	  don't	  need	  to	  posit	  any	  mysterious	  access	  to	  a	  realm	  of	  pure	  intuition	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  moral	  realism	  to	  justify	  a	  supposedly	  "objective"	  realm	  of	  values.	  	  Instead,	  we	  have	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  the	  immediate	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realms	  of	  affect-­‐oriented	  "firstness"	  (qing	  情)	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  entangled	  in	  as	  hopefully	  ever	  more	  influential	  centers	  of	  optimal	  appropriateness	  (jiyi	  集義)	  commanding	  role-­‐relational	  deference	  in	  intergenerational	  projects	  of	  ritual	  constructivism	  and	  as	  virtuosic	  contributors	  to	  living	  traditional	  horizons	  of	  meaning	  and	  value.	  	   Since	  this	  notion	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  truth	  requires	  a	  relational	  and	  participatory	  conception	  of	  creative	  agency,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  introducing	  the	  neo-­‐Marxist	  theory	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  of	  Henri	  Lefebvre.	  	  We	  will	  then	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  assess	  the	  critical	  reconstruction	  project	  I	  have	  been	  engaging	  in	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts,	  thinkers,	  and	  tradition.	  	  After	  introducing	  and	  appropriating	  some	  insights	  and	  conceptual	  tools	  from	  Lefebvre's	  method	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  I	  will	  further	  refine	  the	  metaethical	  and	  first-­‐order	  normative	  theoretical	  stance	  of	  a	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  conception	  of	  agency	  by	  using	  the	  dynamic	  metaphor	  of	  focus-­‐field	  to	  express	  the	  "concerning	  creativity"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  at	  play	  in	  any	  critical	  encounter	  and	  appropriation	  of	  Si-­‐Meng	  presuppositions,	  themes,	  and	  conceptual	  constellations.	  IV.	  Rhythmanalysis	  and	  a	  "creative"	  (cheng	  誠)	  disclosive	  theory	  of	  'truth'	  	  
	   In	  seeking	  a	  way	  to	  critique	  the	  reified	  and	  oppressive	  structures	  of	  space	  and	  time	  in	  late	  industrial	  Capitalism,	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  rhythm	  (a	  temporally	  flowing	  form)	  to	  ground	  his	  critical	  theoretical	  reflections.43	  	  Rhythmanalysis	  is	  not	  just	  a	  theoretical	  orientation	  but	  also	  a	  practical	  somaesthetic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  What	  follows	  draws	  from	  Rhythmanalysis:	  Space,	  Time	  and	  Everyday	  Life,	  by	  Henri	  Lefebvre	  (Bloomsbury,	  2004).	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stance.	  	  Various	  rhythms	  (natural,	  cultural)	  aren't	  merely	  the	  object	  of	  analysis	  and	  critique,	  but	  also	  serve	  as	  the	  focusing	  tool	  and	  method	  of	  analysis.	  	  Bio-­‐cultural	  rhythms	  and	  relational	  thinking	  make	  up	  Lefebvre's	  method	  and	  subject	  matter	  simultaneously.	  	  Even	  though	  Lefebvre	  claims	  that,	  "[t]his	  little	  book	  does	  not	  conceal	  its	  ambition.	  	  It	  proposes	  nothing	  less	  than	  to	  found	  a	  science,	  a	  new	  field	  of	  knowledge	  [savoir]:	  the	  analysis	  of	  rhythms;	  with	  practical	  consequences."44	  	  The	  
savoir	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  is	  different	  from	  a	  concatenation	  of	  systematic	  
connaissance.	  	  It	  indicates	  a	  field	  of	  tacit	  and	  tactful	  know-­‐how	  and	  aesthetic	  sensibility	  (habitus)	  as	  much	  as	  it	  does	  critical	  theoretical	  reflection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  propositional	  and	  programmatic	  discourse.	  	   Lefebvre	  sees	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  having	  a	  long	  history	  and	  inter-­‐cultural	  background,	  because	  "of	  course,	  here,	  as	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  knowledge	  [connaissance]	  and	  action	  germs,	  seeds	  and	  elements	  have	  existed	  for	  centuries.	  	  But	  it	  is	  only	  quite	  recently	  that	  this	  concept,	  rhythm,	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  developed	  form."45	  	  Like	  Peirce	  and	  pragmatic	  semioticians	  in	  America,	  Lefebvre	  wishes	  to	  critique	  structures	  of	  oppression	  beginning	  with	  what	  is	  most	  immediate	  "firstness"	  without	  succumbing	  to	  one	  or	  another	  form	  of	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  given	  in	  its	  epistemological	  or	  ethical-­‐political-­‐religious	  registers.	  	  How	  do	  fluid	  processes	  of	  becoming	  (with	  their	  inherent	  potentials	  for	  relational	  flourishing	  and	  holistic	  health)	  become	  reified	  as	  fixed	  or	  determinate	  things	  with	  severely	  limited	  potentials	  for	  creativity	  and	  growth?	  	  This	  question	  motivates	  Lefebvre's	  building	  on	  a	  rich	  tradition	  of	  Western	  critical	  marxism	  stemming	  from	  Theodor	  Adorno	  to	  Gregory	  Lukacs:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid.	  45	  Ibid.	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The	  critique	  of	  the	  thing	  and	  of	  the	  process	  of	  thingification	  (of	  reification)	  in	  modern	  thought	  would	  fill	  volumes.	  	  It	  has	  been	  led	  in	  the	  name	  of	  becoming,	  of	  movement,	  of	  mobility	  in	  general.	  	  But	  has	  it	  been	  seen	  through	  to	  the	  end?	  	  Does	  it	  not	  remain	  to	  be	  taken	  up	  again	  starting	  from	  what	  is	  most	  concrete:	  rhythm?46	  	  For	  Lefebvre,	  the	  study	  of	  rhythm(s)	  can	  proceed	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways:	  1)	  "study	  and	  compare	  cases"	  (e.g.	  the	  body,	  living	  or	  not	  with	  its	  respirations,	  pulses,	  circulations,	  assimilations	  —	  durations	  and	  phases	  of	  these	  durations,	  etc.)	  which	  always	  "remains	  close	  to	  practice"	  (i.e.	  it	  starts	  with	  concrete	  and	  proceeds	  to	  useful	  abstraction)	  or	  2)	  "starting	  with	  concepts,	  definite	  categories...instead	  of	  going	  from	  concrete	  to	  abstract,	  one	  starts	  with	  full	  consciousness	  of	  the	  abstract	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  concrete."47	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  Lefebvre	  claims	  that	  these	  two	  methods	  do	  not	  "exclude"	  each	  other,	  but	  rather	  "they	  complete	  one	  another"	  in	  a	  single	  order	  of	  critical	  praxis.	  	  The	  reason	  that	  concretion/abstraction	  are	  not	  juxtaposed	  in	  Lefebvre's	  rhythmanalysis	  is	  that	  both	  refer	  to	  somaesthetically	  embodied	  practices	  of	  conceptual	  creation.	  	   In	  asking	  if	  there	  is	  a	  "general	  concept	  of	  rhythm",	  Lefebvre	  answers	  with	  a	  definitive	  "yes,	  and	  everyone	  possesses	  it"	  in	  the	  dynamic	  form	  of	  social	  embodiment.	  	  But	  Lefebvre	  notes	  that	  most	  remain	  confused	  about	  the	  critical	  theoretical	  potential	  of	  using	  embodied	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  tool	  by	  confusing	  the	  "mechanical	  movement"	  idea	  of	  rhythm	  while	  brushing	  aside	  the	  "organic	  aspect."	  	  For	  Lefebvre,	  there	  is	  an	  aesthetic-­‐ethical-­‐religious	  (Kierkegaard)	  dimension	  of	  
repetition	  in	  rhythmanalsysis,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  mechanical-­‐Formal	  sameness.	  	  All	  rhythm's	  contain	  both	  repetition	  and	  measure,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.14.	  47	  Ibid.	  
	   229	  
but	  "there	  is	  no	  identical	  absolute	  repetition,	  indefinitely.	  	  Whence	  the	  relation	  between	  repetition	  and	  difference.	  	  When	  it	  concerns	  the	  everyday,	  rites,	  ceremonies,	  fetes,	  rules	  and	  laws,	  there	  is	  always	  something	  new	  and	  unforeseen	  that	  introduces	  itself	  into	  the	  repetitive:	  difference."48	  	   The	  oppressive,	  fascist	  effects	  of	  Capitalist	  socio-­‐economic	  ordering	  are	  felt	  most	  immediately	  in	  our	  embodied	  experiences	  of	  alienated	  labor,	  colonized	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  dwelling.	  	  When	  the	  commodity	  "prevails	  over	  everything"	  "social	  space	  and	  (social)	  time,	  dominated	  by	  exchanges,	  become	  the	  time	  and	  space	  of	  markets;	  although	  not	  being	  things	  but	  including	  rhythms,	  they	  enter	  into	  products."49	  Not	  just	  in	  conditions	  of	  commodity	  fetishism,	  but	  in	  a	  generalized	  social	  ontology,	  things	  are	  conceptual	  abstractions	  derived	  from	  primordial	  relations	  with	  a	  rhythmic	  structure	  of	  repetition.	  	  The	  everyday,	  ordinary	  experience	  of	  things	  is	  haloed	  by	  a	  more	  or	  less	  dim	  sense	  of	  bio-­‐cultural	  rhythmanalysis.	  	  Bringing	  our	  somaesthetic	  experience	  of	  rhythms	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  critical	  consciousness	  is	  a	  transformative	  method	  of	  radical	  praxis	  for	  Lefebvre:	  The	  everyday	  establishes	  itself,	  creating	  hourly	  demands,	  systems	  of	  transport,	  in	  short,	  its	  repetitive	  organization.	  	  Things	  matter	  little;	  the	  thing	  is	  only	  a	  metaphor,	  divulged	  by	  discourse,	  divulging	  representations	  that	  conceal	  the	  production	  of	  repetitive	  time	  and	  space.	  	  The	  thing	  has	  no	  more	  existence	  than	  pure	  identity	  (which	  the	  thing	  symbolizes	  materially.)	  	  There	  are	  only	  things	  and	  people.	  .	  .Time	  and	  space,	  the	  cyclical	  and	  the	  linear,	  exert	  a	  reciprocal	  action:	  they	  measure	  themselves	  against	  one	  another;	  each	  one	  makes	  itself	  and	  is	  made	  a	  measuring-­‐measure;	  everything	  is	  cyclical	  repetition	  through	  linear	  repetitions.	  	  A	  dialectical	  relation	  (unity	  in	  opposition)	  thus	  acquires	  meaning	  and	  import,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  generality.	  	  One	  reaches	  by	  this	  road	  as	  by	  others,	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  dialectic.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.,	  p.16.	  50	  Ibid.,	  p.18.	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Lefebvre	  defines	  measure	  in	  an	  agentially	  realist	  way:	  "rhythm	  seems	  natural,	  spontaneous,	  with	  no	  law	  other	  than	  its	  unfurling.	  	  Yet	  rhythm,	  always	  particular,	  (music,	  poetry,	  dance,	  gymnastics,	  work,	  etc.)	  always	  implies	  a	  measure.	  	  Everywhere	  where	  there	  is	  rhythm,	  there	  is	  measure,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  law,	  calculated	  and	  expected	  obligation,	  a	  project."51	  	  The	  normativity	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  is	  always	  revealed	  in	  measuring	  measures	  by	  turning	  raw	  affect	  into	  refined	  sensibility.	  	  In	  this	  way	  Lefebvre's	  project	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  shares	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  project	  of	  beginning	  with	  "affect/situation"	  qing	  情	  to	  realize	  "optimal	  appropriateness	  in	  ritual	  patterns"	  yili	  義理／禮	  in	  a	  role-­‐focused	  dynamic	  of	  ethical	  agency.	  	  A	  critical	  ethic	  of	  harmony	  is	  celebrated	  in	  both	  Confucian	  role	  ethics	  "musical	  perfectionism"	  (yue	  樂)	  as	  a	  somaesthetic	  check	  on	  rigid	  formalization	  of	  entrenched	  historical-­‐political	  hierarchies,	  and	  in	  Lefebvre's	  neo-­‐marxist	  rhythmanalysis,	  "harmony,	  which	  results	  from	  a	  spontaneous	  ensemble,	  or	  from	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  is	  simultaneously	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  (in	  music	  and	  elsewhere:	  language	  movements,	  architecture,	  works	  of	  art	  and	  diverse	  arts,	  etc.)"—including	  the	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐	  ethical-­‐political	  practices	  of	  all	  sorts—(li	  禮)	  is	  a	  continually	  rewoven	  fabric	  of	  familial-­‐social-­‐political	  relational	  ontology.	  	   Indeed,	  rhythmanalysis	  reunites	  the	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  (zhida	  至大	  and	  至剛)	  aspects	  of	  critical	  theory	  to	  promote	  a	  broadly	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  approach	  to	  critical	  theory	  and	  embodied	  practice.	  	  It	  is	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  rhythm	  that	  "reunites	  quantitative	  aspects	  and	  elements,	  which	  mark	  time	  and	  distinguish	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moments	  in	  it	  —	  and	  qualitative	  aspects	  and	  elements,	  which	  link	  them	  together,	  found	  the	  unities	  and	  result	  from	  them."52	  	  Lefebvre	  considers	  the	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  dimensions	  together	  in	  a	  somaesthetics	  of	  performative	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  a	  critical	  method	  which	  is	  itself	  transformative	  (theory	  as	  tool):	  Rhythm	  appears	  as	  regulated	  time,	  governed	  by	  rational	  laws,	  but	  in	  contact	  with	  what	  is	  least	  rational	  in	  human	  being:	  the	  lived,	  the	  carnal,	  the	  body.	  Rational,	  numerical,	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  rhythms	  superimpose	  themselves	  on	  the	  multiple	  natural	  rhythms	  of	  the	  body	  (respiration,	  the	  heart,	  hunger	  and	  thirst,	  etc.),	  though	  not	  without	  changing	  them.	  	  The	  bundle	  of	  natural	  rhythms	  wraps	  itself	  in	  rhythms	  of	  social	  or	  mental	  function.	  	  Whence	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  analytic	  operation	  that	  consists	  in	  opening	  and	  unwrapping	  the	  bundle.	  	  Disorder	  and	  illness,	  at	  the	  worst	  death,	  take	  over	  the	  operation.	  	  However,	  the	  natural	  and	  the	  rational	  play	  only	  a	  limited	  role	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  rhythms,	  which	  are	  simultaneously	  natural	  and	  rational,	  and	  neither	  one	  nor	  the	  other.53	  	  Similarly	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  role	  ethics	  an	  integrated,	  holistic	  perspective	  of	  the	  "living	  body"	  (ti體)	  and	  "socioculturally	  ritually	  embodied	  living"	  (li	  禮)	  operate	  together	  as	  an	  ethically	  normative	  but	  agentially	  creative	  "thirdness"	  within	  a	  horizon	  of	  "firstness"	  (immediate	  bodily	  rhythms	  in	  a	  spectrum	  of	  health-­‐illness)	  and	  "secondness"	  (socially	  stipulated	  roles	  and	  relationships	  with	  normative	  expectations	  and	  responsibilities).	  	  	  Lefebvre	  identifies	  the	  following	  set	  of	  conceptual	  oppositions	  that	  are	  to	  be	  correlatively	  understood	  in	  an	  ecological	  fashion	  rather	  than	  ontologically	  circumscribed	  set	  of	  dualisms:	  1)	  repetition	  and	  difference;	  2)	  mechanical	  and	  organic;	  3)	  discovery	  and	  creation;	  4)	  cyclical	  and	  linear;	  5)	  continuous	  and	  discontinuous;	  6)	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative.	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  Lefebvre	  considers	  it	  necessary	  to	  employ	  these	  concepts	  and	  correlative	  oppositions	  "with	  care,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  fine-­‐tune	  them	  through	  use"	  because	  "they	  converge	  in	  the	  central	  concept	  of	  measure."54	  	  This	  normatively	  rich	  idea	  of	  
measure	  is	  productively	  ambiguous	  between	  these	  bipolar	  conceptual	  correlates	  and	  is	  capable	  of	  	  "stimulat[ing]	  knowledge	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  practice."	  	  And	  all	  of	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  strikingly	  resonant	  with	  Confucian	  somaesthetic	  thinking	  about	  the	  continuity	  of	  knowing	  and	  doing	  (zhi	  xing	  he	  yi	  知行合一).	  	   In	  a	  fashion	  strikingly	  akin	  to	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  ethical	  epoche	  of	  "concerning	  creativity"	  (shendu	  慎獨),	  a	  practicing	  rhythmanalyst	  puts	  their	  somaesthetic	  potential	  into	  imaginative	  and	  experimental	  relationship	  with	  a	  dynamic	  natural-­‐social	  complex	  as	  a	  ritually	  participating	  member	  in	  a	  democratic	  or	  "beloved"	  community	  of	  interpreters.55	  	  For	  Lefebvre,	  rhythmanalysis	  "does	  not	  isolate	  an	  object,	  or	  a	  subject,	  or	  a	  relation.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  grasp	  a	  moving	  but	  determinate	  complexity	  (determination	  not	  entailing	  determinism)."56	  We	  might,	  following	  Derrida's	  deconstruction	  of	  traditional	  Marxist	  scientology	  (viz.	  bad	  science	  and	  bad	  faith),	  consider	  how	  Lefebvre's	  neo-­‐marxist	  rhythmanalysis	  can	  function	  as	  a	  general	  hauntology	  or	  philosophical	  exorcism:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ibid.,	  p.19.	  55	  For	  more	  on	  the	  "beloved	  community"	  and	  a	  community	  of	  interpretation	  see	  Robert	  Corrington's	  
The	  Community	  of	  Interpreters:	  On	  the	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Nature	  and	  the	  Bible	  in	  American	  Philosophical	  
Tradition	  (1987).	  	  In	  this	  text	  he	  takes	  up	  the	  semiotics	  of	  C.S.	  Peirce	  and	  the	  post-­‐Absolutist	  philosophy	  of	  loyalty	  of	  Josiah	  Royce	  to	  develop	  a	  unique	  horizonal	  and	  emergent	  theory	  of	  democratic	  interpretation	  in	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  way.	  	  The	  categories	  of	  firstness,	  secondness,	  and	  thirdness	  are	  taken	  up	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  how	  natural	  complexes	  (natural	  communities)	  can	  potentially	  transform	  in	  non-­‐coercive	  ways	  to	  realize	  ever	  more	  rich	  and	  inclusive	  horizons	  of	  meaning	  and	  value.	  56	  Ibid.,	  p.21.	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The	  spectre	  of	  theoretical	  questioning	  goes	  from	  pure	  abstraction	  —	  the	  logic	  of	  identity	  —	  to	  the	  full	  complexity	  of	  the	  contradictions	  of	  the	  real.	  	  An	  immense	  questionnaire,	  the	  answers	  to	  which	  are	  given	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  questions,	  and	  nevertheless	  hide	  themselves	  behind	  words,	  in	  locutions	  and	  expressions.	  	  It	  often	  suffices	  to	  chase	  them	  out,	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  the	  light	  of	  day:	  to	  show	  them.57	  	  This	  kind	  of	  critical	  theory	  resonates	  well	  with	  the	  somaesthetic	  presuppositions	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethics,	  particularly	  the	  non-­‐foundational	  concept	  of	  agency	  in	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking.	  	   The	  idea	  of	  "embodied	  thinking-­‐feeling"	  (si	  思)	  is	  central	  to	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse.	  	  It	  involves	  moral	  imagination	  and	  cultivated	  ritual	  deference	  in	  conduct,	  speech,	  and	  thought.	  	  The	  previously	  articulated	  passage	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  regarding	  the	  cultivation	  of	  "flood-­‐like	  qi	  氣"	  recognizes	  the	  importance	  of	  embodied	  and	  relational	  thinking	  in	  projects	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  and	  ameliorative	  ethical	  agency.	  	  We	  can't	  be	  like	  the	  hapless	  farmer	  from	  Song	  who	  pulled	  up	  his	  sprouts	  too	  soon	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  aid	  the	  process	  of	  [ethical-­‐agential]	  growth.	  	  We	  instead	  find	  ourselves	  called	  to	  patiently	  abide	  in	  transformative	  processes	  and	  skillfully	  intervene	  in	  bringing	  to	  fruition	  imagined	  futurity	  and	  realizing	  potential.	  	  Abiding	  our	  time	  and	  husbanding	  our	  resources	  is	  a	  much	  better	  approach	  to	  agential	  growth	  than	  the	  precipitous	  agriculturalist	  from	  Song.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  phenomenology	  of	  affect	  and	  role-­‐focused	  sensibility-­‐cum-­‐responsibility	  is	  what	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinkers	  had	  in	  mind	  in	  inviting	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  most	  basic	  flows	  of	  agential	  "firstness"	  or	  "concerning	  creativity"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  in	  realizing	  relational	  flourishing	  (ren	  仁)	  in	  deferential	  patterns	  of	  familial-­‐social-­‐political	  creative	  democracy—both	  "ritual	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propriety"	  li	  禮	  and	  "authoritative	  governing"	  renzheng	  仁政.	  	  Lefebvre	  similarly	  recognizes	  that	  "everywhere	  where	  there	  is	  interaction	  between	  a	  place,	  a	  time	  and	  an	  expenditure	  of	  energy,	  there	  is	  rhythm.	  	  Therefore,	  [there	  is	  always]:	  	   (a)	  	  repetition	  (of	  movements,	  gestures,	  actions,	  situations,	  differences);	  	  	   (b)	  	  interferences	  of	  linear	  processes	  and	  cyclical	  processes;	  	  	   (c)	  	  birth,	  growth,	  peak,	  then	  decline	  and	  end."58	  	  Thus,	  for	  Lefebvre,	  "analysis	  should	  ride	  with	  the	  movements	  in	  whichever	  work	  or	  whichever	  sequence	  of	  actions	  until	  their	  end"	  and	  not	  give	  up	  due	  to	  inertia,	  exhaustion,	  or	  depression.	  	  Rhythmanalysis	  is	  an	  embodied	  tool,	  not	  an	  abstract	  theory—the	  point	  here,	  hence	  the	  marxism,	  is	  to	  change	  things	  not	  just	  to	  understand	  things	  in	  a	  bloodless	  ballet	  of	  abstractions.	  	   The	  embodied	  and	  transactional	  theoretical	  tool	  approach	  offered	  by	  Lefebvre	  takes	  the	  notion	  of	  rhythm	  bringing	  with	  it	  or	  requiring	  "some	  complementary	  considerations:	  the	  implied	  but	  different	  notions	  of	  polyrhythmia,	  eurhythmia	  and	  arrhythmia."	  	  Rhythmanalysis	  elevates	  them	  to	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  starting	  from	  the	  lived-­‐experience	  of	  rhythmic	  punctuation	  (projective	  and	  consummatory	  perspectives):	  Polyrhythmia?	  	  It	  suffices	  to	  consult	  one's	  body;	  thus	  the	  everyday	  reveals	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  polyrhythmia	  from	  the	  first	  listening.	  	  Eurhythmia?	  Rhythms	  unite	  with	  one	  another	  in	  the	  state	  of	  health,	  in	  normal	  (which	  is	  to	  say	  normed!)	  everydayness;	  when	  they	  are	  discordant,	  there	  is	  suffering,	  a	  pathological	  state	  (of	  which	  arrhythmia	  is	  generally,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  symptom,	  cause	  and	  effect).	  	  The	  discordance	  of	  rhythms	  brings	  previously	  eurhythmic	  organisations	  towards	  fatal	  disorder.	  	  Polyrhythmia	  analyses	  itself.	  	  A	  fundamental	  forecast:	  sooner	  or	  later	  the	  analysis	  succeeds	  in	  isolating	  from	  within	  the	  organised	  whole	  a	  particular	  movement	  and	  its	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rhythm.	  	  Often	  coupled	  empirically	  with	  speculations	  (see,	  for	  example,	  doctors	  in	  the	  field	  of	  auscultation,	  etc.),	  the	  analytic	  operation	  simultaneously	  discovers	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  rhythms	  and	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  particular	  rhythms	  (the	  heart,	  the	  kidneys,	  etc.).	  	  The	  rhythmanalysis	  here	  defined	  as	  a	  method	  and	  a	  theory	  pursues	  this	  time-­‐honoured	  labour	  in	  a	  systematic	  and	  theoretical	  manner,	  by	  bringing	  together	  very	  diverse	  practices	  and	  very	  different	  types	  of	  knowledge:	  medicine,	  history,	  climatology,	  cosmology,	  poetry	  (the	  poetic),	  etc.	  	  Not	  forgetting,	  of	  course,	  sociology	  and	  psychology,	  which	  occupy	  the	  front	  line	  and	  supply	  the	  essentials.59	  	  Lefebvre	  provocatively	  asks	  the	  most	  basic	  question	  "What	  is	  it	  to	  think?	  And	  more	  precisely,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  when	  you	  speak	  of	  rhythms?"60	  	  The	  emphasis	  in	  this	  rhythmanalytic	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  isn't	  "what	  do	  you	  think	  when	  you	  speak	  of	  rhythm(s)"	  but	  more	  fundamentally	  "how	  do	  you	  think	  rhythmanalytically?"	  	  Lefebvre	  recognizes	  the	  persistence	  of	  dualistic,	  body-­‐denigrating	  (Nietzsche)	  ways	  of	  thinking	  in	  the	  post-­‐Platonic,	  post-­‐Pauline	  tradition(s)	  of	  Western	  philosophy,	  "the	  Cartesian	  tradition	  has	  long	  reigned	  in	  philosophy."	  	   But	  the	  disembodied	  Cogito	  continues	  to	  haunt	  our	  theoretical	  presuppositions	  and	  embodied	  habitus	  in	  ethical	  and	  political	  thinking:	  It	  is	  exhausted,	  but	  remains	  present.	  	  The	  'Cogito	  .	  .	  .'	  signifies:	  to	  think	  is	  to	  think	  thought;	  it	  is	  to	  reflect	  on	  oneself	  by	  accentuating	  (putting	  the	  accent	  on)	  the	  consciousness	  inherent	  to	  the	  act	  of	  thinking.	  	  Yet	  what	  we	  have	  thought	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  preceding	  pages	  implies	  another	  conception	  of	  
thinking.	  	  It	  is	  to	  think	  that	  which	  is	  not	  thought:	  the	  game	  and	  the	  risk,	  love,	  art,	  violence,	  in	  a	  word,	  the	  world,	  or	  more	  precisely	  the	  diverse	  relations	  between	  human	  being	  and	  the	  universe.	  	  Thinking	  is	  a	  part,	  but	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  totality,	  as	  many	  philosophers	  thought	  it.	  	  Thought	  explores,	  expresses.	  	  The	  exploration	  can	  hold	  in	  store	  surprises.	  	  Likewise,	  perhaps,	  rhythms	  and	  their	  analysis	  (rhythmanalysis).61	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Lefebvre	  thinks	  that	  "rhythmanalysis	  could	  change	  our	  perspective	  on	  surroundings,	  because	  it	  changes	  our	  conception	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  classical	  philosophy	  that	  is	  still	  dominant	  in	  this	  field.	  	  The	  sensible,	  this	  scandal	  of	  philosophers	  from	  Plato	  to	  Hegel,	  (re)takes	  primacy,	  transformed	  without	  magic	  (without	  metaphysics)."	  	  There	  is	  "nothing	  inert	  in	  the	  world,	  no	  things:	  [there	  is	  only]	  very	  diverse	  rhythms,	  [acting]	  slow	  or	  lively	  (in	  relation	  to	  us)."62	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  Mengzi	  the	  "office"	  of	  the	  human	  body-­‐heart-­‐minding	  is	  to	  "think"	  (xin	  zhi	  guan	  nai	  si心之官乃思也)	  and	  Confucian	  role-­‐focused	  "embodied	  reflection"	  develops	  an	  elaborate	  somaesthetic	  vocabulary	  of	  selective	  ethical	  attention,	  refined	  sensibility/taste,	  and	  singular	  transactional	  qi	  potential	  (jing	  yi	  精
一).	  	  Thus,	  the	  language	  of	  "concerning	  creativity"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  be	  simply	  dismissed	  as	  psychologizing	  solipsism	  in	  private	  projects	  of	  self-­‐cultivation,	  but	  it	  really	  demands	  a	  brave	  pragmatic	  reading	  with	  democratic	  agency	  realizing	  itself	  in	  the	  fullness	  of	  time	  and	  in	  shared	  spaces	  of	  trust-­‐infused	  personalized-­‐ritual	  appearance.	  	   Lefebvre	  asks	  if	  there	  might	  be	  an	  esoteric	  dimension	  to	  his	  rather	  idiosyncratic	  development	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  marxist	  criticism.	  	  The	  unique	  ability	  to	  turn	  the	  same	  "method"	  as	  embodied	  "tool"	  on	  both	  bodily	  and	  urban	  rhythms	  is	  an	  important	  sociological-­‐anthropological	  insight	  in	  the	  Lefebvrean	  project.	  	  He	  asks,	  "might	  there	  be	  hidden,	  secret,	  rhythms,	  hence	  inaccessible	  movements	  and	  temporalities?"	  	  And	  answers	  himself,	  "No,	  because	  there	  are	  no	  secrets.	  	  Everything	  knows	  itself,	  but	  not	  everything	  says	  itself,	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publicizes	  itself.	  	  Do	  not	  confuse	  silence	  with	  secrets!"63	  	  This	  rejection	  of	  a	  purely	  psychological,	  inward,	  private	  theatre	  of	  consciousness	  is	  consistent	  with	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  sensibilities	  regarding	  "knowing	  incipiency"	  (zhiji	  知幾)	  and	  "way-­‐making	  body-­‐heart-­‐minding	  is	  vulnerable	  and	  subtle"	  (daoxin	  weiwei道心惟微).	  	  It	  also	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  philosophical	  persona	  of	  Confucius	  in	  the	  
Analects	  rejecting	  any	  idea	  of	  esoteric	  teachings:	  	  The	  Master	  said:	  "My	  students,	  do	  you	  think	  there	  is	  something	  I	  am	  hiding	  from	  you?	  	  I	  have	  nothing	  to	  hide.	  	  I	  don't	  act/conduct	  myself	  (xing	  行)	  with	  out	  my	  relationship	  to	  you.	  	  This	  is	  me	  (Qiu	  丘：	  Confucius'	  personal	  name)."64	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  revelatory	  teaching,	  without	  philosophical	  or	  religious	  esoteric	  doctrine,	  situates	  Confucianism	  in	  a	  very	  unique	  position	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  as	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  only	  major	  world	  religious-­‐philosophical	  traditions	  that	  can	  offer	  a	  robust	  ethical	  vocabulary	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  and	  ameliorating	  our	  current	  predicaments	  of	  culture	  while	  not	  asking	  for	  any	  ideological	  or	  doctrinal	  commitments—especially	  of	  a	  supernatural	  kind—on	  the	  part	  of	  its	  adherents/practitioners.	  	  We	  don't	  need	  to	  believe	  in	  anything	  but	  the	  power	  of	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  beginning	  in	  familial	  experience	  and	  critically	  extending	  to	  Ultimate	  realms	  of	  ecological-­‐religious	  flourishing	  to	  be	  a	  practicing	  Confucian.	  	  And	  this	  sort	  of	  "belief"	  is	  more	  of	  an	  embodied	  mode	  of	  tacit	  know-­‐how	  (xin	  信)	  than	  it	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  propositional	  calculus.	  	   Lefebvre	  self-­‐critically	  asks	  if	  his	  presentation	  of	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  a	  theory	  isn't	  just	  "phenomenology	  from	  the	  window"—considering	  especially	  his	  chapter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Ibid.,	  p.27.	  64	  Analects	  7.24:	  子曰：「二三子以我為隱乎？吾無隱乎爾。吾無行而不與二三子者，是丘也。」	  
	   238	  
dealing	  with	  the	  rhythm	  of	  cities	  as	  taken	  in	  from	  a	  Parisian	  window.	  	  	  His	  answer	  is	  a	  mixed	  one	  insofar	  as	  this:	  "vaguely	  existential	  (a	  slightly	  heavy	  technical	  term)	  phenomenology	  (ditto)	  of	  which	  you	  speak,	  and	  of	  which	  you	  accuse	  these	  pages,	  passes	  over	  that	  which	  quite	  rightly	  connects	  space,	  time	  and	  the	  energies	  that	  unfold	  here	  and	  there,	  namely	  rhythms"	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  "no	  more	  than	  a	  more	  or	  less	  well-­‐used	  tool."65	  	  But	  Lefebvre's	  idea	  of	  "tool"	  is	  far	  from	  an	  instrumental	  use	  of	  rationality,	  as	  it	  includes	  the	  body	  as	  a	  basic	  attuning	  element	  in	  all	  constructions	  of	  experience.	  	  We	  are	  either	  flourishing	  or	  not	  in	  any	  given	  situation	  of	  relational	  becoming.	  	  Hence	  "ritual"	  (li	  禮)	  participation	  is	  a	  better	  way	  to	  think	  through	  rhythmanalysis	  as	  a	  "well-­‐used	  tool"	  than	  is	  any	  voyeuristic	  epistemology	  of	  the	  spectator	  from	  the	  window.66	  	   Rhythmanalysis	  "consists	  in	  understanding	  that	  which	  comes	  to	  it	  from	  
nature	  and	  that	  which	  is	  acquired,	  conventional,	  even	  sophisticated,	  by	  trying	  to	  isolate	  particular	  rhythms.	  	  It	  is	  a	  difficult	  type	  of	  analysis,	  one	  for	  which	  there	  are	  possible	  ethical,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  practical,	  implications,	  in	  other	  words,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  lived	  would	  modify,	  metamorphose,	  the	  lived	  without	  knowing	  it.	  	  Here	  we	  find,	  approached	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  but	  the	  same,	  the	  thought	  of	  metamorphosis."67	  Despite	  being	  presented	  at	  times	  as	  involving	  a	  post-­‐human	  or	  at	  least	  extra-­‐human,	  even	  anthropocene,	  perspective	  on	  the	  rhythm	  of	  cities,	  Lefebvre	  consistently	  returns	  to	  natural	  biorhythms	  as	  expressed	  and	  articulated	  by	  bodies	  resisting	  the	  colonization	  of	  time	  and	  lived-­‐space	  via	  the	  oppressive	  structures	  of	  late	  Modern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Ibid.	  66	  For	  more	  on	  the	  participatory	  element	  of	  ritual	  see	  Herbert	  Fingarette's	  The	  Secular	  as	  Sacred.	  67	  Ibid.,	  p.28.	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In	  what	  follows	  we	  will	  be	  using	  a	  broadly	  rhythmanalytic	  and	  somaesthetic	  approach	  to	  develop	  a	  "creative"	  cheng	  誠	  theory	  of	  truth	  that	  starts	  with	  our	  basic	  affective	  experience	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  affective	  "firstness"	  (qing	  情),	  considering	  ritual-­‐ordered	  and	  role-­‐focused	  expectations	  and	  available	  normative	  "scripts"	  for	  exemplary	  performance	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  "secondness"	  (li	  禮),	  and	  realizing	  non-­‐coercive	  virtuosity	  (de	  德)	  in	  a	  role-­‐focused	  and	  bodily-­‐integrated	  "creative	  agency"	  (cheng	  
誠)	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  action-­‐driving	  thirdness.	  	  The	  language	  of	  "resolute	  becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  can	  be	  developed	  to	  articulate	  a	  rhythmanalsysis	  of	  personal	  becoming	  in	  transactional	  relationality	  beginning	  in	  family	  experience	  and	  critically	  extending	  to	  cosmic	  ultimacy.	  	  I	  will	  also	  introduce	  some	  of	  Song	  dynasty	  discourse	  on	  "learning	  of	  way-­‐making"	  (daoxue	  道學)	  that	  uses	  a	  focus-­‐field	  language	  of	  dynamic	  patterning	  (li	  理)	  and	  "vital	  stuff"	  (qi	  氣)	  to	  articulate	  a	  role-­‐focused	  sense	  of	  transactional	  potential	  and	  optimal	  appropriateness	  to	  ground	  an	  agential	  and	  moral	  realist	  account	  of	  truth.	  	   One	  question	  that	  we	  may	  have	  in	  reading	  received	  and	  excavated	  texts	  that	  make	  up	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  conceptual	  constellation	  we	  are	  reconstructing	  is	  how	  to	  best	  conceive	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  "four	  sprouts"	  (siduan	  四端)	  or	  raw	  [moral]	  feelings	  potentially	  leading	  to	  virtuosic	  conduct	  and	  the	  "seven	  [natural]	  feelings"	  (qiqing	  七情)	  characteristic	  of	  neuro-­‐affective	  typical	  human	  persons?	  	  How	  should	  we	  understand	  a	  finely-­‐tuned	  inquiry	  into	  the	  "root	  nature"	  (benxing	  本性)	  of	  "way-­‐making	  heartmind"	  (daoxin	  道心)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  "vital	  stuff	  nature"	  (qizhizhixing	  
氣質之性)	  and	  its	  experiential	  sensorium	  of	  affective	  energies	  (renxin	  人心)?	  	  These	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are	  imminently	  practical	  questions	  and	  ought	  to	  illicit	  philosophical	  interest	  for	  us	  given	  that	  we	  inhabit	  a	  pluralistic,	  multicultural	  globalized	  world	  wherein	  a	  shared	  cultural	  grammar	  (li	  禮)	  of	  a	  ritually-­‐stylized	  aestheticization	  of	  social	  relations	  is	  largely	  absent	  or	  at	  least	  diminished	  beyond	  anything	  that	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  constellation	  of	  thinkers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  or	  find	  acceptable.	  	  What	  are	  the	  limits	  of	  philosophical	  reconstruction	  in	  deploying	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse?	  	  What	  ends-­‐in-­‐view	  can	  we	  hope	  to	  achieve	  in	  critically	  engaging	  with	  this	  philosophical	  corpus	  and	  traditional	  horizon?	  	   Is	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  inspired	  Four-­‐Seven	  debate	  just	  a	  historically	  interesting	  but	  largely	  irrelevant	  philosophical	  exercise	  in	  Confucian	  casuistry?	  	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  to	  the	  contrary	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  debate	  offers	  a	  particular	  style	  of	  "way-­‐making	  learning"	  wherein	  collaborative	  inquiry	  in	  a	  ritually	  constructed	  community	  of	  interpretation	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  still	  largely	  Eurocentric,	  Enlightenment	  models	  of	  agonistic	  philosophical	  inquiry	  aimed	  at	  identifying	  some	  set	  of	  ahistorical	  Truths	  or	  achieving	  Rationally-­‐Autonomous	  argumentative	  conquest.	  	  Secondly,	  this	  unique	  non-­‐foundational	  discourse	  on	  ethical	  creativity,	  offers	  us	  a	  distinctively	  Confucian	  way	  of	  thinking	  through	  embodied	  agency	  that	  provides	  interesting	  material	  for	  doing	  comparative	  philosophy—particularly	  after	  the	  so-­‐called	  "bodily	  turn"	  in	  recent	  philosophical	  movements	  like	  phenomenology,	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  moral	  psychology,	  and	  pragmatic	  somaesthetics.	  The	  distinctively	  Confucian	  approach	  can	  contribute	  creative	  insights	  and	  potential	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avenues	  for	  further	  exploration	  in	  recently	  emergent	  fields	  like	  neuroethics	  and	  sociobiological	  approaches	  to	  understanding	  "the	  ethical	  project."69	  	   In	  Embodied	  Moral	  Psychology	  and	  Confucian	  Philosophy	  (2013)	  Bongrae	  Seok	  highlights	  the	  "convincing	  possibility	  that	  seemingly	  archaic	  and	  foreign	  traditions	  like	  Confucian	  philosophy	  can	  benefit	  from	  an	  interdisciplinary	  integration	  of	  philosophy,	  psychology	  and	  other	  empirical	  sciences."	  	  And	  he	  suggests	  that	  Confucian	  moral	  philosophy	  as	  "a	  unique	  philosophical	  tradition	  of	  the	  embodied	  moral	  mind	  [that	  combines]	  the	  body	  and	  the	  heart	  (the	  affection	  towards	  others)"	  provides	  a	  "viable	  model	  of	  moral	  psychology	  where	  embodied	  emotion	  serves	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  virtuous	  dispositions."70	  	  And	  in	  arguing	  that	  "Confucian	  philosophy	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  dead	  and	  gone	  tradition	  of	  ancient	  China"	  which	  contemporary	  persons	  have	  little	  academic	  interest	  in,	  Seok	  convincingly	  shows	  how	  Confucian	  ethical	  philosophy	  can	  be	  a	  "living	  tradition	  for	  all	  of	  us	  as	  a	  philosophy	  of	  moral	  excellence	  based	  on	  the	  embodied	  human	  emotions	  that	  we	  all	  vividly	  experience	  everyday."71	  	  As	  such	  Confucian	  philosophy	  then	  proves	  to	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  contribute	  towards	  our	  interdisciplinary	  projects	  aimed	  at	  better	  theorizing	  moral	  experience	  and	  embodied	  agency	  in	  a	  realistic	  way.	  	   In	  this	  process-­‐oriented	  correlative	  cosmology	  from	  which	  Si-­‐Meng	  and	  Neo-­‐Confucian	  thinking	  emerges,	  the	  closest	  conceptual	  correlate	  to	  the	  English	  word	  "emotion"	  is	  qing	  情	  which	  can	  also	  mean	  something	  like	  the	  "essential	  facts	  about	  a	  thing	  or	  a	  situation"	  (i.e.	  "firstness"	  as	  immediate	  truth).	  	  Seok	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  See	  for	  example	  Philip	  Kitcher's	  The	  Ethical	  Project	  (2011).	  70	  Bongrae	  Seok,	  Embodied	  Moral	  Psychology	  and	  Confucian	  Philosophy	  (Lexington,	  2013),	  p.	  x.	  71	  Ibid.,	  p.xi	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semantic	  scope	  of	  qing	  情	  and	  raises	  an	  important	  question	  regarding	  the	  	  significance	  that	  this	  term	  might	  have	  for	  Confucian	  ethical	  thinking:	  In	  Chinese	  philosophy,	  emotion	  is	  typically	  notated	  as	  qing	  (情)	  but	  qing	  is	  not	  necessarily	  affective,	  expressive,	  or	  irrational	  inner	  subjective	  states.	  	  In	  many	  Chinese	  philosophical	  texts,	  qing	  is	  explained	  (a)	  ontologically	  as	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  human	  being,	  (b)	  epistemologically	  as	  the	  way	  the	  mind	  (not	  as	  a	  distant	  observer	  but	  as	  a	  close	  resonator)	  understands	  the	  world,	  (c)	  axiologically	  as	  the	  positive	  sense	  of	  harmony	  or	  commitment	  to	  higher	  moral	  values.	  	  If	  qing	  is	  more	  than	  private	  inner	  episodes	  and	  feelings,	  what	  is	  qing	  and	  why	  is	  it	  important	  in	  Confucian	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  moral	  psychology?72	  	  Seok	  goes	  on	  to	  answer	  this	  provocative	  question	  by	  showing	  how	  qing	  情	  is	  best	  understood	  within	  a	  dynamic	  and	  disclosive	  field	  of	  embodied	  affect	  which	  unifies	  multiple	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  qing	  along	  a	  fact-­‐value	  dialectical	  spectrum.73	  	  	   Part	  of	  the	  confusion	  for	  interpreters	  arises	  from	  expressions	  like	  "nature	  of	  things"	  wu	  zhi	  qing	  物之情	  (Mencius,	  3A4)	  which	  lead	  A.C.	  Graham	  (1989)	  and	  others	  to	  define	  the	  qing	  of	  some	  object/situation	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  something	  being	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  "essentialist"	  interpretation,	  wherein	  qing	  is	  conceptually	  equivalent	  to	  eidos	  is	  then	  applied	  to	  passages	  that	  more	  or	  less	  explicitly	  relate	  qing	  to	  the	  embodied	  emotions	  as	  just	  an	  instance	  of	  identifying	  the	  essential	  traits	  of	  universal	  human	  being.	  	  It	  would	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  category	  mistake	  according	  to	  essentialists	  to	  view	  the	  qing	  情	  of	  insentient	  creatures	  or	  situations	  as	  any	  different	  from	  the	  qing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Ibid.,	  p.	  123.	  73	  "In	  sum	  there	  are	  three	  major	  semantic	  dimensions	  of	  qing.	  	  First,	  qing	  means	  the	  nature	  of	  things.	  	  It	  is	  parallel	  but	  contrasted	  with	  xing,	  which	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  essential	  and	  identifying	  features	  of	  existence.	  	  Second,	  qing	  also	  means	  the	  direct	  and	  vivid	  sensation	  of	  the	  way	  things	  progress	  or	  evolve	  in	  particular	  conditions	  of	  situations	  or	  environments.	  	  Third,	  qing	  means	  the	  affective	  side	  of	  the	  human	  psyche,	  the	  feeling	  we	  have	  about	  events	  occurring	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  us."	  (Ibid.,	  p.126)	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of	  human	  beings.	  	  Such	  an	  essentialist	  reading	  of	  qing	  is	  given	  further	  credence	  by	  the	  intimate	  correlation	  that	  the	  term	  has	  with	  "natural	  tendencies"	  or	  "inherent	  dispositions"	  (xing	  性).	  	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  interesting	  fact	  that	  the	  unprovenanced	  Shanghai	  Museum	  version	  of	  the	  Chu	  楚	  bamboo	  slips	  "Natural	  Tendencies	  Emerge	  from	  Conditions"	  (Xingziming	  Chu	  《性自命出》)	  is	  titled	  "Discourse	  on	  Natural	  Tendencies	  and	  Affectivity"	  (Xingqing	  Lun	  《性情論》),	  and	  as	  the	  later	  Four-­‐Seven	  debates	  make	  readily	  obvious	  a	  vitally	  important	  question	  for	  Confucian	  thinkers	  throughout	  the	  ages	  has	  been	  to	  elucidate	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  "natural	  tendencies"	  (xing	  性)	  and	  "affective	  experience"	  (qing	  情).	  	  	  Indeed,	  Mengzi	  seems	  to	  even	  view	  the	  terms	  as	  interchangeable	  in	  his	  debate	  with	  Gaozi	  (Mengzi	  6A6)	  who	  held	  that	  the	  xing	  性	  of	  human	  persons	  was	  ethically	  ambivalent	  at	  best	  (xing	  
wushan	  wu	  bushan性無善無不善).	  	  Mengzi's	  response	  to	  this	  Gaozian	  challenge	  is	  to	  respond	  that	  as	  far	  as	  human	  qing	  情	  goes	  it	  is	  certainly	  capable	  of	  acting	  ethically	  efficaciously	  (nairuo	  qi	  qing	  乃若其情	  則可以為善).	  	  The	  Xunzi	  also	  connects	  xing	  and	  qing:	  "xing	  is	  what	  tian	  accomplishes	  and	  qing	  is	  xing's	  material	  foundation"	  (性
者天之就也	  情者性之質也).74	  	  And	  in	  the	  same	  chapter	  of	  the	  Xunzi	  there	  is	  an	  explicit	  connection	  drawn	  between	  "natural	  tendencies"	  and	  embodied	  emotions:	  "xing's	  love,	  hate,	  joy,	  anger,	  sadness,	  and	  pleasure	  are	  called	  qing"	  (性之好惡喜怒哀
樂謂之情).	  	  And	  in	  the	  Liyun	  (禮運)	  chapter	  of	  the	  Liji	  (禮記)	  we	  find	  expressions	  such	  as	  "human	  qing	  is	  a	  field"	  (人情以為田)	  and	  "human	  qing	  is	  the	  sage	  king's	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Xunzi,	  Chapter	  22,	  Rectification	  of	  Names	  正名篇.	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field"	  (故人情者	  聖王之田也).	  	  Seok	  here	  brings	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  any	  "private	  theater	  of	  Cartesian	  mind,	  this	  open	  field	  [of	  interpersonal	  affectivity]	  can	  be	  publicly	  accessible	  and	  cultivated."75	  	  	   Indeed,	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  affective	  experience	  (qing	  情)	  can	  be	  unified	  using	  this	  metaphor	  of	  a	  transactional	  field	  of	  disclosure	  (not	  a	  statically	  given	  mirror	  of	  subjective	  representation):	  This	  interactive	  and	  open	  nature	  of	  qing	  is	  probably	  understood	  better	  in	  the	  metaphor	  of	  field.	  	  Qing	  is	  an	  open	  space	  (field)	  where	  the	  world	  is	  felt	  directly	  and	  engaged	  interactively.	  	  It	  is	  not	  an	  enclosed	  theater	  where	  the	  world	  is	  only	  translated	  or,	  at	  best,	  transplanted.	  	  As	  qing	  is	  cultivated	  and	  properly	  governed,	  it	  is	  tuned	  to	  the	  world	  and	  it	  presents	  the	  world	  to	  us	  because	  it	  is	  the	  embodied	  feeling	  that	  gives	  us	  the	  direct	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  given	  situation	  really	  means	  to	  us.	  	  As	  far	  as	  we	  live	  in	  this	  world,	  we	  cannot	  be	  neutral	  and	  cool	  to	  the	  world;	  we	  are	  inescapably	  emotional	  to	  and	  interactive	  with	  the	  world	  because	  the	  world	  is	  not	  a	  physical	  location	  but	  a	  meaningful	  place	  to	  us.	  	  From	  this	  perspective	  of	  embodiment	  and	  interaction,	  different	  meanings	  of	  qing	  can	  be	  coherently	  understood.76	  	  We	  will	  continue	  to	  discover	  throughout	  our	  exploration	  of	  these	  core	  Si-­‐Meng	  texts	  a	  great	  emphasis	  placed	  upon	  the	  vital	  significance	  of	  affectivity	  (qing	  情)	  in	  coming	  to	  know	  an	  interpersonal	  world	  of	  shared	  experience.	  	  Qing	  is	  "'what	  something	  really	  is'	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  unmediated	  experience	  itself	  resides	  in	  affective	  transactions	  that	  become	  selective	  and	  abstract	  when	  reduced	  to	  the	  cognitive	  structures	  of	  language"	  and	  "is	  important	  in	  understanding	  the	  radically	  contextualized	  and	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  creativity	  itself."77	  	   In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  full	  significance	  of	  the	  Four-­‐Seven	  debate	  in	  Confucian	  philosophy	  we	  do	  well	  to	  contextualize	  it	  within	  a	  discourse	  regarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Seok,	  p.135.	  76	  Ibid.,	  p.139.	  77	  Hall	  and	  Ames,	  Zhongyong	  "Glossary",	  pp.73-­‐74.	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the	  relationship	  between	  "[normative]	  patterning"	  (li	  理)	  and	  "vital	  energies"	  (qi	  氣)	  in	  a	  tradition	  of	  Cheng-­‐Zhu	  school	  of	  Neo-­‐Confucian	  philosophy.	  	  Building	  upon	  the	  hermeneutic	  work	  of	  Confucian	  thinkers	  like	  Zhou	  Duynyi,	  Zhang	  Zai,	  and	  the	  Cheng	  brothers,	  as	  well	  as	  drawing	  inspiration	  from	  Buddhist	  traditions	  of	  dharma	  lineage	  succession,	  Zhu	  Xi	  articulated	  a	  systematic	  account	  of	  way-­‐learning	  transmission	  that	  points	  to	  exemplary	  "conceptual	  personae"	  in	  a	  living	  tradition	  who	  come	  to	  embody	  a	  certain	  understanding	  of	  Neo-­‐Confucian	  orthodoxy	  and	  ideals.78	  	  	  	   The	  later	  Korean	  interlocutors	  of	  the	  Four-­‐Seven	  debate	  frequently	  refer	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Zhu	  Xi	  as	  authoritative	  and	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  the	  "four	  sprouts"	  and	  "seven	  feelings"	  obviously	  come	  from	  the	  writings	  traditionally	  attributed	  to	  Mengzi	  and	  Zisizi	  respectively.79	  	  The	  "four	  sprouts"	  or	  moral	  affects—"compassion	  and	  empathy"	  (ceyin	  zhixin	  惻隱之心),	  "	  "(xiu	  e	  zhixin	  羞惡之心),	  "	  "	  (cirang	  zhixin	  辭讓之
心),	  and	  "	  "	  (shifei	  zhixin	  是非之心)	  	  all	  of	  which	  given	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  environing	  conditions	  can	  be	  developed	  into	  the	  relational	  virtuosities	  of	  'consummate	  conduct'	  (ren	  仁),	  'optimal	  appropriateness'	  (yi	  義),	  'ritual	  propriety'	  (li	  禮),	  and	  'pragmatic	  wisdom'	  (zhi	  智)—are,	  within	  the	  course	  of	  the	  debate,	  frequently	  referenced	  to	  explain	  a	  sort	  of	  "rooted	  goodness"	  (xing	  ben	  shan	  性本善)	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  more	  on	  "conceptual	  personae"	  see	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari	  What	  is	  Philosophy?	  	  Zhu	  Xi	  sees	  his	  own	  thinking	  as	  an	  "authoritative	  consolidation"	  (tong	  統)	  of	  the	  exemplary	  lives	  of	  Yao,	  Shun,	  Yu,	  and	  other	  Sage	  rules	  stretching	  through	  Confucius,	  through	  Zisizi,	  and	  Mengzi	  before	  being	  revived	  in	  the	  Song	  dynasty	  by	  figures	  like	  Zhou	  	  Dunyi	  and	  the	  Cheng	  brothers.	  	  See《徽州朱文公祠
堂记》:	  “尧、舜、禹、汤、文、武、周公生，而道始行；孔子孟子生，而道始明；孔孟之道，周、
程、张之继之；周、程、张子之道，文公朱先生又继之。此道统之传，历万世而可考也。”	  79	  p.56	  reading	  Zhuzi	  yulei	  on	  理	  and	  氣;	  p.63-­‐	  body	  and	  互發	  (本性	  and	  氣情);	  Affect	  theory,	  new(ish)	  materialism,	  and	  agential	  realism;	  Zhu	  Xi's	  construction	  of	  道統	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  Zisizi	  and	  Mengzi	  (p.68	  Zisizi	  and	  41,	  51,	  56	  on	  Si-­‐Meng).	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the	  "seven	  feelings"	  from	  the	  "Ritual	  Rhythm"	  chapter	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Rites《礼记·礼
运》	  "happiness"(xi喜),	  "anger"	  (nu怒),	  "sorrow"	  (ai	  哀),	  "fear"	  (ju	  惧),	  "love"	  (ai
爱),	  "disgust"(e	  恶),	  and	  "desire"	  (yu欲).	  	  This	  text	  was	  attributed	  to	  Zisizi	  who	  also	  offers	  a	  fourfold	  presentation	  of	  the	  basic	  biocultural	  affects	  "mandated	  by	  heaven"	  (tianming	  天命)	  as	  "happiness",	  "anger",	  "sorrow",	  and	  "joy/musicality"	  (le	  樂)	  in	  the	  "Focusing	  the	  Familiar"	  (Zhongyong	  中庸)	  chapter	  of	  the	  Liji.	  	   Since	  the	  main	  thrust	  of	  the	  debate	  circles	  around	  how	  to	  best	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  "way-­‐making	  heartmind"	  (daoxin	  道心)	  of	  exemplary	  persons	  that	  realizes	  (perceives	  possibilities	  and	  creates	  potentiality)	  normative	  patterns	  of	  things	  (gewu	  zhizhi	  格物致知)	  in	  terms	  of	  "coherence"	  or	  dynamic	  "patterning"	  (li	  理)	  and	  a	  more	  mundane	  sense	  of	  "human	  heartmind"	  (renxin	  人心)	  that	  is	  precariously	  positioned	  in	  a	  biologically	  and	  socially	  charged	  nexus	  of	  affective	  energies	  (qi	  氣),	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  make	  use	  of	  a	  hermeneutically	  responsible	  ars	  contextualis	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  non-­‐dualistic	  distinction	  between	  "patterning"	  (li	  理)	  and	  "affective	  energies"	  (qi	  氣)	  that	  the	  various	  interlocutors	  depend	  upon	  in	  developing	  their	  respective	  positions.	  	  What	  we	  have	  to	  avoid	  is	  a	  simplistic	  rendering	  of	  li	  理	  as	  "Principle"	  understood	  in	  a	  tradition	  of	  metaphysical	  substance	  ontology	  in	  which	  the	  Arche	  or	  Principium	  is	  what	  is	  most	  real	  and	  stands	  behind	  the	  manifold	  of	  changing	  appearances	  as	  a	  directive	  force.	  	  We	  do	  well	  to	  give	  up	  a	  retrospective	  search	  after	  static,	  metaphysically	  transcendent	  Principles	  and	  turn	  instead	  to	  the	  real	  world	  of	  ever	  changing	  unique	  insistent	  particularities	  that	  can	  be	  prospectively	  and	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pragmatically	  brought	  into	  greater	  degrees	  of	  unity	  in	  ethical	  and	  ontological	  discourse.	  	  We	  might	  take	  a	  hint	  from	  William	  James	  and	  prefer	  to	  speak	  of	  an	  "Ultimate"	  instead	  of	  an	  "Absolute"	  since	  we	  are	  interested	  here	  in	  achieving	  creative	  agency	  and	  not	  mirroring	  some	  metaphysically	  transcendent	  order	  of	  Being.80	  	  	   	  Indeed,	  this	  language	  of	  Ultimacy	  resonates	  more	  readily	  with	  the	  "limitless	  supreme	  ultimate"	  (wuji	  er	  taiji	  無極而太極)	  that	  is	  employed	  in	  Dao-­‐learning	  Confucian	  discourse	  to	  describe	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  "[ethically	  normative]	  patterning	  is	  continuous	  with	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  roles"	  (liyifenshu	  理一分殊).	  	   Likewise,	  in	  rendering	  qi	  	  氣	  in	  a	  philosophically	  nuanced	  translation	  requires	  that	  we	  guard	  against	  any	  simplistic	  understandings	  that	  would	  depend	  upon	  an	  ontologically	  dualistic	  categorization	  of	  Form/Matter	  characterizing	  much	  of	  Western	  philosophical	  history.	  	  The	  etymology	  of	  qi	  氣	  calls	  to	  mind	  vapors	  (visual	  and	  olfactory)	  emerging	  from	  a	  likely	  ritually	  significant	  context	  of	  heating	  millet	  wine	  to	  share	  with	  ancestors	  and	  guests	  at	  a	  banquet.	  	  It	  needs	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  then	  that	  far	  from	  referring	  to	  a	  distinct	  domain	  of	  purely	  material	  or	  corporeal	  stuff	  passively	  awaiting	  the	  imposition	  of	  active	  Form,	  qi	  氣	  always	  signifies	  an	  atmospheric	  quality	  of	  experience	  that	  can	  be	  pragmatically	  conceptualized	  using	  yin-­‐yang	  correlative	  categories.	  	  It	  is	  then	  "rhythm"	  as	  moving	  patterning	  of	  qi	  configurations	  that	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  think	  with	  than	  the	  static	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  See	  William	  James'	  on	  the	  "One	  and	  the	  Many"	  in	  Pragmatism.	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Form(s)	  when	  considering	  how	  experience	  takes	  on	  more	  or	  less	  distinctive	  aesthetic-­‐ethical-­‐religious	  orderings	  of	  experience.	  	  	   	  In	  discussing	  Guo	  Xi's	  Song	  dynasty	  painting	  Early	  Spring,	  Stanley	  Murashige	  considers	  the	  dynamic	  "mountain-­‐water"	  (shanshui	  山水)	  aesthetic	  patternings	  in	  a	  naturalistic	  yin-­‐yang	  cosmology	  of	  rhythmic	  changes:	  Though	  objects	  retain	  their	  individuality,	  they	  never	  claim	  a	  birthright	  beyond	  the	  community	  of	  the	  mountain.	  	  As	  one	  traverses	  the	  junctures	  of	  objects,	  one	  realizes	  that	  the	  objects	  depend	  upon	  each	  other	  for	  their	  existence,	  that	  they	  are	  reciprocal,	  that	  the	  movement	  from	  one	  is	  but	  a	  transformation	  into	  the	  other.	  	  No	  form	  is	  discrete	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  but	  instead	  lives	  in	  the	  embrace	  of	  its	  neighbors,	  appearing	  in	  the	  metamorphosis	  that	  happens	  across	  boundaries.	  	  Illuminating	  contrast	  and	  the	  shifting	  in-­‐and-­‐out	  rhythm	  of	  the	  brush	  encourage	  correspondence,	  connotation,	  and	  correlation.	  	  While	  spontaneous	  inflections	  of	  contrast	  and	  rhythm	  bestow	  particularity,	  they	  deny	  absolute	  separateness,	  so	  that	  each	  thing,	  while	  retaining	  its	  own	  integrity,	  respects	  a	  common	  foundation.81	  	  Murashige	  also	  draws	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Xie	  He's	  (ca.	  490)	  Six	  "Principles"	  of	  aesthetic	  creativity,	  particularly	  the	  first	  one	  of	  "vaporous	  energy/resonance	  corresponds	  with	  life/movement"	  (qiyun	  shengdong	  氣韻生動)	  to	  develop	  a	  contemporary	  hermeneutic	  of	  qi	  that	  views	  it	  relationally	  and	  contextually	  in	  light	  of	  atmospheric	  qualities	  and	  dispositional	  modes	  of	  non-­‐linear	  influence	  (shi	  勢).	  	  I	  too	  maintain	  that	  this	  is	  a	  pervasive	  and	  persistent	  feature	  of	  a	  yin-­‐yang	  correlative	  cosmology	  and	  our	  renderings	  of	  li	  理	  and	  qi	  氣	  in	  philosophically	  nuanced	  English	  need	  to	  be	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  highlighting	  this	  cultural	  dynamic	  of	  somaesthetic	  and	  role	  ethical	  creativity.82	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  See	  Stanley	  Murashige,	  "Rhythm,	  Order,	  Change,	  and	  Nature	  in	  Guo	  Xi's	  Early	  Spring"	  Monumenta	  
Serica	  43(1995):	  337-­‐364,	  	  p.348.	  82	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  Western	  Marxist	  interpretation	  that	  might	  help	  us	  think	  dynamically	  about	  structure	  and	  content	  see	  Henri	  Lefebvre's	  Rhythmanalysis.	  	  From	  recent	  sinology,	  Paul	  Goldin's	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  V.	  William	  James'	  Stream	  of	  Consciousness	  and	  a	  Focus-­‐Fringe	  Model	  of	  Selective	  Attention	  	  In	  a	  1905	  essay	  published	  as	  part	  of	  A	  Pluralistic	  Universe	  	  William	  James	  writes	  that	  “[t]he	  body	  is	  the	  storm	  centre,	  the	  origin	  of	  co-­‐ordinates,	  the	  constant	  place	  of	  stress	  in	  [our]	  experience-­‐train.	  Everything	  circles	  round	  it,	  and	  is	  felt	  from	  its	  point	  of	  view.”	  The	  "world	  experienced,”	  James	  elaborates,	  “comes	  at	  all	  times	  with	  our	  body	  as	  its	  centre,	  centre	  of	  vision,	  centre	  of	  action,	  centre	  of	  interest.”	  For	  purposes	  of	  survival,	  and	  for	  other	  value-­‐laden	  reasons	  of	  various	  modes	  of	  thriving,	  “all	  minds	  must	  […]	  take	  an	  intense	  interest	  in	  the	  bodies	  to	  which	  they	  are	  yoked"	  and	  "[m]y	  own	  body	  and	  what	  ministers	  to	  its	  needs	  are	  thus	  the	  primitive	  object,	  instinctively	  determined,	  of	  my	  egoistic	  interests"	  even	  though	  "other	  objects	  may	  become	  interesting	  derivatively	  through	  association”	  with	  this	  very	  body.83	  	   As	  a	  pioneer	  in	  psychological	  inquiry	  William	  James	  wished	  to	  avoid	  the	  epistemic	  and	  ethical	  pitfalls	  of	  Sensationalism—that	  following	  the	  early	  modern	  Empiricists	  understood	  consciousness	  to	  be	  an	  atomistic	  train	  of	  discrete	  sense-­‐data—and	  Intellectualism,	  a	  kind	  of	  thinking	  that	  posits	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐many	  model	  or	  a	  transcendental	  ego	  to	  explain	  the	  continuity	  of	  conscious	  experience.84	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  "What	  is	  qi?	  And	  was	  it	  a	  good	  idea?"	  (2017)	  is	  an	  interesting	  historical-­‐philological	  conjecture	  regarding	  the	  cultural	  gestalt	  shift	  that	  occurred	  in	  late	  Bronze	  age	  antiquity	  using	  qi	  氣	  as	  an	  organizing	  root-­‐metaphor	  for	  shifting	  the	  intellectual	  climate	  from	  a	  ghost	  and	  spirit	  belief-­‐system	  to	  a	  more	  naturalistic	  explanation	  of	  cosmic	  and	  ancestral	  forces	  (tian	  天)	  exerting	  influence	  over	  precarious	  human	  lives	  in	  the	  Warring	  States	  period.	  83	  See	  	  William	  James	  Principles	  of	  Psychology	  v.1,	  p.324.	  For	  a	  provocative	  somaesthetic	  interpretation	  of	  James	  on	  body-­‐thinking	  see	  Richard	  Shusterman's	  "Deeper	  into	  the	  Storm	  Center"	  in	  his	  Body	  Consciousness	  (2012).	  84	  Basically,	  James	  wishes	  to	  avoid	  what	  Antonio	  Damasio	  has	  more	  recently	  referred	  to	  as	  "Descartes'	  Error"	  or	  the	  common	  fallacy	  of	  trying	  to	  separate	  out	  a	  wholly	  mental	  realm	  of	  experience	  from	  its	  corporeal	  and/or	  emotional	  background	  matter.	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James	  argues	  that	  both	  these	  models	  are	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task	  of	  phenomenologically	  describing	  consciousness	  as	  an	  embodied	  process,	  and	  offers	  instead	  the	  heuristic	  metaphor	  of	  a	  "stream	  of	  consciousness."	  	  For	  James,	  "no	  one	  ever	  had	  a	  simple	  sensation	  by	  itself."85	  	  Instead,	  consciousness	  "from	  our	  natal	  days,	  is	  of	  a	  teeming	  multiplicity	  of	  objects	  and	  relations,	  and	  what	  we	  call	  simple	  sensations	  are	  results	  of	  discriminative	  attention,	  pushed	  often	  to	  a	  very	  high	  degree."86	  Without	  positing	  a	  pure	  epistemic	  subject	  of	  representation,	  James	  says	  that	  at	  the	  level	  of	  bare	  phenomenological	  description	  of	  experience	  all	  that	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  saying	  is	  that	  "thinking	  of	  some	  sort	  goes	  on."	  	  For	  James	  consciousness	  is	  an	  embodied	  process	  marked	  by	  flow:	  Consciousness,	  then,	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  itself	  chopped	  up	  in	  bits.	  	  Such	  words	  as	  'chain'	  or	  'train'	  do	  not	  describe	  it	  fitly	  as	  it	  presents	  itself	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  	  It	  is	  nothing	  jointed;	  it	  flows.	  	  A	  'river'	  or	  a	  'stream'	  are	  the	  metaphors	  by	  which	  it	  is	  most	  naturally	  described.	  	  In	  talking	  of	  it	  hereafter,	  
let	  us	  call	  it	  the	  stream	  of	  thought,	  of	  consciousness,	  or	  of	  subjective	  life.	  (239)	  	  	   	  James	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  any	  stream	  of	  consciousness	  is	  inevitably	  marked	  by	  five	  "characteristics"	  or	  what	  we	  might	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  any	  conscious	  experience:	  1)	  Every	  thought	  tends	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  personal	  consciousness.	  (personalism	  condition)	  2)	  Within	  each	  personal	  consciousness	  thought	  is	  always	  changing.	  (process	  condition)	  3)	  Within	  each	  personal	  consciousness	  thought	  is	  sensibly	  continuous.	  (continuity	  condition)	  4)	  It	  always	  appears	  to	  deal	  with	  objects	  independent	  of	  itself.	  (intentionality	  condition)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  William	  James,	  Principles	  of	  Psychology	  v.1,	  p.224.	  86	  Ibid.	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5)	  It	  is	  interested	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  these	  objects	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others,	  and	  welcomes	  or	  rejects—chooses	  from	  among	  them,	  in	  a	  world—all	  the	  while."	  (ethical-­‐aesthetic	  interest	  condition)87	  	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  first	  condition	  of	  personalism	  James	  suggests	  that	  consciousness	  "in	  its	  form"	  always	  "tends	  to	  personality."	  	  In	  considering	  cases	  of	  borderline	  schizophrenia,	  hypnotism,	  and	  anaesthetic	  experience,	  James	  argues	  that	  consciousness	  has	  an	  inveterate	  tendency	  to	  strive	  towards	  revolving	  around	  a	  "center"	  of	  focal	  personality	  always	  marked	  by	  a	  horizontal,	  multiplicity	  of	  "fringe"	  awareness.	  	  As	  regards	  the	  second	  process	  condition	  James	  offers	  a	  kind	  of	  pragmatic	  materialist	  account	  of	  psychic	  transformations	  as	  being	  ineluctably	  marked	  by	  physical	  changes	  in	  bodily	  being.	  	  James	  points	  to	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  changing	  moods	  with	  regards	  to	  purportedly	  stable	  entities	  or	  objects	  "out	  there"	  in	  the	  world:	  There	  are	  facts	  which	  make	  us	  believe	  that	  our	  sensibility	  is	  altering	  all	  the	  time,	  so	  that	  the	  same	  object	  cannot	  easily	  give	  us	  the	  same	  sensation	  over	  again.	  	  The	  eye's	  sensibility	  to	  light	  is	  at	  its	  maximum	  when	  the	  eye	  is	  first	  exposed,	  and	  blunts	  itself	  with	  surprising	  rapidity.	  .	  .	  .We	  feel	  things	  differently	  according	  as	  we	  are	  sleepy	  or	  awake,	  hungry	  or	  full,	  fresh	  or	  tired.	  .	  .Yet	  we	  never	  doubt	  that	  our	  feelings	  reveal	  the	  same	  world,	  with	  the	  same	  sensible	  qualities	  and	  the	  same	  sensible	  things	  occupying	  it.88	  	  	  James	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  our	  "difference	  of	  sensibility"	  conditions	  that	  is	  revealed	  by	  our	  varying	  "emotions	  about	  things"	  from	  one	  age	  to	  another	  or	  even	  changing	  more	  rapidly	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  "different	  organic	  moods."89	  James	  accepts	  change	  as	  a	  given	  and	  recognizes	  that	  "experience	  is	  remolding	  us	  every	  moment"	  and	  "with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Ibid,	  p.	  225—italics	  and	  parenthetical	  comments	  added	  for	  emphasis	  and	  clarity.	  88	  Ibid.	  89	  Ibid.,	  p.232.	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every	  pulse	  of	  change"	  we	  come	  to	  inhabit	  a	  different	  set	  of	  feeling	  conditions	  and	  we	  can	  appeal	  to	  "brain-­‐physiology"	  to	  corroborate	  our	  view.	  	   James	  develops	  a	  selective	  attention	  or	  "spotlight"	  model	  of	  focus-­‐field	  thinking	  about	  consciousness.	  	  Our	  embodied	  experience,	  set	  as	  it	  is	  against	  a	  "blooming	  buzzing	  confusion"	  of	  ever	  changing	  background	  conditions,	  is	  meant	  to	  on	  this	  Jamesian	  account	  of	  flowing	  attention	  or	  "stream	  of	  consciousness"	  offer	  a	  realistic	  alternative	  to	  theories	  of	  perception	  or	  epistemologies	  that	  would	  posit	  a	  superordinate	  Knower	  or	  take	  the	  Known	  to	  refer	  only	  to	  unchanging	  entities.	  	  As	  a	  pragmatist,	  James	  was	  interested	  in	  an	  experimental	  epistemology	  that	  takes	  pluralism	  and	  instrumentalism	  for	  granted	  in	  an	  unfinished	  cosmos	  marked	  by	  plasticity	  and	  precarity.	  	  For	  James,	  a	  "permanently	  existing	  'idea'	  or	  'Vorstellung'	  which	  makes	  its	  appearance	  before	  the	  footlights	  of	  consciousness	  at	  periodical	  intervals,	  is	  as	  mythological	  an	  entity	  as	  the	  Jack	  of	  Spades."90	  	  	   James	  develops	  the	  ethical	  and	  religious	  implications	  of	  his	  thinking	  about	  selective	  attention	  in	  a	  fringe-­‐focus	  dynamic	  of	  perpetual	  becoming.	  	  [more	  here	  from	  James'	  text	  ].	  	  The	  "pulses	  of	  change"	  that	  he	  describes	  in	  his	  phenomenology	  of	  personal	  consciousness	  are	  also	  always	  "pockets	  of	  potential"	  for	  realizing	  aesthetic-­‐ethical-­‐religious	  "optimal	  appropriateness"	  (yi	  義)	  that	  makes	  way	  for	  ever	  more	  expansive	  horizons	  of	  significance	  and	  ameliorative	  futurity.	  	  Such	  a	  means-­‐ends	  continuum	  is	  circular	  but	  not	  in	  a	  vicious	  sense	  as	  it	  displays	  dimensions	  akin	  to	  an	  Emersonian	  sense	  of	  infinite	  perfectibility.91	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Ibid.,	  p.236.	  91	  See	  Emerson's	  "Circles".	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  VI.	  A	  Dynamic	  Focus-­‐Field	  Model	  of	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethical	  Agency:	  "Resolute	  Becoming"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  and	  "Creative	  Integrity"	  (cheng	  誠)	  as	  ends-­‐in-­‐view	  	  	   As	  we	  have	  already	  made	  clear,	  many	  scholars	  who	  would	  eschew	  any	  substance	  oriented,	  thing-­‐based	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  relational	  ontology	  of	  experience	  in	  early	  Chinese	  thinking	  prefer	  to	  use	  a	  more	  dynamic	  register	  of	  discourse	  to	  describe	  human	  becomings	  in	  a	  correlative	  cosmology.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  single	  most	  important	  position	  this	  dissertation	  is	  making	  a	  plea	  for	  is	  reconstructing	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  lineage	  of	  Confucian	  role	  ethical	  thinking	  about	  persons,	  agency,	  and	  responsibility	  outside	  of	  the	  recent	  debates	  between	  "communitarian"	  and	  "liberal"	  conceptions	  of	  self/persons.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  either	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  accept	  the	  ontological	  fiction	  of	  a	  wholly	  autonomous	  subject	  capable	  of	  choosing	  their	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  behind	  a	  theoretical	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  to	  ground	  the	  ideal	  apparatus	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  or	  we	  are	  left	  jettisoning	  any	  conception	  of	  self	  in	  favor	  of	  coercive	  authoritarian	  or	  paternalist	  structures	  that	  implement	  one	  or	  another	  form	  of	  "communitarian"	  perfectionism.	  	  I	  think	  that	  by	  reconstructing	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  on	  embodied	  agency	  and	  unique	  personal	  potential	  we	  can	  get	  a	  rich	  conception	  of	  self	  or	  personhood	  that	  construes	  persons	  as	  relationally-­‐constituted	  and	  becoming	  creators	  in	  ameliorating	  social	  structures	  (li	  禮)	  and	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  (yi	  義).92	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  For	  an	  illuminating	  discussion	  on	  the	  communitarian/liberal	  debates	  and	  a	  distinctively	  Confucian	  conception	  of	  democratic	  persons	  as	  uniquely	  situated	  persons	  see	  Sor-­‐Hoon	  Tan's	  Confucian	  
Democracy,	  pp.17-­‐25.	  	  For	  a	  contemporary	  example	  wherein	  Si-­‐Meng	  thinking	  about	  agency	  might	  be	  able	  to	  contribute	  important	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  strategic	  insights	  is	  in	  materialist,	  abolitionist,	  literacy	  programs	  that	  work	  with	  a	  "voices	  out"	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  "oppressors	  in"	  model	  of	  revolutionary	  educational	  praxis.	  	  Transforming	  power-­‐knowledge	  apparatuses	  from	  within	  and	  not	  merely	  attempting	  to	  rehabilitate	  or	  reform	  liberal	  subjects	  in	  carceral-­‐educational	  systems	  or	  within	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   Indeed,	  	  shendu	  慎獨	  thinking	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  "resolute	  human	  becoming"	  or	  "concerning	  creativity"	  in	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  structures	  the	  very	  conditions	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  realizing	  creative	  ethical	  agency.	  	  But	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  unique	  "pulses	  of	  change"	  and	  "pockets	  of	  creativity"	  without	  having	  to	  posit	  a	  metaphysical	  will-­‐o'-­‐the-­‐wisp,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  ready-­‐made,	  purely	  inward	  conception	  of	  self	  that	  would	  serve	  to	  ground	  our	  "original	  nature"	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  metaphysical	  principle.	  	  We	  don't	  need	  to	  confess	  our	  philosophical	  sins	  every	  time	  we	  find	  ourselves	  guilty	  of	  one	  or	  another	  form	  of	  "the	  philosophical	  fallacy,"93	  but	  we	  should	  strive	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  creative	  agency	  without	  pernicious	  philosophical	  fictions	  that	  would	  inhibit	  creativity	  or	  promote	  oppressive	  structures	  to	  reign	  in	  unrepentant	  forms	  of	  autonomous	  and	  possessive	  "individualism."	  	  Reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  discourse	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  democratic	  agency	  without	  autonomous	  individuals	  or	  foundational	  subjects.	  	  We	  can	  do	  everything	  we	  need	  to	  counter	  oppressive,	  fascist	  domination	  structures	  in	  history	  and	  society	  starting	  with	  family-­‐focused	  selves	  and	  extending	  to	  ameliorative	  "becoming	  creators"	  in	  a	  cosmic	  drama	  (tiandirensancai	  天地人三才).94	  	   Roger	  Ames,	  drawing	  extensively	  upon	  pragmatist	  and	  process	  thinking,	  has	  developed	  a	  dynamic	  focus-­‐field	  model	  of	  persons	  through	  philosophical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  "prison	  literary	  complex"	  is	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  that	  is	  urgently	  needed.	  See	  Michael	  Sutcliffe's	  "All	  our	  Community’s	  Voices:	  Unteaching	  the	  Prison	  Literacy	  Complex"	  in	  Abolition:	  An	  Insurgent	  Journal	  
of	  Politics.	  93	  Dewey's	  terminology	  used	  to	  point	  out	  modes	  of	  reasoning	  that	  take	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  process	  has	  somehow	  causally	  necessary	  for	  initiating	  the	  process	  in	  the	  beginning.	  	  It	  is	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  "teleology."	  94	  The	  phrase	  "becoming	  creator"	  is	  drawn	  from	  Emerson's	  The	  American	  Scholar	  where	  he	  uses	  it	  in	  a	  multiple	  sense	  to	  refer	  simultaneously	  to	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  creative	  but	  also	  to	  aesthetico-­‐ethical-­‐religious	  situations	  that	  would	  be	  "becoming	  of"	  a	  creator	  spirit.	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translations	  as	  ars	  contextualis	  that	  can	  assist	  uninitiated	  readers	  approach	  the	  probably	  rather	  unfamiliar	  set	  of	  assumptions	  undergirding	  early	  Chinese	  thinking	  about	  agency.	  	  It	  isn't	  just	  Si-­‐Meng	  Confucians	  who	  are	  working	  with	  a	  relationally	  constituted	  concept	  of	  transactional	  uniqueness	  as	  participatory	  agency.	  	  We	  can	  employ	  a	  focus-­‐field	  interpretive	  dynamic	  then	  to	  better	  approach	  pre-­‐Qin	  and	  Han	  thinking.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  only	  perhaps	  in	  some	  of	  the	  post-­‐Buddhist	  thinkers	  in	  China	  that	  we	  get	  anything	  like	  a	  One-­‐behind-­‐the-­‐Many	  model	  of	  transcendental	  ego	  in	  conceptualizing	  persons—and	  here	  too	  I	  think	  a	  strong	  case	  would	  have	  to	  be	  made	  on	  an	  individual	  textual	  basis	  that	  a	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  wasn't	  still	  operative,	  although	  perhaps	  largely	  tacit	  in	  Chinese	  translations	  of	  Indian	  Buddhist	  texts.	  	  In	  
Thinking	  Through	  the	  Han	  Ames	  and	  Hall	  make	  use	  of	  focus-­‐field	  rhetoric	  to	  contextualize	  pluralistic	  Chinese	  thinking	  in	  contrast	  to	  single-­‐source	  Western	  metaphysics:	  Our	  focus-­‐field	  model	  of	  the	  self	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  we	  have	  elsewhere	  termed,	  ars	  contextualis.	  	  Chinese	  thinkers,	  both	  Confucian	  and	  Daoist,	  most	  often	  employ	  an	  approach	  to	  philosophic	  understanding	  that	  is	  in	  striking	  contrast	  to	  the	  two	  dominant	  modes	  of	  Western	  speculation.	  	  Among	  the	  majority	  of	  classical	  Chinese	  thinkers,	  there	  is	  resort	  neither	  to	  ontologia	  generalis,	  a	  "general	  ontology,"	  nor	  to	  scientia	  universalis,	  a	  "science	  of	  universal	  principles."	  	  It	  is	  the	  "art	  of	  contextualization"	  that	  is	  most	  characteristic	  of	  Chinese	  intellectual	  endeavors.	  	  The	  variety	  of	  specific	  contexts	  defined	  by	  particular	  family	  relations,	  or	  sociopolitical	  orders,	  constitute	  the	  fields	  focused	  by	  individuals	  who	  are	  in	  turn	  shaped	  by	  the	  field	  of	  influences	  they	  focus.	  	  Ars	  contextualis,	  as	  a	  practical	  endeavor,	  names	  that	  peculiar	  art	  of	  contextualization	  that	  allows	  the	  focal	  individual	  to	  ally	  herself	  with	  those	  contexts	  that	  she	  will	  constitute	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  will	  constitute	  her.95	  	  	   They	  go	  on	  to	  articulate	  how	  this	  ars	  contextualis	  as	  a	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  available	  conceptual	  schemas	  (e.g.	  part-­‐whole	  mereology	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Ames	  and	  Hall,	  Thinking	  Through	  the	  Han,	  p.39.	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or	  one-­‐many	  micro-­‐macro	  cosmic	  thinking).	  	  An	  early	  Chinese	  focus-­‐field	  model	  deals	  with	  "this's	  and	  "that’s"	  in	  an	  always	  provisional	  discourse	  of	  fluid	  becomings	  as	  opposed	  to	  static	  things	  in	  a	  block-­‐universe:	  
Ars	  contextualis	  suggests	  a	  "this-­‐that"	  rather	  than	  a	  "one-­‐many"	  or	  "part-­‐whole"	  model.	  	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  overarching	  context	  determining	  the	  shape	  of	  other	  contexts,	  the	  world	  is	  an	  open-­‐ended	  affair	  comprised	  by	  "thises"	  and	  "thats"	  construable	  from	  any	  number	  of	  distinct	  perspectives.	  	  There	  is	  no	  One	  behind	  the	  many;	  there	  are,	  rather	  many	  ones,	  many	  particular	  foci	  that	  organize	  the	  fields	  about	  them.	  	  The	  art	  of	  contextualization	  involves	  the	  production	  of	  harmonious	  correlations	  of	  the	  myriad	  unique	  details	  (wanwu	  
萬物	  or	  wan	  you	  萬有)	  that	  make	  up	  the	  world."96	  	  	  In	  such	  a	  fluid	  and	  dynamic	  conception	  of	  becoming	  unique	  as	  resolutely	  focusing	  a	  diffuse	  field	  of	  relationality	  via	  a	  role-­‐focused	  responsibility	  ideal,	  the	  importance	  of	  "doing	  one's	  utmost"	  (zhong	  忠)	  and	  "patterns	  of	  deference"	  (shu	  恕)	  as	  embodied	  moral	  imagination	  becomes	  readily	  evident.	  	  With	  a	  role-­‐focused	  conception	  of	  agency	  all	  we	  have	  to	  draw	  upon	  is	  a	  legacy	  of	  exemplary	  persons	  paying	  careful	  attention	  to	  cultivating	  their	  virtuosities	  德	  and	  tending	  to	  their	  heartminding	  dispositions	  心情	  in	  ameliorating	  ritual	  performativity	  禮	  across	  time.	  	  This	  is	  what	  the	  Si-­‐Meng	  distinction	  between	  "heavenly	  way-­‐making"	  (tiandao	  天道)	  and	  "human	  way-­‐making"	  (rendao	  人道)	  amounts	  to.	  	  It	  is	  not	  an	  ontological	  difference	  or	  unbridgeable	  theological	  chasm	  marked	  by	  an	  abyss	  of	  depravity.	  	  The	  heavenly-­‐celestial	  legacy	  of	  ancestors	  and	  those	  who	  have	  forged	  paths	  of	  meaningful	  and	  ameliorative	  way-­‐making	  before	  live	  on	  in	  current	  projects	  of	  constant	  renegotiation	  of	  what	  relational	  flourishing	  should	  look	  like	  in	  present	  predicaments	  and	  situations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Ibid.,	  p.40.	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   A	  dynamic	  focus-­‐field	  model	  not	  only	  helps	  us	  approach	  early	  Chinese	  thinking	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  by	  putting	  our	  often	  unexamined	  and	  culturally	  received	  presuppositions	  at	  risk,	  but	  it	  also	  helps	  in	  developing	  a	  stance	  that	  can	  solve	  the	  dilemmas	  of	  universalism	  vs.	  particularism	  in	  ethical	  theory.	  	  Ars	  Contextualis	  is	  not	  just	  for	  sinologists	  and	  comparative	  philosophers	  making	  sense	  of	  texts,	  but	  as	  unique	  pockets	  of	  creative	  agency	  in	  the	  world	  we	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  our	  experience	  by	  thinking	  creatively	  in	  situations.	  	  A	  "focus/field	  model	  results	  from	  understanding	  an	  item's	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  to	  be	  constituted	  by	  acts	  of	  contextualization"	  because:	  At	  any	  given	  moment,	  items	  in	  a	  correlative	  scheme	  are	  characterizable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  focal	  point	  from	  and	  to	  which	  lines	  of	  divergence	  and	  convergence	  attributable	  to	  them	  move,	  and	  the	  field	  from	  which	  and	  to	  which	  those	  lines	  proceed	  .	  .	  .	  Fields	  are	  unbounded,	  pulsating	  in	  some	  vague	  manner	  from	  and	  to	  their	  various	  transient	  foci.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  field	  readily	  contrasts	  with	  the	  one-­‐many	  and	  part-­‐whole	  models.97	  	  	  Applying	  a	  focus/field	  model	  to	  classical	  Confucianism	  then	  can	  help	  us	  to	  see	  this	  tradition	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  a	  family-­‐centered	  moral	  particularism	  (focus)	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  inclusive	  pluralism	  that	  is	  achieved	  within	  a	  flourishing	  community	  (field).	  	  A	  "focus/field	  model	  retains	  particularism	  as	  the	  focus	  while	  dissolving	  universalism	  into	  inclusive	  pluralism	  as	  the	  field."98	  	  	   It	  is	  definitely	  worth	  considering	  possible	  criticisms	  of	  this	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  selfhood	  as	  a	  heuristic	  for	  approaching	  early	  Confucian	  thinking	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  hermeneutic	  responsibility	  (appropriate	  balance	  of	  suspicion	  and	  faith).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Ames	  and	  Hall,	  Anticipating	  China,	  p.273-­‐275.	  98	  For	  more	  on	  this	  dissolution	  of	  the	  particularist/universalist	  dilemma	  in	  ethical	  theory	  see	  Tao	  Jiang	  "Intimate	  Authority:	  The	  Rule	  of	  Ritual	  in	  Classical	  Confucian	  Political	  Discourse"	  in	  Confucian	  
Cultures	  of	  Authority,	  p.22.	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Might	  not	  it	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  is	  overly	  reliant,	  if	  not	  upon	  an	  ontologically	  foundational	  autonomous	  individual,	  at	  least	  upon	  a	  centered	  subject	  of	  representation	  in	  all	  too	  human	  (because	  coercive,	  classist	  and	  patriarchal)	  structures	  of	  ritual	  space?	  	  In	  addressing	  these	  centrist	  concerns	  about	  selfhood	  from	  a	  Buddhist	  perspective,	  Peter	  Hershock	  problematizes	  the	  focus-­‐field	  model:	  [T]he	  focus-­‐field	  metaphor	  itself	  unfortunately	  replicates	  much	  of	  the	  objective	  and	  binary	  feel	  of	  all	  centrist	  conceptions	  of	  personhood.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  implies	  the	  possibility	  of	  determining	  by	  observation	  that	  a	  person	  is	  this	  focusing	  of	  the	  field	  while	  I	  the	  observer	  am	  yet	  another.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  language	  of	  focus	  and	  field	  requires	  the	  admission	  of	  a	  metaperspective	  from	  which	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  what	  is	  being	  focused—the	  field	  of	  relationships.	  	  Something	  acts	  as	  an	  'outside-­‐stander.'	  	  Moreover,	  the	  metaphor	  continues	  to	  represent	  the	  person	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  a	  limited	  phenomenon	  on	  the	  perhaps	  infinite	  ranges	  of	  the	  field.	  	  In	  short,	  persons	  are	  still	  seen	  extrinsically,	  as	  objectifiable	  'things'	  arising	  on	  or	  out	  of	  a	  surrounding	  field	  of	  relations.99	  	  What	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  lacking,	  from	  a	  Buddhist	  perspective,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  richly	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  (an)atman	  or	  "no	  self"	  as	  a	  decentering	  compassionate	  force	  wherein	  a	  "realization	  that	  the	  world	  is	  neither	  an	  objective	  context	  for	  our	  personal	  existence,	  nor	  a	  merely	  subjective	  or	  ideal	  construct"	  can	  be	  embraced.	  	  That	  is,	  "the	  systems	  and	  focus-­‐field	  models	  fail	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  explicitly	  and	  unmitigatedly	  embrace	  the	  priority	  of	  orientation	  rather	  than	  being	  or	  existence—an	  embrace	  crucial	  to	  at	  least	  Mahayana	  Buddhist	  metaphysics—and,	  on	  the	  other,	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  indispensable	  role	  of	  karma	  or	  dramatic	  interplay	  in	  any	  adequate	  depiction	  of	  (at	  least	  Buddhist)	  personhood."100	  	  	  	   Hershock	  considers	  the	  "dramatic	  quality	  of	  sentient	  impermanence"	  to	  be	  ontologically	  basic	  as	  a	  relationally	  driven	  narrative	  without	  privileged	  centers	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  See	  Peter	  Hershock's	  Liberating	  Intimacy,	  p.45.	  100	  Ibid.	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experience.	  	  Rehearsing	  philosophically	  informed	  etymologies	  Hershock	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  English	  word	  "drama"	  derives	  from	  the	  Greek	  draein	  ("to	  act"	  or	  "to	  do")	  and	  likewise	  the	  Sanskrit	  karma	  "not	  only	  implies	  purposive	  action	  but	  also	  the	  inescapable	  meaningfulness	  of	  our	  purposes	  for	  how	  things	  have	  already	  and	  will	  yet	  come	  about."101	  Hershock	  prefers	  to	  speak	  of	  narrative	  unfoldings	  and	  enfoldings	  of	  always	  provisional	  persons	  as	  opposed	  to	  purportedly	  discrete	  agents	  who	  as	  foundational	  centers	  of	  their	  unique	  worlds	  actively	  bring	  a	  focused	  attention	  to	  a	  diffuse	  field	  of	  relationality.	  	  Within	  a	  perspective	  of	  an	  all-­‐pervasive	  buddha-­‐mind,	  as	  a	  circle	  whose	  center	  is	  everywhere	  and	  circumference	  is	  nowhere,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  identify	  a	  singular	  center	  of	  foundational	  identity.	  	  However,	  it	  certainly	  can	  be	  beneficial	  to	  single	  out	  a	  practice-­‐oriented	  site	  for	  agential	  cultivation.	  	  Hershock	  has	  made	  clear	  in	  his	  works	  dealing	  with	  Confucian	  cultures	  of	  Buddhist	  practice,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  starting	  with	  family	  and	  extending	  into	  society	  via	  critical	  narratives	  that	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  cultivate	  and	  sustain	  ethical	  attention	  (samadhi).	  	  Focusing	  this	  field	  of	  agency	  is	  the	  only	  recipe	  we	  have	  for	  ameliorating	  our	  precarious	  and	  finite	  experience	  as	  embodied	  persons.	  	   Recently,	  Roger	  Ames	  has	  qualified	  his	  focus-­‐field	  rhetoric	  by	  clarifying	  a	  profoundly	  embodied	  concept	  of	  agential	  creativity.	  	  We	  begining	  with	  the	  "fact	  of	  [family]	  association"	  that	  uniquely	  identifies	  us	  as	  potentially	  virtuosic	  human	  persons	  and	  extend	  into	  ever	  more	  refined	  and	  expansive	  (至大而至剛)	  fields	  of	  creative	  becoming:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Ibid.	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Taking	  the	  gerundive,	  processional,	  and	  dynamic	  sense	  of	  dao	  as	  primary,	  its	  several	  derived	  meanings	  emerge	  rather	  naturally:	  'to	  lead	  forth'	  requires	  the	  'explaining'	  of	  a	  'method,	  art,	  teaching,	  or	  doctrine'	  that	  then	  produces	  a	  'way,	  path,	  or	  road'	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  our	  way	  forward.	  	  Thus,	  at	  its	  most	  fundamental	  level,	  dao	  denotes	  the	  active	  project	  of	  'moving	  ahead	  in	  the	  world,'	  of	  'forging	  a	  way	  forward,'	  of	  'road	  building.'	  	  It	  is	  to	  register	  the	  dynamic	  implications	  of	  dao	  that	  we	  have	  on	  occasion	  used	  the	  neologism	  'way-­‐making'	  as	  a	  translation	  (Ames	  and	  Hall,	  2003	  passim)	  .	  .	  .Dao	  as	  both	  'what	  is'	  (things	  and	  their	  various	  attributes)	  and	  'how	  things	  are'	  (their	  actions	  and	  various	  modalities)	  serves	  as	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  this	  dynamic	  holism.	  .	  .	  .Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  line	  between	  what	  we	  might	  take	  to	  be	  putative	  things	  and	  events:	  A	  'thing'	  is	  a	  distinctive,	  dynamic	  focus	  located	  within	  an	  unbounded	  field	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  holographically	  implicated	  within	  this	  focus,	  requiring	  a	  focus-­‐field	  rather	  than	  a	  part-­‐whole	  language	  to	  give	  it	  expression.102	  	  	  This	  focus-­‐field	  dynamic	  of	  things	  and	  persons	  requires	  a	  "completing"	  or	  "creative"	  view	  of	  cosmic	  processes	  (tianli	  天理)	  and	  such	  a	  theory	  of	  ethical	  "truth"	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  simple	  representationalist	  "discovering"	  model;	  but	  instead	  we	  have	  to	  employ	  a	  pragmatic,	  somaesthetic,	  and	  rhythmanalytic	  notion	  of	  measuring	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  an	  always	  experimental	  project	  wherein	  responsibility	  as	  ritual	  construction	  and	  tian	  calling	  (tianming	  天命)	  is	  always	  provisional,	  disclosive	  and	  transactionally	  realized.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  See	  Roger	  T.	  Ames	  and	  Henry	  Rosemont	  Jr.,	  "The	  Intergenerational	  Transmission	  of	  Confucian	  Culture"	  Confucian	  Role	  Ethics:	  A	  Moral	  Vision	  for	  the	  21st	  Century?,	  p.161.	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Conclusion	  	  	   As	  a	  major	  theme	  of	  this	  dissertation	  has	  been	  a	  disclosive	  theory	  of	  ethical	  truth	  within	  a	  relational	  conception	  of	  agency,	  it	  is	  only	  appropriate	  that	  I	  defer	  writing	  a	  definitive	  conclusion	  and	  opt	  instead	  for	  a	  invitation	  for	  future	  collaborative	  projects.	  	  This	  pluralistic	  and	  disclosive	  theory	  of	  truth	  I	  offer,	  which	  is	  neither	  discovered	  nor	  invented,	  but	  performed	  in	  an	  interpretive	  horizon	  of	  an	  always	  invitational	  communicating	  community	  spanning	  across	  intergenerational	  time	  and	  intercultural	  spaces	  of	  reasons,	  cannot	  yield	  systematic	  closure.	  	  But	  what	  such	  an	  aspirational	  theory	  does	  offer	  is	  a	  coherent	  vision	  and	  an	  emergent	  set	  of	  engaging	  ideals	  for	  reconstructing	  (in	  a	  profoundly	  Deweyan	  sense)	  philosophy	  to	  better	  deal	  with	  the	  problems	  and	  predicaments	  of	  persons	  in	  their	  everyday	  lives.	  	   As	  emergent	  ends-­‐in-­‐view	  or	  horizonal	  possibilities	  for	  future	  research,	  I	  can	  say	  that	  this	  dissertation	  has	  me	  oriented	  in	  at	  least	  three	  distinct	  philosophical	  directions.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  continue	  to	  think	  through	  agency	  in	  a	  somatic	  and	  relationally	  realist	  manner	  in	  conversation	  with	  recent	  developments	  in	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  fields	  such	  as	  feminist	  ethics,	  object	  oriented	  ontology,	  new	  materialisms,	  new	  pragmatisms,	  ecstatic	  naturalisms,	  eco-­‐ethics	  and	  newly	  emergent	  religious	  perspectives	  from	  a	  plurality	  of	  faith	  traditions.	  	  	  	   Secondly,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  continue	  the	  comparative	  philosophical	  project	  I've	  started	  by	  reconstructing	  Si-­‐Meng	  "resolute	  agency"	  (shendu	  慎獨)	  thinking	  in	  an	  interpretive	  horizon	  of	  global,	  intercultural	  comparative	  philosophy.	  	  I	  hope	  to	  research	  more	  deeply	  the	  continuing	  genealogy	  of	  "resolute	  agency"	  in	  Confucian	  thinking	  by	  taking	  on	  the	  significance	  that	  this	  term	  comes	  to	  have	  in	  the	  Song-­‐
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Yuan-­‐Ming	  transition	  period	  between	  so-­‐called	  classical	  Confucianism	  to	  the	  neo-­‐Confucian	  or	  daoxue	  道學	  movement	  to	  the	  modern	  period	  of	  a	  changing	  Confucian	  cultural	  matrix.	  	  Mapping	  the	  importance	  of	  shendu	  慎獨	  and	  an	  associated	  conceptual	  cluster	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  neo-­‐Confucian	  thinkers	  is	  a	  philosophical	  narrative	  that	  I	  believe	  could	  be	  more	  effectively	  told	  by	  situating	  it	  in	  the	  reconstructed	  Si-­‐Meng	  horizon	  that	  this	  dissertation	  lays	  out.	  	  Moving	  through	  the	  idea	  as	  it	  evolves	  from	  Zhou	  Dunyi,	  Zhang	  Zai,	  and	  the	  Cheng	  brothers	  through	  Zhu	  Xi,	  Wang	  Yangming,	  and	  Liu	  Zongzhou	  in	  particular,	  would	  be	  a	  great	  way	  to	  introduce	  and	  problematize	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  distinctively	  Confucian	  metaphysics	  of	  persons	  in	  the	  Song-­‐Ming	  period	  of	  intellectual	  development.	  	   Finally,	  I	  want	  to	  continue	  to	  think	  through	  the	  contemporary	  significance	  of	  the	  concept	  shendu	  慎獨	  in	  ethical,	  political,	  and	  religious	  registers	  of	  cultural	  meaning	  for	  pluralistic	  societies	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  a	  predominantly	  Confucian	  historical	  background.	  	  As	  a	  non-­‐foundational	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  personal	  agency	  as	  an	  achievement	  of	  creative	  integration	  of	  variously	  embodied	  roles	  and	  relationally-­‐constituted	  responsibility	  matrices,	  we	  might	  find	  productive	  ways	  of	  moving	  beyond	  so	  much	  of	  the	  conceptual	  impasse	  of	  a	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  tradition	  of	  thinking	  about	  individual	  and	  societal	  rights,	  obligations,	  and	  values.	  	  In	  arguing	  against	  discrete,	  foundational	  individualism	  in	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  political	  theory,	  we	  don't	  have	  to	  give	  up	  on	  creative	  personal	  agency	  as	  the	  role-­‐encumbered	  dynamic	  of	  family-­‐centric	  focused	  fields	  of	  meaning	  and	  responsibility,	  offer	  a	  more	  realistic	  and	  effective	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  transformative	  agency.	  	  By	  shifting	  the	  paradigm	  from	  talk	  about	  individuals—be	  it	  rights,	  virtues,	  actions,	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intentions,	  etc.—to	  a	  more	  role-­‐focused	  discourse—rhythmanalysis,	  social	  imaginary,	  ritual	  practice,	  etc.—we	  can	  find	  more	  effective	  ways	  to	  critique	  and	  transform	  oppressive	  hierarchies	  the	  stifle	  personal	  creativity	  and	  agency.	  	  We	  don't	  need	  autonomy	  to	  talk	  about	  freedom,	  and	  we	  don't	  need	  discrete	  agents	  to	  think	  about	  agency.	  	  	  	   As	  a	  relational	  and	  collaborative	  project,	  I	  invite	  anyone	  who	  finds	  this	  project	  to	  be	  philosophically	  amenable	  or	  resonant	  with	  their	  own	  thinking	  to	  keep	  offering	  constructive	  criticisms	  and	  creative	  inspiration.	  	  The	  interpretive	  community	  of	  Confucian	  way-­‐making	  (daotong	  道統)	  is	  always	  about	  making	  friends	  (daoyou	  道友)	  in	  ongoing	  philosophical	  conversations	  and	  collaborative	  experiments	  in	  living.	  	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  staying	  on	  the	  path	  of	  such	  a	  somatically	  and	  relationally	  charged	  philosophical	  project	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life.	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